Science for policy and the scientification of politics Haris Shekeris – Groupe de Lecture Séance 13 – 07 mars 2017
Presentation Plan ● I. Introduction ● II. Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model ● III. The Pragmatistic Model ● IV. Weingart’s empirical challenge ● V. Epilogue
I. Introduction
Some pre-history ● Minimal input of scientific advice into policy- making before WWII (but see Douglas) ● Deep cultural impact of Atom bombs? ● 1947: Steelman Report: Science for Policy (also Vannevar Bush report on policy for Science) ● Research only relevant for defence purposes ● 1957: Shock of Sputnik – science let loose (scientific arms-race?)
Reactions to science’s new dominant role ● Warning from Eisenhower himself: “captive of a scientific-technological elite” ● “closed” or “court” politics – against democracy ● Fear of popularity of scientific decisions, promises of technological miracles for research funds - “scientific salesmen” - conflict of interest ( also see Weingart) ● Positive reaction: “End of ideology”, “end of politics”
Underlying assumptions ● Actual influence of science on decisions coupled with unaccountability of scientific advisors ( unknowingly, same problematic in Shekeris 2014 ) ● Possession of superior knowledge by scientists that renders them indispensable for policy (however, see “Wicked Problems” (1973) - policy problems set in opposition to scientific problems)
II. Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model
Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model I. Underlying assumptions ● Beyond administration as art, second stage of “rationalisation” of government (Weber) ● Linear sequence of political problem definition – expert advice – political decision ● Value-freedom of scientific knowledge ● Disinterestedness, neutrality and uniformity of scientific community Habermas does not question the latter assumptions -key topics for Weingart, STS achievement
Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model II. The Simple Decisionistic Model ● Division of labour between (rationalised, scientific) means of carrying out (irrational, value-, goal- and needs-based) decisions and decisions themselves ● No ultimate justification of decisions and no cogent discussion of values ● Dependence of expert on politician ● No involvement of the public (Schumpeterian model)
Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model III. The Technocratic Model ● Decisions analysis: choice may be rationalised ● The politician an artifact of imperfect rationalization ● No scope for democratic decision-making ● Weakening assumptions: – Technical progress (Kitcher’s insistence on it?) – Continuum of rationality of problems In real situations, values persist
Decisionistic vs Technocratic model IV. The Expanded decisionistic model ● A core of decision-making cannot be rationalised further ● Science makes this presupposition a reality (see ‘risk’) ● Habermas’s criticism: failure due to abstract separation of values and techniques Suggestion: interdependence of values proceeding from interest situations and techniques used to satisfy value-oriented needs pragmatistic model
III. The pragmatistic model
The Pragmatistic Model ● Value-convictions persist only in so far as they’re connected to available or imaginable techniques ● Critical interaction between expert and politician – development of techniques based on value systems which in turn they transform ● Communication between politicians and scientists necessarily mediated by institutionalized public discussion among citizens
A sketch of modern governance (in time?) Modern state – first stage of Weberian “rationalization” (administration as art) Second stage of Weberian “rationalization” (administration as science, two-part relation) Technocratic model Decisionistic (simple or expanded) model Democratized models, three part relation (Weingart disagrees)
The pragmatistic model (cont’d) ● Rational discussion ‘net’ between theory and practice ● Translation of technical solution back into the historical context of the practical situation ● Weakness: communication gap and translation problems (question: Any progress with Public Engagement 50 years later?)
Implications of Habermas’ model - Scientification of politics à la Habermas ● Policy for scientific research as the locus of problem of science-politics dialogue ● Aim: to direct consciously the co-evolution of social life (and values, interests) and technological progress (note the historical situatedness) ● Public discourse internal to the elucidation of tradition-bound self-understanding that determines needs and values
Scientification of politics à la Habermas ● Necessary but missing condition: enlightenment of political will, general public discussion free from domination ● Problems: – Decline of the public realm – Depoliticisation – lack of proper discussion on practical problems – Inaccessibility of scientific knowledge
Scientification of politics à la Habermas ● Habermas’ suggestions: – Science Journalism and other translation/communication efforts – Free exchange of scientific information used for military purposes (Wow!!) – Initiatives by scientists to cross the boundaries and initiate discussions with citizens ( RRI avant la lettre?)
Concluding thoughts on Habermas: Technocracy’s long shadow ● Socialism and “scientific government” (Henri de Saint- Simon, Karl Marx) ● Epistocracy, rule of the knowers ● Evidence-based policy ● EU expert groups, recent bailouts and the questioning by the EU parliament – economics as THE key example ● Afterthought: Kitcher and Collins guilty of assuming a simple linear model of policy?
IV. Weingart’s empirical Challenge
Weingart’s empirical challenge to Habermas “Scientification of politics” hand-in- hand with “politicisation of science”
Decisionistic vs Technocratic Model I. Underlying assumptions ● Linear sequence of political problem definition – expert advice – political decision ● Value-freedom of scientific knowledge ● Disinterestedness, neutrality and uniformity of scientific community Habermas does not question the latter assumptions -key topics for Weingart, STS achievement
Weingart’s empirical challenge to Habermas ● Cracks in popular perceptions of science after the high-profile disasters (Three-Mile, Chernobyl) ● “Scientification of politics” hand-in-hand with “politicisation of science”
Scientification of politics ● Many scientific issues become political (environmental degradation, risk discourse) – and then scientists are called for advice ● Science one input among many in policy-making ● Coupling of science and policy via transformation of scientific knowledge into expert appraisal – systemic feature, not due to personal idiosyncracies
Politicisation of Science ● New forms of science, eg regulatory science, and new tools such as risk management ● Legitimising function of science – competing parties in political controversies use experts ● Scientists pick sides based on various motives (CFC legislation example, no empirical data at the beginning)
Weingart’s first paradox and its resolution ● The paradox: by the time scientific advice for government becomes ubiquitous, initial concerns about the scientists’ role disappear ● The resolution: democratisation of scientific expertise, reciprocal and recursive relationship between science and policy
Weingart’s second paradox Despite the legitimating function of scientific knowledge, the quest for expertise exacerbates controversies rather than alleviating them (cf Sarewitz, excess of objectivity) and forces non-scientists to settle the debates However Policy-makers’ confidence in science by does not diminish
Second Paradox Resolution ● Domination of the discourse of science, no other source of legitimacy – deep institutionalisation of the science/policy links ● Unstable equilibrium, “contraction” and “expansion”
Contraction and expansion ● Strategies used both by science and by politics ● Complementary rather than contradictory ● Contraction: hierarchical organisation of expertise in policy, adopted by governments and by IPCC – reduction of knowledge input in policy ● Expansion: Overselling to media for attention
Crying Wolf Alarmist pronouncements based on little evidence Establishment and dominance of scientific field expansion Challenge to credibility of science, difficulty to discern genuine knowledge
Two grim predictions Rather, it is foreseeable that there will be no end to the continued production of knowledge which, to capture public attention and support, will be sold on promises and threats, a strategy that could be self-defeating in the long run. Likewise, it is foreseeable that there will be no end to the competition among policy-makers for the most recent scientific knowledge in the search for its legitimating power.
V. Epilogue: An (important?) lacuna Technology and business (industry) as shaping both the scientific research agenda and modern government Weingart aware of this but chooses to ignore it in his analysis See “Science, Government and the Politics of Knowledge”, Cozzens and Woodhouse, 1995
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