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WH WHEN N EXP XPER ERTS TS TALK LK, , DO DOES S ANY NYONE ONE LI LIST STEN? EN? THE LIMITS OF EXPERT INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION ERIC MERKLEY UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA PRESENTATION FOR THE SPPGA APRIL 10, 2019 PROBLEM Pu


  1. WH WHEN N EXP XPER ERTS TS TALK LK, , DO DOES S ANY NYONE ONE LI LIST STEN? EN? THE LIMITS OF EXPERT INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC OPINION ERIC MERKLEY UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA PRESENTATION FOR THE SPPGA APRIL 10, 2019

  2. PROBLEM Pu Publi lic opin inion ion is is far offside fside exper erts s on a wi wide de range ge of is issues es of scie ience ce and econ onom omic ics

  3. PROBLEM Why?

  4. PR PROB OBLEM EM #1: : NE NEWS WSROOM OOM BIAS

  5. MEDIA BIAS AND COVERAGE OF EXPERTS  Epis isodi odic c frami ming ng  little attention to expert consensus  Fals lse e bala lance ce  citation of contrarian experts  Conflict flict  citation of polarizing information sources

  6. ISSUE SELECTION Liberals Against Conservatives Against Mixed/None Experts Experts GMOs; Science Vaccines Climate change nuclear safety Trade protectionism; Immigration; Federal Economics Rent control farm support Reserve; road pricing

  7. METHODS  Manual coding of 3,147 articles  Coded for: Expert message related to consensus (Y/N)  Consensus Cue (Y/N)  ‘False balance’ (Y/N)  Polarizing opponents and allies (Y/N) 

  8. FINDINGS Message ages of expe pert t co consensu sus s are ve very y unco commo mon 1) 1) Only 22% of relevant news stories have a message from an expert related to an  area of consensus Rare to have a clear signal of consensus (2%) 

  9. 80 Expert Message Consensus 60 % of relevant stories 40 20 0 Vaccines GMOs Federal Reserve Immigration Trade Farm Support Rent Control Climate change Average Nuclear Power Tolls EXPERT MESSAGES AS % OF RELEV EVANT ANT COVERAGE

  10. 80 Expert Message Consensus 60 % of relevant stories 40 20 0 GMOs Vaccines Federal Reserve Trade Rent Control Farm Support Immigration Climate change Average Nuclear Power Tolls EXPERT MESSAGES AS % OF TOTAL AL COVERAGE

  11. FINDINGS False balance isn’t that common 2) 2) Only 22% of stories have ‘false balance’ 

  12. PREVALENCE OF ‘FALSE BALANCE’ (%)

  13. FINDINGS Bala lance nce tends s to refle lect ct pola larizi izing ng poli litical ical co confli lict ct 3) 3) 42% of stories with a polarizing political opponent  48% of stories have a polarizing ally aligned with the expert community 

  14. PREVALENCE OF POLARIZ ARIZING ING SOURCE CES S (%)

  15. PR PROB OBLEM EM #2: : PO POLITICA TICAL L PARTY E Y ELITE TES WITH DOMINIK STECULA

  16. OUR ARGUMENT Parti tisans ans le learned ned their ir posit itio ions ns on c cli limate e sci cience ce from m poli litic ical al eli lites  Communicated through the mass media  In-group vs. out-group cueing

  17. RESEARCH QUESTION Are party ty eli lite messages ages in in t the news media ia co correla lated ed wit ith aggregat egate e le leve vels ls of cl clim imate e skepti tici cism sm after er co controll ollin ing g for other r factor ctors? s?

  18. DATA 17 majo jor r news source ces, , 25,0 ,000 0 news storie ies  National and regional newspapers  Broadcast news (ABC, CBS, NBC)  Cable (CNN, Fox, MSNBC)  Associated Press

  19. PARTY Y CUES S IN NEWS CONTENT OVER TIME (%)

  20. ANNUAL (LEFT) AND QUARTERLY (RIGHT) CLIMATE SKEPTICISM

  21. AGGREGATE POLARIZATION  Partisan Climate Change Threat Index (PCCTI) from Carmichael and Brulle (2017)  Quarterly from 2001-2014

  22. PERCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE THREAT BY PARTY Y (LEFT), POLARI ARIZA ZATION TION (RIGHT)

  23. FINDINGS  Most consistent predictor  messages from Democratic elites  Evidence of out-group and (to a lesser extent) in-group cueing for Republican party supporters

  24. EFFECT OF PARTY CUE ON CLIMATE SKEPTICISM Strong D Democratic Cue Weak D Lean D Indep Lean R Weak R Strong R -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 Effects on Linear Prediction Strong D GOP Cue Weak D Lean D Indep Lean R Weak R Strong R -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15 Effects on Linear Prediction Strong D Polarization Weak D Lean D Indep Lean R Weak R Strong R -.1 -.0 0 .05 .1 .15

  25. PROBL OBLEM EM #3 #3: ANT NTI-INT INTELLEC ELLECTU TUAL ALISM ISM

  26. ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM Anti-int intel elle lectu ctual alis ism: m: a generalized mistrust of experts and intellectuals rooted in a suspicion of scholarly and intellectual pursuits.

  27. HYPOTHESIS Anti-int intel elle lectu ctual alis ism m li limit its the persu suasi asiven eness ess of exper ert t co consensus us cu cues

  28. DATA AND MEASUREMENT .3  Survey of 3,600 American citizens gathered from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) .2  Battery of trust questions for various types of experts (e.g. scientists, economists, .1 doctors, etc.) 0 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 Anti-intellectualism (0-1)

  29. MEASUREMENT Measur ured ed le leve vel l of agree eement ment wit ith four r statemen ements ts rela lated ed to the foll llowi wing ng is issues: Climate change (80% % suppor ort) t)  Nuclear power (48% % support) t)  GMOs (46% % support) t)  Fluoride (53% % support) t) 

  30. PERSUASIVE EFFECT OF CONSENSUS CUE ACROSS ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

  31. IMP MPLI LICA CATI TIONS ONS

  32. IMPLICATIONS  Need d to take the in informati rmation n envir ironm nment nt serio iousl sly  Limits of ideology-driven motivated skepticism – not the only motivation and too static to explain over time changes  Limits on effectiveness of consensus as a persuasion tactic?

  33. EXPERT MESSAGES AS % OF TOTAL GMOs Vaccines Climate change Average Federal Reserve AL COVERAGE Trade Rent Control Nuclear Power Farm Support % of relevant stories Consensus Expert Message Tolls Immigration 0 20 40 60 80

  34. PREVALENCE OF POLARIZ ARIZING ING SOURCE CES S (%)

  35. IMPLICATIONS  Need to take the information environment seriously  Lim imit its of id ideolo logy gy-dri riven en motiv ivat ated ed skepti ticis cism m – too stati tic c to expl plai ain ove ver r tim ime e ch change ges  Limits on effectiveness of consensus as a persuasion tactic?

  36. PARTY Y CUES S IN NEWS CONTENT OVER TIME (%)

  37. IMPLICATIONS  Need to take the information environment seriously  Limits of ideology-driven motivated skepticism – not the only motivation and too static to explain over time changes  Lim imit its on effecti ectiven eness ess of co consensu sus s as a persuas uasio ion n tact ctic ic?

  38. PERSUASIVE EFFECT OF CONSENSUS CUE ACROSS ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

  39. Tha Thank nk You ou! Contact: eric.merkley@ubc.ca www.ericmerkley.com

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