NEW NUMBER-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES ric Brier Houda - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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NEW NUMBER-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES ric Brier Houda - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Innovation Centre NEW NUMBER-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES ric Brier Houda Ferradi Marc Joye David Naccache NutMiC 2019 Paris, June 2427, 2019 THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (1) The oldest and most known


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Innovation Centre

NEW NUMBER-THEORETIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES

Éric Brier Houda Ferradi Marc Joye David Naccache

NutMiC 2019 Paris, June 24–27, 2019

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THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (1)

The oldest and most known family comprises species based on the inversion of a one-way permutation Notable species belonging to this family: RSA, Rabin, Paillier, ...

  • Faithful, well-behaved, well understood,

long history. ..

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 2

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THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (2)

Appeared in the late 1980’s. Derived from domesticated (non-interactivized) ZKPs using the Fiat–Shamir transform Notable species belonging to this family: Fiat–Shamir, Schnorr, (EC)DSA, ...

  • Faster, give you signatures because they

consent to, bend muscles in silence (pre-computation) then perform a fast jump to sign. ..

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 3

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THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (3)

The pairing-based family appeared in the 2000’s Notable species belonging to this family: Boneh–Lynn–Shacham, Waters, ...

  • More clumsy maths, cute, robust, look

good, popular...

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 4

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THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (4)

We also have a few lattice-based and coding-based schemes Containing species such as BLISS, RLWE-SIGN, NTRU-SIGN, Güneysu–Lyubashevsky–Pöppelmann, ...

  • Agile, post-quantum, rare, some seem to

stink while still alive...

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 5

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THE ZOOLOGICAL COLLECTION OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (5)

We know one intriguing species based on p2q Called ESIGN

  • Very smart, first found in Japan

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 6

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THIS TALK INTRODUCES AN ODDITY

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 7

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THIS TALK INTRODUCES AN ODDITY

  • Thick fur to keep warm and dry under water
  • Electro-sensory system for underwater foraging
  • Snake-like venom released from back claws of males
  • A mammal laying eggs in underground burrows like reptiles. ..
  • Webbed feet for swimming like aquatic birds, toothless mouth and beak

Platypus Signatures are prime numbers, works best modulo prq, no known attacks

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 7

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LET’S GET STARTED WITH DEFINITIONS Definition (Jacobi Imprint)

For an integer a and n = (n0, . . . , nk−1) ∈ Nk such that gcd(a, ni) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, the Jacobi imprint I

n(a) is given by

I

n(a) = k−1

  • i=0

a ni

  • 2i

where a ni

  • =

1 − a

ni

  • 2

Remark: a

ni

  • = 0 if

a

ni

  • = 1 and

a

ni

  • = 1 if

a

ni

  • = −1

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 8

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SLIDE 10

LET’S GET STARTED WITH DEFINITIONS Definition (Jacobi Imprint)

For an integer a and n = (n0, . . . , nk−1) ∈ Nk such that gcd(a, ni) = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, the Jacobi imprint I

n(a) is given by

I

n(a) = k−1

  • i=0

a ni

  • 2i

where a ni

  • =

1 − a

ni

  • 2

Remark: a

ni

  • = 0 if

a

ni

  • = 1 and

a

ni

  • = 1 if

a

ni

  • = −1

Facts

1 Factoring ni is not required for computing

a

ni

  • 2 Legendre and Jacobi symbols coincide when ni ∈ P

3 Legendre symbol checks whether a is a square, but Jacobi symbol does not

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 8

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A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1)

Let q = (q0, . . . , qk−1) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = k−1

j=0 qj

Consider the function F0 given by F0 : D ⊂ Z∗

Q → N, x → F0(x) = I q(x)

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9

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A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1)

Let q = (q0, . . . , qk−1) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = k−1

j=0 qj

Consider the function F0 given by F0 : D ⊂ Z∗

Q → N, x → F0(x) = I q(x)

Attack #1 Given ˆ y = k−1

i=0 ˆ

yi 2i with ˆ yi ∈ {0, 1}, do the following:

1 For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, choose ri

$

← Z∗

qi such that

ri

qi

  • = ˆ

yi

2 Set x ← CRT(

r, q) where r = (r0, . . . , rk−1)

3 Output x as a pre-image of ˆ

y

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9

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SLIDE 13

A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1)

Let q = (q0, . . . , qk−1) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = k−1

j=0 qj

Consider the function F0 given by F0 : D ⊂ Z∗

Q → N, x → F0(x) = I q(x)

Attack #1 Given ˆ y = k−1

i=0 ˆ

yi 2i with ˆ yi ∈ {0, 1}, do the following:

1 For 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, choose ri

$

← Z∗

qi such that

ri

qi

  • = ˆ

yi

2 Set x ← CRT(

r, q) where r = (r0, . . . , rk−1)

3 Output x as a pre-image of ˆ

y Solution: Restrict D to entries smaller than a given bound B

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9

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A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1)

Let q = (q0, . . . , qk−1) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = k−1

j=0 qj

Consider the function F0 given by F0 : D ⊂ Z∗

Q → N, x → F0(x) = I q(x)

F0 induces a group homomorphism from

  • Z∗

Q, ·

  • to
  • {0, 1}k, ⊕
  • :

F0(x1 · x2 mod Q) = F0(x1) ⊕ F0(x2) , ∀x1, x2 ∈ Z∗

Q

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9

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SLIDE 15

A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1)

Let q = (q0, . . . , qk−1) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = k−1

j=0 qj

Consider the function F0 given by F0 : D ⊂ Z∗

Q → N, x → F0(x) = I q(x)

Attack #2 Given ˆ y = k−1

i=0 ˆ

yi 2i with ˆ yi ∈ {0, 1}, do the following:

1 Generate a set of ℓ “small” primes pi and compute zi = F0(pi) 2 Use linear algebra modulo 2 to find εi ∈ {0, 1} such that ˆ

y = ε1z1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ εℓzℓ

3 Output x = 1≤i≤ℓ εi=1

pi as a pre-image of ˆ y

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9

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SLIDE 16

A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (1)

Let q = (q0, . . . , qk−1) be a set of k distinct (odd) primes and let Q = k−1

j=0 qj

Consider the function F0 given by F0 : D ⊂ Z∗

Q → N, x → F0(x) = I q(x)

Attack #2 Given ˆ y = k−1

i=0 ˆ

yi 2i with ˆ yi ∈ {0, 1}, do the following:

1 Generate a set of ℓ “small” primes pi and compute zi = F0(pi) 2 Use linear algebra modulo 2 to find εi ∈ {0, 1} such that ˆ

y = ε1z1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ εℓzℓ

3 Output x = 1≤i≤ℓ εi=1

pi as a pre-image of ˆ y Solution: Restrict D to prime values

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 9

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A NEW CANDIDATE ONE-WAY FUNCTION (2)

Let κ denote a security parameter. Let also k = k(κ) and ℓ = ℓ(κ) Define D =

  • x ∈ P | x < 2kℓ

and F1 : D → N, x → F1(x) = I

n(x)

where n = (n0, . . . , nk−1) is a set of k pairwise co-prime moduli of the form ni = pi2qi for ℓ-bit primes pi and qi, 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1

Assumption

For every polynomial-time algorithm A, the success probability Pr

  • ˆ

x

$

← D; A(F1(ˆ x)) = x | F1(x) = F1(ˆ x)

  • is negligible

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 10

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SIGNATURES MODULO p2q

Key generation Signer publishes k moduli ni = pi2qi. All secret factors (i.e., the pi’s and qi’s) are ℓ-bit long

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 11

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SIGNATURES MODULO p2q

Key generation Signer publishes k moduli ni = pi2qi. All secret factors (i.e., the pi’s and qi’s) are ℓ-bit long Signing Signer hashes H(m) = (h0, . . . , hk−1) ∈ {0, 1}k and picks k random ℓ-bit integers ri such that ri qi

  • = hi ,

for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 Next, signer generates at random u ∈ Z∗

Q such that

σ := CRT( r, q) · u2 mod Q ∈ P where Q =

k−1

  • i=0

qi

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 11

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SIGNATURES MODULO p2q

Key generation Signer publishes k moduli ni = pi2qi. All secret factors (i.e., the pi’s and qi’s) are ℓ-bit long Signing Signer hashes H(m) = (h0, . . . , hk−1) ∈ {0, 1}k and picks k random ℓ-bit integers ri such that ri qi

  • = hi ,

for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 Next, signer generates at random u ∈ Z∗

Q such that

σ := CRT( r, q) · u2 mod Q ∈ P where Q =

k−1

  • i=0

qi Verification To verify, check that (i) σ ∈ P , (ii) σ < 2ℓk (iii) I

n(σ) = H(m)

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 11

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TOY EXAMPLE (k = 8)

Picking the secret primes

i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 6 i = 7 pi 59069 54139 52639 53813 49871 41269 53653 40361 qi 62989 32917 36583 48383 36653 34963 52517 38971

we have the public moduli

n0 = 219777865328629 n1 = 096480757993357 n2 = 101366529455143 n3 = 140109376837127 n4 = 091160286242573 n5 = 059546546811643 n6 = 151177768427453 n7 = 063484161219691

and the value Q = 7

i=0 qi = 9625354820834308444301890854766785161

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 12

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TOY EXAMPLE (k = 8)

Consider a message whose digest is h = (h0, . . . , h7) and draw ri’s as:

i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 i = 6 i = 7 hi 1 1 1 1 1 ri 64863 58999 47120 50684 37458 57079 43135 56942

We get CRT( r, q) = 1395786251559231878789764535858641198 By selecting u = 2152266820709866295140077504687803459, we obtain the signature σ = 1137542561586761230770585345256092841 ∈ P

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 12

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SECURITY ANALYSIS Theorem

Signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure assuming the hardness of inverting F1, in the random

  • racle model

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 13

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GENERALIZED SIGNATURES

Replace Jacobi symbol ·

·

  • with higher-order power residue symbol

·

·

  • r

shorter signatures

Definition (rth-order Imprint)

Fix ζ a primitive rth root of unity. For an integer α ∈ Z[ζ] and a vector

  • ν = (ν0, . . . , νk−1) ∈ Z[ζ]k, such that α and νj (with 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1) are co-prime, the

rth-order imprint of α w.r.t. ν is the integer I

(r)

  • ν (α) ∈ Z given by

I

(r)

  • ν (α) =

k−1

  • i=0

α νi

  • r

ri where α νi

  • r

= j ⇐ ⇒ α νi

  • r

= ζj

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 14

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PARAMETER SELECTION

  • Key lengths and bit security for moduli of the form ni = pirqi

Type Bit-security Modulus level

(bit size)

Legacy 80 1024 Basic 112 2048 Normal 128 3072 High 192 7680 Very high 256 15360

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 15

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PARAMETER SELECTION

  • Key lengths and bit security for moduli of the form ni = pirqi

Type Bit-security Modulus level

(bit size)

Legacy 80 1024 Basic 112 2048 Normal 128 3072 High 192 7680 Very high 256 15360

  • Select r as a parameter ranging from 2 up to 5
  • Ring Z[ζr] is known to be norm-Euclidean with

r = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 30 each r gives rise to a new signature scheme

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 15

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NEW SPECIES IN THE SIGNATURE ZOO

Quadratapus* r = 2 legacy (80 bits) Cubapus-112 r = 3 basic security (112 bits) Cubapus-128 r = 3 normal security (128 bits) Quartapus r = 4 high security (192 bits) Pentapus r = 5 very high security (256 bits) Detailed implementation is provided for Quartapus (quartic residue symbols)

*Quadratapus is an endangered species

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 16

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THANKS!

Innovation Centre c 2019 OneSpan Innovation Centre 17