Multilateral Privacy Requirements Analysis in Online Social - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

multilateral privacy requirements analysis in online
SMART_READER_LITE
LIVE PREVIEW

Multilateral Privacy Requirements Analysis in Online Social - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Multilateral Privacy Requirements Analysis in Online Social Networks Seda Grses COSIC, K.U. Leuven 18. February, 2011 CRID University of Namur, Belgium 1 x close this advertisement security and priv acy in online social networks K.U.


slide-1
SLIDE 1

Multilateral Privacy Requirements Analysis in Online Social Networks

Seda Gürses COSIC, K.U. Leuven

  • 18. February, 2011

CRID University of Namur, Belgium

1
slide-2
SLIDE 2 2

SPION

security and priv acy in

  • nline social networks

K.U. Leuven (COSIC, DistriNet, ICRI, HMDB), Vrije Universiteit Brussel (SMIT), University

  • f Ghent (Onderwijskunde), Carnegie Melon

University (Heinz College)

responsibilization

accountability

x close this advertisement 2
slide-3
SLIDE 3 3

SPION

security and priv acy in

  • nline social networks

trust, reputation and access control identity management legal frameworks anonymous communication feedback and awareness systems behavioral aspects

x close this advertisement

http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/spion

3
slide-4
SLIDE 4
  • utline
  • introduction to privacy requirements
  • stakeholder analysis: service provider
  • SNS access control design
  • feedback and awareness systems
4 4
slide-5
SLIDE 5

privacy?

  • what is privacy?
  • what are privacy requirements?
  • in security engineering: confidentiality
5 5
slide-6
SLIDE 6
  • nline social networks (SNS)
6 6
slide-7
SLIDE 7
  • nline social networks
7 7
slide-8
SLIDE 8 8

2004

Facebook created

1m

8
slide-9
SLIDE 9 9 2004 2005

Facebook in

Highschools

Facebook

friends friends of friends all facebook users the entire Internet

1m 5m

9
slide-10
SLIDE 10 10 2004

2006

Highschools 2005

Facebook available to the

PUBLIC(pg13)

Facebook

1m 5m 12m

10
slide-11
SLIDE 11 11 2004

2006

Highschools 2005

Facebook available to the

PUBLIC(pg13) xss attacks

Facebook

1m 5m 12m

11
slide-12
SLIDE 12 12 2004

2006

Highschools 2005

Facebook available to the

PUBLIC(pg13) xss attacks

Facebook

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m

12
slide-13
SLIDE 13 13 2004

2006

Highschools 2005

Facebook available to the

PUBLIC(pg13)

Facebook

newsfeed protests 740.000

xss attacks

1m 5m 12m

13
slide-14
SLIDE 14 14 2004 Facebook

2007

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m

14
slide-15
SLIDE 15 15 2004 Facebook

2007

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API Mobile

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m

15
slide-16
SLIDE 16 16 2004 Facebook

2007

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m

16
slide-17
SLIDE 17 17 2004 Facebook

2007

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m

17
slide-18
SLIDE 18 18 2004 Facebook

2007

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m

18
slide-19
SLIDE 19 19 2004 Facebook

2007

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

breastfeeding

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m

19
slide-20
SLIDE 20 20 2004 Facebook

2007

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

memorilization

bans

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m

breastfeeding

20
slide-21
SLIDE 21 21 2004 Facebook

2008

2005 PUBLIC 2006

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2007

Canadian Privacy Commissioner

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

21
slide-22
SLIDE 22 22 2004 Facebook

2008

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007

Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

popularity algorithm

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

22
slide-23
SLIDE 23 23 2004 Facebook

2008

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007

Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

popularity algorithmprotests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

23
slide-24
SLIDE 24 24 2004 Facebook

2009

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008

cyberbullying

unlimited license to user content

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m

24
slide-25
SLIDE 25 25 2004 Facebook

2009

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008

cyberbullying

unlimited license to user content

protests

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m

25
slide-26
SLIDE 26 26 2004 Facebook

2009

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008

cyberbullying

unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m

26
slide-27
SLIDE 27 27 2004 Facebook

2009

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008

cyberbullying

unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m

27
slide-28
SLIDE 28 28 2004 Facebook

2009

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008

cyberbullying

unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

Canadian Privacy Commissioner

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m

28
slide-29
SLIDE 29 29 2004 Facebook

2009

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008

cyberbullying

unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

Canadian Privacy Commissioner

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m

29
slide-30
SLIDE 30 30 2004 Facebook

2010

2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008 cyberbullying unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

2009

facebook

google

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m 400m

30
slide-31
SLIDE 31 31 2004 Facebook 2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008 cyberbullying unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

2009

facebook

google

CONNECTIONS

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m 350m

2010

400m

31
slide-32
SLIDE 32 32 2004 Facebook 2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008 cyberbullying unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

2009

facebook

google

CONNECTIONS

chat leak

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

2010

400m

32
slide-33
SLIDE 33 33 2004 Facebook 2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008 cyberbullying unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

2009 facebook google

CONNECTIONS

chat leak

NOYB

FACECLOAK

SCRAMBLE

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

2010

400m

33
slide-34
SLIDE 34 34 2004 Facebook 2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008 cyberbullying unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

2009 facebook google

CONNECTIONS

chat leak NOYB FACECLOAK SCRAMBLE

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

2010

400m

34
slide-35
SLIDE 35 35 2004 Facebook 2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008 cyberbullying unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

2009 facebook google

CONNECTIONS

chat leak NOYB FACECLOAK SCRAMBLE

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

2010

400m

35
slide-36
SLIDE 36 36 2004 Facebook 2005 PUBLIC 2006 2007 Canadian Privacy Commissioner

LIVE FEED

protests

1.600.000

Highschools xss attacks

protests 740.000

newsfeed

Facebook API Mobile BEACON

protests 50.000 in 3 days

bans

2008 cyberbullying unlimited license to user content

user voting

protests

friends lists

2009 facebook google

CONNECTIONS

chat leak NOYB FACECLOAK SCRAMBLE

1m 5m 12m 50m 100m

2010

500m

NHS reveals data to Facebook

Discriminatory Behavioral Profiling User IDs revealed to Third Parties

Homeland Security friends Aliens

36
slide-37
SLIDE 37
  • all of these are (somehow) about privacy and

the design of the system

  • how do we deal with these issues when

developing systems?

  • specifically: during requirements engineering
37 37
slide-38
SLIDE 38

multilateral privacy requirements engineering

  • reconcile:
  • privacy notions (legal & surveillance studies)
  • privacy solutions (computer science)
  • in a social context (online SNS)
  • multilaterally
  • during requirements engineering
38 38
slide-39
SLIDE 39

privacy requirements definition

39

lack of universality lack of satisfiability subjectivity legal compliance contrivability environmental factors counter - factuality temporality agonism negotiability

39
slide-40
SLIDE 40

multilateral privacy requirements engineering

  • reconcile:
  • privacy notions (legal & surveillance studies)
  • privacy solutions (computer science)
  • in a social context (online SNS)
  • multilaterally
  • during requirements engineering
40 40
slide-41
SLIDE 41

solutions from privacy research

41

data confidentiality anonymous communications PPDM/PPDP IDMS Differential Privacy Privacy Policy Languages Feedback and Awareness Systems

41
slide-42
SLIDE 42

privacy research paradigms

42

privacy as confidentiality the right to be let alone.

Warren & Brandeis (1890) hiding information and identity

42
slide-43
SLIDE 43

privacy research paradigms

43

privacy as confidentiality the right to be let alone.

Warren & Brandeis (1890) hiding information and identity

privacy as control

separation of identities, data protection principles right of the individual to decide what information about himself should be communicated to

  • thers and under what
  • circumstances. (Westin 1970)
43
slide-44
SLIDE 44

privacy research paradigms

44

privacy as confidentiality the right to be let alone.

Warren & Brandeis (1890) hiding information and identity

privacy as control

separation of identities, data protection principles right of the individual to decide what information about himself should be communicated to

  • thers and under what
  • circumstances. (Westin 1970)

privacy as practice

the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of

  • ne’s own identity (Agre, 1999)
transparency and feedback 44
slide-45
SLIDE 45

privacy research paradigms

45

privacy as confidentiality

hiding information and identity

privacy as control

separation of identities, data protection principles

privacy as practice

transparency and feedback 45
slide-46
SLIDE 46

multilateral privacy requirements engineering

  • reconcile:
  • privacy notions (legal & surveillance studies)
  • privacy solutions (computer science)
  • in a social context (online SNS)
  • multilaterally
  • during requirements engineering
46 46
slide-47
SLIDE 47

case study

47

Social Network Services web-based systems communication

  • riented

wide audience many stakeholders short development cycles global privacy concerns proprietary systems

47
slide-48
SLIDE 48

multilateral privacy requirements engineering

  • reconcile:
  • privacy notions (legal & surveillance studies)
  • privacy solutions (computer science)
  • in a social context (online SNS)
  • multilaterally
  • during requirements engineering
48 48
slide-49
SLIDE 49 49

multilaterality

users SNS providers DP authorities user groups

49
slide-50
SLIDE 50

SNS providers

50

stakeholder artifacts privacy policy legally binding socially constructed defining roles & responsibilities

actively and collectively produced exchanged & consumed govern usage

50
slide-51
SLIDE 51

method

51

template analysis

analyze textual data codes to construct template relationships between themes

51
slide-52
SLIDE 52

SNS and TPA providers of interest

52

facebook

  • rkut

myspace

playfish

zynga

52
slide-53
SLIDE 53
  • verview of findings
  • two coders
  • total 68 codes in SNS PP

, 43 in TPA PP

  • 5 main themes (privacy concerns)
  • personal information, data protection and policy definition
  • user control of information
  • user interactions and information
  • advertisement and third parties
  • internet safety, minors and underage users
53 53
slide-54
SLIDE 54
  • verview of findings
  • two coders
  • total 68 codes in SNS PP

, 43 in TPA PP

  • 5 main themes (privacy concerns)
  • personal information, data protection and policy definition
  • user control of information
  • user interactions and information
  • advertisement and third parties
  • internet safety, minors and underage users
54 54
slide-55
SLIDE 55 55

privacy data protection

non-absolute relational contextual

  • pacity of the individual

procedural safeguards

accountability

transparency

55
slide-56
SLIDE 56

privacy policy definition

56

PP

SNS Provider

user

data

(user) 56
slide-57
SLIDE 57

privacy policy definition

57

PP

SNS Provider

user

data

(user) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

data

(user)

data

(user) 57
slide-58
SLIDE 58

privacy policy definition

58

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

User2 User3

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1) 58
slide-59
SLIDE 59

privacy policy definition

59

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

User2 User3

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1) 59
slide-60
SLIDE 60

privacy policy definition

60

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

User2 User3

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1) TP5 TP6 TP7 60
slide-61
SLIDE 61

privacy policy definition

61

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

User2 User3

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1) TP5 TP6 TP7

t0 t∞

61
slide-62
SLIDE 62

privacy is control over your personal information

62

personal information in SNS

PII (USA) personal information (EU)

(information theoretical/ statistical) anonymity

62
slide-63
SLIDE 63

privacy as control

63

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

User2 User3

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1) TP5 TP6 TP7 63
slide-64
SLIDE 64

privacy as control

64

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

User2 User3

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1) 64
slide-65
SLIDE 65

privacy as control

65

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

data

(user1)

data

(user1) 65
slide-66
SLIDE 66

privacy as control

66

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) 66
slide-67
SLIDE 67

privacy as control

67

PP

SNS Provider

User1

content uploaded by user traffic data

67
slide-68
SLIDE 68

SNS design

68

Relational Information (RI)

Transitive Access Control (TAC)

68
slide-69
SLIDE 69 69

Relational Information (RI)

information on SNS that is controlled by

  • r related to many
69
slide-70
SLIDE 70 70

P Rel Q R

Controllers = {P ,Q,R}

Relational Information

70
slide-71
SLIDE 71 71

Transitive Access Control (TAC)

topology based access control where profiles in vicinity co-determine access

71
slide-72
SLIDE 72 72

alice’s friends of friends can access her information

Transitive Access Control

72
slide-73
SLIDE 73 73

alice’s friends of friends can access her information

Transitive Access Control

73
slide-74
SLIDE 74 74

alice’s friends of friends can access her information

Transitive Access Control

74
slide-75
SLIDE 75

privacy policy definition

75

PP

SNS Provider

User1

content uploaded by user traffic data RI

TAC

user attributes

75
slide-76
SLIDE 76

user control?

76

PP

SNS Provider

User1

data

(user1) TP1 TP2 TP3 TP4

User2 User3

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1)

data

(user1) TP5 TP6 TP7

u

76
slide-77
SLIDE 77

conclusions

  • privacy concerns of SP:
  • data protection compliance
  • frame privacy as control (min. set of data)
  • increase trust in providers
  • paradox:
  • sharing = collaborative (design supported)

practice

  • privacy = individual responsibility and control of

information

77 77
slide-78
SLIDE 78

compliance?

  • DP success: (semi) transparency of data

collection, processing and distribution practices

  • DP fail: interpreted to the advantage of the

service providers

  • responsibilize the users
  • false perception of control
  • minimize accountability and transparency
  • push responsibility to third parties (vice versa)
78 78
slide-79
SLIDE 79

personal data?

  • Definition of Personal Data does not address
  • collaborative/relational information
  • does not fit a matrix of personal data
  • statistical inference
  • surveillance: control populations by categorizing individuals and
practicing social sorting (identification not necessary)
  • no protection of anonymous data
  • anonymous communications
  • anonymized datasets
  • consent -> identification -> increased surveillance -> endanger
anonymity 79 79
slide-80
SLIDE 80

future improvements

  • expand definition of personal information on SNS
  • beware of relational information
  • increase scope of “control”
  • include traffic data, data from third parties, cookie use
  • enable sharing of data that bypasses the SP
  • beware: facebook has censored proponents of this vision
  • avoid privacy policy jungle
  • accountability and transparency
  • better security and (transparent) access control
  • demand collaborative privacy control
80 80
slide-81
SLIDE 81

questions?

Contact: Seda Gürses seda@esat.kuleuven.be Cosic, K.U. Leuven, Belgium

81 81