The E Effect ct o of P Population ion Aging on P Polit itics - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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The E Effect ct o of P Population ion Aging on P Polit itics - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The E Effect ct o of P Population ion Aging on P Polit itics ics: : The Dif Difficulty of of Cou ountering S Sil ilver P Pow ower in in Japan Presented at Is Japan a Silver Democracy? Demographics, Politics, and


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SLIDE 1

The E Effect ct o

  • f P

Population ion Aging on P Polit itics ics: :

The Dif Difficulty of

  • f Cou
  • untering “S

“Sil ilver P Pow

  • wer”

” in in Japan

Presented at “Is Japan a Silver Democracy? Demographics, Politics, and Policy Choices for the 21st Century” 3 December 2014, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, USA

Mi Michio io Umed Umeda (PhD Mic

Michigan an 20 2011)

Assista tant t Profes essor, E Ehime U Univers ersity

1

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SLIDE 2

Starting Point: Cross-national Comparison of Public Spending on Elderly and Non-Elderly Citizens

5.8 6.5 7.1 8.3 8.9 9.3 9.9 10.2 10.4 11.4 12.9 14.0 15.7 16.0 17.4 18.6 24.7 28.9

38.5

42.3

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Elderly/Non-Elderly Spending Ratio (ENSR) average 1985-2000 (Lynch 2006, Table 2.7 pp 30) 2

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SLIDE 3

The Structure is Getting Worse…

  • 80 -70 -58 -56 -53 -52 -32 -20 -6 17 23 42 49 50 76 86 92

104 116

799

  • 100

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Percent Change in ENSR, 1960-2000 (Lynch 2006, Table 3.1 pp 45) 3

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SLIDE 4

Huge Budget Deficit

  • The Japanese government is not a big spender in

any sense (e.g. public spending/GDP).

  • However, Japan does not have enough tax or

social security revenue to support benefits (e.g. pensions and medical service for elderly citizens).

  • As a result, Japan accumulates a large deficit each

year to finance the current program, which will impose a heavy burden on future generations.

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SLIDE 5

Question :

  • Politicians in Japan sometimes claim that we

should raise taxes (e.g. consumption tax) in

  • rder “not to leave a debt to our children (子孫

に借金を残すな)”

  • At the same time, they rarely claim that we need

benefit cuts (e.g. old-age pension) in order “not to leave a debt to our children.”

  • Why? Because it is politically suicidal! There are

five electoral reasons of avoiding the C words.

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SLIDE 6

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (1): Number

6 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 Median (52 years) is here

Japanese Population Structure of Eligible Voters (Oct 2013)

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SLIDE 7

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (2): T urnout

30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 1996 2000 2003 2005 2009 2012

20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70-

7 Low Lower H Hous

  • use T

T ur urnout af afte ter Elec ecto toral al Reform 1 1996-20 2012

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SLIDE 8

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (3): Preference

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 20- 30- 40- 50- 60-

much less less same as now more much more

ISSP2006 more or less government spending in OLD AGE PENSIONS 8

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SLIDE 9

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (4): Issue Salience

20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70%

1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2005 2009

20- 30- 40- 50- 60-

“Welfare” Issue Saliency, 1972-2009 (updated from Umeda 2012 based on Meisui Electoral Survey) 9

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SLIDE 10

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (5): Institutions - 1

5) The electoral system gives additional power to elderly and/or more active voters

  • A small “minimum winning coalition”

under SMD with low turnout: 30% of district voters is enough to keep winning.

  • As such, candidates tend to focus on small

core and active group of voters while campaigning.

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SLIDE 11

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (5): Institutions - 2

5) The electoral system gives additional power to elderly and/or more active voters

  • Malapportionment gives some additional

voice to districts with older and more rural voters.

  • Those of the Upper House SMD/MMD

push the weighted up median age of the voters by one year.

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SLIDE 12

Conclusion

  • The combination of these five factors (i.e.

numbers, turnout, preferences, issue saliency and institutions) makes any benefits cut for the elderly extremely difficult in Japan.

  • We may need stronger political leadership

and/ or a crisis to override the elderly’s “silver power “in Japan’s democratic processes.

  • It may happen in the US too…

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