Advanced Probabilistic Couplings for Differential Privacy
Gilles Barthe, Noémie Fong, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grégoire, Justin Hsu, Pierre-Yves Strub October 25, 2016
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Advanced Probabilistic Couplings for Differential Privacy Gilles - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Advanced Probabilistic Couplings for Differential Privacy Gilles Barthe, Nomie Fong, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grgoire, Justin Hsu, Pierre-Yves Strub October 25, 2016 1 A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to ones
Advanced Probabilistic Couplings for Differential Privacy
Gilles Barthe, Noémie Fong, Marco Gaboardi, Benjamin Grégoire, Justin Hsu, Pierre-Yves Strub October 25, 2016
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A new approach to formulating privacy goals: the risk to one’s privacy, or in general, any type of risk . . . should not substantially increase as a result of participating in a statistical database. This is captured by differential privacy.
— Cynthia Dwork
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Increasing interest
In research. . .
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Increasing interest
In research. . . . . . and beyond
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Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith
Let ǫ, δ ≥ 0 be parameters, and suppose there is a binary adjacency relation Adj on D. A randomized algorithm M : D → Distr(R) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for every set of outputs S ⊆ R and every pair of adjacent inputs d1, d2, we have
Prx∼M(d1)[x ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Prx∼M(d2)[x ∈ S] + δ.
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Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith
Let ǫ, δ ≥ 0 be parameters, and suppose there is a binary adjacency relation Adj on D. A randomized algorithm M : D → Distr(R) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for every set of outputs S ⊆ R and every pair of adjacent inputs d1, d2, we have
Prx∼M(d1)[x ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Prx∼M(d2)[x ∈ S] + δ.
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Composition properties Program is (ǫ + ǫ′, δ + δ′)-private
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Composition properties Program is (ǫ + ǫ′, δ + δ′)-private
Formally
Consider randomized algorithms M : D → Distr(R) and M : R → D → Distr(R′). If M is (ǫ, δ)-private and for every r ∈ R, M′(r) is (ǫ′, δ′)-private, then the composition is (ǫ + ǫ′, δ + δ′)-private:
r
$
← M(d); res
$
← M(r, d); return(res)
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When privacy follows from composition
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When privacy follows from composition
(Linear types, refinement types, self products, relational Hoare logics, . . . )
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When privacy doesn’t follow from composition
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Complicated privacy proofs
— Lyu, Su, Dong
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Complicated privacy proofs
— Lyu, Su, Dong
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Recent progress (2016) Differential privacy ≈ Approximate couplings
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Recent progress (2016) Differential privacy ≈ Approximate couplings Approximate couplings ≈ Proofs in the logic apRHL
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Recent progress (2016) Differential privacy ≈ Approximate couplings Approximate couplings ≈ Proofs in the logic apRHL
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Enhance the logic
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Our work: formal privacy proofs with:
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Our work: formal privacy proofs with:
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A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB]
Imperative language with random sampling
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A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB]
Imperative language with random sampling
approximate probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic
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A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB]
Imperative language with random sampling
approximate probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic
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A crash course: the program logic apRHL [BKOZB]
Imperative language with random sampling
approximate probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic
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Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO]
Definition
Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ1, µ2 ∈ Distr(A) are related by an (ǫ, δ)-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µL, µR ∈ Distr(A × A) with:
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Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO]
Definition
Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ1, µ2 ∈ Distr(A) are related by an (ǫ, δ)-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µL, µR ∈ Distr(A × A) with:
◮ support in R ; 15
Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO]
Definition
Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ1, µ2 ∈ Distr(A) are related by an (ǫ, δ)-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µL, µR ∈ Distr(A × A) with:
◮ support in R ; ◮ π1(µL) = µ1 and π2(µR) = µ2 ; 15
Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO]
Definition
Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ1, µ2 ∈ Distr(A) are related by an (ǫ, δ)-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µL, µR ∈ Distr(A × A) with:
◮ support in R ; ◮ π1(µL) = µ1 and π2(µR) = µ2 ; ◮ for every S ⊆ A × A,
Prz∼µL[z ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Prz∼µR[z ∈ S] + δ
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Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO]
Definition
Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ1, µ2 ∈ Distr(A) are related by an (ǫ, δ)-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µL, µR ∈ Distr(A × A) with:
◮ support in R ; ◮ π1(µL) = µ1 and π2(µR) = µ2 ; ◮ for every S ⊆ A × A,
Prz∼µL[z ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Prz∼µR[z ∈ S] + δ
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Approximate couplings [BKOZB, BO]
Definition
Let R ⊆ A × A be a relation and ǫ, δ ≥ 0. Two distributions µ1, µ2 ∈ Distr(A) are related by an (ǫ, δ)-approximate coupling with support R if there exists µL, µR ∈ Distr(A × A) with:
◮ support in R ; ◮ π1(µL) = µ1 and π2(µR) = µ2 ; ◮ for every S ⊆ A × A,
Prz∼µL[z ∈ S] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Prz∼µR[z ∈ S] + δ
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Interpreting judgments
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Interpreting judgments
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Interpreting judgments
(ǫ,δ)
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Differential privacy in apRHL
⊢ {Adj(d1, d2)} c ∼(ǫ,δ) c {res1 = res2}
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Differential privacy in apRHL
⊢ {Adj(d1, d2)} c ∼(ǫ,δ) c {res1 = res2}
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Proof rules Proof rule ≈ Recipe to combine couplings
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Proof rules Proof rule ≈ Recipe to combine couplings
Sequence rule ≈ standard composition of privacy
Seq ⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ) c2 {Ψ}
⊢ {Ψ} c′
1 ∼(ǫ′,δ′) c′ 2 {Θ}
⊢ {Φ} c1; c′
1 ∼(ǫ+ǫ′,δ+δ′) c2; c′ 2 {Θ} 18
Proof rules Proof rule ≈ Recipe to combine couplings
Sequence rule ≈ standard composition of privacy
Seq ⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ) c2 {Ψ}
⊢ {Ψ} c′
1 ∼(ǫ′,δ′) c′ 2 {Θ}
⊢ {Φ} c1; c′
1 ∼(ǫ+ǫ′,δ+δ′) c2; c′ 2 {Θ} 18
Our work: formal privacy proofs with:
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Accuracy-dependent privacy
Rough intuition
◮ Think of δ in (ǫ, δ)-privacy as failure probability ◮ “Algorithm is private except with small probability δ” ◮ “If the noise added is not too large, then . . . ”
Similar to up-to-bad reasoning
◮ Common tool in crypto proofs ◮ “If bad event doesn’t happen, then protocol is safe” 21
In apRHL: up-to-bad rule
UtB
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ) c2 {¬Ψ1 → x1 = x2} | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr
[ [c1] ](m1)[Ψ1] < δ′
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ+δ′) c2 {x1 = x2}
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In apRHL: up-to-bad rule
UtB
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ) c2 {¬Ψ1 → x1 = x2} | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr
[ [c1] ](m1)[Ψ1] < δ′
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ+δ′) c2 {x1 = x2}
Notes
◮ Ψ1 is “bad event”, only mentions c1 22
In apRHL: up-to-bad rule
UtB
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ) c2 {¬Ψ1 → x1 = x2} | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr
[ [c1] ](m1)[Ψ1] < δ′
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ+δ′) c2 {x1 = x2}
Notes
◮ Ψ1 is “bad event”, only mentions c1 ◮ If bad event doesn’t happen, have privacy 22
In apRHL: up-to-bad rule
UtB
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ) c2 {¬Ψ1 → x1 = x2} | = m ∈ Θ = ⇒ Pr
[ [c1] ](m1)[Ψ1] < δ′
⊢ {Φ} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ+δ′) c2 {x1 = x2}
Notes
◮ Ψ1 is “bad event”, only mentions c1 ◮ If bad event doesn’t happen, have privacy ◮ Bound probability of Ψ after c1 22
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Advanced composition theorem
Compose n mechanisms, each (ǫ, δ)-private
◮ Standard composition: (n · ǫ, n · δ)-private ◮ Advanced composition: (ǫ∗, δ∗)-private
ǫ∗ ≈ √n · ǫ and δ∗ ≈ n · δ + δ′
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Advanced composition theorem
Compose n mechanisms, each (ǫ, δ)-private
◮ Standard composition: (n · ǫ, n · δ)-private ◮ Advanced composition: (ǫ∗, δ∗)-private
ǫ∗ ≈ √n · ǫ and δ∗ ≈ n · δ + δ′
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Advanced composition theorem
Compose n mechanisms, each (ǫ, δ)-private
◮ Standard composition: (n · ǫ, n · δ)-private ◮ Advanced composition: (ǫ∗, δ∗)-private
ǫ∗ ≈ √n · ǫ and δ∗ ≈ n · δ + δ′
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Advanced composition theorem
Compose n mechanisms, each (ǫ, δ)-private
◮ Standard composition: (n · ǫ, n · δ)-private ◮ Advanced composition: (ǫ∗, δ∗)-private
ǫ∗ ≈ √n · ǫ and δ∗ ≈ n · δ + δ′
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In apRHL: new while rule
AC
| = Θ → e1 = e2 ⊢ {Θ ∧ e1} c1 ∼(ǫ,δ) c2 {Θ} while e1 do c1 exceutes at most n iterations ⊢ {Θ} while e1 do c1 ∼(ǫ∗,δ∗) while e2 do c2 {Θ ∧ ¬e1}
Notes
◮ Surprising: generalization to approximate couplings ◮ More surprising: privacy composition directly generalizes 25
Putting it all together
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A brief preview: the Between Thresholds algorithm
Variant of a mechanism by Bun, Steinke, Ullman (2016)
Formalized (ǫ, δ)-privacy in EasyCrypt
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Formal proof combines many different features:
◮ Accuracy-dependent privacy ◮ Advanced composition ◮ Adaptively chosen inputs ◮ “Subset” coupling 28
Formal proof combines many different features:
◮ Accuracy-dependent privacy ◮ Advanced composition ◮ Adaptively chosen inputs ◮ “Subset” coupling 28
Formal proof combines many different features:
◮ Accuracy-dependent privacy ◮ Advanced composition ◮ Adaptively chosen inputs ◮ “Subset” coupling
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Our work: formal privacy proofs with:
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Our work: formal privacy proofs with:
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