NANYANG RESEARCH PROGRAMME The Segmented Sex Industry in Singapore - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

NANYANG RESEARCH PROGRAMME

Presenter：Zhang Yijie Mentor：Dr Leong Kaiwen

The Segmented Sex Industry in Singapore

SSS02

Contents

• 01. Introduction
• 02. Legal Sector
• 03. Illegal Sector
• 04. Model
• 05. Discussion

• 1
• 1

Introduction

01

Introduction

In Singapore, the sex industry is segmented, where one sector of the industry operates legally and the other illegally. Despite drawbacks of the illegal, there is still a sizeable population of sex workers who choose to work in the illegal sector. Existing literature on prostitution in Singapore has provided little information is available about the relationship between the two sectors. This study contributes to existing literature by increasing understanding of the factors that determine whether a sex worker works in either sector using a model.

• 2
• 2

Background

Legal sector

02

Background Legal sector

The sex worker must find a brothel owner who would like to employ her.

1

• legally female
• between 21 - 35 years of age
• cannot be Malay or Muslim

must be from China, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore.

3

She must apply to and seek clearance from the officers in the taskforce in the CID

2

She will undergo an interview, during which she may be asked whether she has been coerced into the sex industry.

4

The brothels are contained in four Designated Red Areas (DRAs), namely Geylang, Keong Saik Street, Desker Road and Flanders Square.

How to get into the legal sector?

02

Background Legal sector

Limiting the number of commercial establishments like pubs and KTVs,

Limited working opportunities

Conducting patrols in the area by uniformed and plain-clothes policemen

Patrols

Installing more streetlights and surveillance cameras.

Surveillance

• Curfews
• Having to seek permission to leave the brothels
• A ban on visiting clubs or bars
• A ban on working outside the brothel

Restrictions on mobility

One will face a travel ban ranging between three years to a lifetime ban after the contract expires.

Travel ban

Brothel owners take 30 to 50 percent of their earnings

Commission

If the interview is successful, she will have to sign a contract, which includes the following terms.

• 3
• 3

Illegal sector

Background

03

ILLEGAL SECTOR Background

ILLEGAL SECTOR

Related activities are criminalised

• Soliciting in public places
• Pimping
• Running a brothel

WHAT

Most illegal sex workers

• riginate from
• China
• Thailand
• Vietnam
• Malaysia
• Philippines

WHO

• street solicitation
• ff-street solicitation
• Commercial

establishments

• Unregistered brothel
• Internet solicitation

WHERE

03

• 20.7% among a random

sample of arrested illegal sex workers

• <5% among registered sex

workers.

HIGHER STI INFECTION RATE

Illegal sex workers face a lack of legal recourse should exploitation by clients or agents arise as they cannot go to the police due to their illegal status.

LACK OF LEGAL RECOURSE

Illegal sex workers may be under agents who may be exploitative.

EXPLOITATION

legal Illegal

ILLEGAL SECTOR Comparison

03

Illegal sector Advantages

Higher income Greater flexibility Ineligibility Shorter travel ban

First, they desire a higher income as registered sex workers have to pay the brothel owners commission. Fourth, should they be caught, the travel ban they face is of a duration of three-years, which is shorter than if their contracts expire at the licensed brothels. Second, they desire greater flexibility, as registered sex workers are often restricted in movement. Third, they may not meet the criterion to become a registered sex worker, e.g. too young or male.

Why they may choose not to work in the legal sector

03

Illegal sector Factors

Cost of punishment Probability of conviction

• 4
• 4

Model

04

Model About the model A function of social loss which incorporates the various costs associated with illegal sex activity. Examines the role of the probability of conviction and the cost of punishment in determining the number of offenses committed in the illegal sex sector. The optimal level of illegal sex activity is the level at which social loss is minimised. Understand the factors affecting the level of illegal sex activity and relate this to the reasons why a migrant sex worker would choose to work in the illegal sector over the legal sector.

04

Model Factors

SUPPLY OF OFFENSES

𝑃 = 𝑃( 𝑞, 𝑔, 𝑣 )

where O is the number of offenses, p, the probability of conviction, f, the cost of punishment and u the other determinants of criminal activity DAMAGES

𝐸 𝑃 = 𝐼 𝑃 − 𝐻(𝑃)

where D is the net damage to society, H is the harm to society and G is the gain to the sex workers. PUNISHMENT

𝑔’ = 𝑐𝑔

fj is the cost of punishment to the illegal migrant sex worker. COST OF APPREHENSION AND CONVICTION

𝐷 = 𝐷 (𝑞, 𝑃)

where C is the cost of apprehension and conviction, p is the probability of conviction and O is the number of offenses.

04

Model Optimality conditions Finding the two first-order optimality conditions,

𝛜𝑴 𝛜𝒈 = 𝑬’ 𝑷𝒈 + 𝑫’ + 𝒄𝒒𝒈𝑷𝒈 + 𝒄𝒒𝑷 = 𝟏 𝛜𝑴 𝛜𝒒 = 𝑬’ 𝑷𝒒 + 𝑫’𝑷𝒒 + 𝑫𝒒 + 𝒄𝒒𝒈𝑷𝒒 + 𝒄𝒈𝑷 = 𝟏 𝑴 = 𝑴(𝑬, 𝑫, 𝑷, 𝒄𝒈)

Assuming social loss is equal to the loss in real income from illegal sex work by migrant sex workers at O number of offenses,

𝑴 = 𝑬(𝑷) + 𝑫(𝒒, 𝑷) + 𝒒𝒄𝒈𝑷

Dividing by Of and Op and substituting 𝐹𝑔 = − 𝑔

𝑃 𝑃𝑔

and 𝐹𝑞 = −

𝑞 𝑃 𝑃𝑞 , two equations are

found,

𝑬′+ 𝑫′ = −𝒄𝒒𝒈 𝟐 − 𝟐 𝑭𝒈 (𝟐) 𝑬′ + 𝑫′ + 𝑫 𝟐 𝒑𝝇 = −𝒄𝒒𝒈 𝟐 − 𝟐 𝑭𝒒 (𝟑)

▼ ▼

Marginal Cost Marginal Revenue

Thus equations 1 and 2 represent the

• ptimality condition where MR = MC.

04

Model Graph The social loss is minimised where MC = MR with respect to either f or p. This has implications for public policy in terms of finding the appropriate f and p to achieve the

• ptimal

level

• f
• ffenses at MC = MR.

• 5
• 5

Discussion

05

Discussion Effectiveness of the model We thus can determine two factors behind a choice to choose the illegal over the legal one. First, the perceived probability of conviction. Whether the probability of conviction serves to deter the sex worker to enter the illegal sector depends on other factors (uj) such as her attitude towards risk. Second, the cost of punishment. Again, whether the anticipated loss of income arising from the travel ban should she be convicted serves to deter her entry to the illegal sector depends on other factors.

05

Discussion Government policies match the duration of ban faced by illegal workers to that of the legal sector reduce the duration of the ban faced by legal workers.

Increase p Increase f

more frequent police raids more extensive police patrols

Th Thanks anks fo for r li list stening! ening!