Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management Solutions - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management Solutions - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management Solutions Michael Shaulov, CEO michael@lacoon.com Daniel Brodie, Sr Security Researcher daniel@lacoon.com About: Daniel Security researcher for nearly a decade From PC to Mobile


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Practical Attacks against Mobile Device Management Solutions

Michael Shaulov, CEO

michael@lacoon.com

Daniel Brodie, Sr Security Researcher

daniel@lacoon.com

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About: Daniel

  • Security researcher for nearly a decade
  • From PC to Mobile
  • Researcher and Developer at Lacoon
  • Developing an App Analysis framework

for spyphones and mobile malware

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About: Michael

  • Decade of experience researching and

working in the mobile security space

From feature-phones to smartphones Mobile Security Research Team Leader at NICE Systems

  • CEO and co-founder of Lacoon Mobile

Security

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Targeted Attacks: From PC to Malware

Convergence of Personal and Business Ubiquitous Perfect Surveillance Hardware

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137g

Targeted Attacks: From PC to Malware

Convergence of Personal and Business Ubiquitous Perfect Surveillance Hardware

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Targeted Attacks: From PC to Malware

Convergence of Personal and Business Ubiquitous Perfect Surveillance Hardware

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Agenda

  • Rise of the spyphones
  • Introduction to MDM and Secure

Containers

  • Bypassing secure container encryption

capabilities

  • Recommendations and summary
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TARGETED MOBILE THREATS

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The Mobile Threatscape

Business Impact Complexity

Consumer-oriented. Mass. Financially motivated, e.g.: Premium SMS Fraudulent charges Botnets Targeted: Personal Organization Cyber espionage

Mobile Malware Apps Spyphones

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Mobile Remote Access Trojans (aka Spyphones)

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Recent High-Profiled Examples

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Commercial mRATS

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A Double-Edged Sword

Back-Up mRAT

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Survey: Cellular Network 2M Subscribers

Sampling: 500K

Infection rates: June 2013:

1 / 800 devices

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Survey: Cellular Network 2M Subscribers

Sampling: 500K

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MDM and SECURE CONTAINERS 101

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Mobile Device Management

  • Policy and configuration management tool
  • Helps enterprises manage BYOD and

mobile computing environment

  • Offerings include separating between

business data and personal data

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MDM: Penetration in the Market

Gartner, Inc. October 2012

“Over the 5 years,

65% of enterprises

will adopt a mobile device management (MDM) solution for their corporate liable users”

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MDM Key Capabilities

  • Software management
  • Network service management
  • Hardware management
  • Security management

Remote wipe Secure configuration enforcement Encryption

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Secure Containers All leading MDM solutions provide secure containers

MobileIron AirWatch Fiberlink Zenprise Good Technology

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Behind the Scenes: Secure Containers

Enterprise

Secure Communication (SSL)

Encrypted Storage

Application Sandbox

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MDMs and Secure Containers

3 assumptions:

 Encrypt business data  Encrypt communications to the

business (SSL/ VPN)

 Detect Jailbreak/ Rooting of

devices

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MDMs and Secure Containers

Let’s test these assumptions…

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BYPASSING MOBILE DEVICE MANAGEMENT (MDM) SOLUTIONS

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Overview

Infect the device Install Backdoor Bypass containerization Exfiltrate Information

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ANDROID

DEMO

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Step 1: Infect the Device

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Publish an app through the market

Use “Two-Stage”: Download the rest of the dex later and only for the targets we want

Get the target to install the app

Through spearphishing or physical access to the device

Step 1: Technical Details

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Step 2: Install a Backdoor (i.e. Rooting) Root

Any process can run as root user if it is able to trigger a vulnerability in the OS

Vulnerability

Android device vulnerabilities are abundant

Exploit

On-Device detection mechanisms can’t look at apps exploiting the vulnerability

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Privilege escalation

We used the Exynos exploit (Released Dec., 2012)

Create the hidden ‘suid’ binary and use it for specific actions

Place in a folder with --x--x--x permissions

Undetected by generic root detectors Step 2: Technical Details

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Step 3: Bypass Containerization

Jo, yjod

  • d sm

r,so;

Storage

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Step 3: Bypass Containerization

Jo, yjod

  • d sm

r,so;

Storage

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Step 3: Bypass Containerization

Jo, yjod

  • d sm

r,so; Hi, This is an email

Storage Memory

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We listen to events in the log

For <= 2.3 we can just use the logging permissions For >4.0 we access the logs as root

When an email is read… Step 3: Technical Details

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Step 4: Exfiltrate Information

Jo, yjod

  • d sm

r,so; Hi, This is an email

Storage Memory Exfiltrate information

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We dump the heap using /proc/<pid>/ maps and /mem

Then search for the email structure, extract it, and send it home

Step 4: Technical Details

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IOS

DEMO

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Step 1: Infect the device

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Step 2: Install a Backdoor (i.e. Jailbreaking) Jailbroken xCon Community

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Install signed application

Using Enterprise/ Developer certificate

Use the Jailbreak

To complete the hooking

Remove any trace of the Jailbreak Step 2: Technical Details

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Step 3: Bypass Containerization

Load malicious dylib into memory (it's signed!) Hook using standard Objective-C hooking mechanisms Get notified when an email is read Pull the email from the UI classes

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MITIGATION TECHNIQUES

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MDM

MDMs are good for:

Management Compliance Enforcement DLP Physical Loss

However…

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MDM is static and inefficient against the dynamic nature of cybercrime

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Do We Have Visibility?

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Can We Assess Risk in Real-Time?

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Can We Mitigate Targeted Threats?

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Attacks are going to happen It’s a question of assessing risk

And mitigating the effects

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“Life is inherently risky. There is

  • nly one big risk you should avoid

at all costs, and that is the risk of doing nothing.”

Denis Waitley

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Risk Metrics / Visibility Vulnerabilities and Usage

Is the device up-to-date? Any known vulnerabilities pertaining to the OS? Is the device connecting to a public hotspot?

App Behavioral Analysis

What is the common app behavior? (static analysis) What is the app doing? (dynamic analysis)

Funky Correlation of Events

Is the device sending an SMS when the phone is locked?

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Risk Metrics / Real-Time Assessment Network Behavioral Analysis

  • Anomaly detection of communications of apps
  • Outgoing content inspection (unencrypted)
  • Blocking of exploit and drive-by attacks
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Thank You.

Michael Shaulov, CEO

michael@lacoon.com

Daniel Brodie, Sr Security Researcher

daniel@lacoon.com