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The Eurasian Connection Organised by Kring Internationaal Johan de - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Eurasian Connection Organised by Kring Internationaal Johan de Witthuis, Utrecht, 14 April 2016 W elkom W elcom e Wilkommen Bienvenida Bienvenu Bem-vindo Velkommen Benvenuto Vlkommen Tervetuloa Witaj Dobrodoli Program 16.30


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The Eurasian Connection

Organised by Kring Internationaal Johan de Witthuis, Utrecht, 14 April 2016

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W elkom

W elcom e Wilkommen Bienvenida Bienvenu Bem-vindo Velkommen Benvenuto

Välkommen

Tervetuloa Dobrodošli Witaj

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Program

16.30 Doors open 16.45 Welcome and introduction of the guests by Caroline Tuin, Chairperson Kring I nternationaal 17.05 Rob van Leeuwen will take us to the world of pensions in the countries that were the former Soviet Union 17.45 I ain Batty, laywer at CMS Cameron McKenna. As one of the founders

  • f the pension system in Poland, I ain will talk to us about the

developments in the pension system in Eastern European countries that are now member of the EU. 18.25 Q&A 18.35 Closing drinks and networking opportunity 19.30 Doors close

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Welcome and introduction of the speakers

Caroline Tuin

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Agenda

  • Welcome
  • I ntroduction of our guests
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Welcome

to the 4th meeting of the Kring Internationaal

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Introduction of our guests

  • Rob van Leeuwen (1964):

– Graduated in 1989 from Groningen University with a Masters degree in mathematics; – Became a full member of the Royal Actuarial Association of the Netherlands in 1995; – Working since 2001 in successor states to the former Soviet-Union (predominantly in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine); – Before 2001, Rob worked for several Consulting firms in the Netherlands as well as in Russia and as a technical director and member of the management board at a mid-sized insurance company in the Netherlands; – Since 2001, Rob has been working on a combination of international donor projects and assignments for private sector clients in the CIS.

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Introduction of our guests (2)

  • I ain Batty:
  • Has been practising as an English solicitor for 25 years
  • Is a partner at the leading international law firm, CMS, and is responsible for the

co-ordination of the Commercial Practice in Central and Eastern Europe;

  • Has a wealth of experience in the CEE region having worked there since 1991

and having lived there since 1997. He is based in Poland but travels extensively through the region;

  • Has been involved in drafting pension fund legislation for a large number of

countries in the region including Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovakia and Macedonia. He has also worked in Russia, China and Kenya;

  • Iain has a particular focus on advising insurance companies and pension fund
  • perators on a variety of commercial, regulatory and contractual issues across

the region;

  • Iain regularly speaks at conferences and appears in the press.
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Pension reform in the former Soviet Union - out in the desert

Rob van Leeuwen

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The Washington consensus

  • Or: roll-out of the Chilean model
  • I n the early 1980-ies Chile has reformed its pension system, to include a

mandatory, funded, Defined Contribution, privately managed component

  • This was part of a wider reform effort, to set the Chilean economy on a

market-oriented (or: “capitalist”) path

  • I t fitted well with the general “zeitgeist” (Reagan, Thatcher, Milton

Friedman),promoting self-reliance instead of dependency of the State

  • These reforms were copied widely in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia,

Colombia, Mexico, Peru etc.)

  • Success factor: 35 years of continually declining interest rates
  • Problem: high marketing, administration, asset management costs
  • Reforms were picked up by the World Bank, I MF, USAI D, EU
  • When former socialist economies started to transfer to market economies

in the 1990-ies, this opened a new field for the introduction of the “three pillar” model

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The three pillars (of wisdom?)

  • Pillar I : mandatory, PAYG financed, can include a basic pension, often

includes a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) component

  • Pillar I I : mandatory, funded, Defined Contribution (DC)
  • Pillar I I I : voluntary, includes both occupational pensions and private

arrangements This is the World Bank classification, which is most widely used in practice Problems:

  • The “double burden” or “transition burden”

– no extra cost: implicit liabilities are made explicit; or should we say: – liabilities (to citizens) that can be reneged upon become “harder” (to bondholders)

  • Risk of high marketing, administration, asset management costs
  • Citizens fail to make informed choices

Advantage: citizens have their nest eggs in two baskets:

  • The demographic, domestic, labor share of GDP-dependent basket
  • The potentially international, capital share of GDP-dependent basket
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Kazakhstan

  • I ntroduced in 1998
  • Pillar I mostly concerns legacy pensions, a basic pension and a minimum

guarantee

  • Pillar I I is dominant

– Funded by an employee contribution of 10% of wages – From 2018 the employer will contribute an additional 5% of wages

  • Pillar I I I is virtually non-existent
  • The State took the transition burden upon itself
  • I mpeccable technical implementation:

– A legal and supervisory infrastructure creating a wide array of potential investment vehicles – After initial hick-ups the contribution collection mechanism was sophisticated and automated

  • Problem: lack of investment opportunities, resulting in low nominal returns

and negative real returns

  • The State guaranteed a 0% real return
  • 2013 reform:

– all pillar II pension funds were brought under State Control – The strict DC system is to attain DB elements – details remain hazy

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Russian Federation

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Russian Federation

  • I ntroduced in 2002
  • All contributions paid by the employer
  • Pillar I : a basic pension + an NDC component (contribution 22% for those

born before 1967, 16% for those born thereafter)

  • Pillar I I : based on a contribution of 6% for those born in or after 1967

– since 2014 also these are diverted to Pillar I; this moratorium will extend at least into 2017 – since 2015 participation in Pillar II is voluntary

  • Pillar I I I is mostly limited to industry-wide DC plans and DC plans of some

foreign employers

  • The system is hugely in deficit: about 50% of pension payments comes

from general taxes

  • Recently the NDC system moved to a “points” system, which allows the

government to better control costs in times of high inflation

  • Pension age 55 (female) respectively 60 (male) – still a “sacred cow”
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Other countries

Ukraine:

  • Has been contemplating the introduction of a second pillar for 15 years – it

was supposed to happen when several macro-economic parameters (e.g. inflation) would meet certain criteria

  • What actually happened was that only the minimum pension was

somewhat indexed and as a result over time all pensioners are squeezed to the minimum Azerbaijan:

  • Did a good job implementing Pillar I : a basic pension + an NDC component
  • I s implementing a funded pillar in a very cautious way (and rightly so!)

Tajikistan:

  • I mplemented a funded pillar in 1999, but it remains underdeveloped
  • Only in 2013 crossed over from the Soviet DB system to an NDC system,

but also this reform is far from complete, mainly due to lack of human resources

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Conclusions former SU

  • As Leo Tolstoy said: “All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is

unhappy in its own way.”

  • I n Russia and Kazakhstan pension reform has been partly reversed
  • I n Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Ukraine it hasn’t really taken off yet

Problems:

  • The transitional “double burden” was underestimated

– “Petrostates” coped with this more easily – until recently

  • Real investment returns were overestimated
  • Lack of knowledge and indifference on the part of the population

– Great scope for “nudging” people into one or the other choice by making it the default option

  • Lack of investment opportunities

– Notwithstanding rhetoric about pension systems providing a “stable base of long-term investors”

  • Wider economic instability not conducive to stable retirement saving

– Inflation, currency depreciation, corruption, civil war, political risk

  • The State can be a good arbiter between private parties

– However, as a contributor, having the State as your counterpart is something different…

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Pensions in Eastern Europe

  • a hasty retreat?

Iain Batty

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Wave of reform to create three pillar pension systems

  • Reform spread across the region with new laws implemented between 1998

and 2005

  • Wide-ranging reforms in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia,

Macedonia and Slovakia

  • The Czech Republic was a straggler, introducing its reforms in 2013
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Pensions Terminology in CEE

  • Differs from existing EU terminology
  • First Pillar – state social security
  • Second Pillar – mandatory, funded, privately managed
  • Third Pillar – voluntary, funded, privately managed, whether employer

sponsored or individual

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Overview of Pension Reform in the Region

  • Until mid 1990s virtually no funded provision
  • State was monopoly provider
  • After that many countries in the region underwent radical reform
  • Reform justified by need to avert a demographic crisis and also the need to

create domestic institutional investors

  • Reform heavily influenced by World Bank
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Moves to Three Pillar System

  • Move to a three pillar system inspired by the World Bank
  • I n Pillar I individual benefits are more closely linked to contributions
  • Many people are (or were) able to contribute to privately managed Pillar I I

funds

  • return for making contributions to Pillar I I funds people pay lower

contributions to Pillar I

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Legal Model - Segregation of Management Company and Fund

  • Standard model in CEE countries
  • I ncreases transparency of ownership
  • Lessens opportunity for fraud
  • Provides clearer charging structures
  • Assets deemed to be owned by state
  • Eurostat decisions and court cases
  • Caused problems for fund sponsors later on
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Charging structures

  • Fee on positive investment return
  • Fee on contributions
  • Fee on assets
  • Switching/ withdrawal fee
  • Varying fees depending on relative performance
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Guarantees

  • I mprove confidence
  • But at a cost – ultimately members will pay
  • Relative rate of return guarantee
  • Central fund to be used in event of fraud – paid by pension funds
  • Taxpayer funded resource – used for under-performance and fraud
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Reversals of Reform

The middle of the last decade was the highpoint for CEE pensions. Concerns started to be raised because:

  • little competition re charges
  • uniform investment policies
  • high proportions of investment in government paper
  • switching between funds

The financial crash of 2008 had a decisive impact

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Case studies Poland and Hungary

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Poland – Legal Framework – Second Pillar

  • I ndividual chooses fund
  • Employer should not know identity of chosen fund
  • Employer channels money to social security agency – ZUS
  • Pension fund company controls pension fund
  • Company is dedicated single purpose entity capitalised to minimum € 4

million

  • Pension fund is purely pool of assets
  • Regulation by interventionist supervisory body
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Poland – Tax and Investment – Second Pillar

  • Tax treatment of 2nd pillar is same as for social security contributions i.e.

EET

  • Originally only 5% of pension assets could be invested abroad
  • Quantitive restrictions on investment
  • Funds did not take advantage of ceilings on equity investment
  • Little in the way of corporate bonds
  • Much went into government paper
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Poland – death by a thousand cuts

  • 2011 – reduction in rate of contribution from 7.3% to 2.3%
  • Reduction in charges
  • Modifications to guarantee system
  • Restrictions on advertising
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Poland - Further drastic cuts in 2014

  • Transfer of 51% of assets to state social security
  • Ban on investment into sovereign bonds
  • ”Safety zip” mechanism
  • Ban on advertising (reversed by Constitutional Court)
  • Further participation in Pillar I I pension assets was made voluntary (default
  • ption = only Pillar I )
  • Fear now that new interventionist government will abolish system
  • I f so, questions over what will happen to fund assets
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Poland – Foreign Investment

  • Originally capped at 5%
  • Questioned by ECJ
  • Now at 30%
  • Currently ≈ 8% of assets invested abroad
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Poland – Top Pension Funds

Fund 1) Nationale Nederlanden 2) Aviva 3) PZU 4) Met Life 5) AXA Total AUM – EUR 28 Billion approx. Number of members 3.0 million 2.6 million 2.2 million 1.6 million 1.1 million

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Hungary – Pillar II

  • Pillar I I went live on 1 January 1998
  • Mandatory for those entering labour market for first time
  • Voluntary for other groups
  • Take-up rate was much higher than government expected
  • Many Pillar I I funds but market was dominated by five players
  • Consolidation subsequently took place
  • Employer channeled contributions to funds and therefore had some

influence on decision

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Hungary – Flawed legal regime – Second Pillar

  • Legal form of MPF was unsatisfactory
  • Strongly influenced by form of Hungarian voluntary mutual benefit funds
  • I n theory banks and insurers could not establish funds
  • I n practice they did
  • Single legal entity – non transparent
  • Governed by consolidated Hungarian financial supervisory authority
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Hungary - devastation in 2011

  • Populist nationalist goverment almost eliminated pillar
  • Justified on basis that defecit needed eliminating
  • I nitially categoried a suspension but then declared permanent
  • I n theory members could remain as such
  • I n practice this proved bureaucratic and difficult
  • There are now around 60 000 members compared with one million plus prior

to 2011

  • Sponsoring FI s took a haircut
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Plundering of pension assets in

  • Romania
  • Slovakia
  • Estonia

The Czech Republic implemented a new second pillar in 2013 and eliminated it in 2016

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Lessons to be learnt

  • Approach of CEE states should have been foreseen
  • Biggest problem was that assets in funds were deemed to have been state

social security assets

  • States had good reasons for doing this but this increased risks of

expropriation

  • FI s have had their fingers burned. None are likely to want to re-enter the

mandatory pensions market in coming decades

  • Many states struggle with troublesome demographics and state pensions

which provide little more than a subsistence income

  • Will there be the emergence of viable voluntary pillars in the future?
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Lessons for the Netherlands?

  • We have around 50% in PAYG, around 50% funded

– That’s good (… is it?)

  • We are an island of DB in a sea of DC.

– (High) time to change?

  • The “second pillar” was actively pushed by international donors for developing

countries and countries in transition.

– Don’t try this at home! – It is not a panacea for aging of the population due to low birthrates and increased longevity

  • I t shows however that the link between “employer” and “pension” is an accident
  • f history rather than a natural phenomenon

– Compare with the link between “employer” and “health insurance” in the US, which we find strange

  • Pension is the business of the individual, aided by the State
  • The individual should – up to certain limits – be compelled to participate in

pension arrangements

  • Competition between funds does not work very well, however the State should

not manage assets (is the Swedish model the answer?)

  • Pensions should be based on a mix of PAYG promises and funded arrangements
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QUESTIONS??

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Next event

13 October 2016 The African Connection

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Please join us for drinks and talks