HARDSPLOIT Framework for Hardware Security Audit a bridge between - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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HARDSPLOIT Framework for Hardware Security Audit a bridge between - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

HARDSPLOIT Framework for Hardware Security Audit a bridge between hardware & a so0ware pentester Who am I ? Julien Moinard - Electronic engineer @opale-security (French company) - Security consultant, Hardware & SoDware pentester -


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HARDSPLOIT

Framework for Hardware Security Audit a bridge between hardware & a so0ware pentester

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Who am I ?

  • Julien Moinard
  • Electronic engineer @opale-security (French company)
  • Security consultant, Hardware & SoDware pentester
  • Team project leader of Hardsploit
  • DIY enthusiast

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Opale Security in 1 slide

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Internet of Things & Privacy concern ?

  • Any IoT object could reveal informa@on about

individuals

  • Wearable Technology: clothes, watches, contact

lenses with sensors, microphones with cameras embedded and so on

  • Quan@fied Self: pedometers, sleep monitors, and so
  • n
  • Home Automa@on: connected households using smart

fridges, smart ligh<ng and smart security systems, and so on

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Internet of Things & Privacy concern ?

  • Last news : (you can update this slide every week L)

Firmware can be read without any problem (SPI memory) VTech was hacked in November, exposing millions of accounts. In response, the firm took some essen<al services offline, meaning products could not be registered on Christmas Day. 16/03/2016

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Iot Eco-system (20000 feet view)

  • Privacy Risk level : Where?

HF communica<on (ISM Band) + Wifi + 3G-5G , Bluetooth, Sigfox, Lora etc.. Classical wired connec<ons Central servers, User Interface, API, Backoffice etc. IoT devices 16/03/2016

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SOFTWARE To secure it:

  • Security products (Firewall, An<virus, IDS,…)
  • Security services (Pentest, Audit, …)
  • Tools (Uncountable number of them)

HARDWARE To secure it:

  • Few or unimplemented solu<ons (Encryp<on

with key in a secure area, an<-replay mechanisms, readout protec<on, …)

Security speaking, hardware is the new soDware ?

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  • 1/ Open it
  • 2/ Fingerprint all the component if you can else automa@c brute forcing
  • 3/ Use those that may contain data (Online / Offline analysis ?)
  • 4/ Perform read | write opera@on on them
  • 5/ Reverse engineering, find vulnerabili<es and exploit them

Hardsploit & hardware hacking basic procedure

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Global Purpose

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Why ?

  • Because chips contain interes<ng / private data
  • Passwords
  • File systems
  • Firmware

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How ?

  • A hardware pentester need to know electronic buses and he need to be

able to interact with them 1-Wire JTAG / SWD UART CAN PARALLEL Custom

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Hardsploit framework

Same hardware but a sofware update is needed to add a new protocols

Hardsploit IoT target Input / Output database Module (SWD, SMBus, I2C, SPI, etc..)

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Hardsploit bus indenSficaSon & scanner

(in progress, not published yet)

Hardsploit IoT target Input / Output Database of pagerns Database of components Module (I2C, SPI, etc..) IO hardware mixer

Scanner 16/03/2016

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Tool of trade

FUNCTIONALITIES BUSPIRATE JTAGULATOR GOODFET HARDSPLOIT UART Bus iden<fica<on SPI PARALLEL I2C JTAG / SWD

Bus iden<fica<on

MODULARITY Microcontroller Microcontroller Microcontroller uC / FPGA EASE OF USE

Cmd line + datasheet Command line Command line Official GUI / API / DB

I/O NUMBER < 10 24 < 14 64 (plus power) WIRING TEXT (but MOSI = SDA J) TEXT / AUTOMATIC iden<fica<on TEXT LED / TEXT/ AUTOMATIC iden<fica<on 16/03/2016

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Hardsploit: CommunicaSon

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Prototype making

  • Applying soldering paste (low budget style)

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Prototype making

  • Manual reflow oven (DIY style)

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Prototype V0.1 aka The Green Goblin J

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Prototype making (with a budget)

  • The rebirth

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The board – Final version

  • 64 I/O channels
  • ESD Protec<on
  • Target voltage: 3.3 & 5V
  • Use a Cyclone II FPGA
  • USB 2.0
  • 20cm x 9cm

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Hardsploit organizaSon

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Chip management

  • Search
  • Create
  • Modify
  • Interact

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Wiring helper

Datasheet representa<on Hardsploit Wiring module representa<on GUI <–> Board interac<on 16/03/2016

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Se[ngs

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Command editor

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What are available on github (Open) ?

  • Microcontroller (c)
  • API (ruby)
  • GUI (ruby)
  • Create your own Hardsploit module : VHDL & API (ruby)

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Already available (github)

Parallel non mul<plexed memory dump

  • 32 bits for address
  • 8/16 bits for data

Helping wiring I2C 100Khz 400Khz and 1 Mhz

  • Addresses scan
  • Read, write, automa<c full and par<al dump

SPI mode 0,1,2,3 up to 25 Mhz

  • Read, write, automa<c full and par<al dump

SWD interface (like JTAG but for ARM core)

  • Dump and write firmware of most ARM CPU

GPIO interact / bitbanging (API only for the moment)

  • Low speed < 500Hz read & write opera<ons on 64 bits

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More to come (see online roadmap)…

  • Automa<c bus inden<fica<on & Scanner (@30%)
  • Component & commands sharing platorm (@90%)
  • TTL UART Module with automa<c detec<on speed (@80%)
  • Parallel communica<on with mul<plexed memory
  • I2C sniffing (shot of 4000 bytes up to 1 Mhz)
  • SPI sniffing (shot of 8000 / 4000 byte half / full up to 25Mhz)
  • RF Wireless transmission training plateform (Nordic NRF24, 433Mhz, 868Mhz transcievers)
  • Metasploit integra<on (module) ??
  • JTAG
  • 1 Wire
  • CanBUS (with hardware level adapter)

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Concrete case

  • An electronic lock system
  • 4 characters pin code A – B – C – D
  • Good combinaison – Door opens, green L.E.D turn on
  • Wrong combinaison – Door closes, red L.E.D turn on

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Concrete case: Open it

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Concrete case: Fingerprint

I2C MEMORIES 24LC64 STM32F103RBT6 SPI MEMORY 25LC08

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Concrete case: Online / Offline analysis ?

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Concrete case: hardsploit scenario

  • 1. Open Hardsploit to create the component (if not exist)
  • 2. Connect the component to Hardsploit (wiring helping)
  • 3. Enter and save the component seungs (if not exist)
  • 4. Dump the content of the memories (1 click)
  • 5. Change the door password by using commands (few clicks)
  • 6. Try the new password on the lock system (enjoy)

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Concrete case: Read | Write operaSon, I2C, SPI, SWD …

  • Time for a live demo ?

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Parallel bus memory

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Concrete case: Fingerprint

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Concrete case: Offline analysis

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Concrete case: Ready to dump the content

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Conclusion

  • IoT Device are (also) prone to vulnerabili<es help you to find them
  • Security policy need to be adpated, nowadays, it is not so difficult to

extract data on IoT

  • Designers need to design with security in mind
  • Skills related to pentest a hardware device is mandatory for Security

Experts (but training exist)

  • Industry need to take care about device security

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Thank you !

Hardsploit board is available at shop-hardsploit.com (250 € / 277 USD / 370 CAD excluding VAT) To learn more about Hardsploit and follow the development

Hardsploit.io & Opale-Security.com

  • Yann ALLAIN (CEO)
  • yann.allain@opale-security.com
  • +33 6 45 45 33 81

Hardware & Sofware, Pentest, Audit, Training

  • Julien MOINARD (Project leader of Hardsploit)
  • julien.moinard@opale-security.com
  • +33 9 72 43 87 07

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