GROUP AGENTS AND COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS Raimo Tuomela University of - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
GROUP AGENTS AND COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS Raimo Tuomela University of Helsinki University of Munich Individualism in Social Science (a) Conceptual understanding of an individuals action must be based on either the individuals own attitudes
We-thinking in the full we-mode sense is in some cases conceptually necessary, e.g. in contexts where
the we-mode constitutes (and thus constructs) full-blown group notions—collective artifacts—such as group beliefs or social institutions;
functionally required in many contexts, especially in cases of joint
action requiring synergy effects for collectively (and individually) beneficial results.
theoretically sufficient for (dis)solving central collective action
dilemmas (e.g. the PD) and thus for creating collective order.
needed for group-based cultural evolution in “developed” cases. is capable of handling large groups better than the I-mode
(primary dependence concerns the group and not individuals).
Group minds and agents have been discussed for
The ancient Romans built into their law the idea of
A corporation (corporatio) contrasts with “societas,” a
A corporatio is a persona capable of action and of
Intrinsically intentional group agents: groups are
Extrinsically intentional group agents: group
An organized group (e.g. a we-mode group) can
In simple cases, a group agent is (possibly “emergently”)
A group agent exists as a functional social
The we-mode involves the following three central ideas
We-mode mental attitudes are had in the way or
In general, there can be we-thinking and
On the other hand, there can be I-thinking
The above classification can be presented concisely in terms of
symbols as follows, where e.g. J = carrying a table jointly:
(1) IM(I, PJ) (2) WM(I, PJ) (3) IM (W, J) (4) WM(W, J) Here IM and WM are operators covering the contents within the
intention where the mode of the we-intention determines in which way or manner the content is held and in the case of WM the “strength” of the “we” involved in it. J means joint action as the content of a we-intention and PJ an individual member’s part action in the members’ joint performance of J.
The idea of a group agent capable of acting as a group
One of Bacharach’s (1999) results can be applied to show that the (pro-group) I-mode and the we-mode, probabilistically construed concerning mode adoption, do not entail the same equilibrium
utilities and the probabilities of the players acting for their own benefit instead of the group’s benefit are the same: The pro-group I- mode admits Pareto-suboptimal equilibria (e.g. DD in Hi-Lo) that in many cases will not be equilibria in the we-mode case. The above applies especially to common interest (Paretian) game situations with strong interdependence (such as, the Hi-Lo game and the PD). In Hi-Lo a full-blown group “framing” obviously makes joint outcome Hi-Hi (rather than Lo-Lo) a rational group’s choice.
Collective intentions in this talk include joint intentions,
One can act jointly either on an I-mode joint intention or,
In some agents’ we-mode joint action the agents form a
(IMI) Agent A has the intention that P in the I-mode
(PLIMI) Agent A has the intention that P in the plain
(PROGIMI) Agent A has the intention that P
(WMI) Agent A has the intention P in the we-mode in
(i) A is functioning qua member of g, (ii) the intention toward P is based on or at least
(iii) A intends to participate in the satisfaction of
(iv) the criteria of group reason, collectivity, and
Collectivity condition for intention: On the ground of (ii), it is necessary that the intention is satisfied for A if and only if it is satisfied for other group members sharing it.
Collective commitment in the we-mode case:
(i) We-mode collective commitment is based on a group reason, viz. a reason for the members to participate -- as distinct from a group agent’s reason to act.
(ii) Giving up one’s commitment here generally requires the group’s permission.
(iii) In the plain or mere I-mode case a person is committed to herself to furthering her own interests. In the pro-group I-mode case she is committed to herself to furthering, at least in part, the group’s
furthering the (we-mode) group’s interests.
Some participants’ joint intention consists of interdependent
member intentions (we-intentions) all of which are also expressible by “We will do X together.” I regard the notion of a we-mode joint intention as a conceptually primitive notion, one that prima facie is not reducible to individuals’ mental states without invoking the notion of agentive social group.
The core idea in my view of joint intention is that if we, viz. you
and I qua members of g, jointly intend to perform X together, this requires that you and I both intend to participate in our performing X jointly for us and do it qua members of g and being collectively committed to performing X jointly; and you and I mutually know (or correctly believe) all this.
(PJI) Some agents (say, A1,…,Am) have formed the joint
intention to perform X if and only if (a) each of them has accepted a plan to perform X jointly, (b) each of them has communicated this acceptance to the others, and (c) it is a true mutual belief among A1,…,Am that (a) and (b) and that they are collectively committed to performing X and that there is or will be a part or share (requiring at least potential contribution) of X for each agent to perform that he accordingly is or will be committed to performing.
On the right-hand side of the analysis, mutual acceptance need
joint acceptance that would make the account directly circular.
If the members of a group collectively accept the
Given this view, what will be said of we-intentions
We-mode intentions need not always concern joint action in a specific sense but in general the group members’ activities as group members in a group. Note that The agents to which we-mode intentions can be attributed can also be group agents, e.g. the member states in the EU. Accordingly group agents’ interaction and interdependence features (e.g. cooperation, conflict) can be investigated within this framework..
In the the case of a specific joint action such as painting a house together a participant A can be said to we-intend to perform an action X with the other members – linguistically, to accept the truth
The notion of we-intention is analyzed below. It can be seen to satisfy the three central we-mode criteria of group reason, collectivity, and collective commitment.
(WI) Member Ai of group g we-intends to perform X together as a group with the other members if and only if
(i) Ai intends to participate in the members’ (“our”) doing X together and to do his part of X as his part of X;
(ii) Ai truly believes that the group members (including himself) collectively accept “We will do X together as a group” in that context and that thus a joint intention to perform X jointly exists between the participants, and this fact is his main justificatory reason for (i);
(iii) Ai has a true belief to the effect that the joint action opportunities for an intentional performance of X will obtain;
(iv) Ai truly believes that there is (or will be) a mutual belief among the participating members of g to the effect that the joint action
(v) (i) and (ii) are in part true because of (iii) and (iv).
(W1)
(i) We will do X together.
(ii) I am one of “us” (the present group).
Therefore,
(iii) I will do my part of our joint performance of X.
(W2)
(i) We will do X together.
(ii) X cannot be performed by us together unless we perform action Z (e.g. help or teach a group member to do his part)
Therefore,
(iii) We will do Z.
(iv) Unless I perform Y we cannot perform Z.
Therefore (because of (iii) and (iv)),
(v) I will do Y (as my contribution to Z). (W1) expresses group membership, (W2) collective commitment and helping.
(IMJI) You and I share in the I-mode the intention to perform X jointly if and only if
(1) I intend that we X in the external reason-based we-attitude sense (namely, I intend that we X in part because I believe that you intend in the external reason-based sense that we X and that we mutually believe that each of us so intends), and
(2) you similarly intend that we X in the external reason-based we- attitude sense,
(3) it is mutually believed by you and me that (1) and (2).
External reasons above are contingent (as contrasted with conceptually required) reasons for one’s intention as explained in Tuomela (2007), Chapter 4. Bluntly speaking, the other persons and their intentions are taken to be a contingent part of the intender’s environment conducive to his own purposes.
Finally, a (we-mode) group’s intention to see to it
The other members because of their
(GI) Group g intends to see to it that X obtains (or comes about, etc., where X is an action or state) as a group if and only if there are
(1) these agents, when acting as group members in the we-mode or in the quasi we-mode sense, have the joint intention toward X (e.g., involving acceptance of the conative expression “Our intention as a group is to see to it jointly that X” or one of its cognates for g) and are collectively committed to bringing about X;
(2) there is a mutual belief among the operative members to the effect that (1);
(3) because of (1), the (full-fledged and adequately informed) nonoperative members qua members of g tend (explicitly or implicitly) to accept with collective commitment—or at least group-normatively
specified in clause (1));
(4) there is a mutual belief in g to the effect that (3).
We may note that—compatibly with (IG)—corporations
(a) Group g intends to paint the house. (Group intention): (b) We (the members of g) accept collectively (in an explicit or
implicit sense) that we will paint the house jointly and hence accept as true for g the intention expression “We will paint the house jointly.” (Joint intention)
(c) Each of us accepts the intention expression “We will paint the
house jointly.” (We-intention)
(d) I, qua member of g and a participant in our joint intention to
paint the house jointly with the others, intend to perform my part (or contributory share) of our painting the house. (Generic part- performance intention; the central intention-component of a we- intention)
(e) My part being to paint the front of the house, I intend to do it
and set myself to do it. (Specific part-performance intention followed by intention-in-action that initiates action)
The fact expressed by (a) may be a social, coordinative group
reason for (b) when (a) is conceptually and justificatorily prior to (b)—such as it is e.g. in the case of a leader’s order entailing (a) given that (a), furthermore, is collectively accepted by the
tasks to specially authorized members (a) and (b) can be regarded as truth-equivalent.
(b) expresses a social, at least coordinative reason for (c), (c)
entails (d) on conceptual grounds, and (d) entails (e) on conceptual and situation-specific informational grounds. In the sense of this schema group reason requires acting at least partly for the group.
The group reason for members’ participation expressed by (a)
serves in this context as the central explanans of (e).
About a century ago many group phenomena were
These early theoreticians in effect made basically the
In my 2007 book the grand research theme is the pro-
The distinction between pro-group I-mode and we-mode
McDougall (1920) considers a group of pilgrims on their way to a city and discusses the following five cases of increasing strength:
the members of the group flee in panic.
“community of purpose.” There is no collective volition here, and the action is not due to the will of all. The members do not at all care for the arrival of the group as a whole; they desire and will only their
for its members not to get robbed. Each member privately desires that the whole group shall reach the city. This is not truly a collective volition because the individual desires (volitions) are private and diverse. This is a case of the pro-group I-mode.
composed of various nationalities: all members will the same collective action and desire the same end of that action, and they also have similar motives arising from their “sentiment for the city”. Still their combined actions are not due to a collective volition but
(strengthened form of) pro-group I-mode intention and action.
and each member identifies himself with the army and desires its success as an end in itself. Here we have collective will: The participants with the same cultural and social background share an underlying motive (sentiment) and desire to achieve the same end. The participants identification with the group in the context of their shared sentiment and desire makes them intend (will) and act as a
and of its members jointly intending as a group.
Alfred Vierkandt’s theory in his book
Vierkandt postulates a group agent in a subjective
Vierkandt distinguishes between a will that is shared (“gemeinsam”) and one that is “societal” (“gemeinschaftlich”) on McDougallian lines. Vierkandt’s societal will or intention is a rudimentary version of a we- mode group intention and his shared intention amounts to pro-group I-mode intention.
Example: When some people aim at shooting at an escaped lion they may just do it together (gemeinsam) based on their personal (private) “affect” while having the same object (the lion) as the physical object of the shooting and while coordinating their activities
shooting—the subjects are different and there is no group will.
But when they (like an army unit would do) form their will and act on it as a group, also the subject is the same, viz. the group. The societal (gemeinschaftlich) case covers organized groups that can be viewed as group agents. We have a we-mode case here.
Ferdinand Tönnies published the first edition of his well-
He postulates an artificial, imaginary collective person, a
The collective person unifies its members not only by
“If the volition of the one [person] meets and combines with the
volition of the other, there results a common volition which may be interpreted as unified because it is mutual. This common volition postulates or requires, and thus controls, the volition of A in accordance with the volition of B as well as the volition of B in accordance with the volition of A.” “…thus, the will of each single person who belongs to the group is part of and at the same time conditioned by the group’s collective will, which is to say he is dependent on it.” “Every collective will can represent itself in a single natural person or in a number of those whose common will is conceived as the representation of a higher collective will.”
Bacharach, M. 1999. “Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Co-operation”, Research in Economics 53, 117-147.
Hakli, R., Miller, K., and Tuomela, R. 2010. “Two Kinds of We- Reasoning.” Economics and Philosophy.
McDougall, W. (1920). The Group Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tuomela, R. (2007). The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View, New York: Oxford University Press. (Paperback ed. 2010).
Tuomela, R. (forthcoming), Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents, Oxford University Press
Tönnies, F. (1887/1996). Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Vierkandt, A. (1928/1975), Gesellschaftslehre, 2nd Ed. New York: Arno Press
The following cases of social action in a multiagent context are at least conceptually possible while any other combinations of the basic elements involved are conceptually excluded:
(1) An agent has an I-intention in the I-mode to perform an action Y as his participatory action in an action X performed jointly in the I- mode;
(2) An agent has an I-intention in the we-mode to perform an action Y as his participatory action in an action X performed jointly in the we-mode;
(3) An agent has a we-intention in the I-mode to perform an action X jointly with some others in the I-mode;
(4) An agent has a we-intention in the we-mode to perform an action X jointly in the we-mode with some others. The restriction to a multiagent context in this classification excludes single-agent action that has a social reason (e.g. somebody drives a sports car because all cool guys do it, etc.) and also group agent’s action (see below in the text).
(1) A we-mode group can perform intentional actions (at least in
a functional sense).
(2) Intentional action requires an agent, an individual agent or a
group agent, respectively, in the individual case and the group case.
(3) Intentional action by an individual agent and by a group agent
are relevantly analogous concerning the central features of the common sense conceptual framework of agency (cf. premise (5) below).
(4) Intentional action requires that the agent acts for a reason, is
committed to the action, and appropriately coordinates the activities and movements that the performance of the action in question requires.
(5) On the basis of (3) and (4), intentional action by
(6) A group acts (and can only act) intentionally
(7) Acting as a group member in the full sense, viz.
1) Joint intentions figure centrally in participants’ (social) practical reasoning and resulting joint action. Thus:
a) Joint intentions - in analogy with single-agent intentions - present problems and restrict available action alternatives. E.g. forming a joint intention to go swimming excludes other alternatives and pre-sents problems concerning the means to perform the joint action in question.
b) Joint intentions serve - in the “jointness” sense - to initiate, guide, control, and monitor joint action, creating order - especially interpersonal coordination - in social life. Furthermore, there cannot be intentional joint action without joint intention (at least joint “intention-in- action”).
c) Joint intentions help to connect the group-level with the personal
business company’s buying another company - must be based on the joint intentions of some authority-possessing members of the group.
d) Joint intentions have a normative impact on the agents’ thinking and acting.
2) The concept of joint intention is central both in philosophy of social science and in theorizing about the social world.Thus:
a) The concept of joint intention (a person’s we-intention) is needed for a satisfactory characterization of the social “I” (viz. “I” as “one of us”). It will argued below that joint intentions - which are necessary ingredients
irreducible to private intentions and other private notions.
b) The concept of joint intention helps to conceptualize the conflict between the group-level and personal level interests and is central for the analysis of group-phenomena such as actions performed by groups in terms of what group members think and do;
c) The notion of joint intention (and related jointness-notions) can be and should be important in theory-formation in the social sciences. The most basic argument for this is simply that people have joint intentions in many central social situations and that, therefore, social theory must deal with the concept of joint intention.
d) The notion of a joint intention entails joint commitment, which is at least a weakly normative notion.