The Politics of Transforming Education in Ecuador 2006-2017 Ben Ross Schneider, Pablo Cevallos Estarellas, and Barbara Bruns Quito, 2007 Lima, 2012
1. Ecuador’s education transformation in an Andean context 2. What drives learning improvement? 1. What education economics is telling us: cost-effective interventions Outline 2. What policymakers are doing: system-wide reform with little evidence base 3. Challenges of reforming teacher policy – technical and political 4. How Andean countries are doing it? 5. What we can learn from Ecuador?
An Andea ean countr tries es on La Lati tin Amer America regi egional tes est t 2006 2006-2013 2013 Math Scores on Second (SERCE) and Third Regional Test (TERCE) 520 511 500 492 480 460 LA average* 440 420 400 2006 2013 e
An Andea ean countr tries es on La Lati tin Amer America regi egional tes est t 2006 2006-2013 2013 Math Scores on Second (SERCE) and Third Regional Test (TERCE) 600 581 580 560 540 517 520 511 Chile 500 492 LA average* 480 460 440 420 400 2006 2013 e
An Andea ean countr tries es on La Lati tin Amer America regi egional tes est t 2006 2006-2013 2013 Math Scores on Second (SERCE) and Third Regional Test (TERCE) 600 581 580 560 540 527 517 520 511 Chile 500 492 490 Peru 480 LA average* 460 440 420 400 2006 2013 e
An Andea ean countr tries es on La Lati tin Amer America regi egional tes est t 2006 2006-2013 2013 Math Scores on Second (SERCE) and Third Regional Test (TERCE) 600 581 580 560 540 527 517 513 Chile 520 511 Ecuador 500 492 490 Peru 480 460 LA average* 460 440 420 400 2006 2013 e
An Andea ean countr tries es on PIS ISA: A: 2000 2000-2015 2015 Math scores on PISA 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 Chile Peru OECD Average Note: Values for Peru interpolated from 2000-2009
What is driving Andean education • Cost-effective interventions? progress?
Source: Evans and Popova, What Really Works to Improve Learning in Developing Countries, 2015
Source: Glewwe and Muralidharan, 2015
What is driving • Cost-effective interventions? Andean education • Or comprehensive reform tackling the progress? core issue of teacher quality?
Hig High qua quality ty te teachers ar are e pr produc duced by by a a Sy System tha that re reward rds ta talent an and is is se selective Financial (salaries, High quality benefits, trajectory) and Effective preparation for professional incentives professional teaching (quality of peers, working development conditions) attract talented people Good Teaching in a Secondary Teacher school school school education leaders Periodic Teacher Screening point 2: Screening point 1: performance evaluation Standards for Selectivity of entry into – retain high quality, teacher hiring teacher ecucation remove low quality How it works in Finland, Singapore, Canada, Japan, Korea, Shanghai
Ra Raising ng te teacher qua quality ty re require res re reforming the the Sy System tha that pr produc duces s te teachers Financial (salaries, Large number of benefits, trajectory) and Little or no low quality professional incentives effective (quality of peers, working institutions professional conditions) not development competitive with other sectors Non- Academically weak Academically weak merit Teaching in a students – bottom preparation school school half of high school No emphasis on leaders grads practice/Delinked from schools Automatic promotion Job stability No selectivity No selectivity No performance evaluation How it works in low-performing countries…
• Big agenda – multiple reforms, covering incentives, institutions and processes need to be pursued at same time and aligned • Capacity-intensive - teacher performance evaluation; institutional accreditation; effective professional development all require expert skill and Teach cher reform is implementation capacity tech chnically ch challenging • Hard to monitor - To affect student learning, reforms must affect teacher practice in the classroom, but this is hard to change • Slow and diffused results – benefits, in terms of education system performance, take years to accrue
… … and politically conflictual • Costs of reform are concentrated on teachers and teacher unions • Increased accountability, decreased job stability, more variable pay • Threats to union structure (decentralization) or unity (variable compensation) • Unions have immense political power • Largest, most homogeneous, and most powerful union in many countries • High disruptive power through strikes and demonstrations • Direct political power in funding candidates and voting bloc • Not just a labor association • Leadership often politicized and allied with powerful parties • May control significant rents (e.g., appointments) • May be part of clientelist, machine politics • Multiple layers of interests superimposed on unions • Quality reforms affect all of these interests
• No satisfying answers from political scientists • May be lessons from the Andean wave – three politically distinct countries implementing very similar reforms • Parallel in Washington DC, which has So wh So why – an and when – been researched • Dee and Wyckoff, 2013 – within 3 does do es it ha happen? ppen? years, teacher evaluation program “shifted the entire distribution of teachers in the direction of higher quality” • Jacob et al, 2015 – test-based recruitment has produced more effective new teachers
Ecuador Chile Peru Wash DC Policy goals and instruments 2007-15 2004-16 2009-14 2010 ü More selective and higher quality pre-service ü ü education ( selection pt. 1) - Raise academic standards for admission ü ü ü - Close low quality schools ü ü ü - Create high quality teacher training university ü - Create exit exam ü “Andean wave” of Higher standards for new teachers ( selection point ü ü ü ü 2 ) Teacher - Test-based hiring ü ü ü ü - Higher salaries for new recruits ü ü ü ü Policy Reforms Individual teacher performance evaluation ü ü ü ü - Bonus pay for top scorers ü ü ü ü - Eliminate job stability ü ü ü ü Promotion based on skills and performance ü ü ü ü - More remunerative salary scale ü ü ü ü Higher quality professional development ü ü ü ü - Professional incentives (time for collaboration, ü ü ü ü more in-service training, higher quality training)
The case of Ecuador’s education reform - Sense of crisis: spending fell to 1 % of GDP; lowest scores in LAC region on SERCE; teachers working only 62 % of contractual hours. Unique - Political leader with a mandate and personal conviction: Rafael features Correa. - Resources: oil prices and economic expansion permit 4-fold increase in spending, to 5% in 2013.
• Key reform opponent (teachers’ union) was defeated by Correa’s communications Ecuador: strategies. Political • No other major stakeholders were influential, but parent and student involvement in school- strategies level decisions built support. • Strong technical team in Ministry and stable leadership only 2 ministers from 2006-2013.
1. 1. Mo More se selective, , What was done? an and hig igher er • Minimum standards set for teacher education qua quality, curriculum • Most teacher training institutes were closed pre-se pr service down teacher te • National Education University (UNAE) was created educ educatio tion
What was done? 2. 2. Higher r • Entrance tests to apply for public teacher positions st standards for • Minimum score in ENES test to enter teacher ne new w tea eacher hers education programs • Recruitment campaign “I want to be a teacher”
3. Individual 3. What was done? te teacher • First-time assessment of all in-service teachers & principals per performanc nce e • Economic incentives to those who received better marks ev evaluation • Creation of Institute of Educational Assessment (INEVAL)
4. 4. High quality What was done? in in-se service • National training program for in-service teachers pr profes essiona nal • Orientation program for new teachers de devel elopm pmen ent • Mentorship program
5. Restruct cture What was done? teach cher career • Entry salary increase wit with prom omot otion ion • “Meritocratic” career ladder based o ba d on t n tested d • More professional opportunities competenci cies
What worked? • Strong political leadership produced overwhelming public support. • Long tenure of reformers generated continuity of reforms. • Teachers’ union opposition to reforms was skillfully deactivated. • Education reform was comprehensive. What looks problematic? Co Conclusi sions • Top-down reform failed to build a broader coalition of civil society support and cultivate teacher buy-in. • Teacher selection mechanisms showed a disconnect between requisites and retribution. • Limited attention was given to the quality of key actors of the education system other than teachers – e.g., school leaders and supervisors. • Some substantively important reforms may produce little impact, as they do not address the flaws they were meant to solve.
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