McBits: Objectives fast constant-time Set new speed records - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

McBits: Objectives fast constant-time Set new speed records code-based cryptography for public-key cryptography. D. J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Joint work with: Tung Chou Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (original speaker, still waiting for U.S. visa) Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen

McBits: Objectives fast constant-time Set new speed records code-based cryptography for public-key cryptography. D. J. Bernstein ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Joint work with: Tung Chou Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (original speaker, still waiting for U.S. visa) Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen

McBits: Objectives fast constant-time Set new speed records code-based cryptography for public-key cryptography. D. J. Bernstein ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. University of Illinois at Chicago & ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection Technische Universiteit Eindhoven against quantum computers. Joint work with: Tung Chou Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (original speaker, still waiting for U.S. visa) Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen

McBits: Objectives fast constant-time Set new speed records code-based cryptography for public-key cryptography. D. J. Bernstein ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. University of Illinois at Chicago & ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection Technische Universiteit Eindhoven against quantum computers. Joint work with: ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection Tung Chou against cache-timing attacks, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven branch-prediction attacks, etc. (original speaker, still waiting for U.S. visa) Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen

McBits: Objectives fast constant-time Set new speed records code-based cryptography for public-key cryptography. D. J. Bernstein ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. University of Illinois at Chicago & ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection Technische Universiteit Eindhoven against quantum computers. Joint work with: ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection Tung Chou against cache-timing attacks, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven branch-prediction attacks, etc. (original speaker, ✿ ✿ ✿ using code-based crypto still waiting for U.S. visa) with a solid track record. Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen

McBits: Objectives fast constant-time Set new speed records code-based cryptography for public-key cryptography. D. J. Bernstein ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. University of Illinois at Chicago & ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection Technische Universiteit Eindhoven against quantum computers. Joint work with: ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection Tung Chou against cache-timing attacks, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven branch-prediction attacks, etc. (original speaker, ✿ ✿ ✿ using code-based crypto still waiting for U.S. visa) with a solid track record. Peter Schwabe ✿ ✿ ✿ all of the above at once . Radboud University Nijmegen

McBits: Objectives The track constant-time Set new speed records 1978 McEliece de-based cryptography for public-key cryptography. public-key Bernstein ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. Has held University of Illinois at Chicago & optimization ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection echnische Universiteit Eindhoven 1962 Prange. against quantum computers. ork with: 1988 Lee–Brick ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection 1989 Krouk. Chou against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. echnische Universiteit Eindhoven branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Go riginal speaker, 1990 van ✿ ✿ ✿ using code-based crypto aiting for U.S. visa) 1991 Coffey–Go with a solid track record. Schwabe 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. ✿ ✿ ✿ all of the above at once . oud University Nijmegen 1993 Chabaud.

Objectives The track record constant-time Set new speed records 1978 McEliece prop cryptography for public-key cryptography. public-key code-based ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. Has held up well after Illinois at Chicago & optimization of attack ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection Universiteit Eindhoven 1962 Prange. 1981 against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. Universiteit Eindhoven branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. er, 1990 van Tilburg. ✿ ✿ ✿ using code-based crypto U.S. visa) 1991 Coffey–Goodman–F with a solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. ✿ ✿ ✿ all of the above at once . University Nijmegen 1993 Chabaud.

Objectives The track record Set new speed records 1978 McEliece proposed for public-key cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. Has held up well after extensive Chicago & optimization of attack algorithms: ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection Eindhoven 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. Eindhoven branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. ✿ ✿ ✿ using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. with a solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. ✿ ✿ ✿ all of the above at once . Nijmegen 1993 Chabaud.

Objectives The track record Set new speed records 1978 McEliece proposed for public-key cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. ✿ ✿ ✿ at a high security level. Has held up well after extensive optimization of attack algorithms: ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. ✿ ✿ ✿ using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. with a solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. ✿ ✿ ✿ all of the above at once . 1993 Chabaud.

Objectives The track record 1994 van 1994 Canteaut–Chabanne. new speed records 1978 McEliece proposed 1998 Canteaut–Chabaud. public-key cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. 1998 Canteaut–Sendrier. a high security level. Has held up well after extensive ✿ ✿ ✿ 2008 Bernstein–Lange–P optimization of attack algorithms: 2009 Bernstein–Lange– ✿ ✿ ✿ including protection 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. Peters–van against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. 2009 Bernstein ✿ ✿ ✿ including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. 2009 Finiasz–Sendrier. against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. 2010 Bernstein–Lange–P ranch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 2011 Ma 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. 2011 Beck ✿ ✿ ✿ using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. 2012 Beck solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. 2013 Bernstein–Jeffe ✿ ✿ ✿ of the above at once . 1993 Chabaud. Meurer (p

The track record 1994 van Tilburg. 1994 Canteaut–Chabanne. records 1978 McEliece proposed 1998 Canteaut–Chabaud. cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. 1998 Canteaut–Sendrier. security level. Has held up well after extensive ✿ ✿ ✿ 2008 Bernstein–Lange–P optimization of attack algorithms: 2009 Bernstein–Lange– ✿ ✿ ✿ rotection 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. Peters–van Tilborg. computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. 2009 Bernstein (post-quantum). ✿ ✿ ✿ full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. 2009 Finiasz–Sendrier. cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. 2010 Bernstein–Lange–P rediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 2011 May–Meurer–Th 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. 2011 Becker–Coron–Joux. ✿ ✿ ✿ de-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. 2012 Becker–Joux–Ma track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. 2013 Bernstein–Jeffe ✿ ✿ ✿ ove at once . 1993 Chabaud. Meurer (post-quantum).

The track record 1994 van Tilburg. 1994 Canteaut–Chabanne. 1978 McEliece proposed 1998 Canteaut–Chabaud. cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. 1998 Canteaut–Sendrier. level. Has held up well after extensive ✿ ✿ ✿ 2008 Bernstein–Lange–Peters. optimization of attack algorithms: 2009 Bernstein–Lange– ✿ ✿ ✿ 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. Peters–van Tilborg. ers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. 2009 Bernstein (post-quantum). ✿ ✿ ✿ rotection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. 2009 Finiasz–Sendrier. attacks, 1989 Dumer. 2010 Bernstein–Lange–Peters. etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 2011 May–Meurer–Thomae. 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. 2011 Becker–Coron–Joux. ✿ ✿ ✿ crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. 2012 Becker–Joux–May–Meurer. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. 2013 Bernstein–Jeffery–Lange– ✿ ✿ ✿ once . 1993 Chabaud. Meurer (post-quantum).