The Legitimacy of Inference: Argumentation Strategy in rtis Ratnak - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Legitimacy of Inference: Argumentation Strategy in Ratnak¯ ırti’s ¯ Iśvaras¯ adhanad¯ us .an . am

Sara L. Uckelman s.l.uckelman@durham.ac.uk @SaraLUckelman 02 December 2015

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Introduction

¯ Iśvaras¯ adhanad¯ us .an . am, written by the Buddhist logician and philosopher Ratnak¯ ırti (ca.990–1050). Arguments for and against the existence of “¯ Iśvara”, the Hindu concept of god. Two part-text, each part structured as a dialogue.

◮ First part: Proponent (an unnamed Naiyayika Hindu) argues for the

existence of ¯ Iśvara.

◮ Second part: Opponent (Ratnak¯

ırti) argues against the existence of ¯ Iśvara.

We focus on the formal/structural aspects of the arguments, not their content.

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Background: Ratnak¯ ırti

ca.990–1050. Buddhist monk and scholar in Vikramaś¯ ıla Monastery (Bengal). Student of Jñ¯ anaśr¯ ımitra. Important religious and philosophical leader, teacher of many Buddhist missionaries to Tibet. Author of 10 (known) works, which fall into two types:

◮ siddhi: (1) thesis endorsed by R.; (2) attacks by opponent; (3) criticism

• f the attacks

◮ d¯

us .an . a: (1) thesis endorsed by opponent; (2) arguments pro by

• pponent; (3) attacks by R.

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Background: The text

A d¯ us .an . a text. Arguments for the positive thesis (held by Naiyayika) are directed against (1) an opponent whose identity is not specified, but who is probably Buddhist, as well as (2) specific Mimamsaka Hindu

• pponents who are identified.

Dialogue as a framing structure. Not a real dialogue. Two-level disputation: (1) Does ¯ Iśvara exist? (2) Do your arguments demonstrate that he does? Argumentation about the scope of argumentation: What type of arguments are allowed in what contexts?

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Background: ¯ Iśvara

Properties of ¯ Iśvara: single (eka)

• mnipresent (vibhu)
• mniscient (sarvavid)

a basis for intelligence (buddhisam¯ aśraya) eternal (ś¯ aśvatta) creator (vidh¯ atr .)

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The central inference

1 Thesis (pratijñ¯

a): That subjected to dispute has something with awareness as its cause,

2 Reason (hetu): because it is an effect. 3 Example (dr

.s .t .¯ anta) and pervasion (vy¯ apti): What is an effect has something with awareness as its cause, like a pot.

4 Application (upanaya): And this [thing subjected to dispute] is an

effect.

5 Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore it has something with awareness as

its cause.

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Defects of the hetu

The central inference follows a standard argumentation form in Indian logic, and the opponent’s arguments are focused on showing that none of the five defects of the hetu (reason) occur: having deviation (savyabhic¯ ara) or inconclusive (anaik¯ antika)

• pposed/contradictory (viruddha)

a rival for the subject (prakaran . asama) equivalent to the property to be proved (s¯ adhyasama) mis-timed (at¯ ıtak¯ ala).

(The details of these defects do not matter for the current purposes.)

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Argumentation strategy and probative force

Neither the Opponent nor Ratn¯ akirti attack arguments by showing that they are not valid or that they are logically problematic. Instead, they attack the arguments on the basis of probative force. Certain types of arguments are not allowed because they violate certain norms about discursive commitments. The applicability of inference: The interlocutors come from competing schools which agree on some principles and have some overlap in their logical theory, but not completely.

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Discursive commitments

Determination of discursive commitments. Determination of the “success” of an argument. Arguments for parallel discursive commitments: “If you doubt/accept/reject X, you must also doubt/accept/reject Y ”. Arguments about conflict between discursive commitments and actions.

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Determination of discursive commitments

How do we determine which positions an interlocutor is committed to? Explicit:

◮ Interlocutors are committed to positions that they advance positive

arguments for.

◮ Signals in the text: “Even others agree”, “We both agree”,. . .

Implicit:

◮ Argument structure: When the topic changes, take the preceding

conclusion as implicitly accepted.

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Determination of success

How do we determine when an argument is “successful”? When the opponent cannot/does not respond. When it is the right type of argument in the right context.

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Determination of success

How do we determine when an argument is “successful”? When the opponent cannot/does not respond. When it is the right type of argument in the right context. What is “right”? It is precisely this which is being hashed out.

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A closer look

33.21ff: The Opponent argues that the hetu ‘being an effect’ is not viruddha (opposed/contradictory) by providing an example where the hetu exists along with the property to be proved (sadhya) O Pots are effects, and they are caused by makers who have intelligence. ¯ O Three counterarguments: 1 If what is to be proved is ‘being caused by an intelligent maker’, then the argument fails because of the fallacy of “establishing what is [already] established. For others too assume that all kinds of effect originate in activity; and because activity has the nature

• f consciousness, or has consciousness as its cause, also the world has that [i.e.,

consciousness] as its cause”. O No response: He agrees that ‘being caused by an intelligent maker’ is not what’s to be proved here. 2 If what is to be proved is ‘being caused by an omniscient maker’, then the example of pots actually proves the opposite, since all pot-makers are non-omniscient. O No response: We take him to be committed to potmakers being a counterexample to the pervasion between ‘being caused by an

• mniscient maker’ and ‘being an effect’.

3 How do you get from the inference from ‘being an effect’ to ‘being caused by something intelligent’ to proving special properties of the intelligent maker (e.g.,

• mniscience, omnipresence, being single, etc.)

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The scope of inference (1)

Is inference only able to prove general claims? Or is it able to prove specifics?

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The scope of inference (2)

The Opponent’s Opponent (¯ O): If this specific quality is not the object of the reason, how is this then established from it? Or, if it is established, how is it not the object? If [it is] the object, how does it not touch on the error of not having a positive concomitance?

How does the Opponent (O) establish the required properties of the intelligent maker? If he doesn’t do it via inference, then how are they established? If he does do it via inference, how does he do it, since ‘being

• mniscient’ is not included in ‘being an intelligent maker’?

If ‘being omniscient’ is included in ‘being an intelligent maker’, then pots and potmakers cannot be used as an example to establish positive concomitance.

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The scope of inference (3)

The Opponent (O): There really is an inference that has a specific quality as its object, because, even when there is a pervasion by a universal in general, one infers [something] about that having the property to be established, in virtue of the fact that a universal that contains a specific quality/particular species is a quality of the instance [under dispute]; for otherwise all inference is cut off. . . the inference of fire too does not have the mere universal as its object, because that is established already before. Neither is its object the hill qualified by this [mere universal], because its being qualified by the universal fireness is impossible since there is no connection with [that universal]. Otherwise, in the same way that spotted cows, etc., are cows because of the inherence of cowness, a mountain too would follow as fire because of the inherence of fire.

The Opponent appeals to an analogous inference (“there is fire on the hill, because there is smoke. Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. And there is smoke on the hill. Therefore, there is fire on the hill”) which is accepted by Buddhists, and says that if ¯ O wants to reject O’s argument, he will also have to reject the analogous inference about fire. . . . The paks .adharmat¯ a method.

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Another argument by analogy/parallelity

45.13ff: Ratnak¯ ırti’s Opponent argues: Now if [it is] through perception and non-perception [that one knows] the pervasion between the universals effect and cause only [insofar as] they have the nature of being visible, like [one knows the pervasion] between the universals fire and smoke, then the inference towards another’s mind is ruined; for it is not correct to grasp the pervasion by a mind in general, which equally [belongs to] one’s own and another [person’s] mental continuum [and which is] invisible, by perception, whose object is [something] visible.

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Conclusions

Ratnak¯ ırti and his (imaginary) interlocutors are much more interested in the appropriate ways of establishing conclusions than in showing that ¯ Iśvara does (or does not) exist. The texts investigates the scope and limits of the standard inferential method via questioning applications of the method. New methods of reasoning (paks .adharmat¯ a) are introduced, which implicitly admit the limits of the standard methods.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to the participants of the Heidelberg and Procida workshops

• n this text, in October 2012 and September 2013, as well as

audiences at the International Society for the Study of Argumentation and the International Dharmak¯ ırti Conference, in July 2014 and August 2014. Special thanks to Brendan Gillon, Patrick McAllister, and Parimal G. Patil, for allowing me to make use of their draft translation of the ¯ Iśvaras¯ adhanad¯ us .an . am.

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