2020 in best shape since early 2000s Second straight budget surplus - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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2020 in best shape since early 2000s Second straight budget surplus - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Ireland: Begins 2020 in best shape since early 2000s Second straight budget surplus in 2019 January 2020 Index Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 23: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 38: Brexit Page 46: Long-term fundamentals Page 57:


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SLIDE 1

Ireland: Begins 2020 in best shape since early 2000s

Second straight budget surplus in 2019

January 2020

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SLIDE 2

2

Index

Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 23: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 38: Brexit Page 46: Long-term fundamentals Page 57: Property Page 63: Other Data Page 72: Annex (GDP distortions explainer)

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SLIDE 3

Full employment as debt sustainability improves

Summary

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SLIDE 4
  • 400
  • 300
  • 200
  • 100

100 200 2008 2011 2014 2017 Non-Construction Employment Construction Employment Total Employment vs 2008 peak

4

Domestic economy growing: averaging 4%+ since 2014

Dramatic drop in unemployment rate Employment (000s) well above 2008 peak True growth healthy

* Underlying series is modified final domestic demand (excludes inventories)

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% GDP Underlying* 16.0 4.8 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019

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SLIDE 5

5

Ireland is improving its debt sustainability year-by-year

Ireland is improving its debt dynamics by the month Debt-to-GNI* (100% 2019f, from 166% peak) Debt-to-GG Revenue (243% 2019f, from 353%) Average interest rate (2.3% 2019f, from 5.1%) Debt-to-GDP^ (59% 2019f, from 120%) Debt headed below 100% of national income Two years of budget surplus (€bn)

^ due to GDP distortions, Debt to GDP is not representative for Ireland, we suggest using other measures listed.

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019f Ireland (GNI*) Ireland (GDP)

  • 25
  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019f GG Balance Primary Balance

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SLIDE 6

6

Main risks are external and outside of Ireland’s control

Brexit

Dea Deal is is lik likely to

  • be

be pass passed in in UK K parl parliament mea eaning the im immediate ris isk is is gon

  • ne.

The catch for

  • r Ireland is

is tha hat Britain reverts s to

  • WTO rul

ules s in in the en end and and di diverges s fr from EU EU reg egs. .

US

Ireland is still a “high beta” bet on the US S ec economy, in n part particular it its s ICT sec sector. US S is is in in the la late stag age of

  • f it

its s ec economic cy cycle, alt although in interest rate cu cuts s may extend it its s du duration

Tax

Corporation tax x reform may im impact Ireland's 's ec economic model in in the he medium term. The OECD BEP EPS II pr process ss is is se set to

  • be

be completed by en end 20 2020 20

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SLIDE 7

7

Funding range of €10-14bn for 2020 – down from 2019

€10 10-14bn

Funding ran ange is is €10 10-14bn for

  • r

the the com

  • ming yea

ear Irela eland has has €20bn bn+ in in out

  • utfl

flows s in in 2020, , so

  • the

the NTM NTMA will ill run run do down som

  • me of
  • f its

its cash ash buf buffer

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties s in in Eur Europe The he NTM NTMA us used ECB CB QE QE to

  • extend deb

debt t maturi rity, redu educe in interest t cos

  • st

t and and rep epay y the the IMF

AA AA-

Irela eland has has be been up upgrade to

  • AA

spa pace by y S& S&P Ireland’s debt sustainability has be been im impr proving an and Br Brexi xit ris risk k has has rece eceded

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SLIDE 8

Economy still healthy, but manufacturing has softened in line with global conditions

Section 1: Macro

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SLIDE 9

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

9

  • 10.0%
  • 8.0%
  • 6.0%
  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0%

  • 100
  • 80
  • 60
  • 40
  • 20

20 40 60 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Total Employment (Quarterly net chg, 000s) Total Employment (Y-o-Y growth rate, RHS)

Labour market best illustrates Ireland’s growth story – Ireland is close to full employment

Unemployment rate: down to 4.8% in December 2019 from peak of 16% Employment growth consistently above 2%; average net jobs increase of 15K a quarter

Ireland back to unemployment levels seen pre-crisis

Source: CSO

2.3m people employed

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SLIDE 10

10

High-skill employment has grown sharply (index, 100 = end 2008)

Labour participation has not yet fully recovered as young stay in school

High-skill employment an important driver; though labour participation rate has been slow to recover

Source: Eurostat; CSO High sk0ill jobs include the ISCO08 defined groupings Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals

58% 59% 60% 61% 62% 63% 64% 65% 66% 67% 68% 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019

Rate inflated pre-crisis by migrant construction workers

70 80 90 100 110 120 130 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 High Skill Other

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SLIDE 11
  • 10%
  • 8%
  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Hours worked Hourly wage Employment Other Compensation COE growth (y-o-y)

11

Wage growth a driver for increase in compensation of employees… … but disparities remain across sectors

Wage growth evident in 2019 but uneven across sectors

Source: Eurostat, CSO

15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% Admin & Support Transport/Storage Wholesale/Retail Arts & Rec IT Fin, Insurance & RE Construction Total Health Accom & Food Education Industry Prof, science & tech Public admin 4Q average hourly earnings y-o-y Q2 2019 2019 Q3 average annual earnings (€000, RHS)

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12

y = -0.7267x + 0.0943 R² = 0.8

  • 4.0%
  • 2.0%

0.0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0% 10.0% 12.0% 2.0% 5.0% 8.0% 11.0% 14.0% 17.0% Nominal COE growth per head Unemployment Rate

Inflation (%) in Ireland similar to rest of euro area currently – Brexit ref. impact has gone At full employment, wage growth could become an issue if Brexit outcome is benign

Despite being late cycle, inflation is low; Ireland’s Phillips Curve might be starting to bite

Source: CSO, NTMA analysis; Non-Agriculture employment /wage data on yearly basis (1999-2018) Source: CSO, Eurostat

Unemployment reached 5% in Q3 2019

  • 4
  • 3
  • 2
  • 1

1 2 3 4 HICP Ireland HICP Euro Area

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SLIDE 13

13

GNI* was €197bn in 2018; 7.3% higher than in 2017 (current prices or cash basis) GNI* growth rate averaged 8% in 2013-2018 (current prices or cash basis)

GDP distortions mean we need to look to other metrics; Irish recovery evident when looking at GNI*

Source: CSO Note: See annex for discussion on the GDP distortions from 2015 onwards

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 GDP GNI* GNI* is 61% of GDP

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% GDP Growth GNI* Growth

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SLIDE 14

14

In real terms underlying growth in Ireland averaged 4.3% since 2014 MFDD measure driven by consumption; investment slowed by Brexit uncertainty

When looking for price-adjusted timely data, modified final domestic demand is the best measure

Source: CSO Note MDD measure used here includes private consumption, government consumption, building investment, elements of machinery & equipment investment, elements of intangible asset investment. See annex for more detail.

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Modified Domestic Demand MFDD (MDD ex stocks)

  • 15.0%
  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Investment Consumption Govt MFDD

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SLIDE 15

15

Breakdown of the Irish economy by sector – Industry (pharma) and ICT are 40% of GVA Information and communication sector has expanded rapidly in recent years

Economy has been driven by multinational growth – in particular ICT; tech grew 26% in year to Sept 2019

Source: CSO (2018) Note GVA figures adjusted for distortions in 2015. A depreciation charge was subtracted from industry GVA in 2015 and onwards to take account of multinational effects.

Industry, 27.2%

Construction + Real Estate, 9.1%

Dist, trans, hotels, rest., 13.0% ICT, 17.1% Financial, 8.0% Prof, Admin and Support , 11.6% P Admin, Educ & Health, 11.4% Other, 2.6%

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 ICT % of Economy (GVA adjusted for 2015 distortions) ICT Sector (GVA 4Q y-o-y)

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SLIDE 16

16

Manufacturing PMIs across the globe declined in 2019 Ireland’s PMIs slipping much like rest of globe – services above 50 however

Manufacturing is declining like elsewhere in the world; services are robust but growth has decelerated

Source: Bloomberg

Country PMI Dec Dec 2018 2018 PMI Dec Dec 20 2019 19 EU 51.5 46.4 France 49.7 50.4 Germany 51.5 43.7 Italy 49.2 46.2 Japan 52.6 48.4 Spain 51.1 47.4 UK 54.3 47.5 US 53.8 52.4 World 51.4 50.1

30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Services Manufacturing Composite

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SLIDE 17

17

Consumer spending growth consistent around 3%

Private consumption expanded by 3.3% in 2018 – steady trend emerging Ireland’s consuming faster than Euro Area peers

Source: CSO; Eurostat

45 55 65 75 85 95 105 115

  • 6%
  • 3%

0% 3% 6% 9% 12% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Consumption Growth (4Q Y-o-Y) Consumption (€bns, RHS)

  • 6%
  • 4%
  • 2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Ireland Euro Area

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SLIDE 18
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Credit advanced to Business (y-o-y) Lending for house purchase (y-o-y)

  • 40%
  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Investment Building & Construction Investment ex B+C

18

Lending for house purchase only edging into positive territory

Crucially the recovery was not driven by credit; debt reduction ended as recently as 2018

Source: CBI; CSO Note: Credit to business series excludes financial intermediation and property related credit Note: Modified investment excludes impact of imports of intangible and aircraft leasing assets

Modified investment led solely by building & construction; mach. & equipment is sluggish

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SLIDE 19

19

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% Public and Private debt (% of GNI*) Private debt (% of GNI*) Public debt (% of GNI*) 2003 2008 2013 2018 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 Debt (€Bns) Disposable Income (€Bns) Debt-to-Income Ratio (%) 2008 2013 2018

Household debt ratio has decreased due to deleveraging and increasing incomes Legacy of crisis is on the Government balance sheet not the private sector’s

Private debt levels remain elevated but Ireland has used recovery period to repair balance sheets

Source: CBI data, CSO Source: CBI Note: Private debt includes household and Irish-resident enterprises (ex. financial intermediation) CBI quarterly financial accounts data used for household and CSO data for nominal government liabilities.

Economic growth has allowed smooth private sector deleveraging

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SLIDE 20

20

Gross household saving rate lower than peak but close to EU average Interest burden down to well below 4% of disposable income from peak of 11%

Savings rate around EU average – pointing towards households being more prudent

Source: Eurostat, ONS, CSO ; CBI, Eurostat NTMA calculations Note: Gross Savings as calculated by the CSO has tended to be a volatile series in the past, some caution is warranted when interpreting this data

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 % of f di disp sposable le Inc ncome Ireland EA-19 Germany Spain Italy Netherlands 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 % of Disposable Income (4Q MA) Ireland EU-28 EA-19 UK

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21

External environment worst since 2012 for Ireland? Brexit deal would alleviate short term risks

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020f EA Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative Less accommodative Accommodative in Q4 Accommodative US Monetary Policy Accommodative Accommodative Accommodative but tightening Further tightening Easing Easy policy continuing US growth Stimulative Less stimulative Stimulative Stimulative due to fiscal package YC inversion, but still growing Labour market strength Oil price Falling Falling Rising Falling Flat y-o-y Rising on tensions? UK growth Stimulative Less favourable; Brexit impact Growth slowing Growth slowing Brexit risks Brexit risks reduced for 2020 Euro Growth Stimulative Stimulative Stimulative Slowing growth Sluggish Unimpressive Euro currency Very Helpful Helpful Headwind Neutral No change y-o-y

  • v. £; weaker v $

Neutral?

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SLIDE 22

22

Goods exports outside MNC-dominated sectors rebounding (y-o-y change)

  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Exports Chemical Products and Computer Services Exports ex. Chem & Comp

Current account is distorted heavily by MNEs: modified CA is consistent with GNI*

Export growth has rebounded in 2019; Ireland is living within its means

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Current Account (% of GNI*) Modified Current Account (% of GNI*)

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations Nominal values, exports excludes contract manufacturing. Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland’s current account data. MNC’s action distort metrics heavily.

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SLIDE 23

Ireland likely to have recorded second straight budget surplus in 2019

Section 2: Fiscal & NTMA funding

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SLIDE 24

24

Funding range of €10-14bn for 2020 – down from 2019

€10 10-14bn

Funding ran ange is is €10 10-14bn for

  • r

the the com

  • ming yea

ear Irela eland has has €20bn bn+ in in out

  • utfl

flows s in in 2020, , so

  • the

the NTM NTMA will ill run run do down som

  • me of
  • f its

its cash ash buf buffer

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties s in in Eur Europe The he NTM NTMA us used ECB CB QE QE to

  • extend deb

debt t maturi rity, redu educe in interest t cos

  • st

t and and rep epay y the the IMF

AA AA-

Irela eland has has be been up upgrade to

  • AA

spa pace by y S& S&P Ireland’s debt sustainability has be been im impr proving an and Br Brexi xit ris risk k has has rece eceded

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SLIDE 25

25

Maturity profile: IMF repayment and FRN buy-backs have reduced refinancing risk; Green diversifies investor base

Source: NTMA Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extensions. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any

  • f its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the

2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Billions € Bond (Fixed) EFSM EFSF Bond (Floating Rate) Green Other (incl. Bilateral)

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SLIDE 26

26

The NTMA took advantage of QE to extend debt profile

…Ireland (in years) now compares favourably to other EU countries Various operations have extended the maturity of Government debt …

Source: NTMA; ECB *excludes programme loans. Ireland’s maturity including these loans is still similar

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-53 € Billions Debt Prefunded Long-term Extensions since 2014 Debt Profile 10.6 10.4 10.2 8.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.6 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.3 2 4 6 8 10 12 Govt Debt Securities - Weighted Maturity EA Govt Debt Securities - Avg. Weighted Maturity

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27

Funding requirements will be met by mix of new issuance and rundown of cash

Two bonds mature in 2020, the first in April and the second in October. Four of the remaining five tranches of the UK bilateral loan mature in 2020. Exchequer Borrowing Requirement could be smaller than estimated if Brexit withdrawal agreement is ratified by UK. Existing cash balances will be run down to meet part of the 2020 funding requirement.

Notes: Short Term Pap aper er (ST T pape per) = Net growth in marketable short-term debt (Treasury Bills and Commercial Paper). Intra Go Govt .fund funds = Expected growth in funding from domestic public sector sources. Other her fund nding ng requ quirem ement ents includes general contingency provision e.g. for potential Floating Rate Note purchases. Other her sour urces Includes other cash inflows and expected European Investment Bank loan drawdowns. Mid-point of €10bn-€14bn bond funding range is used for illustrative purposes.

Bond Issuance: 12 EBR: 2 ST paper: 1

Redemption

  • f Bonds: 17

Intra Govt. 1

UK Bilateral 2

Other: 1 Other: 3 Run-down

  • f cash: 8

€- €4 €8 €12 €16 €20 €24 Funding Requirements (€bn) Sources of Funding (€bn)

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28

NTMA issued €69bn MLT debt since 2015; 14.1 yr. weighted maturity; avg. rate of 1.04% Interest costs forecasted pre-QE to be c.€10bn; will drop below €5bn by end 2019

ECB policy and NTMA’s funding strategy have lowered the State’s interest burden

Source: NTMA, CSO, Department of Finance Only showing marketable MLT debt (auctions and syndications). Other issuance such as inflation linked bonds, private placement and amortising bonds occurred but not shown.

2 4 6 8 10 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 GG interest (€bns) SPU 2014 Estimates 2019-2021 Latest Estimates 5Y 8Y 5Y 10Y 10Y 16Y 7Y 30Y 10Y 5Y 20Y 10Y 12Y 15Y 10Y 12Y 30Y 5.5 3.9 2.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 3 6 9 12 15 18 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020f € Billions Auction Syndication Weighted Average Yield % (LHS)

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29

Ireland roughly split 80/20 on non-resident versus resident holdings (H1 ‘19) “Sticky” sources - official loans, Eurosystem, retail - make up over 50% of Irish debt

Diverse holders of Irish debt – sticky sources account for

  • ver 50%

Source: CSO, Eurostat, CBI, ECB, NTMA Analysis IGBs excludes those held by Eurosystem. Eurosystem holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of

  • FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA. Other debt Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC-

related liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

IGBs - Private Non Resident 35% 7%, Resident Short term 4% Eurosystem 21% 10%, Resident Other Debt (incl. Official) 22% 50 100 150 200 250 Other Debt (incl. Official) Retail Eurosystem Short term IGBs - Private Resident IGBs - Private Non Resident Total Debt (€bns)

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30

Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

Investor breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications

Source: NTMA

6.0% 26.4% 6.9% 45.0% 13.4% Ireland UK US and Canada Continental Europe Nordics Asia & Other Fund/Asset Manager, 37.2% Banks/ Central Banks, 38.4% Pensions/ Insurance, 14.2% Other, 10.2%

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31

US yield curve has inverted (albeit only slightly so far): could be waiting a while yet PSPP restarting + re-investment means ECB will be active In IGBs in 2020

Late cycle risks mixed for Ireland: yield curve sets recession clock ticking but central banks are now easing

Source: DataStream, ECB *S *Shaded area reas indicate re recessionary periods in the US US

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 Q1 2015 Q3 2015 Q1 2016 Q3 2016 Q1 2017 Q3 2017 Q1 2018 Q3 2018 Q1 2019 Q3 2019 Q1 2020f Q3 2020f € Billions PSPP IGB purchases (RHS) Cumulative Purchases (LHS)

Reinvest- ment included

  • 3%
  • 2%
  • 1%

0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 US 10 year bond yield minus 3m Treasury bill yield

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SLIDE 32
  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% GGB (% of GNI*) GGB ex. CT receipts (% of GNI*)

32

  • Gen. Govt. Balance in surplus but might

slip into deficit in case of no-deal Brexit Revenue surge has helped Ireland balance the books since 2015 (€bn)

Ireland recorded full budget surplus for first time in 11 years in 2018: another one likely for 2019

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

Surplus is back due to CT windfall

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f 2021f € Billions GG Expenditure (ex-banking recap) GG Revenue GG Revenue 10yr rolling average

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SLIDE 33
  • 4
  • 2

2 4 Romania France Italy Spain Poland UK Belgium EU28 EA Latvia Slovakia Portugal Finland Estonia Croatia Czech Rep Lithuania Austria Sweden Greece Denmark Slovenia Ireland(GNI*) Bulgaria Germany Malta Luxembourg Netherlands Cyprus

33

In recent years Ireland has run primary surpluses that reduced debt ratios 2019 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP) forecasts; Ireland moving up the ranks

Ireland has improved its debt dynamics: next step is to follow others and run a GGB surplus for many years

Source: CSO; Department of Finance, EU Commission forecasts, NTMA calculation Note: Debt Stabilising primary balance is the primary balance it is necessary to run in a year to keep the debt-to-GNI* ratio from rising given the average interest rate and growth in that year.

  • 30.0%
  • 25.0%
  • 20.0%
  • 15.0%
  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% Primary Balance (% of GNI*) Debt Stabilising PB (% of GNI*)

~

  • 40%

Surplus is back due to CT windfall

slide-34
SLIDE 34

34

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019f Debt to GNI* Debt to GDP 37% 67% 80% 87% 90% 86% 66% 65% 59% 55% 51% 25% 19% 32% 33% 30% 18% 11% 9% 9% 9% 8% 62% 86% 111% 120% 120% 104% 77% 74% 68% 64% 59% 57% 56% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% Net Debt/GDP Cash Balances/EDP assets GG Debt/GDP

Ireland’s net debt position converging with gross debt as EDP assets are run down Debt-to-GNI* ratio is high but has declined quickly

Gross Government debt likely close to 59% of GDP at end- 2019; 100% of GNI*; reality somewhere in between

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

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SLIDE 35

35

It’s best to analyse Irish debt with broad range of metrics

2018 GG debt to GG revenue % GG interest to GG rev % GG debt to GDP % Greece 377.9% 6.3% 181.2% Italy 291.7% 7.6% 134.8% Portugal 284.1% 7.5% 122.2% Cyprus 256.5% 6.0% 100.6% Ireland 250.2% 5.7% 63.6% Spain 249.1% 5.9% 97.6% UK 219.3% 5.9% 85.9% Belgium 194.7% 3.9% 100.0% EA19 184.7% 3.7% 85.9% France 183.9% 2.9% 98.4% EU28 178.4% 3.8% 80.4% Slovenia 158.9% 3.9% 70.4% Austria 151.4% 3.1% 74.0% Germany 133.2% 1.9% 61.9% Netherlands 120.3% 1.9% 52.4%

Source: Eurostat, Department of Finance 104% Debt to GNI* ratio in 2018

slide-36
SLIDE 36

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Manufacturing ICT Financial & insurance Admin & support services Wholesale & retail trade Other

  • 2.0

4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 0.0% 4.0% 8.0% 12.0% 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019f Corporation Tax (€bns, RHS) Corporation Tax (% of tax revenue)

36

Corporation tax receipts have more than doubled in four years Sectors with large MNC presence dominate the CT receipts

Corporation tax revenue keeps surprising positively, but each year the concentration risk increases

In 2018, 45% of CT paid by 10 companies

Source: Department of Finance, Revenue

slide-37
SLIDE 37

37

€ Bill illion 2016 2016 2017 2017 2018 2018

Currency y and d de depos

  • sit

its (main inly ly retail il de debt) t) 21.3 21.6 21.6 Securit itie ies oth ther than an sh shar ares,

  • exc. financia

ial l de derivativ ives 124.2 130.7 134.2

  • Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc)

2.4 2.9 3.1

  • Long-term (MLT bonds)

121.8 127.8 131.1 Loa Loans 55.2 49.0 50.3

  • Short-term

0.7 0.5 0.6

  • Long-term

(official funding) 54.6 48.5 49.7 General Gov

  • vernment

t Debt 200.7 201.3 205.9 ED EDP de debt t ins nstrument assets ts 24.9 27.3 28.6 Net Net Gov

  • vernment

t de debt t 175.8 174.0 177.3

S&P restores “AA” grade – for first time in a decade

Source: NTMA, CSO

Ra Rating g Ag Agency Lon Long- term Sho Short- term Outl utlook/ Trend Da Date of

  • f

las last cha change Standard & Poor's AA- A-1+ Stable Nov 2019 Fitch Ratings A+ F1+ Stable Dec 2017 Moody's A2 P-1 Stable Sept 2017 DBRS A(high) R-1 (middle) Stable March 2016 R&I A a-1 Stable Jan. 2017

slide-38
SLIDE 38

“Hard Brexit” risk has de-escalated but cliff edges may keep appearing

Section 3: Brexit

slide-39
SLIDE 39

39

  • After the withdrawal agreement is sorted we

enter the transition period, which is slated to finish at the end of 2020.

  • The UK government has stated its intention to

seek a free-trade arrangement for the long term.

  • This is a departure from Theresa May’s

government position which kept all of the UK in the EU customs union and kept many regulations aligned.

  • The upshot is that the trading relationship will be

more distant, making negotiations difficult.

  • There is only one year to negotiate what normally

takes several years. Risk of hard Brexit if the transition period is not extended.

  • Northern Ireland will remain within the UK

Customs Union but will abide by EU Customs Union rules – dual membership for NI.

  • No hard border on the island of Ireland – customs

border will be in the Irish sea. Goods crossing from ROI to NI will not require checks but goods going to UK will.

  • Complex arrangements will be necessary to

differentiate between goods going to NI and those travelling through NI to UK or vice versa. Customs checks at ports, VAT and tariff rebates and alignment of regulations will be needed.

  • All of this is backed by a complex consent

mechanism, which allows Stormont to opt-out under simple majority at certain times. Northern Ireland border issued solved if current deal is ratified by UK parliament UK-EU Future trading relationship unresolved

Brexit deal solves many issues for Ireland but does not eliminate the risk of a hard Brexit

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SLIDE 40

40

Negatives of hard Brexit outweigh positives in short-term, although opportunities may appear longer term

Sh Short rt term erm

  • Major trade disruption from tariffs, customs

checks and documentation (red tape)

  • Regions suffer severe recession in agriculture and

UK-focused manufacturing; tourism might suffer

  • Confidence shock to business and households
  • Liquidity may dry up in property market
  • Fiscal surplus will turn to deficit, challenging 3%
  • f GDP limit in worst case

Long term erm

  • Lower consumer spending thanks to higher

inflation when tariffs dominate the FX benefit

  • Political economy cost (loss of ally in the EU)

Sho Short term

  • None, bar cheaper domestic food prices?

Lon Long term

  • Fiscal help from Europe is likely; selective temporary

waiving of State Aid rules?

  • FDI influx from UK, as multinationals avoid turmoil;

UK’s reputation might be tarnished

  • Financial services (passporting lost by UK)
  • Other multinationals - especially

IT and business services

  • Commercial property occupancy could rise; there

may also be an influx of well paid workers

  • Gradual partial trade recovery
  • Irish companies may steal EU market share from

British ones (and finally diversify)

  • Import substitution (especially in food)

Cons Pros

slide-41
SLIDE 41

41

Whichever type of Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted

Irish rish/U /UK tr trad ade li link nkages s will ill suf uffer r fol

  • llowing Br

Brexit

  • The UK is the second largest single-country

export destination for Ireland’s goods and the largest for its services

  • At the same time, Ireland imports c. 20% of

its goods from the UK. Ireland’s trade with the UK is is lab labour r in intensive

  • The UK might only account for 14% of

Ireland’s total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that because those UK- reliant sectors are labour intensive SM SMEs Es ac account for

  • r over

r 55% % of

  • f Irish

rish exp xports rts to

  • the

the UK.

  • K. The

hey ar are li likely to

  • be

be mor

  • re ad

adverse sely y affected tha than la larger r com

  • mpanies

s by y the the in intr troducti tion of

  • f tari

ariffs s an and barri barriers s to

  • tr

trade

Source: CSO 2018 * UK data includes Northern Ireland NTMA calculations; Data does not include contract manufacturing

% of f tot total Good

  • ods

(20 2018) Servic ices (20 2018) Tot

  • tal

(20 2018) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.9 18.5 11.6 25.4 18. 23.1 UK* 11.5 21.7 15.7 9.6 13.8 13.6 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 38.8 37.4 29.4 26.8 33.5 30.3 China 3.9 5.9 2.6 1.5 3.1 3.0 Other 21.8 22.4 43.3 38.3 30.7 31.1

slide-42
SLIDE 42

42

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2000200220042006200820102012201420162018 Euro/Sterling (y-o-y, Lagged 3Qs, RHS) Visitors to IE from UK (y-o-y) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 % of Irish Agri Exports going to UK % of Other Irish Goods Exports going to UK

Agriculture has not diversified from the UK Tourism numbers linked to FX moves

Agri-food and tourism most at risk from trade barriers

Source: CSO, Datastream Eikon

  • Agri. exports to UK

All other goods exports to UK

slide-43
SLIDE 43

43

The hit from the baseline for various forecasts of a hard Brexit Impact on GNI* growth under various forecasts of hard Brexit

Fan chart of hard Brexit impact on Ireland – the most severe forecast puts Ireland into recession

Source: CSO, various forecasters – GNI* shown has been deflated to produce a real GNI* series

  • 7%
  • 6%
  • 5%
  • 4%
  • 3%
  • 2%
  • 1%

0% 1% 2020 2022 Baseline DOF/ESRI Central Bank BoE implied (disruptive) BoE implied (disorderly)

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% GNI* (Deal Scenario) DOF/ESRI Central Bank BoE implied (disruptive) BoE implied (disorderly)

slide-44
SLIDE 44

44

Forecast vs. no Brexit baseline Short term (2 years) Medium term (5 years) Long term (10-15 years) Department of Finance (ESRI)

  • 2.4%
  • 3.3%
  • 5.0%

Copenhagen Economics

  • 2.0 to 2.5%
  • 4.5%
  • 7.0%

(of which -4.9% is due to regulatory divergence) Central Bank of Ireland

  • 4.0%
  • 6.0%

Bank of England “disruptive” (implied)

  • 5.0%
  • 6.2%
  • 6.2%

Bank of England “disorderly” (implied)

  • 6.3%
  • 8.2%
  • 8.2%

UK Treasury range (implied)

  • 5.0 to 7.2%

Hard Brexit impact estimates all show similar story – return to WTO rules would be negative for Ireland

Source: ESRI, Copenhagen, Bank of England, UK treasury Implied uses the impact on UK GDP and an elasticity measure of 0.8 to calculate the impact on Irish Growth

slide-45
SLIDE 45

45

  • Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.

The chief areas of interest are  Financial services  Business services  IT/ new media.

  • Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt,

Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services.

  • Ireland’s FDI opportunity will depend on the
  • utcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK

(City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more

  • pportunities in time.

FDI: Ireland may benefit Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland

Many financial institutions have already announced that they will expand or set up in Dublin after Brexit

slide-46
SLIDE 46

Ireland’s long run future looks bright thanks to its favourable demographics

Section 4: Long term fundamentals

slide-47
SLIDE 47

47

Ireland’s GNI* per capita hit 2007 levels and compares favourably to EA

Much rebalancing has taken place – Ireland’s structural growth drivers have reasserted

Source: CSO, Eurostat

Gross National Income* at current prices (1995=100)

  • 5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 Ireland (GNI*) EA 19 (GDP) Germany (GDP) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020f "Celtic Tiger" 1994-2001 Credit/Prop erty Bubble Bubble Burst

Recovery

slide-48
SLIDE 48

48

20 40 60 80 World USA Sweden China Ireland UK Denmark Canada Finland Belgium France Germany Greece Portugal Italy Spain Japan 2015 Old Age Dependency Ratio 2045

Ireland’s population profile healthier than the EU average

Ireland’s population was 4.92m in 2019 –

  • ver 200,000 more than 2011 Census

Ireland’s population will remain younger than most of its EA counterparts

Source: Eurostat (2018) CSO; UN population projections

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% <1 yr 5 101520253035404550556065707580859095

Ireland Germany EU28

25% of Ireland’s population aged 17 or below versus 19% for EU % of population in age cohort

slide-49
SLIDE 49

49

Percentage of population: Ireland’s has relatively more young people and fewer old The consequence is that working-age population expected to grow (2020-2029)

Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look healthy

Source: Oxford Economics forecasts Source: Eurostat

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% <18 years 18-64 65+ EU Ireland

  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% Japan Germany Italy China Euro area EU Austria France Netherlands Belgium Spain UK Denmark Ireland US India

slide-50
SLIDE 50
  • 120
  • 90
  • 60
  • 30

30 60 90 120 Third level Other Education Net Migration 2009-2013 2015-2019

50

Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland “Reverse Brain Drain”

Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland

Source: CSO

  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%

  • 100
  • 50

50 100 150 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Emigration (000s) Immigration (000s) Net Migration (000s) Net Migration (% of Pop, RHS)

slide-51
SLIDE 51

51

Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Brexit may hinder export-led growth

Ireland benefits from export diversification by destination Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices)

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations , * Contract manufacturing proxy

  • 10.00
10.00 30.00 50.00 70.00 90.00 110.00 130.00 150.00 170.00 190.00

90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Contract Manufacturing* Services Goods ex. CM Exports % of f tot total Good

  • ods

(20 2018) Servic ices (20 2018) Tot

  • tal

(20 2018) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.9 18.5 11.6 25.4 18. 23.1 UK* 11.5 21.7 15.7 9.6 13.8 13.6 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 38.8 37.4 29.4 26.8 33.5 30.3 China 3.9 5.9 2.6 1.5 3.1 3.0 Other 21.8 22.4 43.3 38.3 30.7 31.1

slide-52
SLIDE 52

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% Unemployment

  • Comp. of Emp. per

employee growth Annual Averages (1999-2007) 2019f 90 95 100 105 110 115 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

52

Nominal Labour Cost Ratio – IE vs Euro Area Unemployment back towards 1999-2007 level, but wage growth lower

Ireland is relatively competitive now; we need to avoid repeat of the mid-2000s

Ireland still competitive versus The Euro Area

Source: CSO, Eurostat, NTMA calculations Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis *Ratio = IE Nom. Labour Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs

2019 forecast

slide-53
SLIDE 53

53

UN Goal – Peace, Justice and Strong institutions Ireland Actual Figure Ireland Normalised (world leader = 100) OECD Average

Overall

  • 87.5

75.8 Corruption Perception Index (0-100) 73.0 79.4 73.5 Government Efficiency (1-7) 4.8 74.8 52.8 Homicides (per 100,000 people) 1.1 97.8 96.1 Prison population (per 100,000 people) 80.0 87.8 74.6 Property Rights (1-7) 6.1 94.8 73.1 Population who feel safe walking alone at night (%) 75.0 73.7 67.4

Ireland is close to OECD norms socially Ireland scores well on metrics such as property rights and government efficiency

Ireland is a good place to live and do business

Source: United Nations SDG project

50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Gender Equality Decent work and economic growth Reduced Inequalities Sustainable Cities and Communities Ireland (World leader = 100) OECD Average

slide-54
SLIDE 54

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 Slovakia Slovenia Czech Rep Iceland Finland Denmark Norway Belgium Hungary Sweden Austria Poland Netherlands France Germany Switzerland Luxembourg Canada Ireland Estonia Italy Australia Portugal Russia Greece Japan Spain Israel Latvia UK Korea Lithuania USA Turkey Chile Mexico Costa Rica South Africa GINI Coefficient (Post Taxes and Transfers) Pre Taxes and Transfers

54

Income equality – Ireland’s very progressive system means income equality is around OECD average after tax

Source: OECD

Lower GINI score means more equal society

slide-55
SLIDE 55

55

  • Ireland agreed two Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives

(ATADs) with its fellow EU Member States in 2016 and 2017. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives represent binding commitments to implement three significant BEPS recommendations into Irish law as well as two additional anti-avoidance measures.

  • Three out of five required components of the

ATADs are now in effect as of 1st Jan 2019: Controlled-Foreign Company (CFC) rules, Exit Tax and General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAAR).

  • Ireland continues to engage positively at both EU

and OECD level on tax issues.

  • Ireland has been a strong supporter of the BEPS

process since inception.

  • Removal of known tax avoidance structures such

as the “Double Irish”, “the Single Malt” and “stateless companies”.

  • Ireland is best in class on tax transparency and

exchange of information. Ireland is one of only 23 jurisdictions to have been found to be fully compliant with new international best practice by the Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information.

  • Ireland introduced Country-by-Country Reporting

in 2015. The State also ratified the BEPS multilateral instrument in domestic legislation which will update the majority of Ireland’s tax treaties to be BEPS compliant. Ireland’s part in OECD (BEPS 1.0) corporate tax reform Ireland’s role in EU actions on corporate tax reform

Ireland reformed its corporate tax code to meet global standards; the 12.5% rate is fixed Government policy

slide-56
SLIDE 56

56

  • Pillar Two - the basic idea is to introduce a

minimum tax rate with the aim of reducing incentives to shift profits.

  • Where income is not taxed to the minimum level,

there would an “income inclusion rule” which

  • perates as a ‘top-up’ to achieve the minimum

rate of tax.

  • The obvious questions arise:
  • what is the appropriate minimum tax rate?
  • who will get the ‘top-up’ payment?
  • Is the minimum rate taxed at a global (firm)

level or on a country-by-country basis?

  • These questions are as yet unanswered. If the

minimum rate agreed is greater than the 12.5% rate that Ireland levies, it would erode this country’s comparative advantage.

  • The OECD has proposed further corporate tax

reform - a BEPS 2.0.

  • BEPS 2.0 looks at two pillars. The first pillar

focuses on proposals that would re-allocate taxing rights between jurisdictions where assets are held and the markets where user/consumers are

  • based. Non-routine profits could - to some -

degree be taxed where customers reside.

  • Under such a proposal, a proportion of profits

would be re- allocated from small countries to large countries. Such a proposal will reduce Ireland’s corporation tax base but it is impossible to predict the size of the impact.

  • Nothing has been decided but proposals are

currently in the public consultation phase. Pillar One : proposal to re-allocate taxing rights on non-routine profits Pillar Two: proposal for minimum global tax

OECD’s BEPS 2.0 process could impact the tax landscape globally – one to watch in 2020.

slide-57
SLIDE 57

Residential property prices have started to cool as supply comes online

Section 5: Property

slide-58
SLIDE 58

58

House prices have stabilised 20% below their peak (100 in 2007) Office prices have diverged from retail and industrial (peak = 100)

House prices have plateaued over the last year

Source: CSO; MSCI data

20 40 60 80 100 120 National

  • Excl. Dublin

Dublin 20 40 60 80 100 120 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 Retail Office Industrial

slide-59
SLIDE 59

59

Housing supply still below demand; but price inflation has moderated as supply is catching up

New dwellings* make up 80% of housing completions: some debate about the rest Housing Completions above 22,000 in 2018 but still low historically (000s)

* Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections

  • f old houses or connections from “ghost estates” overstate the annual run rate of new building.

Source: DoHPCLG, CSO, NTMA Calculations

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010 2018 Nationally Dublin

  • ex. Dublin

5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019f New dwelling completion Unfinished Reconnection Non-Domestic All connections

slide-60
SLIDE 60

60

Demand has picked up since 2015; credit slowly increasing as cash buyers become less important

Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep trough (000s) Non-mortgage transactions still important but closer to 40% of total

Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register Source: BPFI *4 quarter sum used

20 40 60 80 100 120 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Residential Investment Letting Mover purchaser First Time Buyers 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Q4 2010 Q2 2011 Q4 2011 Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q2 2013 Q4 2013 Q2 2014 Q4 2014 Q2 2015 Q4 2015 Q2 2016 Q4 2016 Q2 2017 Q4 2017 Q2 2018 Q4 2018 Q2 2019 Thousands Non-mortgage transactions Mortgage drawdowns for house purchase Non-mortgage transactions % of total (RHS)

slide-61
SLIDE 61

61

Residential property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012 but steadied in 18/19 Rents are well above previous peak – out of line with prices

Residential property prices have steadied in recent quarters; rents continue to increase

Source: CSO; RTB

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 National (Y-o-Y %) Ex Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Dublin (Y-o-Y %) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Rents (100 = 2005) Price

Prices were above rents Rents now well above prices

slide-62
SLIDE 62

62

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% SD BG NL NW OE DN LX FR ES IE PT EA UK FN BD GR IT

Irish house price valuation metrics continue to rise but remain below 2008 levels; most countries are expensive

Source: OECD, NTMA Workings Note: Measured as % over or under valuation relative to long term averages since 1980.

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% SD NW BG UK DN FR LX ES IE NL OE FN EA BD PT GR IT

Deviation from average price-to-income ratio (Q1 2019, red dot represent Q1 2008) Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q1 2019, red dot represent Q1 2008)

slide-63
SLIDE 63

Ireland’s banks now among strongest in Europe – complete reverse of late 2000s

Section 6: Other data

slide-64
SLIDE 64

64

Net Interest Margin Profit before Tax

Ireland has legacy banking-related assets – equity in banks and expected NAMA surplus

  • Banks continue to be profitable: income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved.
  • Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues and the

slow judicial process in accessing collateral.

  • An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) occurred in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer to

be used for debt reduction. Further disposal of banking assets will depend on market conditions.

Source: Annual reports of banks - BOI, AIB, PTSB Profit measures are before exceptional items (2019H1 annualised)

All three pillar banks are profitable

0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% AIB BOI PTSB 2017 2018 2019H1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 AIB BOI PTSB 2017 2018 2019H1

slide-65
SLIDE 65

65

Domestic bank cost base reduced over time

… and IE banks* below EU average Cost income ratios improve dramatically…

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks, EBA * EBA data includes three domestic banks as well as Ulster Bank, DEPFA & Citibank.

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks

Staffing (000s) halved post crisis

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% LV SK ES PL DK GR PT NL HU SI GB FI IS IE IT EU AT LU BE FR CY DE

123% 88% 144% 54% 65% 69% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% AIB BOI PTSB 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 H1 26 16 5 10 10 2 10 20 30 AIB BOI PTSB 2008 2019H1

slide-66
SLIDE 66

66

CET 1 capital ratios (Jun 2019) Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books were slashed

Capital ratios strengthened as banks were slimmed down and consolidated

Source: Published bank accounts Note: “Transitional” refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios. Source: Published bank accounts

  • 20

40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) AIB BOI Dec-10 Dec-18 20.3% 17.3% 14.9% 13.6% 16.8% 14.4% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) AIB BOI PTSB

slide-67
SLIDE 67

67

Pillar banks sold non-performing loans during 2018, as asset quality continues to improve

No Non-performin ing exp xposures % of f tot total l loan

  • ans1 (los

loss pr prov

  • visio

ion % of NP NPE) Dec-17 17 Dec-18 18 Book k (€bn) bn) BOI

Irish Residential Mortgages 11.0(24) 9.5(21) 23.7 UK Residential Mortgages 1.9(14) 2.3(15) 21.7 Irish SMEs 15.4(46) 11.2(49) 7.6 UK SMEs 8.6(42) 6.1(53) 1.6 Corporate 3.0(69) 2.6(60) 10.3 CRE - Investment 17.9(43) 10.7(44) 7.7 CRE - Land/Development 39.4(55) 14.0(54) 0.6 Consumer Loans 2.1(98) 2.1(140) 5.1 8.3( 3(36 36) 6.3( 3(35 35) 78.4

AIB

Residential Mortgages 14 10.1 (20) 32.3 SMEs/Corporate 11 5.2 (36) 19.6 CRE 33 18.0 (29) 7.9 Consumer Loans 18 11.1 (50) 3.1 16 16 9.6 62.9

PTSB

Residential Mortgages 21.7(44) 8.8(39) 12.4 Buy-to-let Mortgages 21.8(64) 12.9(113) 4.0 Commercial 30.3(104) 33.3(76) 0.2 Consumer Loans 15.4(92) 7.5(112) 0.3 21.7( 7(50) 0) 10.0( 0(64) 4) 16.9

Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Dec 18)

Consumer CRE Corporate/ SME Mortgage

All 3 Pillar banks (€bn) Dec-17 Dec-18 Total Loans 162.4 158.2 Non-performing Exposures 22.0 12.7 (NPE as % of Total) 13.5% 8.0% Provisions 7.3 4.4 (Provisions as % of book) 4.4% 2.8% (Provisions as % of Impaired) 33.2% 34.6%

Source: Published bank accounts 1 Non-performing exposures include impaired loans, loans past due greater than 90 days but not impaired, and Forborne Collateral Realisations

60% 10% 5% 25%

slide-68
SLIDE 68
  • 8.0
  • 6.0
  • 4.0
  • 2.0

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Over 90 days 90-180 days 181-360 days 361-720 days >720 days Total change

68

Irish residential mortgage arrears are still improving; but there are legal bottlenecks to normalisation

  • Non-bank entities now hold 13 per cent of all PDH mortgage accounts outstanding; 11 per cent are held by regulated retail credit

firms, with the remaining 2 per cent held by unregulated loan owners. Credit Servicing Firms hold 22 per cent of all PDH mortgages in arrears over 720 days

Mortgage arrears (90+ days) Repossessions**

Source: CBI

PDH Arrears (by thousands)

* Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years. ** Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%

3412341234123412341234123412341234123412 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

PDH + BTL (by balance) PDH + BTL (by number) 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 PDH BTL % of MA90+ (RHS)

slide-69
SLIDE 69

69

NAMA has repaid its senior debt of over €30bn; likely to deliver surplus of around €4bn – half of which in 2020

  • NAMA’s operating performance is strong
  • Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par
  • f loans of 780 debtors for €32bn
  • NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges.
  • It

t has has rep epaid 100% % of

  • f €30.2b

.2bn of

  • f orig
  • riginal sen

enior de debt

  • NAMA exceeded its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains on course,

subject to market conditions, to redeem its small amount of subordinated debt by 2020.

  • NA

NAMA cou

  • uld deli

deliver r a a surp urplus s for

  • r Irish

rish taxp xpayers s of

  • f ab

about €4bn bn, acc according to

  • its

its man anagement t tea eam - if if curr current mark arket con

  • nditions rem

emain favourable. .

  • The surplus is already factored into the budgetary arithmetic. NAMA plans to return €2bn of the €4bn

to the Exchequer in 2020.

  • NA

NAMA in init itiati tive to

  • de

develop up up to

  • 20,00

,000 ho housi sing uni units s by y 2020 – sub ubject t to

  • com
  • mmercial via

viability ty.

 Progress has been strong so far: 11,700 units were completed in 2014 – 2019;  Another 1,900 are under construction or have had funding approved;  A further 4,500 have planning permission granted.

More NAMA information available on www.nama.ie

slide-70
SLIDE 70

70

The European Commission’s ruling on Apple’s tax affairs does not change the NTMA’s funding plans

  • The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This

figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland’s tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014.

  • Thi

his s case has nothing to do with Ireland’s corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: “This decision does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or its corporate tax rate”.

  • App

pple is is ap appealing the the rulin ruling, g, as as is is the the Iris rish Govern rnment.

  • t. This process could be lengthy. Pending the
  • utcome of the appeal, Apple has paid approximately €13bn plus EU interest (c. €2bn) into an escrow

fund.

  • Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services

to hold and administer the fund.

  • Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management

International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund.

  • As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the

the NTM NTMA has has mad ade no no al allowance for

  • r these

these funds. s.

slide-71
SLIDE 71

71

Government’s NDP outlines green projects; aim to cut CO2 emissions by at least 80% by 2050

Sustainable Mobility €8.6 billion Sustainable Management

  • f Water and

Environmental Resources €6.8 billion Transition to a Low carbon and Climate Resilient Society €7.6 billion

Total:€23 billion (13%

  • f GNI*)

Source: National Development Plan 2018-2027

1 in 5 euros in the National Development Plan (NDP) to be spent on green projects

Further details are available at ntma.ie

slide-72
SLIDE 72

Explanatory charts about the distortions to Ireland’s National Accounts

Annex

slide-73
SLIDE 73

73

Substantial activity from multinationals distorts the national accounts Reclassification of several companies and “onshoring” of IP led to step change in GDP

Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance

Source: CSO; Department of Finance

50 100 150 200 250 300 350 19971999200120032005200720092011201320152017 Nominal GDP (€bns) Nominal GNP (€bns)

c.35% increase in nominal GDP in 2015

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Change in Inventories External Channel Modified Domestic Demand GDP

slide-74
SLIDE 74

74

The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports – mostly through contract manufacturing (CM)

Source: CSO

The capital stock expanded in 2015 by c. €300bn or c. 40%. This is due to:

  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several multinational

companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland by

multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets in Ireland.

Goods produced by the additional capital were mainly

  • exported. Complicating matters, the goods were

produced through “contract manufacturing”. CM occurs where a company in Ireland engages another abroad to manufacture products on its behalf. Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the

  • verseas contractor never takes ownership of the product. When the product is sold abroad, a change of

economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold. This export is recorded in Ireland’s statistics even though it was never produced in Ireland. Little or no employment in Ireland results from this contract manufacturing.

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 National accounts exports Trade data exports Contract manufacturing proxy*

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Investment distorted by multinationals importing intellectual property (IP) into Ireland

  • Investment is above the pre-crisis level due to

MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland.

  • Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years

with this investment impacting the real economy.

  • However the recent sharp increase in intangibles

investment overstates Ireland’s position and should be discounted accordingly. Investment (4Q sum, €bns)

Source: CSO,

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Building Investment Other Investment Distortions Modified GFCF Total GFCF

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GNI* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP; best as a level rather than a growth metric

  • GDP headline numbers do not reflect the “true”

growth of Ireland’s income due to MNCs.

  • Reasons for 2015-18 MNC distortions:
  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • By modifying GNI to take account of these factors,

GNI* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.

National Account – Current Prices (€, y-o-y growth rates) 2015 2016 2017 2018 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 262.8bn (34.9%) 271.7bn (3.4%) 297.1bn (9.4%) 324.0bn (9.4%) minus Net Factor Income from rest of the world = Gross National Product (GNP) 200.8bn (22.9%) 220.6bn (9.9%) 234.9bn (6.5%) 253.1bn (7.7%) add EU subsidies minus EU taxes 1.2bn 1.0bn 1.1bn 1.1bn = Gross National Income (GNI) 202.0bn (22.9%) 221.6bn (9.7%) 236.0bn (6.5%) 254.2bn (7.7%) minus retained earnings

  • f re-domiciled firms
  • 4.7bn
  • 5.8bn
  • 4.5bn
  • 5.0bn

minus depreciation on foreign owned IP assets

  • 30.1bn -35.3bn -42.5bn -46.3bn

minus depreciation on aircraft leasing

  • 4.6bn
  • 4.9bn
  • 5.1bn
  • 5.4bn

= GNI* 162.7bn (9.4%) 175.6bn (8.0%) 184.0bn (4.7%) 197.5bn (7.3%)

Source: CSO

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Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) – which ignores exports - is best cyclical indicator

  • GNI* is useful but not timely. MDD and MFDD are

released on a quarterly and real basis.

  • MDD ignores the net exports channel. It also omits

aircraft leasing and IP imports from investment.

  • The measure includes:
  • Private and government consumption
  • Building investment
  • Some machinery & equipment investment
  • Some intangible asset investment
  • Value of physical changes in stock. This last piece

is impacted by MNCs and is quite volatile.

  • MDD has Ireland growing negatively in Q1 2019

mainly due to volatility in stocks.

  • When stocks are excluded, (i.e. using Modified Final

Domestic Demand) real underlying growth was 2.6% in Q3 2019. Since 2014, annual growth has averaged 4.3% when looking at MFDD.

Source: CSO, four quarter sum growth rate used to strip out substantial quarterly volatility. Note MDD includes inventories. Large inventories in Q4 2016 added a further degree of volatility into MDD data.

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Modified Domestic Demand MFDD (MDD ex stocks)

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Disclaimer

The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities. The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying

  • slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information
  • provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past
  • r future) of the Irish State or the NTMA.

The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice.