Prisoners Dilemma Tit-For-Tat J. Cern, B. Boansk, B. An EC-20 1 - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games

Machines as Strategies

(1,1) (0,5) (5,0) (3,3)

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Coop Defect C D Coop

Tit-For-Tat

C C D D Defect

• J. ˇ

Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 1 / 4

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games

Generalization

(1,1) (1,0) (1,3) (2,1) (0,4) A B m n C D E F

A E

n

D

m different actions valid machine invalid machine

A

m,n

• J. ˇ

Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 2 / 4

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games

Main Results

RI: For every pure strategy there exists a canonical machine representing it. RII: Minimizing size of a machine and verifying its consistency is a polynomial problem. RIII: Computing SSE / MAXPAY-EFCE in a restriction induced by a small class of machine strategies is a polynomial problem.

• J. ˇ

Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 3 / 4

Machines Play Extensive-Form Games

Experimental Evaluation

c1 c2 c3 10−3 10−2 10−1 Configuration c1 c2 c3 10 100 Configuration

Deviations Speedups

• J. ˇ

Cerný, B. Bošanský, B. An EC-20 4 / 4