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Insurance and reinsurance markets and climate risks Arthur - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks Insurance and reinsurance markets and climate risks Arthur Charpentier, ENSAE/CREST arthur.charpentier@ensae.fr Insurance and Adaptation to Climate Change March 2007,


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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

Insurance and reinsurance markets and climate risks

Arthur Charpentier, ENSAE/CREST

arthur.charpentier@ensae.fr

Insurance and Adaptation to Climate Change

March 2007, Paris

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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

Agenda of the talk

  • Some stylized facts, and figures,
  • What means “climate risks”: catastrophes and new risks,
  • Insurance and insurability: what is insurance ?
  • Insurance against natural catastrophes: insuring large and nonindependent

risks,

  • Transferring large risks: reinsurance and ART (captives, finite, cat bonds,

cat options),

  • Climate change and insurance in a changing environment: modeling natural

hazard, modeling economic losses, modeling insurance losses. 2

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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

Some stylized facts

Figure 1: Major natural catastrophes (from Munich Re (2006).) 3

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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

Some stylized facts

Date Loss event Region Overall losses Insured losses Fatalities 25.8.2005 Hurricane Katrina USA 125,000 61,000 1,322 23.8.1992 Hurricane Andrew USA 26,500 17,000 62 17.1.1994 Earthquake Northridge USA 44,000 15,300 61 21.9.2004 Hurricane Ivan USA, Caribbean 23,000 13,000 125 19.10.2005 Hurricane Wilma Mexico, USA 20,000 12,400 42 20.9.2005 Hurricane Rita USA 16,000 12,000 10 11.8.2004 Hurricane Charley USA, Caribbean 18,000 8,000 36 26.9.1991 Typhoon Mireille Japan 10,000 7,000 62 9.9.2004 Hurricane Frances USA, Caribbean 12,000 6,000 39 26.12.1999 Winter storm Lothar Europe 11,500 5,900 110

Table 1: The 10 most expensive catastrophes, 1950-2005 (from Munich Re (2006). 4

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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

What means “climate risks”

Climate risks are risks induced by climate change:

  • impact on natural catastrophes: frequency and severity, some possible

solvency problems,

  • impact on health: “new” risks because of “new” diseases,
  • impact on agriculture: economic implications of climate change,
  • ...

“climatic risk in numerous branches of industry is more important than the risk

  • f interest rates or foreign exchange risk” (AXA 2004, quoted in Ceres (2004)).

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Climate change and sanitary impact

Figure 2: Disease outbreaks during the 1997-98 El Nio. abnormally wet areas, abnormally dry areas, dengue fever, malaria, Rodent-borne: hantavirus pulmonary syndrome and water-borne (cholera). 6

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Climate change and sanitary impact

Figure 3: Risk of malaria transmission (from Epstein (2000)). 7

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Agricultural Insurance: climate and ecosystems

Figure 4: Impact of climate change: repartition of some vegetal species. 8

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Primary insurance

Insurance is “the contribution of the many to the misfortunes of the few”. Some risk adverse agents (insured) are willing to pay even more than the actual value of the (predictable) risk to transfer its consequences to another agent (insurer). 9

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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

Notion(s) of insurability: when can we sell/buy insurance ?

  • 1. judicially, an insurance contract can be valid only if claim occurrence

satisfy some randomness property,

  • 2. the “game rule” (using the expression from Berliner (1982), i.e. legal

framework) should remain stable in time. Those two notions yield the concept of “legal” insurability,

  • 3. the possible maximum loss should not be huge, with respect to the insurer’s

solvency,

  • 4. the average cost should be identifiable and quantifiable,
  • 5. risks could be pooled so that the law of large numbers can be used

(independent and identically distributed, i.e. the portfolio should be homogeneous). These three notions define the concept of “actuarial” insurability. 10

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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

Notion(s) of insurability: when can we sell/buy insurance ?

  • 6. there should be no moral hazard, and no adverse selection,
  • 7. there must exist an insurance market, in the sense that offer and demand

should meet, and a price (equilibrium price) should arise. Those two last points define the concept of “economic” insurability, also called “market imperfections” by Rochet (1998). Are natural catastrophes insurable ? 11

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  • 1. [...] claim occurrence satisfy some randomness property

In France (law n◦82-600 13th of July 1982), Article 1 “sont considérés comme les effets des catastrophes naturelles au sens de la présente loi, les dommages matériels directs ayant eu pour cause déterminante l’intensité anormale d’un agent naturel, lorsque les mesures habituelles à prendre pour prévenir ces dommages n’ont pu empêcher leur survenance ou n’ont pu être prises”. What means “abnormal intensity of natural hazard” ? Is it abnormal to have recurrent floods in some areas easily flooded (in a former river channel) ? 12

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  • 3. [...] the possible maximum loss should not be huge
  • 4. [...] average cost [...] identifiable and quantifiable,

Problem when modeling large claims (industrial fire, business interruption, natural catastrophes,...): extreme value theory framework. The Pareto distribution appears naturally when modeling observations over a given threshold, F(x) = P(X ≤ x) = 1 − x x0 b , where x0 = exp(−a/b) Remark: if −b ≥ 1, then EP(X) = ∞, the pure premium is infinite. Then equivalently log(1 − F(x)) ∼ a + b log x, i.e. for all i = 1, ..., n, log(1 − Fn(Xi)) ∼ a + blog Xi. 13

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2 4 6 8 10 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1

Log−log Pareto plot, hurricane losses

Logarithm of the loss amount Logarithm of cumulated probabilites k=5%, slope= − 1.259 k=25%, slope= −0.864 20 40 60 80 100 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0

Hill estimator of the tail index

Percentage of bservations exceeding the threshold Tail index, with 95% confidence interval

Figure 5: Pareto modeling of hurricanes losses (Pielke & Landsea (1998)). 14

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  • 5. [...] the law of large numbers can be used

Within an homogeneous portfolios (Xi identically distributed), sufficiently large (n → ∞), X1 + ... + Xn n → E(X). If the variance is finite, we can also derive a confidence interval (solvency requirement), if the Xi’s are independent,

n

  • i=1

Xi ∈   nE(X) ± 2√nVar(X)

  • risk based capital need

   with probability 99%. Nonindependence implies more volatility and therefore more capital requirement. 15

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20 40 60 80 100 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04

Implications for risk capital requirements

Annual losses Probability density 99.6% quantile 99.6% quantile Risk−based capital need Risk−based capital need

Figure 6: Independent versus non-independent claims, and capital requirements. 16

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  • 6. [...] no moral hazard and no adverse selection

Frequency of avalanches, per departement Frequency of floods, per departement

Figure 7: The frequency of “arrêté Cat Nat” (avalanches and flood). 17

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  • 7. [...] there must exist an insurance market

Natural catastrophe risk is a low probability risks, hardly predictable. Consider the following example, from Kunreuther & Pauly (2004): “my dwelling is insured for $ 250,000. My additional premium for earthquake insurance is $ 768 (per year). My earthquake deductible is $ 43,750... The more I look to this, the more it seems that my chances of having a covered loss are about zero. I’m paying $ 768 for this ?” (Business Insurance, 2001).

  • annual probability of an earthquake in Seattle 1/250 = 0.4%,
  • actuarial implied probability 768/(250, 000 − 43, 750) ∼ 0.37%

It is a fair price 18

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Reinsurance: excess of loss treaties

In reinsurance excess of loss (stop loss) treaties, the reinsurer undertakes the upper layer of the risk, after a certain attachment point.

INSURED INSURER REINSURER

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

The insurance approach (XL treaty)

Event Loss per event

Figure 8: The XL reinsurance treaty mechanism. 19

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Reinsurance program

SELF INSURANCE deductible PRIMARY INSURANCE priority REINSURANCE upper limit

Reinsurance program

SELF INSURANCE deductible PRIMARY INSURANCE priority REINSURANCE upper limit

FIRST LAYER SECOND LAYER THIRD LAYER

Reinsurance program

SELF INSURANCE deductible PRIMARY INSURANCE priority REINSURANCE upper limit

FIRST LAYER SECOND LAYER THIRD LAYER

Figure 9: Evolution of reinsurance programs. 20

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Reinsurance: cat excess of loss treaties

The main difficulty is to define precisely the event or a single natural event.

The insurance approach (CatXL treaty)

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

The insurance approach (CatXL treaty)

Event Loss per event

Figure 10: The Cat XL reinsurance treaty mechanism. 21

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Captives

Purpose: provide insurance coverage for their owners (cf self-insurance). Enhances the capability to purchase excess insurance and provides a direct access to the reinsurance marketplace.

INSURED INSURER REINSURER

Figure 11: The captive mechanism. 22

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Insurance derivatives (cat bonds)

Cat bonds are interesting since they help to increase capacity in the market, but are expensive to set up.

INSURED INSURER SPV INVESTORS

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

The securitization approach (Cat bond)

Event Loss per event

Figure 12: The securitization mechanism, parametric triggered cat bond. 23

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The trigger is either based on a environmental index (Richter index, precipitation levels, windspeeds, temperatures...) or a claim based index.

Insurance derivatives (cat options)

Those indices can also be used for options. Exchange-traded catastrophe options are standardized contracts bought and sold through an organized market. “Unlike traditional options, catastrophe options give the purchaser the right to

  • btain a cash payment if a specified index of catastrophe losses reaches a

specified level - the strike price”. Example CBOT’s PCS Catastrophe Insurance Options Those options are hardly priced (arbitrage pricing cannot be used). For index based products (risky bonds or options), there is an additional risk of noncorrelation between the physical and the loss triggers (rarely a perfect hedge). 24

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“the government as the ultimate risk manager”

Especially in France, where there is an unlimited government guarantee for catastrophes provided through the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance (national program covering floods, subsidence, earthquakes and avalanches). Also the case in other countries in Europe (Spain, Norway, Switzerland) and in the U.S. (for flood risks). Remark: some risk financing instruments can also be considered (catastrophe tax, government debt instruments, international loans), but it is not insurance anymore. 25

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Insuring in a changing environment ?

Need for accurate loss models based on environmental series. Classical statistical problem of forecasting.

EVENT SIMULATION NATURAL HAZARD EXPOSURE ECONOMIC LOSSES INSURED LOSSES FREQUENCY SEVERITY GEOGRAPHICAL AND LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS, CONSTRUCTION POLICIES IN FORCE COVERAGE, EXCLUSIONS

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Insuring in a changing environment ?

How fast is climate changing ? perhaps quicker than previously anticipated.

1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4

Average temperature, from 1000 to 2000

Year Average annual temperature, northern hemisphere

Crowley & Lowery (2000) Esper et al. (2003) Briffa et al. (1998) Jones et al. (2001) Mann (1999) Mann & Jones (2003)

−10 −5 5 10 15 20

Daily Minimum Temperatures in Paris

date Temperature (°C) 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Figure 13: Global warming and climate change: modeling temperature 27

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−10 −5 5 10 15 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10

Distribution of winter temperature in Paris

Winter average temperature 1980−2000 1900−1920 15.5% of days below 0°C 8.5% of days below 0°C 10 15 20 25 30 35 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12

Distribution of summer temperature in Paris

Summer average temperature 1980−2000 1900−1920 2.4% of days over 25°C 5.2% of days over 25°C

Figure 14: Summer and winter temperature in Paris, 1900-1920 versus 1980-2000. 28

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Climate change and storms

Increase of wind related losses from hurricanes in the U.S., typhoons in Japan and storms in Europe.

1850 1900 1950 2000 5 10 15 20 25

Number of hurricanes, per year 1851−2006

Year Frequency of hurricanes

Figure 15: Number of hurricanes and major hurricanes per year. 29

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Climate change and storms

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 100 200 300 400

Number of tornados in the US, per month

Year Number of tornados

Figure 16: Number of tornadoes (from http://www.spc.noaa.gov/archive/). 30

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From natural events to economic losses

The increase in population and infrastructure densities in urban centers and vulnerable regions multiply the size of maximum potential losses. One has to look for all possible effects of climate change (negative and positive). 31

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From Mills, Roth & Lecomte (2005), means increased losses, and reduced losses,

peril property property liability examples of projected impact hazard industrial auto business health life marine interrup. Higher maximum temperatures, more hot days hospitalizations, death, serious illness heatwave

  • soil subsidence

subsidence

  • decreased ice in maritime lanes

float ice

  • increase roadway accident (reaction time)

accidents

  • increased electric cooling demand

power outage

  • Higher minimum temperatures, less cold days

decrease cold related mortality coldwave

  • extend activity of some pests

infestation

  • avalanche risk

avalanche

  • permasfrost melt

subsidence

  • Increased summer drying

damage to building foundations subsidence

  • decrease water resource quantity

drought

  • increase risk of wildfire

wildfire

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Arthur CHARPENTIER - Insurance and reinsurance market and climate risks

From natural events to economic losses: hurricanes

“the Saffir-Simpson Scale is designed to measure the potential damage of a hurricane to man-made structures [...] if the speed of the hurricane is above 156 mph (category 5), then the damage to a building will be serious no matter how well it’s engineered.”

category sustained central storm relative potential examples winds pressure surge destruction category 1 118 to 153 km/h >980 1.2 to 1.5 m 1 Stan (2005) category 2 154 to 177 km/h 965-679 1.8 to 2.4 m 10 Juan (2003) category 3 178 to 210 km/h 945-964 2.7 to 3.7 m 50 Ivan (2004) some structural damage to small residences and utility buildings, Jeanne (2004) with a minor amount of curtainwall failures Beta (2005) category 4 210 to 249 km/h 920-944 4.0 to 5.5 m 100 Floyd (1999) extensive curtainwall failures with some complete roof structure failure Charley (2004)

  • n small residences, terrain may be flooded well inland

Dennis (2005) category 5 More than 249 km/h <920

  • ver 5.5 m

250 Emily (2005) complete roof failure on many residences and industrial buildings Katrina (2005) flooding causes major damage to lower floors, near the shoreline Rita (2005) massive evacuation of residential areas may be required Wilma (2005)

Table 2: The Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale. 33

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From natural events to economic losses: earthquakes

Richter’s scale quantifies the size of an earthquake the epicenter. Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik or Mercalli are related to earthquake occurrences,

degree description The Mercalli scale category 7 (very strong) difficult to stand, furniture broken, damage negligible in building of good design category 8 (destructive) damage slight in specially designed structures category 9 (ruinous) general panic and damage considerable in specially designed structures category 10 (disastrous) some well built structures destroyed category 11 (very disastrous) few masonry structures remain standing, bridges destroyed category 12 (catastrophic) total damage, almost everything is destroyed The Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karnik scale category 7 (very strong) most people are frightened and try to run outdoors category 8 (damaging) many people find it difficult to stand, even outdoors, furniture overturned category 9 (destructive) general panic, people thrown to the ground, substandard structures collapse category 10 (devastating) masonry buildings destroyed, infrastructure crippled. Massive landslides category 11 (catastrophic) most buildings and structures collapse category 12 (very catastrophic) all surface and underground structures completely destroyed

Table 3: The Mercalli and Medvedev-Sponheuer-Karniks scales. 34

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From economic to insured losses

The exposure for an insurance company is difficult to model. The CRESTA was set up by the insurance industry in 1977, and CRESTA zones have been defined, related to insurance exposure. Figure 17: The use of CRESTA zones to model exposure, in Montreal. 35

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Some references

Aase, K. (1999). An equilibrium model of catastrophe insurance futures and spreads. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 24, 29-96. Association of British Insurers (2005). Financial risks of climate change. http://www.abi.org.uk/climatechange, Berliner, B. (1982). Limits of insurability of risks. Prentice-Hall. Ceres (2004). Investor Guide to Climate Risk Action Plan and Resource for Plan Sponsors, Fund Managers and

  • Corporations. http://www.ceres.org/

Christensen, C.V. & Schmidli, H. (2000). Pricing catastrophe insurance products based on actually reported claims. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 27, 189-200. Cossette, H., Duchesne, T. & Marceau, E. (2004). Modeling catastrophes and their impact on insurance portfolios. North American Actuarial Journal, 4, 1-22. Crichton, D. (2005). Insurance and Climate Change. Conference on climate change, extreme events, and coastal cities. Cummins, J.D. & Geman, H. (1995). Pricing catastrophe insurance futures and call spreads. Journal of Fixed Income, 4, 46-57. Dlugolecki, A. (2001). Climate Change and Insurance. Chartered Insurance Institute Research Report. Epstein, P.R.. (2000). Is Global Warming Harmful to Health? Scientific American , August, 50-57. Froot, K.A. (1999). The financing of catastrophe risk. University of Chicago Press. Geman, H. & Yor, M. (1997). Stochastic time changes in catastrophe option pricing. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 21, 185-193. Harrington, S. & Niehaus, G. (1999). Basic risk with PCS catastrophe insurance derivative contracts. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 66, 205-230. Höppe, P. & Pielke, R. (2006). Workshop on climate change and disaster losses.

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Some references

Kunreuther, H. & Pauly, M.. (2004) Neglecting Disaster : Why donŠt People Insure. Against Large Losses ? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 28, 5-21. Lloyd’s (2006). 360 Risk Project. http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/360_risk_project/ Mills, E., Lecomte, E. & Peara, A. (2001). US Insurance industry perspectives on global climate change. University of Californy. Mills, E., Roth, R.J. & Lecomte, E. (2005). Availability and affordability of insurance under climate change: a growing challenge for the US. http://www.ceres.org/. Monti, A. (2002). Environmental risks and insurance: a comparative analysis of the rile of insurance in the management of environment-related risks. OECD Report. Moss, D.A. (2004). When All Else Fails: Government As the Ultimate Risk Manager. Harvard University Press. Munich Re (2006). Great natural disasters. http://www.munichre.com/pages/03/georisks/ O’Brien, T. (1997). Hedging strategies using catastrophe insurance options. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, 21, 153-162. Pielke, R.A. & Landsea, C.W. (1998). Normalized Hurricane Damages in the United States: 1925-1995. Weather and Forecasting, 13, 351-361. Rochet, J.C. (1991). Assurabilité et Financement des Risques, in Encyclopédie de l’Assurance, Économica. Swiss Re (2003). Natural catastrophes and reinsurance. http://www.swissre.com/.

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