Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); fair wages, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); fair wages, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); search and matching, Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988,1999); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); fair wages, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); search and matching, Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988,1999); volatility and labor immobility, Cuñat and Melitz (2010). HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); fair wages, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); search and matching, Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988,1999); volatility and labor immobility, Cuñat and Melitz (2010). More recently, a surge of papers incorporating labor market frictions into models with heterogeneous …rms: HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); fair wages, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); search and matching, Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988,1999); volatility and labor immobility, Cuñat and Melitz (2010). More recently, a surge of papers incorporating labor market frictions into models with heterogeneous …rms: fair wages, Egger and Kreickemeier (2006), Amiti and Davis (2010); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); fair wages, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); search and matching, Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988,1999); volatility and labor immobility, Cuñat and Melitz (2010). More recently, a surge of papers incorporating labor market frictions into models with heterogeneous …rms: fair wages, Egger and Kreickemeier (2006), Amiti and Davis (2010); e¢ciency wages, Davis and Harrigan (2011); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Related Literature There is a large literature on trade and labor market frictions: minimum wages, Brecher (1974); implicit contracts, Matusz (1986); e¢ciency wages, Copeland (1989); fair wages, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006); search and matching, Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988,1999); volatility and labor immobility, Cuñat and Melitz (2010). More recently, a surge of papers incorporating labor market frictions into models with heterogeneous …rms: fair wages, Egger and Kreickemeier (2006), Amiti and Davis (2010); e¢ciency wages, Davis and Harrigan (2011); search and matching, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010), Mitra and Ranjan (2010), Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008). HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 9 / 27
Inequality An examination of the link between trade and inequality requires new thinking; Stopler-Samuelson e¤ects fail to provide an adequate explanation of inequality trends around the globe (putting aside the Technology vs Trade debate). HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 10 / 27
Inequality An examination of the link between trade and inequality requires new thinking; Stopler-Samuelson e¤ects fail to provide an adequate explanation of inequality trends around the globe (putting aside the Technology vs Trade debate). Trade liberalization raises wage inequality in developed and developing countries, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 10 / 27
Inequality An examination of the link between trade and inequality requires new thinking; Stopler-Samuelson e¤ects fail to provide an adequate explanation of inequality trends around the globe (putting aside the Technology vs Trade debate). Trade liberalization raises wage inequality in developed and developing countries, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). Trade liberalization raises within group wage inequality, Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) and Menezes-Filho, Muendler and Ramey (2008). HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 10 / 27
Residual Inequality: within sectors HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 11 / 27
Residual Inequality: within occupations HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 12 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. Consider a di¤erentiated-product sector: HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. Consider a di¤erentiated-product sector: brands are produced by heterogeneous …rms, which di¤er in productivity; HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. Consider a di¤erentiated-product sector: brands are produced by heterogeneous …rms, which di¤er in productivity; …xed entry and production costs, …xed and variable trade costs; HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. Consider a di¤erentiated-product sector: brands are produced by heterogeneous …rms, which di¤er in productivity; …xed entry and production costs, …xed and variable trade costs; monopolistic competition in the product market; HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. Consider a di¤erentiated-product sector: brands are produced by heterogeneous …rms, which di¤er in productivity; …xed entry and production costs, …xed and variable trade costs; monopolistic competition in the product market; search and matching in the labor market; HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. Consider a di¤erentiated-product sector: brands are produced by heterogeneous …rms, which di¤er in productivity; …xed entry and production costs, …xed and variable trade costs; monopolistic competition in the product market; search and matching in the labor market; wage bargaining. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Framework Our view: the large role of within group inequality is related to selection of …rms into exporting, and selection of workers based on some dimension of heterogeneity. Consider a di¤erentiated-product sector: brands are produced by heterogeneous …rms, which di¤er in productivity; …xed entry and production costs, …xed and variable trade costs; monopolistic competition in the product market; search and matching in the labor market; wage bargaining. Preferences are CES . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 13 / 27
Heterogeneity Workers are homogeneous ex ante , but draw an ability a which is match-speci…c in the di¤erentiated sector. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 14 / 27
Heterogeneity Workers are homogeneous ex ante , but draw an ability a which is match-speci…c in the di¤erentiated sector. The ability a is observed neither by the worker nor by the …rm. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 14 / 27
Heterogeneity Workers are homogeneous ex ante , but draw an ability a which is match-speci…c in the di¤erentiated sector. The ability a is observed neither by the worker nor by the …rm. Firms are homogeneous ex ante , but draw a productivity θ upon entry in the di¤erentiated sector. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 14 / 27
Heterogeneity Workers are homogeneous ex ante , but draw an ability a which is match-speci…c in the di¤erentiated sector. The ability a is observed neither by the worker nor by the …rm. Firms are homogeneous ex ante , but draw a productivity θ upon entry in the di¤erentiated sector. Production : the production function is: y = θ h γ ¯ a , 0 < γ < 1 , (interpretation: human capital externalities or …xed managerial time at the level of the …rm). HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 14 / 27
Heterogeneity Workers are homogeneous ex ante , but draw an ability a which is match-speci…c in the di¤erentiated sector. The ability a is observed neither by the worker nor by the …rm. Firms are homogeneous ex ante , but draw a productivity θ upon entry in the di¤erentiated sector. Production : the production function is: y = θ h γ ¯ a , 0 < γ < 1 , (interpretation: human capital externalities or …xed managerial time at the level of the …rm). Screening : a …rm can identify workers with productivity above a c at cost. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 14 / 27
Heterogeneity Workers are homogeneous ex ante , but draw an ability a which is match-speci…c in the di¤erentiated sector. The ability a is observed neither by the worker nor by the …rm. Firms are homogeneous ex ante , but draw a productivity θ upon entry in the di¤erentiated sector. Production : the production function is: y = θ h γ ¯ a , 0 < γ < 1 , (interpretation: human capital externalities or …xed managerial time at the level of the …rm). Screening : a …rm can identify workers with productivity above a c at cost. Firm productivity and worker ability are distributed Pareto. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 14 / 27
Matching There is a Cobb-Douglas matching function. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 15 / 27
Matching There is a Cobb-Douglas matching function. It yields a cost of hiring : b = ξ x α . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 15 / 27
Matching There is a Cobb-Douglas matching function. It yields a cost of hiring : b = ξ x α . ξ is a parameter, rising in the cost of posting vacancies and declining in the Hicks-neutral e¢ciency of the matching process; HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 15 / 27
Matching There is a Cobb-Douglas matching function. It yields a cost of hiring : b = ξ x α . ξ is a parameter, rising in the cost of posting vacancies and declining in the Hicks-neutral e¢ciency of the matching process; α is the ratio of the Cobb-Douglas coe¢cients on labor and vacancies; HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 15 / 27
Matching There is a Cobb-Douglas matching function. It yields a cost of hiring : b = ξ x α . ξ is a parameter, rising in the cost of posting vacancies and declining in the Hicks-neutral e¢ciency of the matching process; α is the ratio of the Cobb-Douglas coe¢cients on labor and vacancies; x = N / L is the ratio of the number of matched workers to the number of searching workers; our measure of tightness in the labor market. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 15 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. Firms select into exporting, as in Melitz (2003): serve only the serve the domestic exit domestic market market and export θ θ θ 0 d x HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. Firms select into exporting, as in Melitz (2003): serve only the serve the domestic exit domestic market market and export θ θ θ 0 d x More productive …rms: HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. Firms select into exporting, as in Melitz (2003): serve only the serve the domestic exit domestic market market and export θ θ θ 0 d x More productive …rms: post more vacancies; 1 HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. Firms select into exporting, as in Melitz (2003): serve only the serve the domestic exit domestic market market and export θ θ θ 0 d x More productive …rms: post more vacancies; 1 match with more workers; 2 HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. Firms select into exporting, as in Melitz (2003): serve only the serve the domestic exit domestic market market and export θ θ θ 0 d x More productive …rms: post more vacancies; 1 match with more workers; 2 screen to higher ability cuto¤s; 3 HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. Firms select into exporting, as in Melitz (2003): serve only the serve the domestic exit domestic market market and export θ θ θ 0 d x More productive …rms: post more vacancies; 1 match with more workers; 2 screen to higher ability cuto¤s; 3 employ more workers; 4 HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Equilibrium Structure It is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for all the …rm-speci…c variables, and use these solutions to calculate the wage distribution. Firms select into exporting, as in Melitz (2003): serve only the serve the domestic exit domestic market market and export θ θ θ 0 d x More productive …rms: post more vacancies; 1 match with more workers; 2 screen to higher ability cuto¤s; 3 employ more workers; 4 pay higher wages (because they have workforces of higher average ability); 5 HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 16 / 27
Wages 2 1.8 w( θ ) ) θ ( w 1.6 w c ( θ ) , e t a R e 1.4 g a W 1.2 θ d θ x 1 1 1.5 2 2.5 Productivity, θ HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 17 / 27
Inequality of Wages 0.02 0.019 w T 0.018 , x e d n I l i 0.017 e h T µ -ln(1+ µ ) 0.016 0.015 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Trade Openness, ρ = θ d / θ x HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 18 / 27
Interdependence Consider a simpli…ed version of this model, with no worker heterogeneity and no screening. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 19 / 27
Interdependence Consider a simpli…ed version of this model, with no worker heterogeneity and no screening. There are two sectors, one as above, the other produces homogenous goods with one unit of labor per unit output and no trade costs. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 19 / 27
Interdependence Consider a simpli…ed version of this model, with no worker heterogeneity and no screening. There are two sectors, one as above, the other produces homogenous goods with one unit of labor per unit output and no trade costs. Labor market frictions in the homogeneous sector are similar to the di¤erentiated sector, except that ξ can be di¤erent. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 19 / 27
Interdependence Consider a simpli…ed version of this model, with no worker heterogeneity and no screening. There are two sectors, one as above, the other produces homogenous goods with one unit of labor per unit output and no trade costs. Labor market frictions in the homogeneous sector are similar to the di¤erentiated sector, except that ξ can be di¤erent. Preferences are quasi-linear: U = q 0 + 1 ζ Q ζ , ζ < β < 1 . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 19 / 27
Interdependence Consider a simpli…ed version of this model, with no worker heterogeneity and no screening. There are two sectors, one as above, the other produces homogenous goods with one unit of labor per unit output and no trade costs. Labor market frictions in the homogeneous sector are similar to the di¤erentiated sector, except that ξ can be di¤erent. Preferences are quasi-linear: U = q 0 + 1 ζ Q ζ , ζ < β < 1 . There are two countries, A and B , that di¤er only in labor market frictions. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 19 / 27
Interdependence Consider a simpli…ed version of this model, with no worker heterogeneity and no screening. There are two sectors, one as above, the other produces homogenous goods with one unit of labor per unit output and no trade costs. Labor market frictions in the homogeneous sector are similar to the di¤erentiated sector, except that ξ can be di¤erent. Preferences are quasi-linear: U = q 0 + 1 ζ Q ζ , ζ < β < 1 . There are two countries, A and B , that di¤er only in labor market frictions. Assume b A > b B , i.e., labor market frictions in the di¤erentiated sector are relatively larger in country A . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 19 / 27
Trade and Welfare A larger fraction of di¤erentiated-sector …rms export in country B . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 20 / 27
Trade and Welfare A larger fraction of di¤erentiated-sector …rms export in country B . Country B exports di¤erentiated products on net and imports homogeneous goods. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 20 / 27
Trade and Welfare A larger fraction of di¤erentiated-sector …rms export in country B . Country B exports di¤erentiated products on net and imports homogeneous goods. Both countries gain from trade. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 20 / 27
Trade and Welfare A larger fraction of di¤erentiated-sector …rms export in country B . Country B exports di¤erentiated products on net and imports homogeneous goods. Both countries gain from trade. A reduction in ξ j ( = ) reduction in b j ) raises j ’s welfare and reduces the welfare of its trade partner. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 20 / 27
Trade and Welfare A larger fraction of di¤erentiated-sector …rms export in country B . Country B exports di¤erentiated products on net and imports homogeneous goods. Both countries gain from trade. A reduction in ξ j ( = ) reduction in b j ) raises j ’s welfare and reduces the welfare of its trade partner. A simultaneous proportional reduction in ξ A and ξ B raises welfare in both countries. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 20 / 27
Trade and Welfare A larger fraction of di¤erentiated-sector …rms export in country B . Country B exports di¤erentiated products on net and imports homogeneous goods. Both countries gain from trade. A reduction in ξ j ( = ) reduction in b j ) raises j ’s welfare and reduces the welfare of its trade partner. A simultaneous proportional reduction in ξ A and ξ B raises welfare in both countries. A reduction of trade impediments raises welfare in both countries. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 20 / 27
Unemployment The rate of unemployment is a weighted average of sectoral rates of unemployment. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 21 / 27
Unemployment The rate of unemployment is a weighted average of sectoral rates of unemployment. Variation in b A and τ : 0.1 0.09 0.08 u 0.07 B 0.06 0.05 0.04 u 0.03 A 0.02 0.01 b b ' ' A b ' B b 0 A 1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.09 u 0.08 A 0.07 0.06 0.05 u B 0.04 τ 0.03 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2 HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 21 / 27
Unemployment Bene…ts The cost of hiring workers changes with unemployment bene…ts, and the cost of hiring impacts welfare of both countries. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 22 / 27
Unemployment Bene…ts The cost of hiring workers changes with unemployment bene…ts, and the cost of hiring impacts welfare of both countries. This raises two questions: HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 22 / 27
Unemployment Bene…ts The cost of hiring workers changes with unemployment bene…ts, and the cost of hiring impacts welfare of both countries. This raises two questions: Is it bene…cial to have unemployment bene…ts? HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 22 / 27
Unemployment Bene…ts The cost of hiring workers changes with unemployment bene…ts, and the cost of hiring impacts welfare of both countries. This raises two questions: Is it bene…cial to have unemployment bene…ts? How do unemployment bene…ts in a country impact its trade partner? HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 22 / 27
Unemployment Bene…ts The cost of hiring workers changes with unemployment bene…ts, and the cost of hiring impacts welfare of both countries. This raises two questions: Is it bene…cial to have unemployment bene…ts? How do unemployment bene…ts in a country impact its trade partner? Unemployment bene…ts a¤ect wages, because they increase the outside option of workers at the bargaining stage. And they impact the decision of a worker to search for a job in the homogeneous or di¤erentiated sector. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 22 / 27
Unemployment Bene…ts The cost of hiring workers changes with unemployment bene…ts, and the cost of hiring impacts welfare of both countries. This raises two questions: Is it bene…cial to have unemployment bene…ts? How do unemployment bene…ts in a country impact its trade partner? Unemployment bene…ts a¤ect wages, because they increase the outside option of workers at the bargaining stage. And they impact the decision of a worker to search for a job in the homogeneous or di¤erentiated sector. Now the relevant de…nition is ( λ is the relative bargaining weight of employers): λ b j = ξ j x α j + 1 + λ b uj . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 22 / 27
Unemployment Bene…ts The cost of hiring workers changes with unemployment bene…ts, and the cost of hiring impacts welfare of both countries. This raises two questions: Is it bene…cial to have unemployment bene…ts? How do unemployment bene…ts in a country impact its trade partner? Unemployment bene…ts a¤ect wages, because they increase the outside option of workers at the bargaining stage. And they impact the decision of a worker to search for a job in the homogeneous or di¤erentiated sector. Now the relevant de…nition is ( λ is the relative bargaining weight of employers): λ b j = ξ j x α j + 1 + λ b uj . b uj raises b j directly, and reduces b j indirectly via the decline of x j . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 22 / 27
Impact The equilibrium conditions imply that b j is increasing in unemployment bene…ts if and only if ξ 0 j > ξ j . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 23 / 27
Impact The equilibrium conditions imply that b j is increasing in unemployment bene…ts if and only if ξ 0 j > ξ j . Interdependence: The foreign country gains from j ’s unemployment bene…ts if and only if ξ 0 j > ξ j . HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 23 / 27
Impact The equilibrium conditions imply that b j is increasing in unemployment bene…ts if and only if ξ 0 j > ξ j . Interdependence: The foreign country gains from j ’s unemployment bene…ts if and only if ξ 0 j > ξ j . Own e¤ect: Country j may gain or lose from unemployment bene…ts; impact Q , ω , and tax burden T : 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 23 / 27
Optimal Policies Consider a constrained optimum that maximizes joint welfare of the two countries subject to the constraint that labor is allocated to …rms via the matching technology. HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 24 / 27
Optimal Policies Consider a constrained optimum that maximizes joint welfare of the two countries subject to the constraint that labor is allocated to …rms via the matching technology. What policies implement this allocation? HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 24 / 27
Optimal Policies Consider a constrained optimum that maximizes joint welfare of the two countries subject to the constraint that labor is allocated to …rms via the matching technology. What policies implement this allocation? In the market economy there are potential distortions in HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 24 / 27
Optimal Policies Consider a constrained optimum that maximizes joint welfare of the two countries subject to the constraint that labor is allocated to …rms via the matching technology. What policies implement this allocation? In the market economy there are potential distortions in labor markets (tightness need not be optimal); HIR () Geneva Lecture June 16, 2011 24 / 27
Recommend
More recommend
