A Threshold Cryptographic Backend for DNSSEC Francisco Cifuentes - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

a threshold cryptographic backend for dnssec
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A Threshold Cryptographic Backend for DNSSEC Francisco Cifuentes - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

A Threshold Cryptographic Backend for DNSSEC Francisco Cifuentes francisco@niclabs.cl 1 Key Management Implementations Back to ICANN 40 2 Key Management Implementations Needs Zones need to be re-signed PKCS#11 periodically. Keys


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A Threshold Cryptographic Backend for DNSSEC

Francisco Cifuentes

francisco@niclabs.cl

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Key Management Implementations

Back to ICANN 40

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Key Management Implementations

HSM

Needs

  • Zones need to be re-signed

periodically.

  • Keys must not be cloned.

Problems

  • Hardware fails.
  • HSM are expensive.
  • SoftHSM can be vulnerable.

PKCS#11

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What was proposed?

A Threshold Cryptographic Backend.

PKCS#11

Threshold Cryptographic Backend

Threshold Cryptographic backend

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Our work with OpenDNSSEC

PKCS#11

Threshold Cryptographic Backend

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  • Distributed
  • Fault T
  • lerant
  • Robust
  • Secure

Cryptographic backend

Properties of the system

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  • Distributed

– Private key is split into shares and distributed

among n nodes.

– The signing procedure is called in each of the

n nodes.

Properties of the system

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  • Fault-T
  • lerant

– A subset of nodes can fail and the signing

process will be completed succesfully.

Properties of the system

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  • Robust

– Failures and attacks can be reduced

implementing nodes in both difgerent programming languages and operative systems.

Properties of the system

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  • Secure

– No one holds the complete private key. – More than k nodes have to be endangered to

authorize faked signatures.

Properties of the system

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What it is?

  • Basically, a PKCS#11 API

provider.

  • It uses the Threshold

Cryptographic Backend implemented then.

  • It actually signs DNS records.
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What it is not?

  • A fully compliant

PKCS#11 implementation.

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Future work

  • Complete the PKCS#11 implementation,

in order to make it usable directly from BIND (or any other software).

  • T

est on a real zone set.

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Questions?

Francisco Cifuentes

francisco@niclabs.cl