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in France and its consequences Vah Nafilyan OECD, Paris School of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
in France and its consequences Vah Nafilyan OECD, Paris School of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Job displacement in France and its consequences Vah Nafilyan OECD, Paris School of Economics 1 Motivation Job displacement: major concern in France Little is known about the consequences of displacement on labour market
Motivation
Job displacement: major concern in France
Little is known about the consequences of displacement on labour market prospects
Main question: What is the cost of job displacement in terms of earnings and job quality?
Outline I – Institutional Context II- Data III- Displacement Risk IV- Re-employment prospects V- Cost of job loss
I- French Labour Legislation
Two ways to dismiss an employee with open-ended
contract:
- Dismissal for economic reason (Licenciement pour motif
économique)
- Dismissal on personal grounds (Licenciement pour motif
personnel)
Introduction (Q4 -2008) of the rupture conventionnelle:
termination of contract on joint employee/employer initiative.
Dismissal for Economic Reason
Dismissal for economic reasons strongly regulated Aiming to prevent employers to target specific employees An order of dismissals (ordre de licenciements) must be
defined according to objective criteria that are set by collective agreements
The Labour Code defines 4 criteria:
- the family situation
- job tenure
- individual characteristics that hinder re-employment prospects
(age, disability)
- professional qualifications
Job displacement and dismissal for economic reason
High cost of dismissal for economic reason Other ways to adjust the workforce:
- voluntarily separation plan
- decreasing the number of temporary workers
Only part of the job separations due to economic
reasons are captured when looking at dismissals for economic reason
II- Data
Enquête Emploi (Labour Force Survey) 2003-2011 Sample to individuals surveyed up to six consecutive
quarters
- N=1,308
Combining retroactive questions and the panel
dimension of the data, individuals can be tracked for up to 10 quarters
- N=2,533
Potential data issues
Attrition: only 60% of the individuals are surveyed 6
times
Measurement error: reasons for job separation may
be uncorrectly reported
Quarterly displacement rates : administrative vs. survey data
0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Administrative data (MMO-DMO) Enquête Emploi
Note: displacement rate is computed as a share of the employees working in companies with 10 employees or more
III- Risk of job displacement
Model: X includes: Age; Gender; Education level; Family situation; Nationality; Occupation; Industry; Job tenure; Crisis. + region and year fixed effects
Older workers have a higher incidence of displacement
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 and more Age After the crisis Before the crisis
Lower displacement rates for tertiary educated workers
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% Upper tertiarry Short-cycle tertiary education Upper secondary Vocational secondary Lower secondary No degree Before the crisis After the crisis
Industry and construction workers are more at risk
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% Agriculture Industry Construction Wholesale/retail Transport, utilities Finance/business Other services Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Short tenured workers are more likely to be displaced
0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% less than 5 years 5 to 10 10 to 20 More than 20 Pre-crisis Post-crisis
IV-Re-employment prospects of displaced workers
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Quarters following displacement
Labour market status following displacement
Employed Unemployed NILF
Which characteristics matter for re-employment?
Model: X includes: Age; Gender; Education level;Family situation; Nationality; previous job characteristics; Crisis. + region and year fixed effects
Lower re-employment rates after the crisis
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Quarters following displacement Pre-crisis Post-crisis
Older workers face lower re-employment rates
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 and more Age within one year within two year
Only half of the displaced workers find a permanent job
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Permanent contract Regular fixed- term contract Other temporary contracts Self employed
Within one year
Pre-crisis post-crisis
%
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Permanent contract Regular fixed- term contract Other temporary contracts Self employed
Within two years
Pre-crisis post-crisis
%
V- The Cost of Job Loss
1- Wages 2- Job insecurity 3- Working time 4- Paid holidays
Estimating the earnings loss
Estimation strategy: Information on wages collected only at the first and last
interrogation
Control group: those employed on a permanent contract
- ne year before the first interrogation and who have not
been dismissed.
Wage loss
- 1600
- 1400
- 1200
- 1000
- 800
- 600
- 400
- 200
200 400
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Euros Quarters before and after displacement
23
Earnings loss
- 1600
- 1400
- 1200
- 1000
- 800
- 600
- 400
- 200
200 400
- 4
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Euros Quarters before and after displacement Wage Wage+unemployment benefits
Monthly wage loss for re-employed displaced workers
Slightly higher than what is found by Lefranc (2003)
Causal impact?
Are we capturing the causal impact of displacement
- n earnings?
The set of β coefficients is unbiased if displacement
is uncorrelated with the error term.
The legal framework regulating dismissal for
economic reason provides some reasons to believe that selection is made on observables.
Increased job insecurity
A substantial share of re-employed displaced workers
are employed under temporary contract.
Re-employed displaced workers are 8 times as likely
to experience an involuntary job separation as those who have not been dismissed over the past year
Quartely involuntary job loss rate Made redundant
- ver the past year
No involuntary separation over the past year 6.85% 0.87%
Increased part-time work
- 3%
- 2%
- 1%
0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Part-time work differential
Note: the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the individual is working part-time. Linear probability model with individual fixed effects
- 1.2
- 1
- 0.8
- 0.6
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2 0.4
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Number of weeks Quarters before and after displacement
Note: the dependent variable is the number of weeks of paid leave . Model with individual fixed effects
Fewer paid holidays
Conclusion and Policy Implication
The cost of job loss is driven by :
1) Long non-employment spells 2) Lower quality jobs
Policies need to address both issues
Thank you for your attention!
Appendix
Pre vs. post displacement wages
Information on wages collected only at the first and last
interrogation
First estimation of wage loss: before/after (Fixed effect model) Problem: do not capture foregone earnings growth
1 2 3 Dependent variable Wage (including 0 values) Wage (excluding 0 values) log of wage Displaced
- 1008.4
- 111.6
- 0.088
(32.2)*** (41.1)*** (0.024)*** Job characteristics No Yes Yes N 165,616 157,611 157,611 F 127.09 21.4 64.1
Control group: workers employed on permanent contract in the first interrogation and not dismissed