Shoddy Spares Customer Circumvention 18-849b Dependable Embedded - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Shoddy Spares Customer Circumvention 18-849b Dependable Embedded - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Shoddy Spares Customer Circumvention 18-849b Dependable Embedded Systems John DeVale April 1, 1999 (no kidding) Overview: Shoddy Spares, Customer Circumvention N Introduction Any design should take into consideration a customers desire


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Shoddy Spares Customer Circumvention

18-849b Dependable Embedded Systems John DeVale April 1, 1999 (no kidding)

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Overview: Shoddy Spares, Customer Circumvention

N Introduction

  • Any design should take into consideration a customer’s desire to

save money, or bypass safeties in the name of expediency

N Key concepts

  • Security/Authentication
  • Safety/Reliability
  • Regulations

N Tools / techniques / metrics

  • None, but design for security

N Relationship to other topics

  • Reliability
  • Wearout

N Hard to do, people are clever

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YOU ARE HERE MAP

End of life Maintenance and reliability Shoddy Spares Circumvention

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Description of Topic

N Shoddy Spares

  • Fake, or cheap parts used in systems during maintenance

N Security/Authentication

  • Many security schemes based in hardware/software that is user-

accessible can and will be bypassed

N Safety/Environmental

  • Similarly, safety or environmental systems which are

“inconvenient” can by bypassed

N Regulations

  • Systems bypassed or compromised by shoddy spares can

compromise compliance with safety/environmental regulations

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Shoddy Spares

N Maintaining a complex engineered system is expensive.

Corporations and individuals can save money by using replacement parts which do not meet specification, or are counterfeit - they are “shoddy”, but less expensive.

N Counterfeit parts cost US industry an estimated 500

million in 1986 [Cohen 88]. Similarly, the software industry claims $11.4 Billion in losses due to piracy and counterfeiting in 1997[spa 97]

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Security/Authentication

N DIVX - relies on hardware and software built into the

DVD player which charged the user’s account for playing DIVX encoded digital video discs

N DVD - Read country code on disc and in the player to

determine the geographic location, and if it should play the disc

N Sony Playstation, reads copy protection sector off CD-

Rom discs

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Safety/Environmental

N 1986 Enstrom F-28 Helicopter crashes killing reporter Jane Dornaker. Cause

tied to counterfeit parts [fortune 87]

N President of Execuair Corp convicted of selling counterfeit parts to USAF in

1986 [fortune 87]

N Nortwest Flight 520 crashed during takeoff, one factor listed is that the

warning system telling pilot the flaps were incorrectly positioned was disabled [NTSB 87]

N Vehicle performance chips enhance power at the expense of fuel use and excess

exhaust [superchips 99]

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Tools / Techniques

N Microtaggants [www.microtaggants.com]

  • microscopic particles with unique magnetic signatures
  • algorithmically calculate serial number from signature
  • If match, part is genuine
  • Caveat: requires cryptographicly secure algorithm, and

(physically) secure software. May not work for intentional circumvention

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Relationship To Other Topic Areas

N Reliability (general

  • reliability of any system can be compromised by using shoddy

spares

N End of life/wearout

  • systems without certified components will most likely not

function according to design

N Certification

  • Certification only good for system as designed, deviation will void

certification

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Conclusions & Future Work

N Shoddy spares - if intentional still pose a challenge.

Most any system can be compromised if there is no physical security

N Circumvention is equally difficult, degenerating into a

security problem

N Some industries undergo periodic review and re-

certification (air, nuclear)

N While some tools exist, they are not iron-clad