Valuing Retail Structured Products
Jos van Bommel Luxembourg School of Finance
Valuing Retail Structured Products Jos van Bommel Luxembourg School - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Valuing Retail Structured Products Jos van Bommel Luxembourg School of Finance What are Retail Structured Products? Of-the-shelve financial securities sold to private investors, mostly by commercial banks, traded either over the counter, or
Jos van Bommel Luxembourg School of Finance
Avec X2, profitez d’une hausse à 4 ans de l’indice DJ Euro Stoxx 501 dans la limite de 60%, et récupérez à l’échéance, jusqu’à 150% de votre capital investi2. L’indice DJ EuroStoxx 501, diversifié géographiquement et sectoriellement, est constitué des 50 valeurs phares de la zone euro. Le 7 avril 2014, on calcule la performance de l’indice DJ Euro Stoxx 50 par rapport à son cours d’origine3 du 7 avril 2010. La Performance de l’Indice est alors égale à la performance ainsi calculée dans la limite de 60%, et sans pouvoir être négative (« Performance Finale de l’Indice ») A l’échéance, le 17 avril 2014, la Valeur Liquidative Finale du Fonds est égale à 90% du capital investi majoré de la Performance Finale de l’indice: elle sera donc comprise entre 90% et 150% (90% + 60%) de la Valeur Liquidative de Référence4, soit un rendement actuariel maximum de 10,55%5.
500 1000 1500
0% 20% 40% 60% 4 year return on Stoxx50 X2 Payoff
500 1000 1500
0% 20% 40% 60% 4 year return on Stoxx50 X2 Payoff
A 4-yr deposit of €PV(900) A Call Option on the Stoxx with X = S Less a Call with X = 1.6 S
σ, anual volatility
900 € 910 € 920 € 930 € 940 € 950 € 960 € 970 € 980 € 990 € 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
€965,00 €970,00 €975,00 €980,00 €985,00 €990,00 18% 20% 22% 24% 26% 28% 30% 32% 34%
σ, anual volatility
(compared to the replication value)
To replicate a €1000 investment in BNP X2s, you would need to trade
( buy €215 worth of at-the-money Calls, and sell €60 worth of X = 1.6S Calls. )
Ex.: A five year contract, guarantee = 100%, with an upside computed as the sum of monthly returns, capped at 5%.
These products also come in compounded forms. If the above were a compounded product, the maximum payoff would be (1+5%)60 = 18,679 times the investment !!!
Because their payoffs are path dependent, these products are difficult to value. Using a Monte Carlo method of Rossetto and van Bommel (2009), Bernard and Boyle (2010) show that LCPs are
Marketing is very agressive, through unrealistic scenarios: Prospectuses contain approx. 7 scenarios, of which 5 or 6 are extremely unrealistic. Selling commisions to (brokers) are very high (average 6%!!). Evidence (and theory) suggests that overpricing increases in complexity (Stoimenov and Wilkens (2007).
Excerpt from the prospectus of the NAS If the Nasdaq 100 would appreciate by 3% every month… Your return would be > 600%
Source: Bernard et al. (2009)
If the Nasdaq 100 would appreciate by more than 5.5% (the cap) every month… Your return would be 3325%!!
Source: Bernard et al. (2009)
Bernard and Boyle show that the probability of this is lower than 10-19 …
Five additional examples are given, three of which are (also) unreasably optimistic. Representative scenarios such as +14%, -9%, +11%, -12%, etc. Are left out because these return 0, due to the capped increases and the uncapped decreases..
9 year “FCP” (Fonds Commun de
Placement), essentially an ETF.
Value at maturity = maximum value during its life. (“Cliquet”) E.g. if after 3 months, the FCP trades at €109, you get at least €109 back at maturity. The “click” effect does not apply to a visible index or basket, but to the fund itself. Of which AXA is manager and market maker... They invest in environment stocks, employing a complex stop-loss strategy.
Method 1 “safe” If V0 is fund size at day 0, invest the PV(V0) in bonds, the remainder in (environment) stocks. After three months, invest PV(V1) in bonds, the rest in stocks, etc. Method 2 “Risky” Invest all monies in stocks. Switch to all bonds as soon as value falls below PV(Vt)..
+ Funds are “ringfenced”: no transfer to AXA other than management costs (max. 2.2% according to prospectus). Discussion question: what if everybody follows stop-loss strategies…
If stock goes to €25.50 (+2%)
Turbo goes to €5.50 (+10%, if you paid €5) If stock goes to €24.50 (-2%) Turbo goes to €4.50 (-10%) The first such instruments were called Turbos. They had a knockout level slightly above X, say B = €21. If the stock drops to this level, the issuer would redeem the instrument, and return €1. Since 2004 (or so) most banks issue barrier options with
Stock,
Trading at €25
Turbo Loan,
Face value
X = €20
Merton (1973)
Simulate price paths of S, under the risk neutral probability measure, compute the payoff, and discount at the riskfree rate. Do this 1,000,000 times, The average is the value of the Derivative. Advantage of MC: We can accomodate i) any payoff function, (e.g. look back options, shout options), and ii) any prices process (e.g. Geometric BM, Jump-Diffusion, ARCH-GARCH, periodic jumps). For path dependent options MC is very expensive.. So we use “tricks”. I have developed two such tricks
t ddW
ν = intraday drift σd = intraday volatility W = Wiener Process
t t j t d
ν = intraday drift σd = intraday volatility W = Wiener Process σj = Jump standard deviation φt = Normal Random Variable; N(0,1); i.i.d. over time P = Poisson Process, intensity λ
n t n t t j t d
σn = Overnight Standard Deviation N = Counting Process (days) νn = Overnight drift ν = intraday drift σd = intraday volatility W = Wiener Process σj = Jump standard deviation φt = Normal Random Variable; N(0,1); i.i.d. over time P = Poisson Process, intensity λ
Hence, in real life we have the following Value function: V = V(S, X, r, σd, λ, σj, σn, t, T) Where T denotes the number of days until maturity, and t ∈ [0,1) denotes the time (in days) until the end of the trading day. Trick: If S is far away from X, take large (simulation) steps, if S is close to X, take small steps: Choose δt so that the expected overshooting is fixed (e.g. the maximum
We sample extreme values (either the minimum or the maximum) in a continuous interval. For each continuous interval, we denote the return to the minimum value µ ∈ (−∞,0], and the return from the minimum to the ending price ω ∈ [0,∞). Although they are non-overlapping return from a Martingale, µ and ω are dependent: If µ is very small (very negative), the miminum is more likely to reached late in the interval, so that ω is likely to be small. It turns out that µ and ω follow a joint probability distribution: (proposition I)
( )
2 2
2 ) ( ) ( ) , ( σ µ − ω − µ + ω µ − ω ⋅ σ = ω µ e K f Where K(σ) is a proportionality constant.
The asymmetry along the diagonal is due to the fact that the process is a Geometric BM. For a “Arithmetic” BM, there would be no asymmetry. For small (i.e. daily) σ´s the asymmetry is hardly noticable.
µ
0.4 0.6
ω
0.2
( )
2 2
2 ) ( ) ( ) , ( σ µ − ω − µ + ω µ − ω ⋅ σ = ω µ e K f
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 100 101 102 103 104 KBO - (S-X ) S
t
1 second 1 minute 15 minutes 1 hour 2 hours 4 hours 1 day ASM 1 day Merton
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 100 101 102 103 104 KBO - (S-X ) S
t
1 second 1 minute 15 minutes 1 hour 2 hours 4 hours 1 day ASM 1 day Merton
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 100 105 110 115 1 minute 15 minutes 1 hour 3 hours 1 day Merton
We suggest new tricks to value Path Dependent Options
First trick is to adapt the step as a function of the
Second trick is to simulate minimum and ending returns
Due to overnight jumps KBOs are more valuable than
And are worth more in the afternoon than in the morning,
Yes!! Their values are very close to the intrinsic value. What´s more important: the bid-ask spreads are very
30 stocks gross leverage adjusted gross leverage adjusted average 6.4 97.7 24.3 655.3 46.4 min 1.3 2.6 1.1 7.9 2.1 25%-percentile 3.2 36.6 12.4 109.3 18.5 median 4.7 62.4 17.8 235.3 29.5 75%-percentile 6.8 115.1 26.2 606.1 50.8 max 37.9 1,639.3 292.5 14,782.6 4,607.6 stdev 6.0 112.5 24.2 1,244.1 106.4 Relative Spread (basispoints) 18,003 covered warrants 5,129 ELCs
“Playing” with leveraged products is not clever (neither is going
to the casino). But if you want some excitement, knockout barrier options have a lower “cut” than regular options
Black, Fisher, and Scholes, Myron (1973) “The pricing of options and corporate liabilities”, Journal of Political Economy,(May-June). Bernard, Carole, and Boyle, Phelim (2008) “Structured products with caps and floors”, Unpublished working paper, University of Waterloo. Entrop Oliver, Scholz, Hendrik, and Wilkens, Marco (2008) “The price setting behavior of banks: an analysis of open-end leverage certificates on the german market” Unpublished working paper, University of Ingolstadt. Merton, Robert C. (1973) “Theory of Rational Option Pricing”, Bell Journal
Rossetto, Silvia, and van Bommel, Jos (2009) “Endless Leverage Certificates”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 1543-1553. Stoimenov, Pavel A., and, Wilkens, Sacha (2005) “Are structured products fairly priced? An analysis of the German market for equity-linked instruments”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 2971-2993.