Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data CS 573 Data Privacy and - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Jinfei Liu, Juncheng Yang, Li Xiong, and Jian Pei. Secure Skyline Queries on Cloud Platform. ICDE 2017. Jinfei Liu, Juncheng Yang, Li Xiong, and Jian Pei. Secure and Efficient Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data. TKDE 2018. 2018-11-19

Skyline Computation: Hotel Example price hotel distance price p 1 4 400 400 p 1 p 2 24 380 p 2 p 3 14 340 p 3 300 p 4 36 300 p 4 p 5 p 5 26 280 p 6 p 6 8 260 200 p 7 p 7 40 200 p 8 p 8 20 180 p 9 100 p 10 p 9 34 140 p 10 28 120 p 11 p 11 16 60 10 20 30 40 distance to the destination CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Skyline Computation: Hotel Example price hotel distance price 4 400 p 1 400 p 1 p 2 24 380 p 2 p 3 14 340 p 3 300 p 4 36 300 p 4 p 5 p 5 26 280 p 6 8 260 p 6 200 p 7 p 7 40 200 p 8 p 8 20 180 p 9 100 p 10 p 9 34 140 p 10 28 120 p 11 16 60 p 11 10 20 30 40 distance to the destination CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Motivating Example: Skyline Queries Table: Sample of heart disease dataset. (a) Original data. (b) Mapped Data. ID age trestbps ID age trestbps p 1 40 140 t 1 p 2 39 120 t 2 p 3 45 130 t 3 37 140 p 4 t 4 trestbps 140 p 4 p 1 130 p 3 120 p 2 110 35 40 45 age Figure: q(41,125). CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Motivating Example: Skyline Queries Table: Sample of heart disease dataset. (a) Original data. (b) Mapped Data. ID age trestbps ID age trestbps p 1 40 140 t 1 42 140 p 2 39 120 t 2 43 130 p 3 45 130 t 3 45 130 37 140 45 140 p 4 t 4 trestbps 140 p 4 p 1 t 1 t 4 t 3 130 t 2 p 3 q 120 p 2 110 35 40 45 age Figure: q(41,125). CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Motivating Example: Skyline Queries Table: Sample of heart disease dataset. (a) Original data. (b) Mapped Data. ID age trestbps ID age trestbps p 1 40 140 t 1 42 140 p 2 39 120 t 2 43 130 p 3 45 130 t 3 45 130 37 140 45 140 p 4 t 4 trestbps 140 p 4 p 1 t 1 t 4 t 3 130 t 2 p 3 q 120 p 2 110 35 40 45 age Figure: q(41,125). CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Secure Similarity Queries CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Related Work Fully homomorphic encryption - impractical CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Related Work Fully homomorphic encryption - impractical Order preserving encryption - subjective to attacks CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Related Work Fully homomorphic encryption - impractical Order preserving encryption - subjective to attacks Partially homomorphic encryption - limited computation but efficient, many focused on knn queries, challenging for skyline due to complex comparisons CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting Paillier crypto scheme CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting Paillier crypto scheme Basic primitive subprotocols CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting Paillier crypto scheme Basic primitive subprotocols Secure dominance protocol CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting Paillier crypto scheme Basic primitive subprotocols Secure dominance protocol Secure skyline protocol CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting Paillier crypto scheme Basic primitive subprotocols Secure dominance protocol Secure skyline protocol Experimental results CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting Paillier crypto scheme Basic primitive subprotocols Secure dominance protocol Secure skyline protocol Experimental results CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk skyline result CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk skyline result CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk C 1 and C 2 are non-colluding CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Data owner (e.g., hospital, CDC) sends private key to C 2 . Data owner sends E pk ( p i [ j ]) for i = 1 , ..., n and j = 1 , ..., m to cloud server C 1 . CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk An authorized client (e.g., physician) sends E pk ( q ) to cloud server C 1 . CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Our goal is to enable the cloud server to compute and return the skyline to the client without learning any information about the data and the query. CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Our goal is to enable the cloud server to compute and return the skyline to the client without learning any information about the data and the query. CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting: Desired Privacy Properties E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Data Privacy. Cloud servers C 1 and C 2 know nothing about the exact data except the size pattern, the client knows nothing about the dataset except the skyline query result. CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting: Desired Privacy Properties E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Data Privacy. Cloud servers C 1 and C 2 know nothing about the exact data except the size pattern, the client knows nothing about the dataset except the skyline query result. CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting: Desired Privacy Properties E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Data Pattern Privacy. Cloud servers C 1 and C 2 know nothing about the data patterns (indirect data knowledge) due to intermediate result, e.g., which tuple dominates which other tuple. CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting: Desired Privacy Properties E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Query Privacy. Data owner, cloud servers C 1 and C 2 know nothing about the query tuple q . CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Problem Setting: Desired Privacy Properties E pk ( q ) C 1 : Client: E pk ( P ) Data owner : E pk ( P ) , E pk ( q ) , pk q, pk P, pk, sk partial skyline result ... partial skyline result sk C 2 : pk, sk Result Privacy. Cloud servers C 1 and C 2 know nothing about the query result, e.g., which tuples are in the skyline result. CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Outline Problem setting Paillier crypto scheme Basic primitive subprotocols Secure dominance protocol Secure skyline protocol Experimental results CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data

Paillier Cryptosystem • Homomorphic addition of plaintexts: D sk ( E pk ( a ) × E pk ( b ) mod N 2 ) = ( a + b ) mod N • Homomorphic multiplication of plaintexts: D sk ( E pk ( a ) b mod N 2 ) = a × b mod N https://mhe.github.io/jspaillier/ CS 573 Data Privacy and Security Secure Skyline Queries on Encrypted Data