The E Effect ct o of P Population ion Aging on P Polit itics - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The E Effect ct o

• f P

Population ion Aging on P Polit itics ics: :

The Dif Difficulty of

• f Cou
• untering “S

“Sil ilver P Pow

• wer”

” in in Japan

Presented at “Is Japan a Silver Democracy? Demographics, Politics, and Policy Choices for the 21st Century” 3 December 2014, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, USA

Mi Michio io Umed Umeda (PhD Mic

Michigan an 20 2011)

Assista tant t Profes essor, E Ehime U Univers ersity

1

Starting Point: Cross-national Comparison of Public Spending on Elderly and Non-Elderly Citizens

5.8 6.5 7.1 8.3 8.9 9.3 9.9 10.2 10.4 11.4 12.9 14.0 15.7 16.0 17.4 18.6 24.7 28.9

38.5

42.3

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Elderly/Non-Elderly Spending Ratio (ENSR) average 1985-2000 (Lynch 2006, Table 2.7 pp 30) 2

The Structure is Getting Worse…

• 80 -70 -58 -56 -53 -52 -32 -20 -6 17 23 42 49 50 76 86 92

104 116

799

• 100

100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

Percent Change in ENSR, 1960-2000 (Lynch 2006, Table 3.1 pp 45) 3

Huge Budget Deficit

• The Japanese government is not a big spender in

any sense (e.g. public spending/GDP).

• However, Japan does not have enough tax or

social security revenue to support benefits (e.g. pensions and medical service for elderly citizens).

• As a result, Japan accumulates a large deficit each

year to finance the current program, which will impose a heavy burden on future generations.

4

Question :

• Politicians in Japan sometimes claim that we

should raise taxes (e.g. consumption tax) in

• rder “not to leave a debt to our children (子孫

に借金を残すな)”

• At the same time, they rarely claim that we need

benefit cuts (e.g. old-age pension) in order “not to leave a debt to our children.”

• Why? Because it is politically suicidal! There are

five electoral reasons of avoiding the C words.

5

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (1): Number

6 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 Median (52 years) is here

Japanese Population Structure of Eligible Voters (Oct 2013)

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (2): T urnout

30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 1996 2000 2003 2005 2009 2012

20- 30- 40- 50- 60- 70-

7 Low Lower H Hous

• use T

T ur urnout af afte ter Elec ecto toral al Reform 1 1996-20 2012

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (3): Preference

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 20- 30- 40- 50- 60-

much less less same as now more much more

ISSP2006 more or less government spending in OLD AGE PENSIONS 8

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (4): Issue Salience

20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70%

1972 1976 1979 1980 1983 1986 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2005 2009

20- 30- 40- 50- 60-

“Welfare” Issue Saliency, 1972-2009 (updated from Umeda 2012 based on Meisui Electoral Survey) 9

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (5): Institutions - 1

5) The electoral system gives additional power to elderly and/or more active voters

• A small “minimum winning coalition”

under SMD with low turnout: 30% of district voters is enough to keep winning.

• As such, candidates tend to focus on small

core and active group of voters while campaigning.

10

Five reasons that politicians in Japan should not make grandmas unhappy (5): Institutions - 2

5) The electoral system gives additional power to elderly and/or more active voters

• Malapportionment gives some additional

voice to districts with older and more rural voters.

• Those of the Upper House SMD/MMD

push the weighted up median age of the voters by one year.

11

Conclusion

• The combination of these five factors (i.e.

numbers, turnout, preferences, issue saliency and institutions) makes any benefits cut for the elderly extremely difficult in Japan.

• We may need stronger political leadership

and/ or a crisis to override the elderly’s “silver power “in Japan’s democratic processes.

• It may happen in the US too…

12