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The Ins and Outs of Programming Cryptography in Smart Cards . . . and announcing the launch of OpenCard Pascal Paillier CryptoExperts Real World Crypto 2015 Jan 2015 Real World Crypto 2015 Jan 2015 What are Smart Cards? Real World

  1. The Ins and Outs of Programming Cryptography in Smart Cards . . . and announcing the launch of OpenCard Pascal Paillier CryptoExperts Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015 Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  2. What are Smart Cards? Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  3. What are Smart Cards? Command packet: header data Le (APDU-C) command Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  4. What are Smart Cards? Command packet: header data Le (APDU-C) command internal processing Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  5. What are Smart Cards? Command packet: header data Le (APDU-C) Response packet: data SW (APDU-R) command response Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  6. What are Smart Cards? Command packet: header data Le (APDU-C) Response packet: data SW (APDU-R) command response black-box oracle Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  7. What are Smart Cards? Command packet: header data Le (APDU-C) Response packet: data SW (APDU-R) command response contactless interface Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  8. What are Smart Cards? Command packet: header data Le (APDU-C) Response packet: data SW (APDU-R) dual interface Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  9. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  10. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  11. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  12. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  13. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  14. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  15. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  16. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  17. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  18. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  19. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  20. Native vs Virtual Applications Native cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  21. Native vs Virtual Applications VM-based cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  22. Native vs Virtual Applications VM-based cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  23. Native vs Virtual Applications VM-based cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  24. Native vs Virtual Applications VM-based cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  25. Native vs Virtual Applications VM-based cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  26. Native vs Virtual Applications VM-based cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  27. Smart Card Concepts & Standards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  28. Typical Hardware Architecture Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  29. CPU Cores � The 8-bit era ◮ Motorola 68HC05, Intel 8051, AVR AT90 � Then 32-bit RISCs took over ◮ ARM7-TDMI, ARM9/11, SmartMIPS ◮ Cortex M3, M0 Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  30. Embedded Cryptoprocessors All shapes and sizes. Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  31. Embedded Cryptoprocessors Shush! NDA required. . . Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  32. Embedded Cryptoprocessors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  33. Embedded Cryptoprocessors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  34. Embedded Cryptoprocessors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  35. Embedded Cryptoprocessors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  36. Embedded Cryptoprocessors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  37. Embedded Cryptoprocessors Binary fields Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  38. Arithmetic processors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  39. Arithmetic processors The good, the bad and the ugly. Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  40. Arithmetic processors The good: full set of operations in hardware � modular additions, subtractions, multiplications � regular additions, subtractions, multiplications � variable operand length with automatic adjustment � extra support like logical operations, modular inverses, exponentiation � hardware-enhanced side-channel resistance � operand in shared RAM memory � fully parallel to CPU Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  41. Arithmetic processors The bad: much less flexible :( � modular additions, subtractions, multiplications � variable operand length � no extra support � hardware-enhanced side-channel resistance? � fully parallel to CPU Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  42. Arithmetic processors The ugly: just a � big Montgomery multiplier with � coarse-grain scalability � huge side-channel leakage � CPU may be idle when co-processing things Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  43. Arithmetic processors Complexity metrics often seem ”unnatural”. . . Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  44. Arithmetic processors Complexity metrics often seem ”unnatural”. . . x p − 2 mod p much faster and secure than GCD Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  45. Arithmetic processors Complexity metrics often seem ”unnatural”. . . x p − 2 mod p much faster and secure than GCD Mandatory re-design of time-critical algorithms such as random prime number generation Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  46. Smart Card Programming in Practice Smart cards are a close technology. Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  47. Smart Card Programming in Practice Smart cards are a close technology. You may only purchase semi-open javacards or MultOS cards Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  48. Smart Card Programming in Practice Smart cards are a close technology. You may only purchase semi-open javacards or MultOS cards Significant slow-down factor Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  49. Smart Card Programming in Practice Smart cards are a close technology. You may only purchase semi-open javacards or MultOS cards Significant slow-down factor No direct access to CPU or cryptoprocessors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  50. Announcing OpenCard (mid 2015) � fully , truly open smart card that anyone can program in C and/or native code without NDA � 32-bit ARM core, ≃ 600 kB of memory, ≃ 18 kB of RAM � native access to DES/3DES, AES and RSA co-processors Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

  51. Announcing OpenCard (mid 2015) � 3rd party extensions downloadable from OpenCard Market � ideal for programming your own embedded crypto libs and try advanced applications with pairings, lightweight blockciphers, etc. Launch by Q2 2015 on www.cryptoexperts.com/opencard. Check it out, make your own cards and have fun :) Real World Crypto 2015 – Jan 2015

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