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SLIDE 1

• zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Sea-Based Logistics and Lessons zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA from zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA the Falklands OMFTS/STOM/SBL Platforms JSD 48 fi New USMC Paradigm of 1

SLIDE 2 BMM/SBL zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Parameters zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA I zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA %% Marbe Expeditionary U n i t , Sea-Based Logistics Feadbility zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 2

SLIDE 3 Conclusions about zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA SBL Feasibility Ammunition, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA he1 and water drive the sustainment problem There will be competing demands between operation. and logistics for transporter sorties zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA * In most instances. sustainment I s not feaslble using vertlcal replenishment exclusively * Whether SBL i s feasible depends on more than the ton. miles arithmetic The Falklands War Expeditionary warfare: Royal Marines supported by the Royal Navy [and lots of STUPT)

• It zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

was OMFT8 using the sea as maneuver space and landing at a place where the Argles were not It was STOM but STOM stood for shol.e to objective maneuver rather than to objective maneuver It was planned to be SBL without pausing to establish a combat support services area [CSSA) ashore Execution Lack of zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Air Superiority meant SBL was Infeasible and need to build a CSSA ashore Limited hours per day, zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA STUPT ahips, lack of asset vlsibillty. and Navy's whimsy in sending in the desired shlps meant that the pause to build up the CSSA was a long

• ne

* Northwood and Woodward had Uttle appreciation of the logistics sltuntion and were Impatient to get on with pound

• perations

Other Considerations * Sea Control and A i r Superiority zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA are required * Aircraft ranges are limiting Selective Amphlb Offload capability i s required * Need for Naval Surface Fire Support Asset Visibility and Decision Support Software are needed * There must be an effective command structure

8

Execution Y Sea Control estabilshed with sinking of the General Belgrano No LCACs, Tiltrotor, or Heavy Lift Heioa so It was surface

• deployment. not from OTH but from near the bench

. No mines in PakIand Sound, but that could have been a show stopper Landlng at San Carlos successhtl, but Royal Navy did not have air superiority Execution

• not enough lift to move troops and m m m o l ~ l m ~ u p p l y

Land forcu commamder noted that .exarcLos don't force commmdon to cboose between moving men md moving beans,

• bullet. and fuel"

Lack o f l i f t impacted on paca of combat 0 p c n t l 0 ~

• * - o00.0 Omen ops: U

he10 LLft. for- and ammo

• Long

pa- betroen tho r u s d t on M t . Kont on 3031 May Md

• M

t . T-blsdorn w a d t dohpod to resupply unmo M t . Elnkt on 11-12 June duo to need to rMrrpply

• CommMd mtmct-

tnmmpmtblo dth sensibly doddtng lift prforlth.

• Eelos ontrolled by

Ampbiblow Commander. st &a

• LMd TOICM Commander didn't awn have

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• to

the he10 comm net U 3

SLIDE 4 Conclusions zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA * Whlle OMFTS zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA 1s not new, STOM la new - enabled by zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA MV-22, AMV and LCAC and the amphlba that zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA carry them * STOM could be wlthout Sea-Baaed Loglatlca * SBL reduces b o t print, vulnerablllties and auatalnment requiremsnta * SBL requires: * * . * An approprite command structure Sea Control and zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA Alr Superlorlty h e t vlslblUty and aelectlve omoad Adequate zyxwvutsrqponmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA UR and management of the competltlon for It 4