An Inquiry into the Use of Illegal Electoral Practices and Effects - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Potential Interventions: Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Potential Interventions: state strength (eg. probability to stay in power) Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Potential Interventions: state strength (eg. probability to stay in power) military strength: Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Potential Interventions: state strength (eg. probability to stay in power) military strength: valuation of the prize (eg. trade embargo: Kimberley Process) Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Potential Interventions: state strength (eg. probability to stay in power) military strength: valuation of the prize (eg. trade embargo: Kimberley Process) conflict effort costs (eg. availability of arms, affect opportunity costs) Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Potential Interventions: state strength (eg. probability to stay in power) military strength: valuation of the prize (eg. trade embargo: Kimberley Process) conflict effort costs (eg. availability of arms, affect opportunity costs) ability/efficiency on the battlefield (eg. transfer of military technology) Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions Civil Conflict After 1945: majority of conflicts are intrastate (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000), majority of those in developing countries (Murdoch & Sandler 2002). Rising incidence and duration (Collier et al. 2003). Consequence: human misery, economic setback, international spillovers. Often distributive conflicts over rents. Economic factors determine viability. What can be done? Third Party Intervention? Potential Interventions: state strength (eg. probability to stay in power) military strength: valuation of the prize (eg. trade embargo: Kimberley Process) conflict effort costs (eg. availability of arms, affect opportunity costs) ability/efficiency on the battlefield (eg. transfer of military technology) Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions State strength State Strength, different complementary definitions: Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions State strength State Strength, different complementary definitions: ability or capacity of states to act (raise taxes, regulate, provide public goods), given a set of objectives and constraints (Acemoglu 2005) Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions State strength State Strength, different complementary definitions: ability or capacity of states to act (raise taxes, regulate, provide public goods), given a set of objectives and constraints (Acemoglu 2005) Pranab Bardhan, 2010: ’ability to credibly pre-commit’ Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions State strength State Strength, different complementary definitions: ability or capacity of states to act (raise taxes, regulate, provide public goods), given a set of objectives and constraints (Acemoglu 2005) Pranab Bardhan, 2010: ’ability to credibly pre-commit’ ’(a strong ruler can be thought of) a Stackelberg leader, in a model where the ruler maximizes his objective function subject to the reaction function of the ruled.’ Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions State strength State Strength, different complementary definitions: ability or capacity of states to act (raise taxes, regulate, provide public goods), given a set of objectives and constraints (Acemoglu 2005) Pranab Bardhan, 2010: ’ability to credibly pre-commit’ ’(a strong ruler can be thought of) a Stackelberg leader, in a model where the ruler maximizes his objective function subject to the reaction function of the ruled.’ Strong Ruler: Leader in a Stackelberg setup, state can influence actions of the rebels Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction In a Nutshell The Model Civil Conflict Outside Interventions State Strength Conclusions State strength State Strength, different complementary definitions: ability or capacity of states to act (raise taxes, regulate, provide public goods), given a set of objectives and constraints (Acemoglu 2005) Pranab Bardhan, 2010: ’ability to credibly pre-commit’ ’(a strong ruler can be thought of) a Stackelberg leader, in a model where the ruler maximizes his objective function subject to the reaction function of the ruled.’ Strong Ruler: Leader in a Stackelberg setup, state can influence actions of the rebels Weak Ruler: Player in a Cournot setup, state cannot influence actions of rebels Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Setup Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Setup Environment given by exogenous parameters and potential third party intervention Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Setup Environment given by exogenous parameters and potential third party intervention Indefinitely repeated conflict game between ruler and rebels is played Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Stage Game Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Stage Game Two groups, Ruler (R) and Rebels (E), Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Stage Game Two groups, Ruler (R) and Rebels (E), choose their effort levels Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Stage Game Two groups, Ruler (R) and Rebels (E), choose their effort levels so as to maximize their ’income’ π i = p i · Z i − c i · X i , Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Stage Game Two groups, Ruler (R) and Rebels (E), choose their effort levels so as to maximize their ’income’ π i = p i · Z i − c i · X i , where probability of winning of group i is given by a i · X i p i = a i · X i + a j · X j i = { E , R } Z i is valuation of prize of group i c i is unit effort cost of group i a j is bias of contest in favor of group j , a R = a , a E = 1 Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Interaction in the Stage Game Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Interaction in the Stage Game Two dimensions worth distinguishing: Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Interaction in the Stage Game Two dimensions worth distinguishing: State Strength: Weak State vs. Strong State Cournot Stackelberg Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Interaction in the Stage Game Two dimensions worth distinguishing: State Strength: Weak State vs. Strong State Cournot Stackelberg a Z R c R > Z E Z E c E > a Z R Military Strength ( ∼ Prize/Cost Ratio): c E c R Favorite State vs. Underdog State Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Interaction in the Stage Game Two dimensions worth distinguishing: State Strength: Weak State vs. Strong State Cournot Stackelberg a Z R c R > Z E Z E c E > a Z R Military Strength ( ∼ Prize/Cost Ratio): c E c R Favorite State vs. Underdog State In equilibrium: aX ∗ R > X ∗ X ∗ E > aX ∗ E R p ∗ R > p ∗ p ∗ E > p ∗ E R Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Interaction in the Stage Game Two dimensions worth distinguishing: State Strength: Weak State vs. Strong State Cournot Stackelberg a Z R c R > Z E Z E c E > a Z R Military Strength ( ∼ Prize/Cost Ratio): c E c R Favorite State vs. Underdog State In equilibrium: aX ∗ R > X ∗ X ∗ E > aX ∗ E R p ∗ R > p ∗ p ∗ E > p ∗ E R Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Conflict Outcomes: State as Underdog E Ρ Cournot Eqm BR E Ruler is disadvantaged, Stack Eqm rebels are ’ready to fight’. ⇒ aX ∗ R < X ∗ E always ⇒ X ∗ S < X ∗ C R , R X ∗ S < X ∗ C E E ⇒ less conflict if ruler is strong. BR R Iso � profit R R Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Conflict Outcomes: State as Favorite E Ρ Ruler is advantaged, BR R rebels are ’ready to re- treat’. Cournot Eqm ⇒ X ∗ E < aX ∗ R always Stack Eqm ⇒ X ∗ S > X ∗ C R , R X ∗ S < X ∗ C BR E Iso � profit R E E ⇒ ambiguous on total conflict outcome R Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Who Is A Strong State? Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device: Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device: If a ruler wants to be perceived as strong in the future, he needs to stick to X ∗ S R . Incentive to do so, depends on his regard for future income. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device: If a ruler wants to be perceived as strong in the future, he needs to stick to X ∗ S R . Incentive to do so, depends on his regard for future income. discount factor 1 critical ∆ actual ∆ A A1 1 A2 weak underdog strong underdog strong favorite weak favorite Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device: If a ruler wants to be perceived as strong in the future, he needs to stick to X ∗ S R . Incentive to do so, depends on his regard for future income. discount factor 1 For ruler to be credibly critical ∆ strong: δ > δ crit . actual ∆ A A1 1 A2 weak underdog strong underdog strong favorite weak favorite Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Setup The Model Ingredients of the Stage Game Outside Interventions Interaction in the Stage Game Conclusions Credibility of a State Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device: If a ruler wants to be perceived as strong in the future, he needs to stick to X ∗ S R . Incentive to do so, depends on his regard for future income. discount factor 1 For ruler to be credibly critical ∆ strong: δ > δ crit . Ruler is likely to be weak, whenever actual ∆ military strength (prize/cost ratio) differs a lot among the two groups, i.e. conflict is very uneven. A A1 1 A2 weak underdog strong underdog strong favorite weak favorite Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Objectives of a Third Party Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Objectives of a Third Party Objectives of a third party can be of different sorts: Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Objectives of a Third Party Objectives of a third party can be of different sorts: reduce resources wasted in conflict, ( X ∗ E + X ∗ R ). Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Objectives of a Third Party Objectives of a third party can be of different sorts: reduce resources wasted in conflict, ( X ∗ E + X ∗ R ). reduce open conflict intensity, min ( X ∗ E , X ∗ R ): (one cannot fight alone). Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Objectives of a Third Party Objectives of a third party can be of different sorts: reduce resources wasted in conflict, ( X ∗ E + X ∗ R ). reduce open conflict intensity, min ( X ∗ E , X ∗ R ): (one cannot fight alone). affect the distribution of expected conflict gains. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) affecting relative military strength (prize, cost, effectiveness) non-marginally Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) affecting relative military strength (prize, cost, effectiveness) non-marginally Examples: Increase an underdog state’s probability to stay in power Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) affecting relative military strength (prize, cost, effectiveness) non-marginally Examples: Increase an underdog state’s probability to stay in power → ruler becomes strong Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) affecting relative military strength (prize, cost, effectiveness) non-marginally Examples: Increase an underdog state’s probability to stay in power → ruler becomes strong → less resources wasted in conflict, conflict intensity decreases, distribution? Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) affecting relative military strength (prize, cost, effectiveness) non-marginally Examples: Increase an underdog state’s probability to stay in power → ruler becomes strong → less resources wasted in conflict, conflict intensity decreases, distribution? Increase a favorite state’s probability to stay in power Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) affecting relative military strength (prize, cost, effectiveness) non-marginally Examples: Increase an underdog state’s probability to stay in power → ruler becomes strong → less resources wasted in conflict, conflict intensity decreases, distribution? Increase a favorite state’s probability to stay in power → ruler becomes strong → Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Changing the ’rules of the game’ Outside party can change the game that is played (the environment), by affecting the ruler’s regard for the future (probability of replacement) affecting relative military strength (prize, cost, effectiveness) non-marginally Examples: Increase an underdog state’s probability to stay in power → ruler becomes strong → less resources wasted in conflict, conflict intensity decreases, distribution? Increase a favorite state’s probability to stay in power → ruler becomes strong → ambiguous effect on resources wasted in conflict, conflict intensity decreases, distribution tilts towards ruler (repressive regime). Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels The Effect of Outside Interventions policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z E ↓ , c E ↑ X ∗ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ E X ∗ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ? ? ? ↓ min ( X ∗ E , X ∗ R ) ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ Distribution tilts towards Ruler Ruler Ruler ? Z R ↓ , c R ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ X ∗ E X ∗ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ↓ ↓ ? ? min ( X R ) ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ∗ E , X ∗ Distribution tilts towards ? ? Rebels Rebels a ↓ ∗ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ X E X ∗ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ↓ ↓ ? ↑ min ( X ∗ ∗ R ) ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ E , X Distribution tilts towards ? ? Rebels ? Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Targeting the Ruler policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z R ↓ , c R ↑ ∗ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ X E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ X ∗ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ↓ ↓ ? ? min ( X ∗ E , X ∗ R ) ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ Distribution tilts towards ? ? Rebels Rebels If Z R ↓ , then X R ↓ . Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Targeting the Ruler policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z R ↓ , c R ↑ ∗ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ X E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ X ∗ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ↓ ↓ ? ? min ( X E , X ∗ ∗ R ) ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ Distribution tilts towards ? ? Rebels Rebels If Z R ↓ , then X R ↓ . Rebels react by decreasing or increasing their effort, depending on relative military strength. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Targeting the Ruler policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z R ↓ , c R ↑ ∗ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ X E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ X ∗ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ↓ ↓ ? ? min ( X ∗ E , X ∗ R ) ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ Distribution tilts towards ? ? Rebels Rebels If Z R ↓ , then X R ↓ . Rebels react by decreasing or increasing their effort, depending on relative military strength. Reduction in prize Z R may inadvertently lead to higher conflict intensity & more resources wasted. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Targeting the Ruler policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z R ↓ , c R ↑ ∗ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ X E ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ X ∗ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ↓ ↓ ? ? min ( X ∗ E , X R ) ∗ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ Distribution tilts towards ? ? Rebels Rebels If Z R ↓ , then X R ↓ . Rebels react by decreasing or increasing their effort, depending on relative military strength. Reduction in prize Z R may inadvertently lead to higher conflict intensity & more resources wasted. Policies targeting the ruler are ’robust’ to state strength. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Targeting the Rebels policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z E ↓ , c E ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ X ∗ E X ∗ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ? ? ? ↓ min ( X ∗ ∗ R ) ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ E , X Distribution tilts towards Ruler Ruler Ruler ? Known that state is favorite, but state strength still plays crucial role. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Targeting the Rebels policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z E ↓ , c E ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ X ∗ E X ∗ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ? ? ? ↓ min ( X ∗ R ) ∗ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ E , X Distribution tilts towards Ruler Ruler Ruler ? Known that state is favorite, but state strength still plays crucial role. If c E ↑ , X E ↓ . Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Objectives of a Third Party Introduction Non-Marginal Interventions The Model Marginal Interventions Outside Interventions Targeting the Ruler Conclusions Targeting the Rebels Targeting the Rebels policy State as Weak Underdog, (1) State as Strong Underdog, (2) State as Strong Favorite, (3) State as Weak Favorite, (4) Change in Z E ↓ , c E ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ X ∗ E X ∗ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ R ( X ∗ E + X R ) ∗ ? ? ? ↓ min ( X ∗ R ) ∗ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ E , X Distribution tilts towards Ruler Ruler Ruler ? Known that state is favorite, but state strength still plays crucial role. If c E ↑ , X E ↓ . A strong state realizes rebels can now be suppressed even easier, X R ↑ . Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Conclusions Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Conclusions Important to pay attention to not only direct effect of policy, but also indirect effects through strategic interaction. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Conclusions Important to pay attention to not only direct effect of policy, but also indirect effects through strategic interaction. ⇒ Policies may have unintended consequences. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Conclusions Important to pay attention to not only direct effect of policy, but also indirect effects through strategic interaction. ⇒ Policies may have unintended consequences. Some policies are more robust than others with respect to state strength, military strength as well as their interplay. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Conclusions Important to pay attention to not only direct effect of policy, but also indirect effects through strategic interaction. ⇒ Policies may have unintended consequences. Some policies are more robust than others with respect to state strength, military strength as well as their interplay. Changing the ’rules of the game’ (affecting time horizon of the ruler, or prize/costs non-marginally) may be another lever for policy. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Who Is A Strong State? Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device. When is it then in the best interest of the ruler to behave strong (though this is not his best answer in a one-shot game)? Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device. When is it then in the best interest of the ruler to behave strong (though this is not his best answer in a one-shot game)? Given rebels play ’trigger strategy’ (believe ruler will play Stackelberg as long as he has never deviated, never believe him thereafter): Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device. When is it then in the best interest of the ruler to behave strong (though this is not his best answer in a one-shot game)? Given rebels play ’trigger strategy’ (believe ruler will play Stackelberg as long as he has never deviated, never believe him thereafter): If a ruler wants to be perceived as strong in the future, he needs to stick to R ∗ S . Incentive to do so, depends on his regard for future income Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions Who Is A Strong State? Stage Game is indefinitely repeated, no commitment device. When is it then in the best interest of the ruler to behave strong (though this is not his best answer in a one-shot game)? Given rebels play ’trigger strategy’ (believe ruler will play Stackelberg as long as he has never deviated, never believe him thereafter): If a ruler wants to be perceived as strong in the future, he needs to stick to R ∗ S . Incentive to do so, depends on his regard for future income → A credible strong ruler has a high discount factor. Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions The Critical Discount Factor Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions The Critical Discount Factor For ruler to be credibly strong: δ > δ crit . Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions The Critical Discount Factor For ruler to be credibly strong: δ > δ crit . discount factor 1 critical ∆ actual ∆ A A1 1 A2 weak underdog strong underdog strong favorite weak favorite Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction The Model Additional Material Outside Interventions Conclusions The Critical Discount Factor For ruler to be credibly strong: δ > δ crit . discount factor 1 Ruler is likely to critical ∆ be weak, whenever military strength (prize/cost ratio) actual ∆ differs a lot among the two groups, i.e. conflict is very uneven. A A1 1 A2 weak underdog strong underdog strong favorite weak favorite Katharina Wick , Erwin Bulte State strength, outside interventions, and the intensity of conflict

Introduction Data and Empirical Strategy Results Resilience Conclusion War, Resilience, and Political Engagement in Africa Ach Adhvaryu & James Fenske Yale University and University of Oxford March 2013 1 / 28

Introduction Data and Empirical Strategy Motivation Results Overview Resilience Conclusion Motivation Do the effects of war linger on through changes in individuals’ preferences? (Voors et al., 2013) Political knowledge, engagement, and attitudes matter: Better informed voters turn out more and vote for better candidates (Banerjee et al., 2012); civic engagement builds social capital (Putnam, 2000); democracy is associated with growth (Barro, 1996; Tavaresa & Wacziarg, 2001) Does war beget war through the endogenous evolution of preferences? If so, this link could help explain part of the “African growth tragedy” (Collier & Gunning, 1999) 2 / 28

Introduction Data and Empirical Strategy Motivation Results Overview Resilience Conclusion What we do How does exposure to conflict in early life shape political beliefs and activities? We use data on political engagement, beliefs, and attitudes from the 2005 Afrobarometer (nationally representative survey from 17 sub-Saharan African countries). We merge this with spatial data on war intensity in the last 5 decades from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). We find that exposure to conflict during early childhood (ages 0-14) has very small effects on later-life political engagement and attitudes. 3 / 28