When Samples Are Strategically Selected Hanrui Zhang Yu Cheng - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

when samples are strategically selected
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

When Samples Are Strategically Selected Hanrui Zhang Yu Cheng - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

When Samples Are Strategically Selected Hanrui Zhang Yu Cheng Vincent Conitzer Duke University Academia in 20 years SHE HAS 50 A NEW PAPERS AND I POSTDOC ONLY WANT TO APPLICANT. READ 3. Bob, Professor of Rocket Science Academia in


slide-1
SLIDE 1

When Samples Are Strategically Selected

Duke University Hanrui Zhang Vincent Conitzer Yu Cheng

slide-2
SLIDE 2

Academia in 20 years…

A NEW POSTDOC APPLICANT. SHE HAS 50 PAPERS AND I ONLY WANT TO READ 3.

Bob, Professor of Rocket Science

slide-3
SLIDE 3

Academia in 20 years…

Charlie, Bob’s student

GIVE ME 3 PAPERS BY ALICE THAT I NEED TO READ.

CHARLIE IS EXCITED ABOUT HIRING ALICE

slide-4
SLIDE 4

Academia in 20 years…

I NEED TO CHOOSE THE BEST 3 PAPERS TO CONVINCE BOB, SO THAT HE WILL HIRE ALICE. CHARLIE WILL DEFINITELY PICK THE BEST 3 PAPERS BY ALICE, AND I NEED TO CALIBRATE FOR THAT.

slide-5
SLIDE 5

The general problem

A distribution (Alice) over paper qualities 𝜄 ∈ {g, b} arrives, which can be either a good one (𝜄 = g) or a bad one (𝜄 = b)

ALICE IS WAITING TO HEAR FROM BOB

Alice, the postdoc applicant

slide-6
SLIDE 6

The general problem

The principal (Bob) announces a policy, according to which he decides, based on the report of the agent (Charlie), whether to accept 𝜄 (hire Alice)

I WILL HIRE ALICE IF YOU GIVE ME 3 GOOD PAPERS, OR 2 EXCELLENT PAPERS. AND I WANT ALICE TO BE FIRST AUTHOR ON AT LEAST 2 OF THEM.

slide-7
SLIDE 7

The general problem

CHARLIE IS READING THROUGH ALICE’S 50 PAPERS

The agent (Charlie) has access to n(=50) iid samples (papers) from 𝜄 (Alice), from which he chooses m(=3) as his report

slide-8
SLIDE 8

The general problem

CHARLIE FOUND 3 PAPERS BY ALICE MEETING BOB’S CRITERIA HE IS SURE BOB WILL HIRE ALICE UPON SEEING THESE 3 PAPERS

The agent (Charlie) sends his report to the principal, aiming to convince the principal (Bob) to accept 𝜄 (Alice)

slide-9
SLIDE 9

The general problem

The principal (Bob) observes the report of the agent (Charlie), and makes the decision according to the policy announced

IT LOOKS LIKE ALICE IS DOING GOOD WORK, SO LET’S HIRE HER. I READ THE 3 PAPERS YOU SENT ME. ONE IS NOT SO GOOD, BUT THE OTHER TWO ARE INCREDIBLE.

slide-10
SLIDE 10

Questions

  • How does strategic selection affect the principal’s

policy?

  • Is it easier or harder to classify based on strategic

samples, compared to when the principal has access to iid samples?

  • Should the principal ever have a diversity

requirement (e.g., at least 1 mathematical paper and at least 1 experimental paper), or only go by total quality?

slide-11
SLIDE 11

A “hard” world

  • A good candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.05
  • A bad candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.005
  • All candidates have n = 50 papers, and the professor wants

to read only m = 1

  • A reasonable policy: accept iff the reported paper is good
  • A good candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.05)50 ≈ 0.92
  • A bad candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.005)50 ≈ 0.22
slide-12
SLIDE 12

A “hard” world

  • A good candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.05
  • A bad candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.005
  • All candidates have n = 50 papers, and the professor wants

to read only m = 1

  • A reasonable policy: accept iff the reported paper is good
  • A good candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.05)50 ≈ 0.92
  • A bad candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.005)50 ≈ 0.22
slide-13
SLIDE 13

A “hard” world

  • A good candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.05)50 ≈ 0.92
  • A bad candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.005)50 ≈ 0.22

Strategic selection helps the principal!

slide-14
SLIDE 14

An “easy” world

  • A good candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.05 0.95
  • A bad candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.005 0.05
  • All candidates have n = 50 papers, and the professor wants

to read only m = 1

  • A reasonable policy: accept iff the reported paper is good
  • A good candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.95)50 ≈ 1
  • A bad candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.05)50 ≈ 0.92
slide-15
SLIDE 15

An “easy” world

  • A good candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.05 0.95
  • A bad candidate writes a good paper w.p. 0.005 0.05
  • All candidates have n = 50 papers, and the professor wants

to read only m = 1

  • A reasonable policy: accept iff the reported paper is good
  • A good candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.95)50 ≈ 1
  • A bad candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.05)50 ≈ 0.92
slide-16
SLIDE 16

An “easy” world

  • A good candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.95)50 ≈ 1
  • A bad candidate is accepted w.p. 1 - (1 - 0.05)50 ≈ 0.92

Now strategic selection hurts the principal!

slide-17
SLIDE 17

More questions

  • What does the optimal policy look like?
  • What parameter(s) determine its performance?
slide-18
SLIDE 18

And answers…

Come to our poster!