State of the art • 2001 Shor’s algorithm factors 15 on 7 qubits • 2011 Shor’s algorithm factors 21 • 2012 Universal quantum computation on 2 fault tolerant qubits
State of the art • 2001 Shor’s algorithm factors 15 on 7 qubits • 2011 Shor’s algorithm factors 21 • 2012 Universal quantum computation on 2 fault tolerant qubits • 2014-2015 Qubits and gates in silicon chips
State of the art • 2001 Shor’s algorithm factors 15 on 7 qubits • 2011 Shor’s algorithm factors 21 • 2012 Universal quantum computation on 2 fault tolerant qubits • 2014-2015 Qubits and gates in silicon chips • 2015 D-Wave 2X, 1000 qubits, optimization problems, no fault tolerance
State of the art • 2001 Shor’s algorithm factors 15 on 7 qubits • 2011 Shor’s algorithm factors 21 • 2012 Universal quantum computation on 2 fault tolerant qubits • 2014-2015 Qubits and gates in silicon chips • 2015 D-Wave 2X, 1000 qubits, optimization problems, no fault tolerance • 2020 NQIT, Q20:20, fault tolerant (20 qubits), scalable
State of the art • 2001 Shor’s algorithm factors 15 on 7 qubits • 2011 Shor’s algorithm factors 21 • 2012 Universal quantum computation on 2 fault tolerant qubits • 2014-2015 Qubits and gates in silicon chips • 2015 D-Wave 2X, 1000 qubits, optimization problems, no fault tolerance • 2020 NQIT, Q20:20, fault tolerant (20 qubits), scalable • And others...
Towards quantum secure cryptography
Towards quantum secure cryptography Will quantum computers pose a threat to cryptography?
Towards quantum secure cryptography Will quantum computers pose a threat to cryptography? Existing crypto based on unproven hard problems (factoring, discrete log etc)
Towards quantum secure cryptography Will quantum computers pose a threat to cryptography? Existing crypto based on unproven hard problems (factoring, discrete log etc) How long do you want your data to stay secure? ( ∼ 20 years)
Towards quantum secure cryptography Will quantum computers pose a threat to cryptography? Existing crypto based on unproven hard problems (factoring, discrete log etc) How long do you want your data to stay secure? ( ∼ 20 years) How long to make the Internet quantum secure? ( ∼ 20 years)
Towards quantum secure cryptography Will quantum computers pose a threat to cryptography? Existing crypto based on unproven hard problems (factoring, discrete log etc) How long do you want your data to stay secure? ( ∼ 20 years) How long to make the Internet quantum secure? ( ∼ 20 years) What about problems that are hard for quantum computers?
Towards quantum secure cryptography Will quantum computers pose a threat to cryptography? Existing crypto based on unproven hard problems (factoring, discrete log etc) How long do you want your data to stay secure? ( ∼ 20 years) How long to make the Internet quantum secure? ( ∼ 20 years) What about problems that are hard for quantum computers? “ Even if a classical protocol is proven secure based on the hardness of some problem, and that problem is hard even for quantum computers, we have no guarantee that the protocol is secure against quantum computers. ” Dominique Unruh
Quantum Cryptography
Quantum Cryptography • Idea: do not base security on computational problems, but on the laws of physics
Quantum Cryptography • Idea: do not base security on computational problems, but on the laws of physics • Assuming quantum mechanics is correct, unconditional security
Quantum Cryptography • Idea: do not base security on computational problems, but on the laws of physics • Assuming quantum mechanics is correct, unconditional security • Adversary with unlimited power cannot break the encryption
Quantum Cryptography • Idea: do not base security on computational problems, but on the laws of physics • Assuming quantum mechanics is correct, unconditional security • Adversary with unlimited power cannot break the encryption • First development: quantum money scheme
Quantum Cryptography • Idea: do not base security on computational problems, but on the laws of physics • Assuming quantum mechanics is correct, unconditional security • Adversary with unlimited power cannot break the encryption • First development: quantum money scheme • Quantum key distribution
Quantum Cryptography • Idea: do not base security on computational problems, but on the laws of physics • Assuming quantum mechanics is correct, unconditional security • Adversary with unlimited power cannot break the encryption • First development: quantum money scheme • Quantum key distribution • Uses one-time pad
One-time pad
One-time pad M 1
One-time pad ⊕ M 1 Key
One-time pad ⊕ = M 1 Key C 1
One-time pad ⊕ = M 1 Key C 1 C 1 ⊕ Key = M 1
One-time pad
One-time pad M 2 ⊕ Key = C 2
One-time pad M 2 ⊕ Key = C 2 ⊕ = M 1 ⊕ M 2 C 1 C 2
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Make two parties share a random secret key
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Make two parties share a random secret key Arbitrary size key → arbitrary number of messages
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Make two parties share a random secret key Arbitrary size key → arbitrary number of messages Communication bandwidth limited by key rate
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Make two parties share a random secret key Arbitrary size key → arbitrary number of messages Communication bandwidth limited by key rate • BB84
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Make two parties share a random secret key Arbitrary size key → arbitrary number of messages Communication bandwidth limited by key rate • BB84 • Uncertainty principle
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Make two parties share a random secret key Arbitrary size key → arbitrary number of messages Communication bandwidth limited by key rate • BB84 • Uncertainty principle • No cloning
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Make two parties share a random secret key Arbitrary size key → arbitrary number of messages Communication bandwidth limited by key rate • BB84 • Uncertainty principle • No cloning • Unconditional security (based on QM)
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) What about exploiting the implementation?
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) What about exploiting the implementation? Not a problem!
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