PHIL309P Methods in Philosophy, Politics and Economics Eric Pacuit - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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PHIL309P Methods in Philosophy, Politics and Economics Eric Pacuit - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

PHIL309P Methods in Philosophy, Politics and Economics Eric Pacuit University of Maryland 1 / 16 Cardinal Utility Theory u : X R Which comparisons are meaningful? 1. u ( x ) and u ( y ) ? (ordinal utility) 2 / 16 Cardinal Utility Theory


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PHIL309P Methods in Philosophy, Politics and Economics

Eric Pacuit University of Maryland

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Cardinal Utility Theory

u : X → R Which comparisons are meaningful?

  • 1. u(x) and u(y)? (ordinal utility)

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Cardinal Utility Theory

u : X → R Which comparisons are meaningful?

  • 1. u(x) and u(y)? (ordinal utility)
  • 2. u(x) − u(y) and u(a) − u(b)?

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Cardinal Utility Theory

u : X → R Which comparisons are meaningful?

  • 1. u(x) and u(y)? (ordinal utility)
  • 2. u(x) − u(y) and u(a) − u(b)?
  • 3. u(x) and 2 ∗ u(z)?

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Ordinal vs. Cardinal Utility

Ordinal scale: Qualitative comparisons of objects allowed, no information about differences or ratios.

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Ordinal vs. Cardinal Utility

Ordinal scale: Qualitative comparisons of objects allowed, no information about differences or ratios. Cardinal scales: Interval scale: Quantitative comparisons of objects, accurately reflects differences between objects. E.g., the difference between 75◦F and 70◦F is the same as the difference between 30◦F and 25◦F However, 70◦F (= 21.11◦C) is not twice as hot as 35◦F (= 1.67◦C).

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Ordinal vs. Cardinal Utility

Ordinal scale: Qualitative comparisons of objects allowed, no information about differences or ratios. Cardinal scales: Interval scale: Quantitative comparisons of objects, accurately reflects differences between objects. E.g., the difference between 75◦F and 70◦F is the same as the difference between 30◦F and 25◦F However, 70◦F (= 21.11◦C) is not twice as hot as 35◦F (= 1.67◦C). Ratio scale: Quantitative comparisons of objects, accurately reflects ratios between objects. E.g., 10lb (= 4.53592kg) is twice as much as 5lb (= 2.26796kg).

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Cardinal Utility Theory

x ≻ y ≻ z is represented by both (3, 2, 1) and (1000, 999, 1), so we cannot say y whether is “closer” to x than to z.

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Cardinal Utility Theory

x ≻ y ≻ z is represented by both (3, 2, 1) and (1000, 999, 1), so we cannot say y whether is “closer” to x than to z. Key idea: Ordinal preferences over lotteries allows us to infer a cardinal (interval) scale (with some additional axioms).

John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, 1944.

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A Choice

R B W S Take or Gamble? B R S Take Gamble 0.5 0.5 [B : 1] ∼ [R : p, S : 1 − p]

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A Choice

R B W S Take or Gamble? B R S Take Gamble 0.5 0.5 [B : 1] ∼ [R : p, S : 1 − p]

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A Choice

R B W S Take or Gamble? B R S Take Gamble 0.5 0.5 [B : 1] ∼ [R : p, S : 1 − p]

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A Choice

R B W S Take or Gamble? B R S Take Gamble p 1 − p [B : 1] ∼ [R : p, S : 1 − p]

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A Choice

R B W S Take or Gamble? B R S Take Gamble p 1 − p [B : 1] ∼ [R : p, S : 1 − p]

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A Choice

R B W S Take or Gamble? B R S Take Gamble p 1 − p 1 ∗ u(B) = p ∗ u(R) + (1 − p) ∗ u(S)

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A Choice

R B W S Take or Gamble? B R S Take Gamble p 1 − p u(B) = p ∗ 1 + (1 − p) ∗ 0 = p

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Lotteries

Suppose that X = {x1, . . . , xn} is a set of outcomes. A lottery over X is a tuple [x1 : p1, x2 : p2, . . . , xn : pn] where

i pi = 1.

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Lotteries

Suppose that X = {x1, . . . , xn} is a set of outcomes. A lottery over X is a tuple [x1 : p1, x2 : p2, . . . , xn : pn] where

i pi = 1.

x1 x2 · · · xn−1 xn p1 p2 pn−1 pn We identify an element x ∈ X with the lottery [x : 1] ∈ L

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Let L be the set of lotteries. Suppose that ⊆ L × L is a represents a decision maker’s (rational) preferences on L. What properties should satisfy?

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Let L be the set of lotteries. Suppose that ⊆ L × L is a represents a decision maker’s (rational) preferences on L. What properties should satisfy?

  • Fact. If is complete and transitive (plus another condition since L is

infinite), then there is a U : L → R such that L L′ iff U(L) ≥ U(L′)

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Let L be the set of lotteries. Suppose that ⊆ L × L is a represents a decision maker’s (rational) preferences on L. What properties should satisfy?

  • Fact. If is complete and transitive (plus another condition since L is

infinite), then there is a U : L → R such that L L′ iff U(L) ≥ U(L′) For any lottery L = [x1 : p1, . . . , xn : pn], we would like to show that U(L) = n

k=1 pkU(xk).

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Independence Axiom

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<

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<

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=

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=

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=

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>

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>

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A1)

A1 p1 A2 p2 A3 p3

p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A1)

A1 p1 A2 p2 A3 p3

p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A1)

A1 p1 A2 p2 A3 p3

p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A1)

A1 A2 p2 A3 p3

p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A1)

A1 A2 A3 p3

p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A1)

A1 A2 A3

p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

p1 ∗ u(A1) u(A1) p2 ∗ u(A2) u(A2) p3 ∗ u(A3) u(A3) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

p1 ∗ u(A1) u(A1) p2 ∗ u(A2) u(A2) p3 ∗ u(A3) u(A3) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

p2 ∗ u(A2) u(A2) p3 ∗ u(A3) u(A3) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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L = [A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 10 / 16

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[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3] ≻ [A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3] iff [B2 : p2, B3 : p3] ≻ [B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

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[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3] ≻ [A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3] iff [B2 : p2, B3 : p3] ≻ [B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

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[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3] ≻ [A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3] iff [A2 : p′

2, A3 : p′ 3] ≻ [B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

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[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3] ∼ [A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3] iff [A2 : p′

2, A3 : p′ 3] ∼ [B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

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[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3] ≺ [A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3] iff [A2 : p′

2, A3 : p′ 3] ≺ [B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

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[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3] ≻/∼/≺ [A1 : p1, B2 : q2, B3 : q3] iff [A2 : p′

2, A3 : p′ 3] ≻/∼/≺ [B2 : q′ 2, B3 : q′ 3]

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[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, B2 : p2, B3 : p3]

u(A2) p1 p1 + p2 p1 + p2 + p3 = 1

[A1 : p1, A2 : p2, A3 : p3] ≻/∼/≺ [A1 : p1, B2 : q2, B3 : q3] iff [A2 : p′

2, A3 : p′ 3] ≻/∼/≺ [B2 : q′ 2, B3 : q′ 3]

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Independence

For all L1, L2, L3 ∈ L and a ∈ (0, 1], L1 ≻ L2 if, and only if, [L1 : a, L3 : (1 − a)] ≻ [L2 : a, L3 : (1 − a)]. L1 ∼ L2 if, and only if, [L1 : a, L3 : (1 − a)] ∼ [L2 : a, L3 : (1 − a)].

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Better Prizes

Better prizes: When two lotteries are the same except for one outcome, then the decision maker prefers the lottery with the better outcome. a c p 1 − p

b c p 1 − p ≻

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Better Chances

Better Chances: A decision maker prefers a better chance for a better prize a b p 1 − p p > q a ≻ b

a b q 1 − q

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Better Chances

a b p 1 − p p > q, so p = q + r and (1 − q) = (1 − p) + r for some r a ≻ b

a b q 1 − q

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Better Chances

a b q + r 1 − p p > q, so p = q + r and (1 − q) = (1 − p) + r for some r a ≻ b a b q (1 − p) + r

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Better Chances

a a b r q 1 − p p > q, so p = q + r and (1 − q) = (1 − p) + r for some r a ≻ b b a b q 1 − p r

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Better Chances

a a b r q 1 − p p > q, so p = q + r and (1 − q) = (1 − p) + r for some r a ≻ b b a b q 1 − p r

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Better Chances

Better Chances: A decision maker prefers a better chance for a better prize a b p 1 − p p > q a ≻ b

a b q 1 − q

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If L1 L2, then for all p, [L1 : 1] [L1 : p, L2 : (1 − p)]

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If L1 L2, then for all p, [L1 : 1] [L1 : p, L2 : (1 − p)] L1 1

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If L1 L2, then for all p, [L1 : 1] [L1 : p, L2 : (1 − p)] L1 1

L1 L1 p 1 − p

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If L1 L2, then for all p, [L1 : 1] [L1 : p, L2 : (1 − p)] L1 1

L1 L1 p 1 − p

  • L1

L2 p 1 − p

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Describing the Outcomes

Suppose you have a kitten, which you plan to give away to either Ann or

  • Bob. Ann and Bob both want the kitten very much. Both are deserving, and

both would care for the kitten. You are sure that giving the kitten to Ann (x) is at least as good as giving the kitten to Bob (y) (so x y). But you think that would be unfair to Bob. You decide to flip a fair coin: if the coin lands heads, you will give the kitten to Bob, and if it lands tails, you will give the kitten to Ann. as (J. Drier, “Morality and Decision Theory” in Handbook of Rationality)

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Give to Ann L1 x x 0.5 0.5 Fair lottery L2 y x 0.5 0.5 ◮ x is the outcome “Ann gets the kitten” ◮ y is the outcome “Bob gets the kitten”

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Give to Ann L1 x x 0.5 0.5 Fair lottery L2 y x 0.5 0.5 Same outcome ◮ x is the outcome “Ann gets the kitten” ◮ y is the outcome “Bob gets the kitten”

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Give to Ann L1 x x 0.5 0.5 Fair lottery L2 y x 0.5 0.5 Same outcome ◮ x is the outcome “Ann gets the kitten” ◮ y is the outcome “Bob gets the kitten”

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