advantages, cyclical risks Continued growth in 2018 as unemployment - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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advantages, cyclical risks Continued growth in 2018 as unemployment - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Ireland: Long-term advantages, cyclical risks Continued growth in 2018 as unemployment falls to 5% August 2018 Index Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 24: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 42: Brexit Page 48: Long-term fundamentals Page 60:


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SLIDE 1

Ireland: Long-term advantages, cyclical risks

Continued growth in 2018 as unemployment falls to 5% August 2018

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SLIDE 2

2

Index

Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 24: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 42: Brexit Page 48: Long-term fundamentals Page 60: Property Page 67: Other Data Page 77: Annex (GDP distortions explainer)

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SLIDE 3

Growth continues and debt dynamics remain in “sweet spot”

Summary

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SLIDE 4

4

Macro picture is positive: Averaging five per cent growth in last four years

Dramatic drop in unemployment Inflation still low – partly thanks to Brexit True growth healthy, but slowing?

* Underlying series is modified final domestic demand

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 3 4 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 HICP Ireland HICP Euro Area

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 GDP Underlying* 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017

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SLIDE 5

5

A hat-trick of primary surplus, improving debt dynamics and reduced financing needs

Ireland is improving its debt dynamics by the month Debt-to-GNI* (111%, from 166%) Debt-to-GG Revenue (263%, from 353%) Average interest rate (2.9%, from 5.1%) NTMA has reduced near- term issuance needs (€bns) Five years of primary surplus (€bn)

  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 f GG Balance Primary Balance 5 10 15 20 25 30 2018 2019 2020 2021 Recent Reductions Debt Prefunded in Cash Debt End 2013 Debt Profile

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SLIDE 6

6

Known unknowns are outside Ireland’s control

Late Cycle

Irela eland is is la later r tha than the the Eur Euro Area (EA) in in its its ec economic cy cycl cle tha thanks s to

  • its

its clo close se tie ties s to

  • US

Sl Slowdown in invari riably fol

  • llows

s when Ce Centr tral Ba Banks s mak ake mon

  • ney de

dearer and and mor

  • re scarce

US

Ireland is still a “high beta” bet

  • n
  • n the

the US S ec economy, in n par parti ticular r its its ICT sec ector Impact t of

  • f US

S Corp Corporate Tax reform rm

Brexit

“Hard” Brexit could impact Irish Growth by y 4% over er a a 4-5 yea ear r peri period

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SLIDE 7

7

Funding environment still favourable for Ireland in 2018 - €12.5bn issued already at long maturity

€14 14-18bn

fun unding ran ange for

  • r 2018

2018 YTD YTD €12.5b .5bn of

  • f funding

Average maturi rity y 12.1 .1 yea ears Interest t rate of

  • f 1.04

.04%

15 15 years

€4bn bn rai aise sed thr through the the syn yndicated sal ale of

  • f a

a ne new 15 yea ear r ben benchmark rk bon bond. Yiel ield of

  • f 1.31

.319%

€13bn

Ex Expe pected yea ear r end end cash ash bal

  • balance. Irel

eland pr prefunding he heading in into mor

  • re vol
  • latile

ile tim times

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SLIDE 8

GDP/GNP are misleading. Other metrics show Ireland is growing and closer to full employment

Section 1: Macro

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SLIDE 9

9

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

Labour market shows growth story most clearly – 360,000 net new jobs in last six years

Unemployment rate: 5.1% in July 2018 Total employment back to previous peak (2008 peak = 100)

Unemployment approaches 2002-06 average

Source: CSO

65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Non-Construction Employment Total Employment

Non-Construction Employment above 2008 peak for first time

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SLIDE 10

10

Employment growth has been driven by high skilled jobs since start of 2014

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 High Skill Other Employment Growth

Substantial full-time employment growth in recent quarters

Employment growth driven by high skill job creation; Full- time employment expanded by around 5% in 2017

Source: Eurostat; CSO High Skill jobs include the ISCO08 defined groupings Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals

New labour survey method caused unusual reading

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Part-time Emp (Y-o-Y) Full-time Emp (Y-o-Y) Employment (Y-o-Y)

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SLIDE 11

58% 59% 60% 61% 62% 63% 64% 65% 66% 67% 68% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

11

Participation rate hovering around 62%

  • Part. rate down as construction jobs lost and

younger people stay in education longer

Labour participation has not yet recovered – young reaching labour force later

Source: CSO

Rate inflated pre-crisis by migrant construction workers 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-59 60-64 65+ 2007Q3 Peak 2012 2014 2016 2018Q1

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SLIDE 12

12

Wages and hours worked recovering Wage growth across most sectors but still disparity

Wages rising slowly, pockets of slack remain in the market

Source: CSO

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% Fin, Insurance & RE IT Education Prof, science & technical Public admin Accom & Food Health Wholesale/Retail Industry Admin & Support Construction Arts & Rec Transport/Storage 4Q average hourly earnings y-o-y 2018 Q1 average annual earnings (€000, RHS) 35500 36000 36500 37000 37500 38000 30.6 30.8 31.0 31.2 31.4 31.6 31.8 32.0 32.2 32.4 32.6 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Hours Worked (Annualised) Annualised Earnings (annualised,€, RHS)

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SLIDE 13

13

Unemployment rates (%) falling across Europe; falling faster here Unemployment (%) close to lows in Ireland’s main trading partners

Ireland’s labour market is edging closer to full employment - US and UK likely already there

Source: Eurostat, 15-74 age basis; DataStream 20 year average = 1998 Q2 to 2018 Q1

2 4 6 8 10 12 US UK Ireland Euro Area Current U rate U Rate (20 yr average) Lowest U Rate in 20 yrs

2012 2016 2017 18Q1 Germany 5.4 4.2 3.8 3.5 Netherlands 5.8 6.0 4.9 4.1 Austria 4.9 6.0 5.5 5.0 Luxembourg 5.1 6.3 5.6 5.3 Slovenia 8.9 8.0 6.6 5.6 Ireland 15.5 8.4 6.7 5.8 Belgium 7.6 7.9 7.1 6.1 Sweden 8.0 6.9 6.7 6.2 EU 28 10.5 8.6 7.6 7.1 Portugal 15.8 11.2 9.0 7.7 Euro Area 11.4 10.0 9.1 8.6 France 9.8 10.1 9.4 9.2 Italy 10.7 11.7 11.3 11.0 Spain 24.8 19.6 17.2 16.2

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14

External environment less helpful for Ireland

2015 2016 2017 2018/19 EA Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative Less accommodative US Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative but tightening Further tightening: curve inversion? US growth Stimulative Less stimulative Stimulative Stimulative in 2018; fiscal drag in 2019 Oil price Falling Falling Rising Rising UK growth Stimulative Less favourable; Brexit impact Growth slowing Brexit crunch Euro currency Very Helpful Helpful Headwind Neutral

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15

GNI* was €181bn in 2017; 9.4% higher than in 2007 (current prices) GNI* growth rate averaged 7.5% 2013-2017 (current prices)

GDP distortions mean we need to look to other metrics; Irish recovery evident when looking at GNI*

Source: CSO Note: See annex for discussion on the GDP distortions from 2015 onwards

50 100 150 200 250 300 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 GDP GNI*

  • 20.0%
  • 10.0%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 GDP Growth GNI* Growth

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SLIDE 16

16

Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) – a reflection of the home economy - is best cyclical indicator

  • GNI* is useful but not timely. MDD is released on

a quarterly and real basis.

  • MDD ignores the net exports channel. It also
  • mits aircraft leasing and IP imports from

investment to give a modified measure of domestic demand.

  • The measure includes:
  • private consumption
  • government consumption
  • building investment
  • elements of machinery & equipment

investment

  • elements of intangible asset investment
  • value of physical changes in stock
  • This measure pegs real growth closer to 4.0% in

the year to Q1 2018. Since 2014, annual growth has averaged over 5% when looking at MDD.

Source: CSO, four quarter sum growth rate used to strip out substantial quarterly volatility. Note MDD includes inventories. Large inventories in Q4 2016 added a further degree of volatility into MDD data.

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Modified Dom. Demand (Real) Modified Dom. Demand (Nominal)

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SLIDE 17

17

40 45 50 55 60 65 70 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Services Manufacturing Composite

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 MDD (real) Consumption (Real) GNI* (nominal)

Most reliable metrics hint at slower growth Ireland’s PMIs are all expanding but down from heights of 2016

Growth slowed a little in 2017 thanks to less helpful external environment

Source: CSO; Markit, Bloomberg, Investec Note MDD measure used here excludes inventories. Large inventories in Q4 2016 added a further degree of volatility into MDD data.

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SLIDE 18

18

Oil price shock boosted GDP by close to 1.5% in 2015 Ireland is a price taker for energy - 0.6% of GNI* cost increase in last 24 months

Oil price collapse helped supercharge the economy in 2015; but steady recovery of Brent is a headwind

Source: CEPR: Oil and the Euro Area Economy *impact over 1 year. Oil price shock in 2015 was c.50% implies 1 year impact close to 1.5%. Source: DataStream, CSO

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Brent Oil €/Barrel Mineral Fuels Imports (12m rolling, €bns)

significant drop in import cost in 2015/16 reversing in 2017/18

Euro area France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain

  • 0.2

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2

  • 1.5
  • 1
  • 0.5

0.5 Impact on CPI of 50% rise in oil prices* Impact on GDP of 50% rise in oil prices*

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SLIDE 19

19

y = -0.6338x + 0.0869 R² = 0.7889

  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 2.0% 5.0% 8.0% 11.0% 14.0% 17.0% Nominal wage growth per head Unemployment Rate

Inflation in Ireland lower than EA due mostly to weakness of sterling post-Brexit vote

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 3 4 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 HICP Ireland HICP Euro Area "Core" Ireland "Core" EA

Wage growth a natural consequence of improving labour conditions (1999-2021)

Despite being late cycle, inflation is low; Ireland’s Phillips Curve may be “kinked”

Source: CSO, NTMA analysis *red dots are SPU 2018 forecasts (2018-2021); Non-Agriculture employment /wage data Source: CSO, Eurostat

2018 Brexit Vote

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SLIDE 20
  • 40%
  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017

Building Investment Modified Investment

  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2017 Credit advanced to Business (y-o-y) Lending for house purchase (y-o-y)

20

Recovery has not been driven by credit so far, although house building catch-up will boost the economy in 2018

Economic growth 2013-17

Source: CBI; CSO Note: Credit to business series excludes financial intermediation and property related credit Note Modified investment excludes impact of imports of intangible and aircraft leasing assets

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SLIDE 21

21

Consumer spending growth is driven by rising incomes rather than recourse to debt

Private consumption grew at 2.4% y-o-y in Q1 2018 “Core” retail sales* grew by 3.3% y-o-y (value) in June (peak=100)

Source: CSO; CSO (retail sales) * excludes motor sales; 3m average

75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Volume Index Value Index

  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Consumption Growth Y-o-Y (RHS) Annualised Consumption (€bn)

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SLIDE 22

22

Household debt ratio has decreased due to deleveraging and increasing incomes

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% Household Debt (% of Disposable income)

Debt to after-tax income* improving (137%) but among highest in Europe

Private debt levels are high but improving

  • 30
  • 20
  • 10

10 20 30 40 50 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Change in ratio due to Income (RHS) Change in ratio due to Debt (RHS) Debt-to-Disposable Income (LHS)

Source: Eurostat (Q4 2017) Source: CBI *Measure excludes “other liabilities” from household debt.

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SLIDE 23

23

Gross household saving rate lower than peak but healthy 8-10% Interest burden down to only 4% of disposable income from peak of 11%

Saving rate lower in recent years, facilitating consumption and slower pace of deleveraging

Source: Eurostat, ONS, CSO ; CBI, Eurostat NTMA calculations Note: Gross Savings as calculated by the CSO has tended to be a volatile series in the past, some caution is warranted when interpreting this data

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 % of f di disp sposable le Inc ncome Ireland EA-19 Germany Spain Italy Netherlands 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 % of Disposable Income (4Q MA) Ireland EU-28 EA-19 UK

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SLIDE 24

Ireland is well funded while the Government deficit has nearly closed

Section 2: Fiscal & NTMA funding

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25

General Government Balance (excl. banking interventions) Deficit forecast to be fully closed in euro terms by 2020 (€bn)

Ireland has beaten EU targets for seven straight years

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

  • 9.1%
  • 8.3%
  • 6.4%
  • 3.6%
  • 1.2%
  • 0.5%
  • 0.4%
  • 12.2%
  • 11.4%
  • 8.4%
  • 4.8%
  • 1.9%
  • 0.8%
  • 0.6%
  • 14%
  • 12%
  • 10%
  • 8%
  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 GGB (% of GDP) GGB (% of GNI*)

  • 10

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019f GG Expenditure (ex-banking recap) GG Revenue

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SLIDE 26

26

In recent years Ireland has run primary surpluses that reduced debt ratios 2017 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP); Ireland middle of the pack in Europe

Ireland has improved its debt dynamics: next step is to follow others and run GGB surplus

Source: CSO; NTMA calculation Note: Debt Stabilising primary balance is the primary balance it is necessary to run in a year to keep the debt-to-GNI* ratio from rising given the average interest rate and growth in that year.

  • 30%
  • 25%
  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Primary Balance (% of GNI*) Debt Stabilising PB (% of GNI*)

~

  • 40%
  • 4
  • 2

2 4 Spain Portugal Romania France Italy Hungary UK Poland EU 28 Belgium Slovakia Austria Finland Ireland (GNI*) Latvia Estonia Slovenia Lithuania Croatia Greece Bulgaria Denmark Netherlands Germany Sweden Luxembourg Czech Rep Cyprus Malta

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SLIDE 27

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 Debt-to-GNI* Debt-to-GDP

27

Gross Government debt c.69% of GDP in 2017; GG debt fell to 111% of GNI*; reality somewhere in between

Debt-to-GNI* ratio is high but has declined quickly

Source: CSO; Department of Finance, NTMA calculations

37% 66% 79% 87% 90% 86% 66% 64% 59% 25% 20% 32% 33% 30% 18% 11% 9% 9% 62% 86% 111% 120% 120% 104% 77% 74% 69% 66% 64% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% Net Debt/GDP Cash Balances/EDP assets GG Debt/GDP

slide-28
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28

Alternative debt service metrics must also be used for Ireland e.g. General Government debt to GG Revenue

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018F 2020F Ireland Spain Italy Belgium EA-19

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SLIDE 29

29

It’s best to analyse Irish debt with broad range of metrics

2017 GG debt to GG revenue % GG interest to GG rev % GG debt to GDP %

Greece 365.8% 6.5% 178.6% Portugal 292.9% 9.0% 125.7% Italy 282.9% 8.2% 131.8% Ireland 263.0% 7.6%* 68.0%** Spain 259.4% 6.8% 98.3% Cyprus 244.1% 8.0% 97.5% UK 220.8% 6.9% 87.7% Belgium 201.5% 4.8% 103.1% EA19 187.7% 4.3% 86.7% EU28 181.8% 4.4% 81.6% France 180.0% 3.3% 97.0% Slovenia 170.8% 5.8% 73.6% Austria 162.1% 3.8% 78.4% Germany 142.0% 2.3% 64.1% Slovakia 129.2% 3.5% 50.9%

Source: Eurostat *Closer to 6.5% of GG Revenue if you exclude the interest paid to CBI. Other countries would also see their interest % of GG Revenue fall under this treatment but Ireland’s would fall by more given amount held by CBI (FRNs etc.) ** 111% Debt to GNI* ratio

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Snowball Effect (i-g) in Ireland’s favour given lower average interest rate

Source: CSO; Department of Finance,

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% GG Revenue Growth (g) Average Interest Rate (i)

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31

Over 50% of Irish debt stock held by “sticky” sources

Source: CSO, ECB, NTMA Analysis *excludes those held by Eurosystem. Euro system holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of

  • FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA holdings which are likely to further increase the Eurosystem’s

holdings. ** Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC-related liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

50 100 150 200 250 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Billions € IGBs* Retail Eurosystem Holdings Other Debt** Total Debt

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SLIDE 32

32

Maturity profile – IMF repayment and FRN buy-backs have simplified the product mix and reduced refinancing risk

Source: NTMA Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extension that will bring their weighted-average maturity from 12.5 years to 19.5 years. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any of its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the 2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

5 10 15 20 25 Billions € Bond (Fixed & ILB) Bilateral EFSM EFSF Bond (Floating Rate)

slide-33
SLIDE 33

5 10 15 20 25 30 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031-35 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-53 € Billions Debt Debt Prefunded in Cash Recent Reductions Long-term Extensions End 2013 Debt Profile

33

The NTMA improved Ireland’s 2018-2020 maturity profile in recent years

…Ireland (in years) now compares favourably to other EU countries Various operations have extended the maturity of Government debt …

Source: NTMA; ECB *excludes programme loans. Ireland’s maturity including these loans is still similar.

10.1 9.8 9.5 7.8 7.5 7.4 7.4 6.9 6.3 6.2 6.2 2 4 6 8 10 12 IR AT BG DK FR NL ES IT PT FN BD Govt Debt Securities - Weighted Maturity EA Govt Debt Securities - Avg. Weighted Maturity

  • c. €32bn to

fund in coming two years

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SLIDE 34

34

NTMA issuance (by type) in recent years have been biased towards longer dates Interest costs were expected to reach almost €10bn but now are below €6bn a year

Funding strategy has lowered the State’s interest burden

Source: NTMA, CSO, Department of Finance Other issuance includes inflation linked bonds, private placement and amortising bonds

2 4 6 8 10 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 GG interest (€bns) SPU 2014 Estimates 2018-2021 Latest Estimates 5Y 8Y 5Y 10Y 10Y 16Y 7Y 30Y 10Y 5Y 20Y 10Y 15Y 5.5 3.9 2.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 3 6 9 12 15 18 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 YTD € Billions Other Auction Syndication Weighted Average Yield (LHS)

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SLIDE 35

35

The State is funded three to four quarters in advance

  • Our next bond redemption will be

in October 2018 - €8.9bn.

  • On January 3rd, the NTMA issued a new 10

year benchmark bond via syndication. €4bn was raised at a yield of 0.944%.

  • On April 10th, the NTMA issued a new 15

year benchmark bond via syndication. €4bn was raised at a yield of 1.319%.

  • In February/March/May/July a further

€4.5bn was raised by auction across four bonds.

  • NTMA has indicated it would issue €14-

18bn worth of long term bonds in 2018. The chart uses €16bn indicatively.

  • Forecast for end-2018 cash is €13bn.

Source: NTMA

  • EBR is the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (DOF estimate)
  • Cash balances excludes non-liquid asset classes such as Housing Finance

Agency (HFA) Guaranteed Notes.

  • €2.0bn worth of bond buybacks and switches in Q1 2018.
  • Other outflows includes contingencies and potential bond purchases.
  • Other funding includes Retail (State Savings).
  • Rounding may occur.

€10.5 Cash €13 Cash

EBR €1.5

STP

  • ther

EBR €2.4 Bond €8.9 Long term Paper €16 Bonds €15 Other €3.3 €2.0* €- €4 €8 €12 €16 €20 Y/E 2017 Outflow Funding (€14-18bn) Y/E 2018 2019 Outflow

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SLIDE 36

36

OMT and QE (PSPP) have both helped Ireland and other EA sovereigns

Ireland’s bond market performance has been underpinned by ECB action

Yield (%)

Source: Bloomberg (weekly data)

Purchases of IGBs under PSPP in year to September 2018 of c.€3-4bn

40 80 120 160 200 GG Debt Estimated Eurosystem Holdings Universe Estimated Eurosystem Holdings Total PSPP-Eligible Billions €

  • 1

4 9 14 19 24 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 10 Year 2 Year

EU/IMF Program Entry Moodys Downgrade

OMT EU/IMF Program Exit ECB QE Brexit

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37

If US yield curve inverts, recession is likely to follow – keeping base rates at zero* In euro area, PSPP is ending as tightening cycle starts very slowly

Late cycle risks mixed for Ireland: rates may remain low but end of ECB bond buying may expose credit spread

Source: DataStream *S *Shaded area reas indicate re recessionary periods in the US US

0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 € Billions PSPP IGB purchases (RHS) Cumulative Purchases (LHS)

  • 6%
  • 5%
  • 4%
  • 3%
  • 2%
  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 US 3M Treasury bill yield minus 10 year bond yield

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38

Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

Investor breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications

Source: NTMA

Ireland, 8% UK, 33% 9.2% Cont. Europe, 36% 9.6% 4.0% Ireland UK US and Canada Continental Europe Nordics Other 38% 36% 13% 13% Fund/Asset Manager Banks/Central Banks Pensions/Insurance Other

slide-39
SLIDE 39

39

Breakdown of Ireland’s General Government debt

€ Billi llion 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 2017 2017 Currency and deposits (mainly retail debt) 62.1 31.4 20.9 20.7 21.3 21.6 Securities other than shares, exc. financial derivatives 87.3 112.7 119.1 125.8 124.2 130.7

  • Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc)

2.6 2.4 3.8 1.4 2.4 2.9

  • Long-term (MLT bonds)

84.8 110.3 115.3 124.4 121.8 127.8 Loans 60.6 71.3 63.4 55.1 55.2 49.0

  • Short-term

1.9 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.5

  • Long-term

(official funding and prom notes 2009-12) 58.7 69.9 62.1 54.1 54.6 48.5 General Government Debt 210.0 215.3 203.4 201.6 200.7 201.3 EDP debt instrument assets 57.9 53.9 36.1 29.0 24.9 27.3 Net Government debt 152.1 161.4 167.3 172.6 175.8 174.0

Source: CSO

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40

Central Bank of Ireland holdings increase domestic share

  • f Irish Government bonds (IGBs) through PSPP

€ Bi Billion End quarter Dec 2014 Dec 2015 Dec 2016 Dec 2017 Q1 Q1 18

  • 1. Resident

50.8 50.8 56.1 56.1 56.6 .6 (as % of total) (43.7%) (40.6%) (46.1%) (44.2%) (42.8 .8%) – Credit Institutions and Central Bank* 45.9 46.9 51.1 51.7 52.2 .2 – General Government 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 .4 – Non-bank financial 2.9 2.8 4.3 3.8 3.9 .9 – Households (and NFCs) 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 .1

  • 2. Rest of world

65.5 74.2 65.5 70.9 75.6 .6 (as % of total) (56.3%) (59.4%) (53.9%) (55.8%) (57.2 .2%) Total MLT debt 116.3 125.1 121.6 127.0 132.3 .3

Source: CBI

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SLIDE 41

41

Ireland: “A”grade from all major credit rating agencies

Rati ting Agency cy Long-term Sh Short rt-term rm Outl utlook/Trend Da Date of

  • f la

last cha change Standard & Poor's A+ A-1 Stable June 2015 Fitch Ratings A+ F1 Stable Dec 2017 Moody's A2 P-1 Stable Sept 2017 DBRS A(high) R-1 (middle) Stable March 2016 R&I A a-1 Stable

  • Jan. 2017

Source: Bloomberg

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SLIDE 42

Softer Brexit would limit the impact on Ireland but no deal remains a possibility

Section 3: Brexit

slide-43
SLIDE 43

43

Brexit path still shrouded in mist

Oct 18 Dec 18 July 18 Jan/Feb 2019 Q1 2019 29 Mar 2019 2019/20 Mid 2020s

Softer Brexit “Hard” Brexit

Failure to agree at key points could lead to no deal scenario

slide-44
SLIDE 44

44

Whether “hard” or “soft” Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted

Irish rish/U /UK tr trad ade li link nkages s will ill suf uffer r fol

  • llowing Br

Brexit

  • The UK is the second largest single-country

export destination for Ireland’s goods and the largest for its services

  • At the same time, Ireland imports 20-25%
  • f its goods from the UK. Consumer goods,

capital equipment and inputs into the export process will become cheaper thanks to FX. The here is is sign ignificant em employment t rela elated to Ireland’s trade with the UK

  • The UK might only account for 14-15% of

Ireland’s total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that, when you consider the employment related to those exports SM SMEs Es (part rticularl rly ag agri ri-food an and tour

  • urism

sm) ) li likely y to

  • be

be mor

  • re affected tha

than la larger r com

  • mpanies

s by y the the in intr troducti tion of

  • f tari

ariffs s and and bar barri riers s to

  • tr

trad ade

Source: CSO 2016/2017 * UK data includes Northern Ireland NTMA calculations; Data does not include contract manufacturing

Good

  • ods (20

2017) Servic ices (20 2016) Tot

  • tal (20

2016) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.1 20.5 10.5 21.7 17.6 20.9 UK* 13.4 23.6 16.0 6.4 14.4 11.0 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 36.5 31.3 33.4 23.6 35.4 27.2 China 4.1 5.7 2.7 0.2 2.9 1.8 Other 18.8 18.9 37.4 48.2 29.7 39.2

slide-45
SLIDE 45

45

UK is 13-14% of goods exports but very important partner in many small sectors UK is 16% of services exports but not the majority trading partner in any segment

Breakdown of exports to the UK: important trade partner especially so in smaller sectors (agri-food products)

Meat Dairy

Medicinal and pharmaceutical products

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% UK trade % of segment exports UK trade as % of total goods exports Red Box includes many small export sectors that UK is significant % of Computer Services

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% UK trade % of segment exports UK trade as % of total services exports

Source: CSO goods 2017 data, services 2016 data The size of bubble relates to the sector’s importance to Ireland’s exports

slide-46
SLIDE 46

46

Estimated Trade Reductions in “WTO rules Hard Brexit” Scenario

“Hard” Brexit could cost Ireland 4-7% of output

Source: CE, ESRI and Department of Finance analysis

% % of

  • f

exp xports ts los lost t wit ith UK UK % % of

  • f

tot

  • tal

exp xports ts los lost % % of

  • f UK

K exp xports ts los lost t with ith EU EU part partner % % of

  • f tot
  • tal

UK K Ex Export rts s los lost Irela eland 30.6 .6 4.2 .2 27.6 .6 1.5 .5 Belgium 35.1 3.1 25.7 1.0 Spain 38.6 2.9 25.6 0.7 Germany 34.1 2.5 19.4 2.0 Denmark 39.8 2.5 24.4 0.2 Portugal 33.0 2.2 27.7 0.1 EU EU Tot

  • tal

30.5 .5 2.1 .1 22.3 .3 9.8 .8 Poland 30.6 2.1 20.8 0.3 NL 22.1 2.0 15.6 0.9 Italy 29.9 1.7 26.9 0.8 France 24.9 1.6 20.9 1.2 Greece 28.4 1.2 27.2 0.1 Estimated GDP impact “WTO rules Hard Brexit” Scenario

  • 8
  • 7
  • 6
  • 5
  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

% deviations on the level of GDP (relative to baseline) Department of Finance Copenhagen

slide-47
SLIDE 47

47

  • Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.

The chief areas of interest are  Financial services  Business services  IT/ new media.

  • Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt,

Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services.

  • Ireland’s FDI opportunity will depend on the
  • utcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK

(City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more

  • pportunities in time.

FDI: Ireland may benefit Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland

Some foreign banks have already announced that they will set up in Dublin after Brexit

slide-48
SLIDE 48

Ireland’s long run future looks bright. Demographics, educated workforce and retaining competitiveness are all key

Section 4: Long term fundamentals

slide-49
SLIDE 49

49

Ireland’s GNI* per capita hit 2007 levels and compares favourably to EA

Much rebalancing has taken place – Ireland’s structural growth drivers have reasserted

Source: CSO, Eurostat

Gross National Income* at current prices (1995=100)

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 "Celtic Tiger" 1994-2001 Credit/Prop erty Bubble Bubble Burst

Recovery

  • 5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 Ireland (GNI*) EA 19 (GDP) Germany (GNI)

slide-50
SLIDE 50

50

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% <1 yr 5 101520253035404550556065707580859095

Ireland Germany EU28

47% of Ireland’s population aged 34 or below versus 39% for EU % of population in age cohort

Ireland’s population profile healthier than the EU average

Ireland’s population jumped to 4.79m in 2017 – up 200,000 on the 2011 Census Ireland’s population will remain younger than most of its EA counterparts

Source: Eurostat (2017) CSO; OECD population projections

20 40 60 80 World United States China United Kingdom Sweden OECD - Total Belgium Ireland France Finland Germany Greece Italy Portugal Spain Japan 2015 Old Age Dependency Ratio 2045 Old Age Dependency Ratio

slide-51
SLIDE 51

51

Regional data show Ireland’s mix of young and old among the best in EU Ireland’s Working-Age Population expected to grow in coming years (2018-2028)

Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look great

Source: Oxford Economics forecasts

  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% Japan Germany Spain China Euro area EU Belgium France Netherlands Italy Austria Denmark UK US Ireland India

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 10% 15% 20% 25% % of population > 64 years of age % of population < 15 years of age Other Germany Ireland Spain France Italy

Best position is top right Source: Eurostat; Regional NUTS2 basis Note: Each dot is a NUTS2 region in the EU. Y-axis is inverted

slide-52
SLIDE 52

52

Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland “Reverse Brain Drain”

Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland

Source: CSO

  • 100
  • 80
  • 60
  • 40
  • 20

20 40 60 80 100 Third level Other Education Net Migration 2009-2012 2013-2017

  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%

  • 100
  • 50

50 100 150 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Emigration (000s) Immigration (000s) Net Migration (000s) Net Migration (% of Pop, RHS)

slide-53
SLIDE 53

53

Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Brexit may hinder export-led growth

Ireland benefits from export diversification by destination Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices)

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations , * Contract manufacturing proxy

  • 10
10 30 50 70 90 110 130

90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Contract Manufacturing* Services Goods ex. CM Exports Good

  • ods (20

2017) Servic ices (20 2016) Tot

  • tal (20

2016) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.1 20.5 10.5 21.7 17.6 20.9 UK 13.4 23.6 16.0 6.4 14.4 11.0 EU-27 36.5 31.3 33.4 23.6 35.4 27.2 China 4.1 5.7 2.7 0.2 2.9 1.8 Other 18.8 18.9 37.4 48.2 29.7 39.2

slide-54
SLIDE 54

54

Ireland’s goods exports respond vigorously to euro movements – in both directions

  • A 1% depreciation of the euro increases

Irish goods exports to the US by 1%

  • The equivalent response for exports to the

UK is 1.1% and to the rest of world is 0.8%. Brexit has the opposite effect on Irish exports.

  • The EUR/USD exchange rate has a positive effect

(elasticity of 0.4) on Irish goods exports to the euro area, due to Ireland-based multinational companies’ exports to EA for onward sale to the rest of the world

  • The elasticity of total goods exports

excluding pharma to the exchange rate >1

Source: CSO; NTMA empirical analysis Note: All coefficients significant at 99% level; not affected by contract

  • manufacturing. Time period is 1998 to 2016 Q2. For longer time periods, the

UK elasticity is smaller (closer to 0.4-0.5 for 1981 onwards).

Response (% chg.) of Irish goods exports to 1% depreciation of the euro

1.00 1.11 0.41 0.83 1.08 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 US UK EA ROW EXP EXL PHA

slide-55
SLIDE 55

55

Average FDI inflow in $ per capita, 2011–16

Crucially, openness to overseas capital has played a big part in Ireland’s economic development

Source: Unctad (UN) database, Eurostat Note: Luxembourg excluded for presentation purposes – average $68,700 per capita over period. Note 2: High tech = High-technology manufacturing and knowledge-intensive high-technology services

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 Slovakia Lithuania Romania Greece Germany Austria Poland Italy Denmark Latvia Slovenia France Spain Portugal Finland Sweden Iceland United Kingdom Belgium Norway Switzerland Netherlands Cyprus Ireland Malta

Ireland has attracted high-quality jobs

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% % of employment in High Tech Sectors (10Y Average)

slide-56
SLIDE 56

56

All this leads to mixture of highly productive and labour intensive sectors in Ireland

Source: CSO , NTMA calculations, 2017 data

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 GVA (€bns) Employment (% of Total, RHS) HP LI Labour Intensive Highly Productive Labour Intensive HP LI

slide-57
SLIDE 57

57

90 95 100 105 110 115 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

Nominal Labour Cost Ratio – IE vs Euro Area Unemployment back towards 1999-2007 level, but wage growth less than half

Ireland is pretty competitive now; we need to avoid repeat

  • f the mid-2000s

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% Unemployment

  • Comp. of Emp. per

employee growth Annual Averages (1999-2007) 2018f

Ireland competitive versus euro area

Source: CSO, Eurostat Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis *Ratio = IE Nom. Labour Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs

July 2018 5.1%

slide-58
SLIDE 58

58

Selected Countries Global Rank Index Score (0-100)

Sweden 1 85.6 Denmark 2 84.2 Finland 3 84.0 Norway 4 83.9 Czech Republic 5 81.9 Germany 6 81.7 France 10 80.3 Belgium 12 80.0 United Kingdom 16 78.3 Ireland 19 77.9 Spain 25 76.8 Portugal 28 75.6 Italy 30 75.5 Luxembourg 33 75.0 Greece 38 72.9 United States 42 72.4

Ireland’s strong fundamentals highlighted by performance

  • n United Nations sustainability index

Source: United Nations SDG project

Ireland Global rank Vs. Regional Average

Subjective Wellbeing (2016) 13/133 Environmental Performance Index (2016) 19/155 Human Development Index (2016) 8/157 Global Competitiveness Index (2016/17) 21/134 Global Peace Index (2016) 12/149

slide-59
SLIDE 59

59

UN Goal – Peace, Justice and Strong institutions Ireland Actual Figure Ireland Normalised (world leader = 100) OECD Average

Overall

  • 87.5

75.8 Corruption Perception Index (0-100) 73.0 79.4 73.5 Government Efficiency (1-7) 4.8 74.8 52.8 Homicides (per 100,000 people) 1.1 97.8 96.1 Prison population (per 100,000 people) 80.0 87.8 74.6 Property Rights (1-7) 6.1 94.8 73.1 Population who feel safe walking alone at night (%) 75.0 73.7 67.4

Ireland is close to OECD norms on social issues Ireland scores well on metrics such as property rights and government efficiency

Ireland’s performs well versus peers in particular on governance metrics

Source: United Nations SDG project

50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Gender Equality Decent work and economic growth Reduced Inequalities Sustainable Cities and Communities Ireland (World leader = 100) OECD Average

slide-60
SLIDE 60

Property prices are rising thanks to lack

  • f supply and capital inflows

Section 5: Property

slide-61
SLIDE 61

61

Housing supply still below demand but slowly catching up

New dwellings* make up 75% of housing completions: some debate abut the rest Housing Completions above 19,000 in 2017 but still low historically (000s)

* Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections

  • f old houses or connections from “ghost estates” overstate the annual run rate of new building.

Source: DoHPCLG, CSO

  • 10

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010 Nationally Dublin

  • ex. Dublin

6,994 4,911 4,575 5,518 7,219 9,915 14,446

  • 2,000

4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 18,000 20,000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 New dwelling completion Unfinished Reconnection Non-Domestic All connections

slide-62
SLIDE 62

62

Demand has picked up since 2015; Credit slowly increasing as cash buyers become less important

Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep trough (000s) Non-mortgage transactions still important but falling towards 40% of total

Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register Source: BPFI *4 quarter sum used

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Residential Investment Letting Mover purchaser First Time Buyers

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Q4 2010 Q2 2011 Q4 2011 Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q2 2013 Q4 2013 Q2 2014 Q4 2014 Q2 2015 Q4 2015 Q2 2016 Q4 2016 Q2 2017 Q4 2017 Q2 2018 Thousands Non-mortgage transactions Mortgage drawdowns for house purchase Non-mortgage transactions % of total (RHS)

slide-63
SLIDE 63

63

House prices rising strongly but some way

  • ff peak (Y-o-Y change, RHS peak =100)

Office leads commercial property (peak = 100)

Property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012

Source: CSO; IPD

20 40 60 80 100 120 Retail Office Industrial 20 40 60 80 100 120

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 National Index (RHS) National (Y-o-Y %) Ex Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Dublin (Y-o-Y %)

slide-64
SLIDE 64
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 Q1 2011 Q3 2011 Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 Q3 2014 Q1 2015 Q3 2015 Q1 2016 Q3 2016 Q1 2017 Q3 2017 Q1 2018 4Q Sum of Transactions Y-o-Y Change (RHS)

64

  • First time buyers (FTBs) can borrow 90% of the

value of a home (10% minimum deposit). Five per cent of the total new lending to FTBs will be allowed above the 90% LTV limit.

  • For second and subsequent buyers (SSBs), banks

must restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 80 per cent LTV to no more than 20 per cent of new lending to SSBs.

  • Bank must restrict lending for primary dwelling

purchase above 3.5 times LTI to no more than 20 per cent of that aggregate value for FTBs and 10 per cent for SSBs.

  • Banks have to limit Buy-to-Let loans (BTL) above

70 per cent LTV to 10 per cent of all BTL loans. CBI’s amended macro-prudential rules Transactions have slowed since macro- prudential rules introduced

CBI’s macro-prudential rules increase resilience of banking and household sector

Introduction in 2015

Source: Residential Property Price Register

slide-65
SLIDE 65
  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% SD BG OE NW UK NL FR DN LX IE ES EA FN IT PT GR BD

65

Irish house price valuations rose relative to other European countries in 2017 but remain below 2008 levels

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% SD NW BG UK DN FR IE ES LX FN NL OE EA BD PT GR IT

Source: OECD, NTMA Workings Note: Measured as % over or under valuation relative to long term averages since 1980.

Deviation from average price-to-income ratio (Q4 2017, red dot represent Q1 2008) Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q4 2017, red dot represent Q1 2008)

slide-66
SLIDE 66

50 100 150 200 250 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Jones Lang LaSalle Real Office Estimated Rent Value (ERV) IPD Real Office Property Price Index

66

Real commercial property prices still down from peak (index 1983 = 100)

Real office property price moves together with Equivalent Rental Value (rents). Price is driven by real demand in the long-run Bub Bubble peri eriod

  • d

Source: IPD; NTMA Note: IPD office price index updated to Q3 2017

slide-67
SLIDE 67

Worries about contingent liabilities no longer; Ireland now has legacy assets

Section 6: Other data

slide-68
SLIDE 68

Ireland has legacy banking-related assets

  • Ba

Banki king

  • Banks are now profitable; income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved.
  • Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues such as

slow judicial process in accessing collateral.

  • An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) was completed in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish

Exchequer.

  • NA

NAMA

  • NAMA has repaid 100% of its senior debt; it forecasts a profit of €3.5bn subject to market conditions.
  • This is likely to be returned to the Government coffers in the next few years.
  • IBR

BRC

  • Liquidation of the IBRC could ultimately return over €1bn to the Irish Exchequer.
  • The Exchequer received €280m as an interim dividend in 2016 and €270m in 2017.

68

slide-69
SLIDE 69

69

All three pillar banks profitable given enhanced margins

Allied Irish Bank Bank of Ireland Permanent TSB

Source: Annual reports of banks - BOI, AIB, PTSB Profit measures are before exceptional items, 2018H1 figure annualised

State Ownership 71% owned 14% owned 75% owned

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% Net Interest Margin %

  • 1
  • 0.5

0.5 Profit Before Tax (€bns)

  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 Profit Before Tax (€bns) 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018H1 Net Interest Margin %

  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 Profit Before Tax (€bns) 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018H1 Net Interest Margin %

slide-70
SLIDE 70

70

Domestic bank cost base reduced over time

… and IE banks* below to EU average Cost income ratios improve dramatically…

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks, EBA * EBA data includes three domestic banks as well as Ulster Bank, DEPFA & Citibank.

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% DK SE GR FI ES SK CY PL NL MT IE IT BE HU SI* EU GB PT LU AT FR DE

Staffing (000s) shrunk by c.50% post crisis

26 16 5 10 11 3

  • 10

20 30 AIB BOI PTSB 2008 2017 123% 88% 144% 51% 66% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% AIB BOI PTSB 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018H1

slide-71
SLIDE 71

71

21.2% 17.6% 15.8% 14.1% 17.1% 15.0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) AIB BOI PTSB*

CET 1 capital ratios (Jun-18)

  • 20

40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) AIB BOI Dec-10 Jun-18

Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books slimmed down

Capital ratios strengthened as banks were slimmed down and consolidated

Source: Published bank accounts

Note: “Transitional” refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios. * PTSB figure is for December 2017

Source: Published bank accounts

slide-72
SLIDE 72

72

Asset quality continues to improve: impaired loans and provisions fall in 2017

Imp mpair ired loa

  • ans % (cov
  • verage %)1 by

by ba bank k and asset De Dec-15 15 De Dec-16 16 De Dec-17 17 Boo

  • ok

k (€bn) bn) BOI

Irish Residential Mortgages 9.3(52) 6.0(45) 4.7(42) 24.1 UK Residential Mortgages 1.6(22) 0.7(15) 0.8(11) 22.6 Irish SMEs 21.9(52) 15.7(55) 12.0(56) 8.2 UK SMEs 11.1(51) 6.3(55) 5.9(52) 1.7 Corporate 4.6(59) 3.5(54) 2.9(62) 8.8 CRE - Investment 28.5(53) 21.1(57) 13.7(51) 8.3 CRE - Land/Development 84.8(76) 68.8(73) 35.3(60) 0.5 Consumer Loans 4.1(105) 2.7(66) 2.1(63) 4.3 11.6( 6(56) 6) 7.6( 6(54 54) 5.2( 2(49 49) 78.5

AIB

Irish Residential Mortgages 16.6(38) 13.1(44) 9.8(44) 32.2 UK Residential Mortgages 10.8(50) 10.8(46) 8.4(30) 1.5 SMEs/Corporate 11.5(63) 8.0(60) 4.9(54) 17.7 CRE 37.4(61) 29.0(53) 20.4(51) 8.8 Consumer Loans 19.9(70) 13.9(58) 11.6(56) 3.1 18.6( 6(47) 7) 14.0( 0(44) 4) 10.0( 0(53) 3) 63.3

PTSB

Irish Residential Mortgages 23.6(49) 23.4(49) 24.2(49) 17.9 UK Residential Mortgages 3.9(39) 0.0(0) 0.0(0) Commercial 35.8(69) 29.6(113) 46.4(104) 0.2 Consumer Loans 27.0(93) 22.3(88) 16.6(92) 0.3 21.1( 1(49) 9) 23.1( 1(51) 1) 24.2( 2(50) 0) 18.4

1 Total impairment provisions are used for coverage ratios (in parentheses)

Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Dec 17)

Consumer CRE

61% 11% 4% 23%

Corporate/S ME Mortgage

All 3 PCAR banks (€bn) Dec-15 Dec-16 Dec-17 Total Loans 186.5 168.9 160.2 Impaired 29.0 20.3 14.8 (Impaired as % of Total) 15.5% 12.0% 9.2% Provisions 14.7 9.9 7.6 (Provisions as % of book) 7.9% 5.9% 4.7% (Provisions as % of Impaired) 50.6% 48.8% 51.4% Source: Published bank accounts

slide-73
SLIDE 73

73

Ireland’s interest rates on lending for house purchase the highest in euro area Rates on SME loans* over euro area average

Profitability aided by higher interest rates than EA peers

Source: ECB *SME loans proxy of loans <1year and <€1m to Non-Financial Corporates

% % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Max Min Ireland Euro Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Max Min Ireland Euro Area

slide-74
SLIDE 74

20 40 60 80 100 120 Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1718 Over 90 days >720 days* 361-720 days 181-360 days 90-180 days

74

Irish residential mortgage arrears are improving across all duration categories; environment still abnormal

  • PDH mortgage arrears have fallen steadily since 2013. The smaller BTL market (c. 25% of total) has higher arrears but also saw

declines in the same period.

  • C. 117K PDH mortgage accounts were classified as restructured at end 2017. Of these restructured accounts, 86% were meeting the

terms of the restructured arrangement.

Mortgage arrears (90+ days) Repossessions**

Source: CBI

PDH Arrears (by thousands)

* Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years. ** Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1718 PDH + BTL (by balance) PDH + BTL (by number) 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 PDH BTL % of MA90+ (RHS)

slide-75
SLIDE 75

75

NAMA: All original senior debt has been repaid; likely to deliver surplus of around €3.5bn

  • NAMA’s operating performance is strong
  • Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par
  • f loans of 780 debtors for €32bn
  • NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges.
  • It

t has has rep epaid 100% % of

  • f €30.2b

.2bn of

  • f orig
  • riginal sen

enior de debt

  • NAMA exceeded its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains on course,

subject to market conditions, to redeem its small amount of subordinated debt by 2020.

  • NA

NAMA cou

  • uld deli

deliver r a a surp urplus s for

  • r Irish

rish taxp xpayers s of

  • f ab

about €3.5b .5bn, , acc according to

  • its

its management t tea eam - if if curr current t mar arket t con

  • ndit

itions s rem emain favourable.

  • NA

NAMA in init itiati tive to

  • de

develop up up to

  • 20,00

,000 ho housi sing uni units s by y 2020 – sub ubject t to

  • com
  • mmercial via

viability ty.

 Progress has been strong so far with 7,300 units completed from Jan 2014 – May 2018;  Another 2,800 under construction and 8,500 have planning permission granted;  Planning applications lodged or will be lodged in 2018 for a further 8,600 units

More NAMA information available on www.nama.ie

slide-76
SLIDE 76

76

The European Commission’s ruling on Apple’s tax affairs does not change the NTMA’s funding plans

  • The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This

figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland’s tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014.

  • Thi

his s case has nothing to do with Ireland’s corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: “This decision does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or its corporate tax rate”.

  • App

pple is is ap appealing the the ruli ruling, g, as as is is the the Iris rish Govern rnment.

  • t. This process could be lengthy. Pending the
  • utcome of the appeal, Apple has begun to pay approximately €13bn plus EU interest into an escrow

fund.

  • Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services

to hold and administer the fund.

  • Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management

International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund.

  • As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the

the NTM NTMA has has mad ade no no al allowance for

  • r these

these funds. s.

slide-77
SLIDE 77

Explanatory charts about the distortions to Ireland’s National Accounts

Annex

slide-78
SLIDE 78
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Modified Domestic Demand External Channel Change in Inventories GDP

78

Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance

Substantial activity from multinationals from 2015 onwards distorted the national accounts

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

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Reclassification of several companies and “onshoring”

  • f IP led to step change in GDP & capital stock

Source: CSO; Department of Finance *due to confidentiality some sector data for 2015 has been restricted

c.35% increase in nominal GDP in 2015

200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 € Billions

  • Trans. equip. and R&D*

Research and Development Transport equipment Other Assets All fixed assets 50 100 150 200 250 300 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Nominal GDP Nominal GNP

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The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports

Source: CSO

  • The capital stock expanded in 2015

by c. €300bn or c. 40%. This is due to:

  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • The transfer of whole entities and assets of this

size is not something seen before in Ireland.

  • Goods produced by the additional capital

were mainly exported. Complicating matters, the goods were produced through “contract manufacturing” (explained in detail overleaf).

  • Little or no employment in Ireland results from this

contract manufacturing.

50 100 150 200 250 300 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Net Exports Investment Distortions Modified Domestic Demand GDP

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20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 National accounts exports Trade data exports

81

Contract manufacturing (CM) overstates the extent of goods export growth in the last three years

  • Contract manufacturing (CM) occurs where a

company in Ireland engages another abroad to manufacture products on its behalf.

  • Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer

supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the overseas contractor never takes

  • wnership of the product. When the product is

sold abroad, a change of economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold.

  • This export is recorded in Ireland’s statistics even

tho though it it was as ne never r pr produced in in Irela eland.

  • Previously, CM did not have a significant net

impact on GDP as the company would send royalties back to where the intellectual property (IP) was “owned” – it was a royalty import. Now that the IP is here, Ireland’s GDP is artificially inflated.

Source: CSO, NTMA Calculations

c. c. €70 70 bn bn

Contract manufacturing proxy*

*Contract manufacturing proxy is calculated as the difference between the monthly International trade exports statistics and the National Accounts/BOP measure for goods exports. The monthly data is based on the actual volume of goods flowing through Ireland’s various ports/airports whereas the national accounts/BOP makes adjustments for, among other items, contract manufacturing.

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Investment distorted by multinationals importing intellectual property (IP) into Ireland

  • Investment is above the pre-crisis level due to

MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland.

  • Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years

with this investment impacting the real economy.

  • However the recent sharp increase in intangibles

investment overstates Ireland’s position and should be discounted accordingly.

  • Building investment grew by 16.8% in 2017 versus

2016 highlighting pent up demand for housing. Investment (4Q sum, €bns)

Source: CSO,

20 40 60 80 100 120 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017

Building Investment Other Investment Distortions Modified GFCF Total GFCF

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GNI* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP

  • GDP headline numbers do not reflect the “true”

growth of Ireland’s income due to MNCs.

  • Reasons for 2015-17 MNC distortions:
  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • By modifying GNI to take account of these factors,

GNI* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.

  • GNI* only available in nominal terms at present.
  • In time, GNI* will be published on a constant

price basis.

National Account – Current Prices (Euro, y-o-y growth rates) 2015 2016 2017 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 262.4bn (34.4%) 273.2bn (4.1%) 294.1bn (7.6%) minus Net Factor Income from rest of the world = Gross National Product (GNP) 200.4bn (22.2%) 222.2bn (10.8%) 233.1bn (4.9%) add EU subsidies minus EU taxes 1.2bn 1.0bn 1.1bn = Gross National Income (GNI) 201.7bn (22.3%) 223.2bn (10.7%) 234.2bn (5.0%) minus retained earnings of re- domiciled firms

  • 4.6bn
  • 5.8bn
  • 4.6bn

minus depreciation on foreign

  • wned IP assets
  • 31.0bn
  • 36.7bn
  • 43.1bn

minus depreciation on aircraft leasing

  • 4.6bn
  • 4.9bn
  • 5.1bn

= GNI* 161.4bn (8.6%) 189.2bn (9.0%) 181.2bn (3.0%)

Source: CSO

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The current account (CA) is distorted heavily by actions of MNEs – CSO has modified CA to be consistent with GNI*

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland’s current account data. MNC’s action distort metrics heavily.

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Current Account (% of GNI*) Modified Current Account (% of GNI*)

Ireland is living within its means

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85

Disclaimer

The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities. The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying

  • slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information
  • provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past
  • r future) of the Irish State or the NTMA.

The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice.