a near equitable 2 person cake cutting algorithm
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A near equitable 2-person cake cutting algorithm Katarna Cechlrov and Eva Pillrov Faculty of Science, P. J. afrik University, Koice Motivation fair division of a certain resource (cake), between n people cake represented by


  1. A near equitable 2-person cake cutting algorithm Katarína Cechlárová and Eva Pillárová Faculty of Science, P. J. Šafárik University, Košice

  2. Motivation ’fair’ division of a certain resource (cake), between n people cake represented by interval � 0 , 1 � players: different opinions about the values of different parts of the cake these valuations are private information of players various notions of fairness constructive approach is sought Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  3. Valuation of player i for interval I = � p, q � is denoted by U i ( I ) = U i ( p, q ) Assumptions: the valuation is (i) nonnegative, i.e. U i ( I ) ≥ 0 for each interval I ⊆ � 0 , 1 � , (ii) additive, i.e. U i ( I ∪ J ) = U i ( I ) + U i ( J ) for any two disjoint intervals I, J , (iii) divisible, i.e. for each I = � p, q � ⊆ � 0 , 1 � and each λ ∈ � 0 , 1 � there exists r ∈ � p, q � such that U i ( p, r ) = λ U i ( p, q ) , and (iv) normalized, i.e. U i (0 , 1) = 1 . Valuation can be represented by a nonnegative integrable utility 1 function u i : � 0 , 1 � → R such that � u i ( x )d x = 1 . 0 q � U i ( p, q ) = u i ( x )d x for p ≤ q p Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  4. Notions of fairness Definition A simple cake division is a pair d c = ( d, ϕ ) , where d is an ( n − 1) tuple ( x 1 , x 2 ..., x n − 1 ) of cutpoints, 0 < x 1 < x 2 < ... < x n − 1 < 1 , and ϕ : N → N is a permutation of N . Definition Let d c = ( d, ϕ ) be a simple cake division for the set of players N . Then d c is called a) simple fair, if U ϕ ( j ) ( x j − 1 , x j ) ≥ 1 /n for each j ∈ N b) exact, if U ϕ ( j ) ( x k − 1 , x k ) = 1 /n for each j, k ∈ N c) envy-free, if U ϕ ( j ) ( x j − 1 , x j ) ≥ U ϕ ( j ) ( x k − 1 , x k ) for each j, k ∈ N d) equitable, if U ϕ ( j ) ( x j − 1 , x j ) = U ϕ ( k ) ( x k − 1 , x k ) for each j, k ∈ N Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  5. Relations between notions of fairness each envy-free cake division is simple fair for n = 2 , each simple fair cake division is envy-free, but this is not necessarily true for more than two players for n > 2 not every simple fair division is equitable (example: famous divide-and-choose procedure) if in an equitable division the common value of the pieces is at least 1 /n , fairness is ensured a fair equitable division may be neither envy-free nor exact for n = 2 , equitability with values 1/2 is equivalent to exactness. Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  6. Brief history of cake cutting Talmud, the bankruptcy problem: one of the oldest recorded fair-division problems (Auman, Maschler 1985) the famous algorithm ’I cut, you choose’ goes back the Hebrew Bible (Brams, Taylor 1999) a rigorous mathematical theory of fair division started (Steinhaus, Banach and Knaster 1948) existence results: simple fair (Steinhaus 1948) envy-free (Stronquist 1980) moving-knife algorithms (Gardner 1978) Recommended reading: J. Robertson, W. Webb, Cake Cutting Algorithms , A.K. Peters, 1998. Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  7. Simple equitable cake divisions for two players e ∈ (0 , 1) is an equitable point if U 1 (0 , e ) = U 2 ( e, 1) or, equivalently, U 1 ( e, 1) = U 2 (0 , e ) Set of all equitable points: E Theorem For two players, the set E is always nonempty and connected. Moreover, U 1 (0 , e ) and U 2 ( e, 1) are constant on E and either U 1 (0 , e ) = 1 / 2 or exactly one of the two simple divisions generated by e is simple fair for each e ∈ E . Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  8. A finite algorithm uses a finite number of requests ’Cut the given cake piece into two pieces whose values are in the given ratio!’ (cutting query) ’What is your value of the given cake piece?’ (evaluation query) No need to know the complete value functions of players. Moving-knife algorithms are not finite. Impossibility results: no finite algorithm can produce exact division for two players (Robertson and Webb 1997) envy-free division for three players where everybody gets a single piece (Stromquist 2008) Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  9. ε -equitability Definition Let d c = ( d, ϕ ) be a simple cake division and ε > 0 a real number. Then d c is called ε -equitable if | U ϕ ( j ) ( x j − 1 , x j ) − U ϕ ( k ) ( x k − 1 , x k ) | ≤ ε for each j, k ∈ N . Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  10. ε -exact algorithms Robertson, Webb 1997 Player 1 cuts the cake into pieces smaller than ε/ 2 Then player 2 can reduce the pieces to be smaller than ε/ 2 A near exact division produced by a suitable assignment of the obtained pieces to players. Disadvantage: many small pieces, scattered over the whole cake. Simmons, Su 2003: Consensus halving Theorem (Borsuk-Ulam) For any continuous function f : S n → R n there exist antipodal points x, − x ∈ S n such that f ( x ) = f ( − x ) . Advantage: n cut points for n players Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  11. Algorithm bisect begin a 1 := half 1 (0 , 1); b 1 := half 2 (0 , 1) ; if a 1 = b 1 then cut the cake in a 1 and halt; if a 1 > b 1 then rename the players; p 1 2 := half 1 (0 , 1); q 1 2 := 1; p 2 2 := 0; q 2 2 := half 2 (0 , 1); j := 1 ; repeat j := j + 1 ; a j := half 1 ( p 1 j , q 1 j ) ; b j := half 2 ( p 2 j , q 2 j ) ; if a j � = b j then begin if a j < b j then (comment: successful iteration) begin right ( p 1 j , q 1 j , a j , p 1 j +1 , q 1 j +1 ) ; left ( p 2 j , q 2 j , b j , p 2 j +1 , q 2 j +1 ) end ; if a j > b j then (comment: unsuccessful iteration) begin left ( p 1 j , q 1 j , a j , p 1 j +1 , q 1 j +1 ) ; right ( p 2 j , q 2 j , b j , p 2 j +1 , q 2 j +1 ) end ; end until a j = b j or 1 / 2 j − 1 < ε ; � � p 1 j , p 2 � � q 1 j , q 2 �� if a j � = b j then cut the cake in c := max + min / 2 j j else cut the cake in a j ; end Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  12. Example 1   2 if x ∈ � 0 , 1 / 4 � 3 / 2 if x ∈ � 0 , 1 / 3 �   u 1 ( x ) = 0 if x ∈ (1 / 4 , 3 / 4 � u 2 ( x ) = 0 if x ∈ (1 / 3 , 2 / 3 � 2 if x ∈ (3 / 4 , 1 � 3 / 2 if x ∈ (2 / 3 , 1 �   Let a 1 = 1 / 4 b 1 = 1 / 3 E = � 1 / 3 , 2 / 3 � with the common fair values equal to 1/2. j →∞ a j = 3 / 4 / lim ∈ E j →∞ b j = 1 / 3 ∈ E lim Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  13. Example 2  2 if x ∈ � 0 , 1 / 4)  1 / 2 if x ∈ � 0 , 1 / 2)     3 if x ∈ � 1 / 4 , 1 / 3) 0 if x ∈ � 1 / 2 , 3 / 4)   u 1 ( x ) = u 2 ( x ) = if x ∈ � 1 / 3 , 2 / 3) if x ∈ � 3 / 4 , 7 / 8) 0 2     3 / 4 if x ∈ � 2 / 3 , 1 � 4 if x ∈ � 7 / 8 , 1 �   E = � 1 / 2 , 2 / 3 � with the common fair values equal to 3/4. Second iteration successful: A ≥ 1 / 3 and B ≤ 3 / 4 All next iterations unsuccessful, since a j > 2 / 3 and b j < 1 / 2 . Both players: pieces of value 3/4. lim j →∞ a j = 2 / 3 lim j →∞ b j = 1 / 2 Second iteration unsuccessful: a j ∈ (1 / 4 , 1 / 3) , b j ∈ (3 / 4 , 7 / 8) for j > 2 . All following iterations sucessful, lim j →∞ a j = 1 / 3 lim j →∞ b j = 3 / 4 Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  14. Properties of the algorithm Lemma In each iteration j ≥ 2 : � p i j , q i � � p i j − 1 , q i � ( a ) ⊂ for both players i = 1 , 2 j j − 1 j ) = 1 / 2 j − 1 for both players i = 1 , 2 ( b ) U i ( p i j , q i ( c ) p 1 j = a ℓ and q 2 j = b ℓ where ℓ : the last successful iteration before j ( d ) U 1 (0 , a j ) = U 2 ( b j , 1) ( e ) U 1 (0 , p 1 j ) = U 2 ( q 2 j , 1) , hence U 1 (0 , A ) = U 2 ( B, 1) � � � � ( f ) p 1 j , q 1 ∩ p 2 j , q 2 � = ∅ j j ( g ) | U 1 (0 , c ) − U 2 ( c, 1) | ≤ 1 / 2 j − 1 for each c ∈ � p 1 j , q 1 � ∩ � p 2 j , q 2 � j j Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  15. Proof of the Lemma ( a ) Directly from the definition of algorithm bisect . ( b ) Directly from the definition of algorithm bisect . ( c ) Directly from the definition of algorithm bisect . ( d ) Induction on j . Assume, that U 1 (0 , a k ) = U 2 ( b k , 1) for every k < j . Then U 1 (0 , a j ) = U 1 (0 , p 1 j )+ U 1 ( p 1 j , a j ) = U 1 (0 , a ℓ )+ U 1 ( p 1 j , q 1 j ) / 2 = U 2 ( b ℓ , 1) + U 2 ( p 2 j , q 2 j ) / 2 = U 2 ( b j , q 2 j ) + U 2 ( q 2 j , 1) = U 2 ( b j , 1) , hence the desired equality follows. ( e ) Follows from ( c ) and ( d ) . Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

  16. Proof of the Lemma – continued � p k 1 , q k � ( f ) In the first iteration we have = � 0 , 1 � for both k ; in 1 p 1 2 , q 1 p 2 2 , q 2 � � � � the second one = � a 1 , 1 � and = � 0 , b 1 � and 2 2 since after eventuall renaming of player we have a j < b j , the claim holds for j = 1 , 2 . Now let us suppose that � � � � p 1 j , q 1 p 2 j , q 2 ∩ � = ∅ for some j ≥ 2 . Those two intervals j j intersect if and only if p 1 j ≤ q 2 j and simultaneously p 2 j ≤ q 1 j . The algorithm proceeds to the next iteration only if a j � = b j and we distinguish now the successful and unsuccessful iteration. Herl ’any, Apríl 2010 K. Cechlárová

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