SLIDE 1 Global Network Interference Detection over the RIPE Atlas Network
Adventures in Pervasive Measurement
Collin Anderson, Philipp Winter and Roya
SLIDE 2
Once Upon a Time
Starting from the Dark Ages
SLIDE 3 For Now We See Through a Glass, Darkly.
- Early aggressive, examples of
interference set a general practice of measuring from one location for one ISP per country, once in a while.
- Of most interest has been
states where censorship is imposed at the international gateway and by governmental- aligned monopolies.
- Rarely bound to political or
cultural events that may trigger changes in practices.
SLIDE 4 Filtering Norms
- Politicians and international
- rganizations have promoted
filtering in order to protect intellectual property and ‘save’ children.
filtering and surveillance equipment manufacturing is a growth industry.
acceptance for content restrictions, even in ‘democratic’ countries.
SLIDE 5 Filtering Norms
- Legitimacy of these actions are
not within our scope, key presumptions:
- Filtering will be more of a legal
compliance effort than a direct imposition of the state.
- We should anticipate greater
diversity in practices and timing when filtering is a measure taken by third-parties.
SLIDE 6 Detection is Another Growth Industry
- As filtering practices changed,
the number of tools and principles for measurement have grown.
- In Development or Deployed:
OONI, Herdict, ICLab, Satellite, Encore, CensorProbe, rTurtle.
- At Mass Scale: NDT, Glasnost,
Netalyzr.
- Still, mostly one ISP on one
network per country, once in awhile.
SLIDE 7 The Globally-Distributed Atlas Network
topological diversity.
resolution, and X.509 certificate fetching.
- Push measurement rules over
a relatively stable set of nodes.
interference measurement at scale.
SLIDE 8
Measurement Granularity
The Self Evident
Country Practices Seen Time Turkey DNS Port Blocking ~2012 Russia DNS ~2012 Syria HTTP Inspection ~2012
SLIDE 9
Measurement Granularity
The Self Evident
Country ISP Origination Practice Time Resource Turkey Turksat TurkTelecom BGP Hijack 3/28/2014 YouTube Russia Intertax Rostelecom IP Redirection 4/30/2014 208.93.0.190 Syria Tarrasul PDE HTTP Inspection 6/2013 Tor
SLIDE 10 Examining Ephemeral Information Controls Through Atlas
Turkey Social Media Restrictions (March 2014)
SLIDE 11 Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Blocking and Hijack in Turkey (March 2014)
SLIDE 12 Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Normal Route in Turkey (March 2014)
SLIDE 13
Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Blocking (March 21)
SLIDE 14 Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Normal Route in Turkey (March 2014)
SLIDE 15
Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Hijack (March 29)
SLIDE 16
Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Hijack (April 2)
SLIDE 17
Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Hijack (April 3)
SLIDE 18
Selective Compliance and Unilateral Disruption
Google DNS Hijack (April 7)
SLIDE 19 Validating Measurements
- We anticipate that filtering
mechanisms with coordinate answers less than legitimate services (across ASNs, regions or countries).
- Begin to flag answers based on
differences in:
- SSL Certificate Hostnames and
Certification Validation
- Seen End Transit Providers
- Expected Timing
- Obviously Fake Answers (localhost
and RFC1918 Addresses)
- Consensus based pools of reasonable
answers.
SLIDE 20 Beyond the Nefarious Middle Box Traffic Inspection
Path Interdiction and Heterogenous Techniques
SLIDE 21
Route Interdiction
Russia LiveJournal Addresses
SLIDE 22
Rostelecom Interdiction
Russia LiveJournal Addresses
SLIDE 23
‘Valid’ LiveJournal Traffic
Russia LiveJournal Addresses
SLIDE 24 Живой Журнал
New Compliance
- March 13 navalny banned, A record 208.93.0.190.
- April 5 pauluskp A: 208.93.0.150.
April 11 pauluskp banned, listed A of 208.93.0.190.
- April 21 m-athanasios.livejournal banned with
A record of 208.93.0.190.
- Late April 1,450 LiveJournal blogs in Alexa top 1 million,
address 208.93.0.150.
- Four 208.93.0.190, all designated by
Roskomnadzor.
SLIDE 25
LiveJournal A Record of Doom
208.93.0.190
SLIDE 26 Живой Журнал
Enjoy Summer Vacation, Roskomnadzor Style
SLIDE 27 Model Properties of an Interference Detection Platform
- Controls are often ephemeral and issued without forewarning,
requiring push-based measurement rules.
- Validation requires client environment documentation (e.g.
DNS Settings, Network Type).
- Data collection should be longitudinal and frequent over a
normal interval.
- Heterogeneous technical regimes requires heterogenous
technical datasets.
- Idiosyncrasies in host network requires normalization.
SLIDE 28 Ethics and Measurement (Atlas Edition)
- Atlas presents a legitimate question of
consent.
- RIPE’s Term of Service do not provide
guidance.
- Popular social media platforms and major
content providers:
- Requests for social media from third-party
sites are common due to the pervasive inclusion of recommendation systems and included media content.
- Only cases we know where browsing of
content led to attention from law enforcement is in the case of child pornography.
- Navalny’s blog was an Alexa Top 1000 site, in
the top hundreds in Russia. Tor Project is within the top 10,000, the peak number of daily users in Turkey of the network at the time was 70,000.
SLIDE 29
Ethics and Measurement (Atlas Edition)
However, these are piecemeal attempts to legitimize target choice, they are not a systemic framework.
SLIDE 30 Conclusions
- Widespread proliferation presents its own model of
measurement validation.
- Within heterogeneous filtering regimes, we should expect
greater diversity in implementation, including cheating and slow deployment of rules.
- Atlas provides an early look at the opportunities and
impediments ahead for pervasive inference detection, but lingering ethical concerns and available measurement types limit future feasibility.
SLIDE 31
Thank You.
Code and Data: cartography.io