a servant of two masters Luca Tummolini Istituto di Scienze e - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Guilt-aversion: a servant of two masters

Luca Tummolini

Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione - CNR luca.tummolini@istc.cnr.it Goal-oriented Agents Lab -- www.istc.cnr.it/group/goal SINTELNET Working Group 4: Socio-technical Epistemology

Explaining pro-social behaviour

Different theories: Social preferences Team preferences Social norms Guilt-aversion: Social preferences Team preferences Social norms

The economics of guilt- aversion

Guilt as a belief-based emotion The prototypical case:

• “If people feel guilt for hurting their partners … and for failing

to live up to their expectations, they will alter their behavior (to avoid guilt) in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship”

• Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton

(1994) Guilt & empathy

The economics of guilt- aversion

Psychological game-theory Belief-based motivations Trust Game

[1,1] [0,4] [2,2] Ann Bob Trust Grab No Trust Share

Guilt-aversion: a micro- foundation of social norms?

Social norms and second-order expectations

• Lewis (1969); Sugden (1986); Bicchieri (2006)

Charness & Dufwenberg (2006):

Social norm is a moral expectations that people are inclined to live up to Guilt-aversion provides the motivation to behave according to the social norm

Outline

I will argue that the theory of guilt- aversion:

• 1. has a too-broad domain
• 2. should model entitled (vs

empirical) expectations

• 3. is unable to explain norm

compliance This is due to:

• 4. limiting attention to problems of

distributing of the benefits of cooperation

• 5. ignoring the problem of

generating those benefits

• 6. By focusing on these two

complementary problems, it is useful to discriminate between an aversion to:

• empathic guilt
• norm-based guilt

Guilt-aversion and promise- keeping

Promise-keeping is a social norm

• Bicchieri & Lev-On (2007)

Empirical evidence that communication improves cooperation and trust/trustworthiness Guilt-aversion is a possible mechanism

• Charness & Dufwenberg (2006)

“Guilt aversion provides a route by which communication may influence

• behavior. For example, by making a promise to [SHARE], B may

strengthen A’s belief that B will [SHARE]. This may be plausible, because if B believes that A’s belief that B will [SHARE] is strengthened by the promise, then this strengthens the incentives for B to [SHARE]” Charness & Dufwenberg (2006)

Why do we keep our promises?

Empirical evidence against the role of guilt-aversion in promise-keeping

• Vanberg (2008); Ellingsen et al

(2010)

A belief-based preference or a preference to keep one’s promises? Limited empirical support for both theories

• Charness & Dufwenberg (2010)

Are these theories about the same phenomenon?

Maybe Colin Firth can help...

An example: eco-guilt aversion

• “After all it’s not entirely wrong to want or need

stuff [...] we shouldn’t blame the guy in the car for exacerbating climate change, when he’s just trying to get to work.

• Making him feel guilty doesn’t help anybody.
• The real eco shriekers, who walk around like

ghastly preachers are probably a necessary evil but we don’t have to like them. Their Cromwellian take on proceedings and scoffing at attempts to make and buy better (they would for example contend that owning a Prius is actually evil) could be said to make things worse.” Colin Firth http://www.eco-age.com/item/443- VIEW_FROM_THE_NAUGHTY_STEP_

Pro-environmental behaviour

Pro-environmental behaviour:

• behaviour that aims to

minimize the negative impact of one’s actions on the natural and built world

• minimize resource and

energy consumption, use of non-toxic substances, reduce waste production Examples:

• recycle your waste (vs trash

it)

• unplug appliances (phone)

when not in use

• buy local and organic food
• support companies that sell

eco-friendly products

• walking, carpooling or using

public transportations (vs driving)

Eco-guilt

Eco-guilt aversion is not a case of interpersonal guilt aversion By not conforming to eco-norms, one does not personally harm someone else! Eco-guilt results from being aware of having violated a social norm even if others’ payoff expectations have not been disappointed Caveat: exclude cases

• agents adopting the “function” of the norm (e.g. eco-

shriekers)

• irrational agents that instrumentally link individual’s

behaviour with collective outcomes

Guilt in two senses

Psychologists of emotions distinguish between two senses of guilt: Sense of empathic guilt:

• Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Hoffman, 1981;

Hoffman, 1987; Nieden-thal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1999; Tangney & Dearing, 2002

Sense of norm-based guilt:

• Izard, 1977; Lewis, 1971; Monteith, 1993; Mosher, 1965;

Mosher, 1966; Piers & Singer, 1971; Wertheim & Schwartz, 1983

The sense of empathic guilt is inter-personal

• “I feel guilty for having unfairly harmed someone!”

Empathic guilt-aversion motivates to meet others’ expectation of reward when one:

• 1. has caused the harm
• 2. the harm caused is unfair

Guilt in two senses

The sense of norm-based guilt is intra-personal and pertain to norm violation per se “I feel guilt for violating a norm!” Norm-based guilt-aversion motivates to meet others’ expectation when others rely on them

Empathic guilt and the problem

• f distributing the benefits

The benefits of cooperation are obtained if the problem

• f their distribution is solved

The distribution problem is a cooperation problem Distributive justice and the sense of fairness Sense of fairness: norm or social preference? Fairness norm & empathetic preferences (Binmore 2005) Social preference (Bowles & Gintis 2011)

Norm-based guilt and the problem of generating the benefits

The benefits of cooperation are obtained if the problem

• f their generation is solved
• Calcott (2008); Sterelny (2012)

The generation problem is a coordination problem

Promise-keeping and empathic guilt-aversion

By promising, the promisor has intentionally induced the promisee to rely

• n his behavior

Inducing reliance and then disappointing it is wrong because it causes an unjust harm It presupposes that we care for fairness: by breaking a promise the promisor disappoints the entitled expectation of the promisee to receive what he deserves and cause him an unjust harm The entitled expectation is on the outcome and is harbored only by the promisee In this perspective a promise is valuable for the problem of the distribution of benefits: If I will not obtain my fair share, I will not cooperate A promise is viewed as a proposal for a joint action (cooperation) that if accepted (uptake) establish the joint project (that you rely one me while I do a)

Promise-keeping and norm- based guilt-aversion

The harm is due to the fact the people usually do what they promise to do Promising and doing what one has promised enable the fact that

• ne can induce reliance in others by promising

The fact that the you are predictable is what ensure that I can rely on you and do my share It is in this second sense that keeping a promise is a norm Not doing what one has promised to do is wrong simply because it does not conform to the standard set by the norm of promising What is unjust is not the effect on the promisee, but the action itself of breaking the promise

Promise-keeping and norm- based guilt-aversion

The entitled expectation is only that the promisor keeps the promise (i.e. the action) and is harbored by any of the bystanders (including the promisee) In this perspective, a promise is valuable for the problem of generation of benefits If I do not know what you will do, I will not be able to coordinate with you and I will not cooperate It presupposes that we care for predictability (= norm compliance) The value of predictability is a cognitive value

Promise-keeping and philosophy

Rawls (1971): fairness principle and the institution of promising Scanlon (1990; 1999): principle of fidelity, expectations and promising Velleman (2003; 2009): guilt as anxiety about social exclusion that is entitled fear of losing attitudinal trust as assumption of good will

Conclusions

Guilt-aversion is a servant of two masters: The problem of the distribution of benefits The problem of the generation of benefits A more plausible model of guilt-aversion should explicitly deal with:Fairness considerations and entitled expectations when modelling empathic guiltThe cognitive value of predictability when modelling norm-based guilt Promise-keeping is complex because it involves both empathic and norm-based guilt feelings

Thank you...

Giulia Andrighetto

Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione (CNR) & European University Institute (EUI)

Daniela Grieco

University of Verona & Bocconi University

joint work with