Successfully Attacking Agency Regulations Thomas H. Dupree Jr. - - PDF document

Successfully Attacking Agency Regulations Thomas H. Dupree Jr. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP SUMMARY: Challenging agency regulations in court can often prove an uphill battle. Federal courts will often review regulations deferentially under Chevron, emphasizing the importance of agency expertise and judgment. And the familiar “arbitrary-and- capricious” standard of review lacks the bite of the de novo standard that appellate courts use when reviewing pure legal questions. This paper examines a successful challenge to agency regulations in the transportation sector—Association of American Railroads v. Department of Transportation, 821 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The case involved a challenge to the authorizing statute itself, in which Congress attempted to give the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak the authority to jointly issue performance standards governing Amtrak trains operating on the tracks of freight railroads.

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Challenging agency regulations in court can often prove an uphill battle. Federal courts will often review regulations deferentially under Chevron, emphasizing the importance of agency expertise and judgment. And the familiar “arbitrary-and- capricious” standard of review lacks the bite of the de novo standard that appellate courts use when reviewing pure legal questions. This paper examines a successful challenge to agency regulations in the transportation sector brought by the Association of American Railroads. The case is Association of American Railroads v. Department of Transportation, 821 F.3d 19 (D.C.

• Cir. 2016). It involved a scheme in which the Federal Railroad Administration and

Amtrak jointly issued performance standards governing Amtrak trains operating on the tracks of freight railroads. In this case, the challengers won—at least so far, as it is possible the Government will continue to try to get the result overturned. The D.C. Circuit held the authorizing statute—that is, the statute that gave the FRA and Amtrak the power to issue the regulations—unconstitutional. Unlike many traditional arbitrary-and-capricious challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act, when an authorizing statute is struck down as unconstitutional, the agency cannot simply issue new regulations in an effort to cure the procedural flaw.

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I. In 1970, Congress established the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, better known as Amtrak, to engage in the commercial enterprise of providing intercity passenger rail service. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 454 (1985). Congress’s purpose was to “revitalize rail passenger service in the expectation that the rendering of such service along certain corridors can be made a profitable commercial undertaking.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1580 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4735, 4735. Congress provided that Amtrak “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government,” but rather “shall be

• perated and managed as a for-profit corporation.” 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2)-(3).

Describing Amtrak as a private corporation was consistent with historic practice, as “[o]peration of passenger railroads, no less than operation of freight railroads, has traditionally been a function of private industry, not . . . government[ ].” United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 686 (1982). Amtrak began offering passenger service on May 1, 1971. Because essentially all of the nation’s rail infrastructure was

• wned at the time by the freight railroads, the only viable option was for Amtrak’s

passenger trains to operate over the freight railroads’ tracks. The same is true today: 97 percent of the 21,000 miles of track over which Amtrak operates is owned by freight railroads. The tracks used by Amtrak trains are also used by host railroads to move freight

• traffic. Just as an air-traffic controller manages departures and landings at a busy airport,

the freight railroads must carefully schedule and manage the timing and sequencing of

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the passenger and freight trains operating on their tracks to maximize available capacity and minimize back-ups and delays. Amtrak trains limit the host railroads’ ability to move freight and serve their customers. Thus, while “Amtrak and freight railroads do not compete for passengers,” they “do compete for scarce resources (i.e. train track) essential to the operation of both kinds of rail service.” 821 F.3d at 23 n.1. Subsection 207(a) of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act empowered Amtrak and the FRA to “jointly” develop and promulgate regulations establishing, among other things, on-time performance standards. If Amtrak trains did not satisfy these standards, the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) could launch an investigation and potentially assess damages, payable directly to Amtrak, against the host freight railroad. Id. § 213. The statute further provided that the freight railroads “shall” amend their existing contracts with Amtrak by “incorporat[ing]” the regulations into their contracts to the extent practicable. Id. § 207(c). In addition, the statute provided that if Amtrak and the FRA could not agree on the content of the regulations, either party could ask the STB to appoint an arbitrator to write the regulations. Id. § 207(d). II. Amtrak and the FRA jointly issued their regulations—known as the “metrics and standards”—in 2010. The metrics and standards forced the freight railroads to make immediate and substantial changes to their business operations, including delaying their

• wn freight traffic and redirecting capital spending and resources in an effort to comply.

See Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 672 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The

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record is replete with affidavits from the freight railroads describing the immediate actions the metrics and standards have forced them to take.”). AAR, whose members include North America’s largest freight railroads, challenged PRIIA § 207 on several constitutional grounds. AAR’s complaint alleged, in relevant part, that “Section 207 of PRIIA violates the due process rights of the freight railroads because it purports to empower Amtrak to wield legislative and rulemaking power to enhance its commercial position at the expense of other industry participants.” The district court ruled in the Government’s favor, but the D.C. Circuit reversed. It held that Section 207 “constitutes an unlawful delegation of regulatory power to a private entity.” 721 F.3d at 668. The Supreme Court then vacated and remanded for further proceedings on the premise that Amtrak should be deemed a Government entity “for purposes of determining the validity of the metrics and standards.” Dep’t of Transp.

• v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1228 (2015). “Although Amtrak’s actions here

were governmental,” the Court stated, “substantial questions respecting the lawfulness of the metrics and standards . . . may still remain in the case” and “should be addressed in the first instance on remand.” Id. at 1228, 1234 (citation omitted). III. On remand, the D.C. Circuit held that Section 207 “violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by authorizing an economically self-interested actor to regulate its competitors and violates the Appointments Clause for delegating regulatory power to an improperly appointed arbitrator.” 821 F.3d at 23.

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First, the court stated that the “legal question at the heart of this case is whether it violates due process for Congress to give a self-interested entity rulemaking authority

• ver its competitors.” Id. at 27. Declaring that “the Government’s arguments are

unpersuasive,” the court ruled in AAR’s favor, striking down Section 207. Id. at 33-34. The court devoted ten published pages to explaining why subsection 207(a)’s grant of rulemaking authority to Amtrak violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 27-36. The court concluded: “The Constitution’s drafters may not have foreseen the formidable prerogatives of the administrative state, but the Due Process Clause effectively guarantees the regulatory power of the federal government will be wielded by ‘presumptively disinterested’ and ‘duly appointed’ actors, who, in exercising that awesome power, are beholden to no constituency but the public good.” Id. at 39. Second, the court held that subsection 207(d) violated the Appointments Clause because it delegated regulatory power to an improperly appointed arbitrator. Id. (“Without providing for the arbitrator’s direction or supervision by principal officers, PRIIA impermissibly vests power to appoint an arbitrator in the STB.”); see also id. at 36 (after concluding due process analysis, “consider[ing] the other challenge to PRIIA preserved for our review: whether the arbitration provision violates the Appointments Clause”) (emphasis added). The Government petitioned for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc. On September 9, 2016, the D.C. Circuit denied the rehearing petition without calling for a

• vote. On February 1, 2017, after requesting and obtaining two extensions for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari, the Acting Attorney General sent the Speaker of the

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House a letter advising him that the Department of Justice had decided not to seek further review of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling and would not be seeking certiorari. As the case currently stands, the Government is attempting to persuade the federal courts (so far unsuccessfully) to reinstate the grant of rulemaking authority, on the dubious theory that the statute can be “severed” in a way that cures the Appointments Clause violation while still allowing the grant of rulemaking authority. As the district court pointedly observed, the Government’s argument “is a ticket this Court cannot punch.”