1
play

1 Symmetric algorithm Public key algorithm Secret key public key - PDF document

Cryptography security Cryptography may be a component of a secure system Cryptographic Systems Adding cryptography may not make a Authentication & Communication system secure Protocols Paul Krzyzanowski Distributed Systems


  1. Cryptography ≠ security Cryptography may be a component of a secure system Cryptographic Systems Adding cryptography may not make a Authentication & Communication system secure Protocols Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Terms Terms: types of ciphers Plaintext (cleartext), message M • restricted cipher encryption , E( M ) • sym m etric algorithm produces ciphertext , C = E( M ) • public key algorithm decryption : M = D( C ) Cryptographic algorithm, cipher Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Restricted cipher The key Secret algorithm • Leaking • Reverse engineering – RC4 – All digital cellular encryption algorithms – DVD and DIVX video compression – Firewire – Enigma cipher machine – Every NATO and Warsaw Pact algorithm during Cold War Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems 1

  2. Symmetric algorithm Public key algorithm Secret key public key and private key C 1 = E public ( M ) C = E K ( M ) M = D private ( C 1 ) M = D K ( C ) also: C 2 = E private ( M ) M = D public ( C 2 ) Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems McCarthy’s puzzle (1958) McCarthy’s puzzle • Two countries are at war Challenge – How can a guard authenticate a person • One country sends spies to the other without knowing the password? country • To return safely, spies must give the – Enemies cannot use the guard’s knowledge border guards a password to introduce their own spies • Spies can be trusted • Guards chat – information given to them may leak Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Solution to McCarthy’s puzzle One-way functions Michael Rabin, 1958 • Easy to compute in one direction • Difficult to compute in the other Use one- w ay function , B= f ( A ) – Guards get B … Examples: • Enemy cannot compute A Factoring : – Spies give A , guards compute f(A) pq = N EASY • If the result is B, the password is correct. find p , q given N DIFFICULT Example function: Discrete Log: Middle squares a b mod c = N EASY • Take a 100-digit number (A), and square it find b given a, c, N DIFFICULT • Let B = middle 100 digits of 200-digit result Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems 2

  3. More terms McCarthy’s puzzle example Example with an 18 digit number • one-w ay function – Rabin, 1958: McCarthy’s problem A = 289407349786637777 A 2 = 83756614110525308948445338203501729 – middle squares, exponentiation, … 110525308948445338 • [ one-way] hash function Middle square, B = 110525308948445338 – message digest, fingerprint, cryptographic checksum, integrity check Given A, it is easy to compute B • encrypted hash Given B, it is extremely hard to compute A – message authentication code – only possessor of key can validate message Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems More terms Yet another term • Stream cipher • Digital Signature – Encrypt a m essage a character at a time – Authenticate, not encrypt message – Use pair of keys (private, public) • Block cipher – Owner encrypts message with private key – Sender validates by decrypting with public key – Encrypt a m essage a chunk at a time – Generally use hash(message). Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Cryptography: what is it good for? Cryptographic toolbox • Authentication • Symmetric encryption – determine origin of message • Public key encryption • I ntegrity • One-way hash functions – verify that m essage has not been modified • Random number generators • Nonrepudiation • Message authentication codes – sender should not be able to falsely deny • Digital signatures that a message was sent • Confidentiality – others cannot read contents of the message Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems 3

  4. Classic Cryptosystems Substitution Ciphers Cæsar cipher Cæsar cipher Earliest docum ented m ilitary use of crypto – Julius Caesar c. 60 BC – shift cipher: simple variant of a substitution cipher A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z – each letter replaced by one n positions away U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T modulo alphabet size shift alphabet by n (6) n = shift value = key Sim ilar scheme used in India – early Indians also used substitutions based on phonetics similar to pig latin currently seen as ROT13 in netnews Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Cæsar cipher Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GS GSWUNBMUFZYUM • Convey one piece of information for decryption: shift value • trivially easy to crack (26 possibilities for a 26 character alphabet) Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems 4

  5. Ancient Hebrew variant (ATBASH) Substitution cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z Z Y X W V U T S R Q P O N M L K J I H G F E D C B A M P S R L Q E A J T N C I F Z W O Y B X G K U D V H NBXZGSZHUOVZH IVSMXAMBQCLMB • c. 600 BC • General case: arbitrary mapping • No information (key) needs to be conveyed! • both sides must have substitution alphabet Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Substitution cipher Polyalphabetic ciphers Designed to thwart frequency analysis Easy to decode: techniques – vulnerable to frequency analysis – different ciphertext symbols can represent the same plaintext symbol • 1 → many relationship between Moby Dick Shakespeare letter and substitute J (1.2M chars) (55.8M chars) Leon Battista Alberti: 1466: invented key G M P Q A B Z – two disks S Y C e 12.300% e 11.797% D – line up predetermined letter on o 7.282% o 8.299% inner disk with outer disk d 4.015% d 3.943% – plaintext on inner → ciphertext on b 1.773% b 1.634% outer x 0.108% x 0.140% – after n symbols, the disk is rotated to encrypt: A → J a new alignment decrypt: J → A Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Vigenère polyalphabetic cipher Vigenère polyalphabetic cipher • Blaise de Vigenère , court of Henry III of France, 1518 plaintext letter • Use table and key word to encipher a message A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T • repeat keyword over text: (e.g. key= FACE) FA CEF ACE FACEF .... A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T MY CAT HAS FLEAS B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U • encrypt: find intersection: C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V row = keyword letter D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W column = plaintext letter keytext E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X • decrypt: column = keyword letter, search for letter F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y intersection = ciphertext letter • message is encrypted with as many substitution ciphers ciphertext letter as there are letters in the keyword Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems 5

  6. Vigenère polyalphabetic cipher Vigenère polyalphabetic cipher FA CEF ACE FACEF FA CEF ACE FACEF MY CAT HAS FLEAS MY CAT HAS FLEAS R RY EEY HCW KLGEX A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Transposition ciphers • Permute letters in plaintext according to rules • Knowledge of rules will allow message to be decrypted Transposition Ciphers Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Transposition ciphers: staff cipher Transposition ciphers: staff cipher MYCATHASFLEAS MYCATHASFLEAS M M Y Y C C HAS HAS MHE MHEYAA CSS EAS EAS M C H S E S Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems Paul Krzyzanowski • Distributed Systems 6

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend