Modern age burglary Jeroen Klaver & Kevin de Kok University of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Modern age burglary Jeroen Klaver & Kevin de Kok University of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Modern age burglary Jeroen Klaver & Kevin de Kok University of Amsterdam System & Network Engineering Outline Introduction Research question Approach Analysis Attack vectors Impact Conclusion Introduction


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Modern age burglary

Jeroen Klaver & Kevin de Kok University of Amsterdam System & Network Engineering

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Outline

 Introduction  Research question  Approach  Analysis  Attack vectors  Impact  Conclusion

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Introduction

 Old setup

 Alarm systems over PSTN  Secure

 New setup

 Alarm systems over IP  Secure?

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Research question (1)

 Main question:

”Is it possible to perform a burglary without getting noticed by influencing the communication between the alarm system and the control room?”

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Research question (2)

 Sub questions:

 Which attack vectors that targets communication

can be used to bypass the alarm system?

 What could be the impact if alarm systems over IP-

based networks are vulnerable for different attack vectors?

 Which improvements can be made if alarm systems

  • ver IP-based networks are vulnerable for different

attack vectors?

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Approach

 Traffic capturing part 1

 Blackbox approach  Getting familiarized with the data  Recognising information

 Traffic capturing part 2

 Greybox approach  Different events

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Network setup

 Hub or bridge

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Traffic analysis

 Same packets used every time

 Registration  Activating  Deactivating  Heartbeat  Alarm trigger

 Dedicated ports used for each account  Each packet is acknowledged

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Packet analysis (1)

 Two parts

 Header  Event specific

 Acknowledgement from control room

 Two versions  No repeating pattern

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Packet analysis (2)

 Different account code

 4 digit number

 Two differences

 Specific part  Header

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Packet analysis (3)

 Specific part

 4 bytes differ

 Encryption

 Hex values compared to account code  XOR  Key = 0xB5

 UDP port number

 Acknowlegdement of registration packet  Same encryption as account code

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Packet analysis (4)

 Header

 2 bytes differ

 Must be account code  Example encryption

 Account code: 0011  Bytes: 0x00 and 0x11  XOR  Key = 0x85

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Think as a burglar

 Activate alarm on location X, deactivate from

location Y.

 Trigger alarms from different accounts.

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Attack vectors

 Replay attack

 Disable / enable alarm  Trigger alarm sensors  DoS (system and human)

 Brute force attack

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Replay attack

 Capturing network traffic  Working data sets

 Disabling alarm  Triggering sensors

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DoS attack

 Overloading control room with fake alarms

 Impact on availability security guards

 Requirements

 Data set from a real alarm  Port numbers  Account code  Checksum

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Brute force attack

 Control room ”coorporates”

 Static registration port used

 Account code + checksum = brute force

 Account code: 4 digits(0-9) == 10.000 posibilities  Checksum: 1 byte == 256 posiblities  Total: 10000*256 = 2.560.000 posibilites  Total time needed:

(2560000/2)/60/60/24) ≈ 15 days

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Impact

 PSTN-2-IP sold by different security company's

 Therefore PSTN-2-IP is actively used

 Newer systems available:

 Strong encryption  Seperate vpn routers  QoS

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Improvements

 Rewrite protocol  Protection against replay attacks  Improve confidentiality

 Avoid replay attacks with account information

 Improve integrity

 Avoid decrypting payload from packets

 Improve availability

 Avoid DoS possibilities

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Conclusions

”Is it possible to perform a burglary without getting noticed by influencing the communication between the alarm system and the control room?”

 Protocol vulnerable for replay attacks  No advanced crypto is used  DoS  A burglar needs technical knowledge and

resources.

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On a side note

”It takes 1,5 hours before a line failure is detected by the control room”

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Questions?

 Report soon available at:

https://www.os3.nl/2009-2010/students/kevin_de_kok/rp1