About Face! Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern University of T - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

About Face!

Jason Quinley, Christopher Ahern

University of T¨ ubingen, University of Pennsylvania

October 5, 2012

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 1 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Goals

Apply game-theoretic reasoning to politeness Requests and Proposals Payoffs vs. Preferences Face and Sympathy Norms vs. Conventions

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 2 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Talk Outline

1

Introduction

2

Politeness Theory

3

Game Theory

4

Trust and Modals

5

Conclusion

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 3 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Consider the following...

Questions

Will/Would you lend me a dollar? Will/Would you open the door? Will/Would you turn that music down? Will/Would you marry me?

Answers

Would seems more appropriate for the first three, whereas will is better in the last.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 4 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Why be polite?

Scarcity

Resources are limited, life requires cooperation.

Ambiguity

Information regarding the intentions of other is not always abundant.

Politeness

Offers a strategic solution for these two problems and increasing the range of interactions between individuals with other-regarding preferences.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 5 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

What politeness gets us

Humor(/Cruelty)

A: Would you marry me? B: I would if you were rich/handsome/x! (A: Well I was just asking hypothetically.) We commit ourselves to actions by our words. The ways in which this plays

• ut reveals the underlying structure of the games being played.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 6 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Crucial points for politeness theory

Face Face-threatening acts

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 7 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face

What is face?

Consider your reaction to...

Asking a favor of a friend (stranger) Being asked a favor by a friend (stranger). Being Embarrassed. Seeing someone you know (and like) embarrassed. Seeing someone you don’t know embarrassed.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 8 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face

What is face?

Brown and Levinson (1978)

Face (Goffman, 1982) consists of an individual’s basic needs: Negative face (Autonomy): the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, right to non-distraction, i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition. Positive face (Affiliation): the positive consistent self-image or ’personality’ (including the approval by others of this self-image) claimed by interactants.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 9 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts

Face-threatening acts

When situations call for it...

Speakers must commit a face-threatening act (FTA). In order to mitigate the weight of a FTA, speakers may use several strategies. Intention Don’t do FTA Do FTA Off Record On Record Redress Negative Politeness Positive Politeness Don’t Redress

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 10 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts

Threats at Lunch!!!

What to do if you forget your wallet at lunch:

Don’t do FTA: Don’t ask for money. Off Record:“Oh no! I forgot my wallet in my office!” Negative Politeness:“You don’t have to, but would you mind lending me a bit of money?” Positive Politeness:“I would sure appreciate if you would lend me some money.”

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 11 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Face-threatening acts

Goldilocks

Too much

“Please, if you could, move out of the way of that speeding car,” “Excuse me Sir/Ma’am, if it’s not too much trouble could tell me the time.”

Too little

“Could you give me a thousand dollars?” “Tell me the time!”

Just right

(Excuse me,) could you tell me the time? Could you find it in your magnificent heart to loan me a thousand dollars? I’d be forever in your debt!

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 12 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Crucial points for game theory

Sequential Games Cooperation vs. Coordination

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 13 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games

Sequential Games

Signaling Game: N,O,Aj,Ui

N is the set of players in the game O is a sequence over N that determines the order of play For j ∈ O, Aj is the set of actions available to the jth player in the order of play Ui is a preference for player i over the set of possible paths of play. The payoffs are represented as numeric values, where higher values are more preferred outcomes.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 14 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games

Cooperation: Prisoner’s Dilemma

X Y (2,2) C (0,3) D C Y (3,0) C (1,1) D D

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 15 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Sequential Games

Coordination: Pure Coordination Game

X Y (1,1) A (0,0) B A Y (0,0) A (1,1) B B

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 16 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Crucial points for our analysis

Trust Games Other-regarding preferences Self-enforcing equilibria Mechanisms for enforcing cooperation

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 17 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Trust Games

Consist of...

An Investor and a Trustee. Investor begins with an Initial endowment, which he can keep or invest. If he invests the endowment with the Trustee it grows by some amount/ The Trustee must then decide what amount, if any, to return to the Investor.

Cooperation

Trustee does best when he keeps all money invested. Knowing this, Investor should never invest. Everyone does worse than they could by cooperating.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 18 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Requests as Trust Games

Quinley (2012)

Asymmetries in abilities lead to requests. Requests involve a loss of face on the part of the requester, and carry a risk that the request will be denied. X can ask (A) or not ask Y (¬A) to grant a request. Y can grant (G) or not grant (¬G) the request.

Main Results

Repetition and observation increase cooperativity (trust).

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 19 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Requests as Extended Trust Games

More Structure

X can ask (A) or not ask Y (¬A) to grant a request. Y can grant (G) or not grant (¬G) the request. X can thank (T) Y for granting the request, or not (¬T).

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 20 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Self-Regard and Self-Preservation

How do we process face? 2D4D: Testosterone and Testiness Ultimatum Game and Refusals

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 21 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Game Structure

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 22 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Payoff Structure

Costs

cx is the cost to X to achieve desired outcome. cy is cost to Y. (cy < cx) bx is the benefit to X of Y granting request. (bx < cx)

Face

A requires face “payment” fr by X. Y receives mrfr from A. (mr > 1) T requires face “payment” ft by X. Y receives mtft from T. (mt > 1)

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 23 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

Payoff Structure

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 24 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Trust Games

What to expect

Rollback Equilibrium

X prefers ¬T to T Y prefers ¬G to ¬T X prefers ¬A to ¬G

Result

No one should ever make requests because they will never be granted. Yet we can, and do, make polite requests of strangers we will never interact with

• again. Why is this possible?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 25 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Other-Regarding Preferences

Homo economicus or Homo empathicus

Theoretical (Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Levine 1998) Behavioral (Fehr & Schmidt 2003, Camerer 2003) Neurobiological (Fehr 2009)

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 26 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Other-Regarding Preferences

Sympathy (Sally 2000, 2001)

Sympathy Distribution

For each agent, there is a distribution, δi ∈ ∆(U), such that ∑j δi(Uj) = 1, which determines how much that agent cares about her own payoffs and those

• f others.

Homo economicus

δi(Uj) = 0 for all j = i.

New utility function

Vi = δi(Ui)·Ui +(1−δi(Ui))·Uj

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 27 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

When do we thank people?

Condition

It suffices for X to prefer T to ¬T for Vx(T) > Vx(¬T), which is true when: δx(Uy) >

1 1+mt

Interpretation

The greater the benefit to Y for thanking, the less X has to care about Y s payoff to do so.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 28 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

When to grant a request?

Condition

It suffices for Y to prefer T to ¬G for Vy(T) > Vy(¬G), which is true when:

(cy−mtft) (cy−mtft)+bx+cx−ft < δy(Ux)

Interpretation

The greater the benefit to X relative to cx and cy determines this threshold. If cx is much greater than cy this becomes very small.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 29 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

Some Examples

You see a stranger with arms full of boxes struggling to open a door

X: “Would you mind opening the door for me?” Y: “Sure!” It would seem unreasonable to not help in this context, suggesting that we have a general expectation of a minimum degree of other-regard

You forgot your watch and your phone has died

X: “Excuse me. Could you tell me the time please?” Y: “Fuck you!” This actually occured (Asher, 2012). What is shocking about this example is that it shows a total lack of other-regard. Took place in New York City, make

• f that what you will.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 30 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

The main effect of politeness I

What happens without face?

System without face boils down to a choice on the part of Y, where granting is better if Vy′(¬G) < Vy′(G), which holds when:

cy cy+bx+cx < δy′(Ux′)

Compared to system with face

System with face has lower threshold when δy(Ux) < δy′(Ux′), which is true when:

cy bx+cx < mt

Given that cx > cy and mt > 1, this is always true.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 31 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Application in Trust Games

The main effect of politeness II

What face buys you

A system of requests with polite forms that address face wants requires a lower threshold of other-regarding preferences than one without such means

• f addressing face wants. This can be thought of in two ways:

1

The same requests can be made between more distant individuals.

2

More requests can be made between individuals with a given relationship.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 32 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

Requests vs. Proposals

Could ya would ya ain’t ya gonna if I asked you// Would ya wanna be my baby tonight? John Michael Montgomery Utilities should be partially (or wholly) aligned.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 33 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

Proposals: Will/Would

Xavier: Would you marry me? Yvonne: I would...if you were rich. Xavier:*Sigh* (or) Yvonne: Yes!!! Xavier:Woah, I was just asking hypothetically! Xavier: Would you like to see a movie? Yvonne: Yeah, there are a few I’d like to see. Xavier: Great! When can I pick you up? Yvonne: Oh! I didn’t realize you meant with you. (or) Yvonne:Yeah! When do you want to go? Xavier:Oh! I didn’t mean with me, just in general.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 34 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Credible Signaling

Self-Enforcing Equilibria

Aumann (1990)

C D C 3,3 0,2 D 2,0 1,1 There are two pure strategy Nash Equilibria (C,C) and (D,D). (C,C) is the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Neither player can be sure of what the other player will do, even if they agree beforehand to play C. Why? Both players want the other to play C regardless of what they do. Thus the agreement to play the payoff-dominant equilibrium is not self-enforcing.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 35 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Negative Face and Positive Probabilities

Would you like to see a movie? * Will you like to see a movie?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 36 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Negative Face and Positive Probabilities

Would you like to see a movie?

◮ Positive Probability of Rejection

* Will you like to see a movie?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 36 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Negative Face and Positive Probabilities

Would you like to see a movie?

◮ Positive Probability of Rejection ◮ Information vs. Relationship

* Will you like to see a movie?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 36 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Negative Face and Positive Probabilities

Would you like to see a movie?

◮ Positive Probability of Rejection ◮ Information vs. Relationship ◮ Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics

* Will you like to see a movie?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 36 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Negative Face and Positive Probabilities

Would you like to see a movie?

◮ Positive Probability of Rejection ◮ Information vs. Relationship ◮ Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics

* Will you like to see a movie?

◮ Only two options Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 36 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Negative Face and Positive Probabilities

Would you like to see a movie?

◮ Positive Probability of Rejection ◮ Information vs. Relationship ◮ Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics

* Will you like to see a movie?

◮ Only two options ◮ Implies necessity Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 36 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Negative Face and Positive Probabilities

Would you like to see a movie?

◮ Positive Probability of Rejection ◮ Information vs. Relationship ◮ Recognition of Autonomy, Possible World Semantics

* Will you like to see a movie?

◮ Only two options ◮ Implies necessity ◮ Implies fatality Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 36 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

I gotta know right now!

Would you marry me? Will you marry me?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 37 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

I gotta know right now!

Would you marry me?

◮ Possible Worlds

Will you marry me?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 37 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

I gotta know right now!

Would you marry me?

◮ Possible Worlds ◮ ”I would, if . . . ” or ”I would, but . . . ”

Will you marry me?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 37 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

I gotta know right now!

Would you marry me?

◮ Possible Worlds ◮ ”I would, if . . . ” or ”I would, but . . . ”

Will you marry me?

◮ Only two options Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 37 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

I gotta know right now!

Would you marry me?

◮ Possible Worlds ◮ ”I would, if . . . ” or ”I would, but . . . ”

Will you marry me?

◮ Only two options ◮ Implies necessity Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 37 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

I gotta know right now!

Would you marry me?

◮ Possible Worlds ◮ ”I would, if . . . ” or ”I would, but . . . ”

Will you marry me?

◮ Only two options ◮ Implies necessity ◮ Information > Relationship Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 37 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

I gotta know right now!

Would you marry me?

◮ Possible Worlds ◮ ”I would, if . . . ” or ”I would, but . . . ”

Will you marry me?

◮ Only two options ◮ Implies necessity ◮ Information > Relationship ◮ CKGφ sufficient for collective action Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 37 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Marriage Game Set-up

Play: Sam makes a request of Robin by choosing a message based

• n his belief of success. Utility is a function of the payoffs in the

Marriage Game (the value v of coordination and the time investment t) and the certainty c imposed by the request.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 38 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Communality, Coordination, and Conjugation

A ¬A A v;v 0;0 ¬A 0;0 0;0 M ¬M M v−t;v−t −t;0 ¬M 0;−t 0;0

Table: Degenerate Coordination Game vs. Marriage Game: (Both) USam is listed

• first. (Right)Players have a stronger dispreference for unaligned actions; cf. Stag

Hunt

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 39 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Wouldn’t it be nice if we were married...

M ¬M M v−t;v−t −t;0 ¬M 0;−t 0;0 M ¬M WillM v−t;v−t −t;0 WouldM r(v−t);r(v−t) −rt;0 ¬M 0;−t 0;0

Table: Marriage Game vs. Marriage Game with Would

Utilities are USam, U(Robin) For would, c = r, 0 < r < 1 For will, c = 1 Similar to Pinker et al. (2008) with game expansion

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 40 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Main Results: For Sam

Subjunctive Mood is rational for S under uncertainty or low value interactions

◮ For a c value of 1, we obtain the same EUS for both questions ◮ For Pr(Yes)×v < t, ”would” is rational ◮ will amplifies this negativity; would minimizes losses

Indicative indicates certainty

◮ Pr(Yes)×v > t means no incentive to use subjunctive ◮ Hearer knows this ◮ This works for high p or v or low t.

Diversity of relationships begets diversity of requests

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 41 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Main Results: For Robin

Subjunctive Mood is rational for R under low value interactions or long time

◮ For a c value of 1, we obtain the same EUR for both questions ◮ For v < t, ”would” is felicitous

Indicative indicates certainty

◮ v > t means no incentive to use subjunctive ◮ Hearer knows this ◮ This works for high v or low t. Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 42 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Claim I

Just as Reciprocity gives way to Coordination in repeated economic interactions, so does our language favor reducing semantic ambiguity among long-term associates when information is valuable.

Claim II

In a one-shot scenario with no time investment, direct proposals emerge as a rational strategy.

Claim III

In contrast to Pinker et al., a request allowing the listener autonomy is not always a rational strategy.

Claim IV

Face payment in proposals are not rational.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 43 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Getting the Mood Right

Why proposals need a “will”

Using the modal will ignores the listener’s negative face, but renders the request self-enforcing. This aligns perfectly with our intuition that one cannot back out after asking “Will you marry me?”. Moreover, this reasoning about face provides a rationale for why commissive speech acts are possible, and the form they take.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 44 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Conclusions

Politeness strategies that address face, along with other-regarding preferences, allow requests and trust between a wider range of individuals and relationship types. There is a necessary amount of sympathy between two individuals that suffices to transform a game of cooperation into one of coordination. Face lowers this threshold. would and will differ fundamentally in terms of illocutionary force, and the underlying structure of the interaction. would allows for disavowal and is not necessarily self-enforcing, whereas will as a commissive speech act commits the speaker to a course

• f action.

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 45 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Questions

Politeness is a norm, but polite language is highly conventionalized. How do we untease the two? How do modal frames (Kripke models) enter the picture? Do want and will share a special relationship if we consider self-enforcement of revealed preferences? How are social contracts like Stag Hunts? What about Battles of the Sexes? How to model schadenfreude? Reverse of sympathy?

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 46 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 47 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

Thanks!

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 47 / 47

Introduction Politeness Theory Game Theory Trust and Modals Conclusion

References

Asher (2012) The Non Cooperative Basis of Implicatures Aumann (1990) Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing Brown & Levinson (1978) Politeness Camerer (2003) Behavioral Game Theory Fehr (2009) Social Preferences and the Brain Fehr & Schmidt (1999) A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation Fehr & Schmidt (2003) Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic Applications Goffman (1967) Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior Levine (1998) Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments Quinley(2012) Trust Games as a Model for Requests Rabin (1993) Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics Sally (2000) A General Theory of Sympathy, Mind-Reading, and Social Interaction, with an Application to the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Sally (2001) On Sympathy and Games

Quinley and Ahern () About Face! October 5, 2012 48 / 47