11 July 2017 Ruth Taillon, Director Centre for Cross Border Studies - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

11 july 2017 ruth taillon director centre for cross
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11 July 2017 Ruth Taillon, Director Centre for Cross Border Studies - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Brexit and its Border Implications Presentation to Fianna Fil 11 July 2017 Ruth Taillon, Director Centre for Cross Border Studies 39 Abbey Street, Armagh BT61 7EB r.taillon@qub.ac.uk 2 The centrality of the border to the conflict --


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Ruth Taillon, Director Centre for Cross Border Studies 39 Abbey Street, Armagh BT61 7EB r.taillon@qub.ac.uk

Brexit and its Border Implications

Presentation to Fianna Fáil

11 July 2017

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  • The centrality of the border to the conflict -- increased

dangers arising from uncertainties about the nature of the border

  • Increased tensions re Migration and citizenship issues
  • Social and economic cohesion in the border region and
  • ther disadvantaged areas at risk
  • The commitment to cross-border cooperation

embedded in the Good Friday Agreement must remain a priority before and after ‘Brexit’

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  • A consensus on protecting the 1998 Agreement
  • the specific circumstances pertaining to the island of Ireland
  • the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland
  • the peace process
  • The 1998 Agreement is an ideal vehicle for maintaining the

current socio-economic relations between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and between the island of Ireland and Great Britain following the UK’s exit from the European Union.

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5 “Our commitment to the 1998 Belfast Agreement and its successors, together with the institutions they establish, is undiminished.” “As we leave the European Union we recognise Northern Ireland’s unique circumstances and will seek to ensure that Northern Ireland’s interests are protected. “We will maintain the Common Travel Area and maintain as frictionless a border as possible for people, goods and services between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.”

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  • The Great Repeal Bill will convert EU law into

UK law, ….

  • Once EU law has been converted into

domestic law, parliament will be able to pass legislation to amend, repeal or “improve” any piece of EU law it chooses,

  • “We will not bring the European Union’s

Charter of Fundamental Rights into UK law.”

  • “We will not repeal or replace the Human

Rights Act while the process of Brexit is underway but we will consider our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes.”

  • “We will remain signatories to the European

Convention on Human Rights for the duration

  • f the next parliament.”

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Withdrawal from the ECHR could place Britain in breach of its international obligations in the 1998 Good Friday agreement:

  • the two communities in Northern Ireland would be

protected by safeguards that include “the European Convention on Human Rights and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe”.

European Convention on Human Rights

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  • Acts of the Northern Ireland Assembly
  • Must be compatible with Convention rights
  • Must be compatible with Community law
  • Shall not modify the European Communities Act 1972 or the

Human Rights Act 1998

  • Article 12: “Reconsideration where reference made to

EJC”

“(3)In this section “reference for a preliminary ruling” means a reference of a question to the European Court of Justice …”

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9 U.K. Shared Prosperity Fund to replace the EU Structural Funds: “specifically designed to reduce inequalities between communities across our four nations” “Current EU-wide structural funding … is expensive to administer and poorly targeted.” “The money … will help deliver sustainable, inclusive growth based on our modern industrial strategy.” While there “may be specific European programmes in which we might want to participate and if so, it will be reasonable that we make a contribution” but “… the days of Britain making vast annual contributions to the European Union will end.”

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EU cross-border programmes (PEACE and INTERREG) mirror the objectives of the NSMC in the 1998 Agreement:

  • “to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the

island of Ireland – including on an all-island and cross-border basis – on matters of mutual interest”.

  • funded projects contribute to the further embedding
  • f Strand II

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EU Community Funding: PEACE and INTERREG Programmes Ireland/Northern Ireland 1994-2020

PEACE PROGRAMME INTERREG A INTERREG IA 76 m ECU Peace I (1994-99) 500m ECU INTERREG IIA 165m ECU Peace II (2000-2006) €995m INTERREG IIIA €137m Peace III (2007-2013) €225m INTERREG IVA €192m Peace IV (2014-2020) €229m INTERREG V €240m

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  • Co-operation across EU’s external frontiers is facilitated &

supported by framework for European Territorial Co-operation

(e.g. Norway, Switzerland and third countries or territories neighbouring outermost regions)

BUT

  • Continued participation in EU cross-border cooperation

programmes would require adherence to EU cohesion policy, EU regulations and continued financial contributions.

  • Cooperation can take place outside the EU funding programmes

(e.g.: Karlsruhe Agreement (1996) between France, Luxembourg, Germany and Switzerland facilitates and promotes cross-border cooperation between local and regional authorities and local public institutions

BUT

  • Cross-border cooperation requires both political will and financial

resources

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Risks of the UK withdrawal from the EU / loss of EU funds:

  • cross-border cooperation will be given less priority by the

governments in Belfast, Dublin and London

  • policy divergence may make the conditions for cross-border

cooperation more difficult, increasingly reverting to ‘back-to-back’ policy development

  • reduction of funding for cross-border cooperation increases the

likelihood of a return to piecemeal cooperation with little regional impact

  • CSOs and LAs will struggle to replace EU programme funds – loss of

key personnel and ‘soft infrastructure’

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  • the ‘soft infrastructure’ to support cross-border

cooperation – must be protected and nurtured

  • statutory cross-border bodies
  • links at Departmental and local government level
  • civil society networks and projects
  • existing EU directives and regulations should remain

in place until proposed changes have comprehensive territorial, equality and environmental impact assessment

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  • Continued eligibility of Northern Ireland in the European Territorial Cooperation

Programmes and transnational programmes e.g. Horizon 2020, Erasmus+, Life and Europe for Citizens

  • Additional ‘Peace’ funding allocated to address the challenges of inter-community

conflict and cross-border relationships (Peace IV and a new Peace V)

  • Irish and UK Governments ensure new and sufficient resources are available for

the social and economic development of the border region, including local authority- and civic society-led projects

  • On the UK side, additional funding allocations should be derived from the UK’s current

contribution to the EU budget that will revert to the Treasury post-withdrawal, not from the ‘block grant’

  • A Social Cohesion Programme for these islands, funded by the UK and Irish

Governments – modelled on Peace I and II – to promote and support social cohesion and good relations between the island of Ireland and GB

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“Flexible and imaginative solutions”: The 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement as a framework for post-Brexit relations within and between these islands

  • 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement should not be viewed simply as a

problem to be overcome during the negotiations over the UK’s exit from the EU, but also as a potential “flexible and imaginative” solution to the maintenance of post-Brexit relations.

  • the framework provided for by the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement

must be a minimum conclusion to the negotiations.

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  • Protecting the integrity of the Agreement means not only

ensuring the continuing free movement of Irish and UK citizens between their jurisdictions, but also the free movement of goods and services

  • Accommodations will have to taking into account the Irish

Government’s continuing responsibilities as a co-guarantor of the 1998 Belfast/GFA and the potential economic consequences faced by the [Republic of] Ireland.

  • An outcome that ensured cross-border trade on the island of

Ireland, but not between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain, would not significantly reduce the disturbance to the Irish economy and would require Ireland receiving greater support from the EU.

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Model 1: Republic of Ireland is in the EU/EEA area through its membership of the European Union, but is also within another area as a co-guarantor of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and its membership of the institutions under Strands II and III of that Agreement.

goods, services and people flow freely between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Goods and services from the United Kingdom would not travel further than the Republic of Ireland, and

Goods and services from the United Kingdom have to adhere to all relevant EU regulations and standards

the UK must continue to largely mirror EU tariffs with third countries

Strands II and III institutions would gain greater prominence as coordinating bodies and spaces for significant dialogue

Ireland, as a Member State and within the jurisdiction of the EU Court of would continue to ensure the integrity of the Single Market and to uphold the values of the EU.

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Republic of Ireland EU/EEA Area

1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement Area

Model 1

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Model 2:

Goods from Northern Ireland would have access to the EU/EEA area, but without establishing any disruption to the flow of goods between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom or undermining its constitutional position

Goods, services and people flow freely between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom.

Goods and services from the United Kingdom have to adhere to all relevant EU regulations and standards

The UK must continue to largely mirror EU tariffs with third countries

the Republic of Ireland occupies both areas as a co-guarantor of the 1998 Belfast/GFA and its membership of the Strands II and III institutions

an additional mechanism would have to be put in place in order to distinguish NI goods from goods originating from elsewhere in the UK.

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Strand II Area EU/EEA Area Strand III Area

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Both models:

require UK (and devolved UK administrations) adherence to relevant EU regulations and standards

facilitate the movement of people, goods and services within and between the island of Ireland and Great Britain; avoiding the creation of new or hardening of existing borders between any part of these islands.

  • Model 1 maintains current flows of goods and services between the UK and the Republic of

Ireland, but no goods or services from the UK enter further into the EU

  • Model 2 maintains current flows of goods and services between the UK and the Republic of

Ireland and also allows for the flow of goods and services from Northern Ireland into the Republic

  • f Ireland and the rest of the EU

Post-Brexit, EU cross-border programmes should continue:

  • The UK could make the necessary financial contributions either directly to the relevant EU

budget, or indirectly through the Irish Government/NSMC

  • SEUPB could continue to manage European Territorial Cooperation programmes