SLIDE 1
SLIDE 2 When devops meets security
Michael Brunton-Spall
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”I'm from the Government and I'm here to help”
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”I'm from security and I'm here to help”
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Government Digital Service
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Simpler, Clearer, Faster
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The state of information security in 2015
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BS7799-1:1999
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ISO27001:2005
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Approval to operate
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Accreditation
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Certification
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PCI
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What does this look like?
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Traditional model
SLIDE 16 Idea Code Production Test Design Risk Analysis Design Review Code Review Penetration Test
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How do we deal with changes?
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Agile changes everything
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Only do what's needed now
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Release It!
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MVP and iterate
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Focus on flow and cycle time
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A security nightmare!
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A brave new world for security
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Security needs to be an enabler
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We reviewed agile projects across government
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Biggest consistent fjnding?
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There is no consistency
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Most teams don't know how to do this
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So what can we do?
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Principles over rules
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The UK Government published 8 principles
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1 - Accept uncertainty
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2 - Security as part of the team
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3 - Understand the risks
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4 - Trust decision making
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5 - Security is part of everything
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6 - User experience is important
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7 - Audit decisions
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8 - Understand big picture impact
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But what does that mean?
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Imagine a new project
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Choose security model that's appropriate
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At project inception
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Understand the threats
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Educate decision makers to risks
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Make risk decisions, per story, in the team
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What do you do about it?
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Avoid
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Transfer
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Accept
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Mitigate
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Temporarily Accept
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What sort of controls might we use?
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Active countermeasures
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Deter, Detect, Prevent
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Reactive countermeasures
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Correct, Respond, Recover
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Traditional security people understand this
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But there's more
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Anti-personas
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Misuse cases
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Attack trees
SLIDE 65 https://www.schneier.com/paper-secure-methodology.pdf
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Red teams
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Automated penetration testing
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Automated Integrated Repeatable
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Thanks !