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Advanced Probabilistic Couplings for Differential Privacy Gilles Barthe, Nomie Fong, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grgoire, Justin Hsu, Pierre-Yves Strub October 25, 2016 1 A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to ones


  1. Advanced Probabilistic Couplings for Differential Privacy Gilles Barthe, Noémie Fong, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grégoire, Justin Hsu, Pierre-Yves Strub October 25, 2016 1

  2. A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to one’s privacy, or in general, any type of risk . . . should not substantially increase as a result of participating in a statistical database. This is captured by differential privacy. — Cynthia Dwork 2

  3. Increasing interest In research. . . 3

  4. Increasing interest In research. . . . . . and beyond 3

  5. 4

  6. Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith Let ǫ, δ ≥ 0 be parameters, and suppose there is a binary adjacency relation Adj on D . A randomized algorithm M : D → Distr ( R ) is ( ǫ, δ )-differentially private if for every set of outputs S ⊆ R and every pair of adjacent inputs d 1 , d 2 , we have Pr x ∼ M ( d 1 ) [ x ∈ S ] ≤ exp( ǫ ) · Pr x ∼ M ( d 2 ) [ x ∈ S ] + δ . 5

  7. Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith Let ǫ, δ ≥ 0 be parameters, and suppose there is a binary adjacency relation Adj on D . A randomized algorithm M : D → Distr ( R ) is ( ǫ, δ )-differentially private if for every set of outputs S ⊆ R and every pair of adjacent inputs d 1 , d 2 , we have Pr x ∼ M ( d 1 ) [ x ∈ S ] ≤ exp( ǫ ) · Pr x ∼ M ( d 2 ) [ x ∈ S ] + δ . How to formally verify? 5

  8. Differential privacy is a: relational property of probabilistic programs. 6

  9. Composition properties Program is ( ǫ + ǫ ′ , δ + δ ′ )-private 7

  10. Composition properties Program is ( ǫ + ǫ ′ , δ + δ ′ )-private Formally Consider randomized algorithms M : D → Distr ( R ) and M : R → D → Distr ( R ′ ). If M is ( ǫ, δ ) -private and for every r ∈ R , M ′ ( r ) is ( ǫ ′ , δ ′ ) -private, then the composition is ( ǫ + ǫ ′ , δ + δ ′ ) -private: ← M ( d ); res ← M ( r , d ); return( res ) r $ $ 7

  11. When privacy follows from composition 8

  12. When privacy follows from composition (Linear types, refinement types, self products, relational Hoare logics, . . . ) 8

  13. When privacy doesn’t follow from composition 9

  14. Complicated privacy proofs — Lyu, Su, Dong 10

  15. Complicated privacy proofs — Lyu, Su, Dong How to verify these proofs? 10

  16. Recent progress (2016) Differential privacy ≈ Approximate couplings 11

  17. Recent progress (2016) Differential privacy ≈ Approximate couplings Approximate couplings ≈ Proofs in the logic apRHL 11

  18. Recent progress (2016) Differential privacy ≈ Approximate couplings Approximate couplings ≈ Proofs in the logic apRHL Only proofs beyond composition for ( ǫ, 0)-privacy 11

  19. Enhance the logic New coupling constructions ⇓ New proof rules ⇓ Richer formal proofs of privacy 12

  20. Our work: formal privacy proofs with: Accuracy-dependent privacy Advanced composition Adaptive inputs 13

  21. Our work: formal privacy proofs with: Accuracy-dependent privacy Advanced composition Adaptive inputs 13

  22. A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB] Imperative language with random sampling ← L ǫ ( e ) x $ 14

  23. A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB] Imperative language with random sampling ← L ǫ ( e ) x $ approximate probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } 14

  24. A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB] Imperative language with random sampling ← L ǫ ( e ) x $ approximate probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } Non-probablistic, relational ( x 1 = x 2 ) 14

  25. A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB] Imperative language with random sampling ← L ǫ ( e ) x $ approximate probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } Numeric index 14

  26. Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO] Definition Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Distr ( A ) are related by an ( ǫ, δ )-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µ L , µ R ∈ Distr ( A × A ) with: 15

  27. Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO] Definition Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Distr ( A ) are related by an ( ǫ, δ )-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µ L , µ R ∈ Distr ( A × A ) with: ◮ support in R ; 15

  28. Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO] Definition Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Distr ( A ) are related by an ( ǫ, δ )-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µ L , µ R ∈ Distr ( A × A ) with: ◮ support in R ; ◮ π 1 ( µ L ) = µ 1 and π 2 ( µ R ) = µ 2 ; 15

  29. Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO] Definition Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Distr ( A ) are related by an ( ǫ, δ )-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µ L , µ R ∈ Distr ( A × A ) with: ◮ support in R ; ◮ π 1 ( µ L ) = µ 1 and π 2 ( µ R ) = µ 2 ; ◮ for every S ⊆ A × A , Pr z ∼ µ L [ z ∈ S ] ≤ exp( ǫ ) · Pr z ∼ µ R [ z ∈ S ] + δ 15

  30. Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO] Definition Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Distr ( A ) are related by an ( ǫ, δ )-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µ L , µ R ∈ Distr ( A × A ) with: ◮ support in R ; ◮ π 1 ( µ L ) = µ 1 and π 2 ( µ R ) = µ 2 ; ◮ for every S ⊆ A × A , Pr z ∼ µ L [ z ∈ S ] ≤ exp( ǫ ) · Pr z ∼ µ R [ z ∈ S ] + δ 15

  31. Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO] Definition Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Distr ( A ) are related by an ( ǫ, δ )-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µ L , µ R ∈ Distr ( A × A ) with: ◮ support in R ; ◮ π 1 ( µ L ) = µ 1 and π 2 ( µ R ) = µ 2 ; ◮ for every S ⊆ A × A , Pr z ∼ µ L [ z ∈ S ] ≤ exp( ǫ ) · Pr z ∼ µ R [ z ∈ S ] + δ R ♯ Write: µ 1 µ 2 ( ǫ,δ ) 15

  32. Interpreting judgments ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } 16

  33. Interpreting judgments ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } Two memories related by Φ 16

  34. Interpreting judgments ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } Two memories related by Φ ⇓ Two distributions related by Ψ ♯ ( ǫ,δ ) 16

  35. Differential privacy in apRHL ⊢ { Adj ( d 1 , d 2 ) } c ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c { res 1 = res 2 } 17

  36. Differential privacy in apRHL ⊢ { Adj ( d 1 , d 2 ) } c ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c { res 1 = res 2 } ( ǫ, δ )-differential privacy 17

  37. Proof rules Proof rule ≈ Recipe to combine couplings 18

  38. Proof rules Proof rule ≈ Recipe to combine couplings Sequence rule ≈ standard composition of privacy ⊢ { Ψ } c ′ 1 ∼ ( ǫ ′ ,δ ′ ) c ′ Seq ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } 2 { Θ } ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ; c ′ 1 ∼ ( ǫ + ǫ ′ ,δ + δ ′ ) c 2 ; c ′ 2 { Θ } 18

  39. Proof rules Proof rule ≈ Recipe to combine couplings Sequence rule ≈ standard composition of privacy ⊢ { Ψ } c ′ 1 ∼ ( ǫ ′ ,δ ′ ) c ′ Seq ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 { Ψ } 2 { Θ } ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ; c ′ 1 ∼ ( ǫ + ǫ ′ ,δ + δ ′ ) c 2 ; c ′ 2 { Θ } 18

  40. Our work: formal privacy proofs with: Accuracy-dependent privacy Advanced composition Adaptive inputs 19

  41. Accuracy-dependent privacy 20

  42. Accuracy-dependent privacy Rough intuition ◮ Think of δ in ( ǫ, δ )-privacy as failure probability ◮ “Algorithm is private except with small probability δ ” ◮ “If the noise added is not too large, then . . . ” Similar to up-to-bad reasoning ◮ Common tool in crypto proofs ◮ “If bad event doesn’t happen, then protocol is safe” 21

  43. In apRHL: up-to-bad rule ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 {¬ Ψ � 1 � → x 1 = x 2 } ]( m 1 ) [Ψ � 1 � ] < δ ′ | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr [ [ c 1 ] UtB ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ + δ ′ ) c 2 { x 1 = x 2 } 22

  44. In apRHL: up-to-bad rule ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 {¬ Ψ � 1 � → x 1 = x 2 } ]( m 1 ) [Ψ � 1 � ] < δ ′ | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr [ [ c 1 ] UtB ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ + δ ′ ) c 2 { x 1 = x 2 } Notes ◮ Ψ � 1 � is “bad event”, only mentions c 1 22

  45. In apRHL: up-to-bad rule ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 {¬ Ψ � 1 � → x 1 = x 2 } ]( m 1 ) [Ψ � 1 � ] < δ ′ | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr [ [ c 1 ] UtB ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ + δ ′ ) c 2 { x 1 = x 2 } Notes ◮ Ψ � 1 � is “bad event”, only mentions c 1 ◮ If bad event doesn’t happen, have privacy 22

  46. In apRHL: up-to-bad rule ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ ) c 2 {¬ Ψ � 1 � → x 1 = x 2 } ]( m 1 ) [Ψ � 1 � ] < δ ′ | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr [ [ c 1 ] UtB ⊢ { Φ } c 1 ∼ ( ǫ,δ + δ ′ ) c 2 { x 1 = x 2 } Notes ◮ Ψ � 1 � is “bad event”, only mentions c 1 ◮ If bad event doesn’t happen, have privacy ◮ Bound probability of Ψ after c 1 22

  47. 23

  48. Advanced composition theorem Compose n mechanisms, each ( ǫ, δ )-private ◮ Standard composition: ( n · ǫ, n · δ )-private ◮ Advanced composition: ( ǫ ∗ , δ ∗ )-private ǫ ∗ ≈ √ n · ǫ δ ∗ ≈ n · δ + δ ′ and 24

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