foundation of cryptography 0368 4162 01 lecture 2
play

Foundation of Cryptography (0368-4162-01), Lecture 2 Pseudorandom - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Foundation of Cryptography (0368-4162-01), Lecture 2 Pseudorandom Generators Iftach Haitner, Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv University. February 25, 2014 Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 1 / 26 Part I


  1. Foundation of Cryptography (0368-4162-01), Lecture 2 Pseudorandom Generators Iftach Haitner, Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv University. February 25, 2014 Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 1 / 26

  2. Part I Statistical Vs. Computational distance Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 2 / 26

  3. Section 1 Distributions and Statistical Distance Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 3 / 26

  4. Distributions and Statistical Distance Let P and Q be two distributions over a finite set U . Their statistical distance (also known as, variation distance) is defined as SD ( P , Q ) := 1 � | P ( x ) − Q ( x ) | = max S⊆U ( P ( S ) − Q ( S )) 2 x ∈U We will only consider finite distributions. Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 4 / 26

  5. Distributions and Statistical Distance Let P and Q be two distributions over a finite set U . Their statistical distance (also known as, variation distance) is defined as SD ( P , Q ) := 1 � | P ( x ) − Q ( x ) | = max S⊆U ( P ( S ) − Q ( S )) 2 x ∈U We will only consider finite distributions. Claim 1 For any pair of (finite) distribution P and Q , it holds that SD ( P , Q ) = max D { Pr x ← P [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − Pr x ← Q [ D ( x ) = 1 ] } , where D is any algorithm. Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 4 / 26

  6. Some useful facts Let P , Q , R be finite distributions, then Triangle inequality: SD ( P , R ) ≤ SD ( P , Q ) + SD ( Q , R ) Repeated sampling: SD (( P , P ) , ( Q , Q )) ≤ 2 · SD ( P , Q ) Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 5 / 26

  7. Distribution ensembles and statistical indistinguishability Definition 2 (distribution ensembles) P = { P n } n ∈ N is a distribution ensemble, if P n is a (finite) distribution for any n ∈ N . P is efficiently samplable (or just efficient), if ∃ PPT Samp with Sam ( 1 n ) ≡ P n . Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 6 / 26

  8. Distribution ensembles and statistical indistinguishability Definition 2 (distribution ensembles) P = { P n } n ∈ N is a distribution ensemble, if P n is a (finite) distribution for any n ∈ N . P is efficiently samplable (or just efficient), if ∃ PPT Samp with Sam ( 1 n ) ≡ P n . Definition 3 (statistical indistinguishability) Two distribution ensembles P and Q are statistically indistinguishable, if SD ( P n , Q n ) = neg ( n ) . Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 6 / 26

  9. Distribution ensembles and statistical indistinguishability Definition 2 (distribution ensembles) P = { P n } n ∈ N is a distribution ensemble, if P n is a (finite) distribution for any n ∈ N . P is efficiently samplable (or just efficient), if ∃ PPT Samp with Sam ( 1 n ) ≡ P n . Definition 3 (statistical indistinguishability) Two distribution ensembles P and Q are statistically indistinguishable, if SD ( P n , Q n ) = neg ( n ) . � � � ∆ D Alternatively, if ( P , Q ) ( n ) � = neg ( n ) , for any algorithm D, where � � ∆ D x ← P n [ D ( 1 n , x ) = 1 ] − Pr x ← Q n [ D ( 1 n , x ) = 1 ] ( P , Q ) ( n ) := Pr (1) Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 6 / 26

  10. Section 2 Computational Indistinguishability Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 7 / 26

  11. Computational Indistinguishability Definition 4 (computational indistinguishability) Two distribution ensembles P and Q are computationally � � � ∆ D indistinguishable, if ( P , Q ) ( n ) � = neg ( n ) , for any PPT D. � � Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 8 / 26

  12. Computational Indistinguishability Definition 4 (computational indistinguishability) Two distribution ensembles P and Q are computationally � � � ∆ D indistinguishable, if ( P , Q ) ( n ) � = neg ( n ) , for any PPT D. � � Can it be different from the statistical case? Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 8 / 26

  13. Computational Indistinguishability Definition 4 (computational indistinguishability) Two distribution ensembles P and Q are computationally � � � ∆ D indistinguishable, if ( P , Q ) ( n ) � = neg ( n ) , for any PPT D. � � Can it be different from the statistical case? Non uniform variant Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 8 / 26

  14. Computational Indistinguishability Definition 4 (computational indistinguishability) Two distribution ensembles P and Q are computationally � � � ∆ D indistinguishable, if ( P , Q ) ( n ) � = neg ( n ) , for any PPT D. � � Can it be different from the statistical case? Non uniform variant Sometime behaves differently then expected! Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 8 / 26

  15. Repeated sampling Question 5 Assume that P and Q are computationally indistinguishable, is it always true that P 2 = ( P , P ) and Q 2 = ( Q , Q ) are? Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 9 / 26

  16. Repeated sampling Question 5 Assume that P and Q are computationally indistinguishable, is it always true that P 2 = ( P , P ) and Q 2 = ( Q , Q ) are? � � � ∆ D Let D be an algorithm and let δ ( n ) = ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � � � Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 9 / 26

  17. Repeated sampling Question 5 Assume that P and Q are computationally indistinguishable, is it always true that P 2 = ( P , P ) and Q 2 = ( Q , Q ) are? � � � ∆ D Let D be an algorithm and let δ ( n ) = ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � � � δ ( n ) = | Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] | x ← P 2 x ← Q 2 n n � � � � ≤ � Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − x ← ( P n , Q n ) [ D ( x ) = 1 ] Pr � � x ← P 2 � n � � � � + x ← ( P n , Q n ) [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − Pr Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] � � x ← Q 2 � � n Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 9 / 26

  18. Repeated sampling Question 5 Assume that P and Q are computationally indistinguishable, is it always true that P 2 = ( P , P ) and Q 2 = ( Q , Q ) are? � � � ∆ D Let D be an algorithm and let δ ( n ) = ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � � � δ ( n ) = | Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] | x ← P 2 x ← Q 2 n n � � � � ≤ � Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − x ← ( P n , Q n ) [ D ( x ) = 1 ] Pr � � x ← P 2 � n � � � � + x ← ( P n , Q n ) [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − Pr Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] � � x ← Q 2 � � n � � � � � ∆ D � ∆ D = ( P 2 , ( P , Q ) ( n ) � + (( P , Q ) , Q 2 ) ( n ) � � � � � Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 9 / 26

  19. Repeated sampling Question 5 Assume that P and Q are computationally indistinguishable, is it always true that P 2 = ( P , P ) and Q 2 = ( Q , Q ) are? � � � ∆ D Let D be an algorithm and let δ ( n ) = ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � � � δ ( n ) = | Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] | x ← P 2 x ← Q 2 n n � � � � ≤ � Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − x ← ( P n , Q n ) [ D ( x ) = 1 ] Pr � � x ← P 2 � n � � � � + x ← ( P n , Q n ) [ D ( x ) = 1 ] − Pr Pr [ D ( x ) = 1 ] � � x ← Q 2 � � n � � � � � ∆ D � ∆ D = ( P 2 , ( P , Q ) ( n ) � + (( P , Q ) , Q 2 ) ( n ) � � � � � So either | ∆ D ( P 2 , ( P , Q ) ( n ) | ≥ δ ( n ) / 2, or | ∆ D (( P , Q ) , Q 2 ) ( n ) | ≥ δ ( n ) / 2 Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 9 / 26

  20. � � � ∆ D Assume D is a PPT and that ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / p ( n ) for some � � p ∈ poly and infinitely many n ’s, and assume wlg. that � � � ∆ D P 2 , ( P , Q ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / 2 p ( n ) for infinitely many n ’s. � � Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 10 / 26

  21. � � � ∆ D Assume D is a PPT and that ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / p ( n ) for some � � p ∈ poly and infinitely many n ’s, and assume wlg. that � � � ∆ D P 2 , ( P , Q ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / 2 p ( n ) for infinitely many n ’s. � � Can we use D to contradict the fact that P and Q are computationally close? Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 10 / 26

  22. � � � ∆ D Assume D is a PPT and that ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / p ( n ) for some � � p ∈ poly and infinitely many n ’s, and assume wlg. that � � � ∆ D P 2 , ( P , Q ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / 2 p ( n ) for infinitely many n ’s. � � Can we use D to contradict the fact that P and Q are computationally close? Assuming that P and Q are efficiently samplable Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 10 / 26

  23. � � � ∆ D Assume D is a PPT and that ( P 2 , Q 2 ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / p ( n ) for some � � p ∈ poly and infinitely many n ’s, and assume wlg. that � � � ∆ D P 2 , ( P , Q ) ( n ) � ≥ 1 / 2 p ( n ) for infinitely many n ’s. � � Can we use D to contradict the fact that P and Q are computationally close? Assuming that P and Q are efficiently samplable Non-uniform settings Iftach Haitner (TAU) Foundation of Cryptography February 25, 2014 10 / 26

Download Presentation
Download Policy: The content available on the website is offered to you 'AS IS' for your personal information and use only. It cannot be commercialized, licensed, or distributed on other websites without prior consent from the author. To download a presentation, simply click this link. If you encounter any difficulties during the download process, it's possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

Recommend


More recommend