for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxin - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

The Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical, Biological or Toxin Weapons

Nikita Smidovich UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA)

Legal Framework

The complete and total prohibitions of use of chemical, biological and toxin weapons:

• Geneva Protocol (Prohibition of the Use in War of

Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva

• n 17 June 1925)
• 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC, EIF

1975)

• 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, EIF

1997)

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SG Mandate

General Assembly:

Requests the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological)

• r toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the

1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States” (A/RES/42/37C (1987) Guidelines and Procedures (A/RES/44/561 (1989)

Fact-finding

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Security Council Support

Security Council (Resolution S/RES/620 of 1988):

• Encourages the Secretary-General to carry out promptly

investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxic weapons…….., in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report the results

• Decides to consider immediately, taking into account

the investigations of the Secretary-General, appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, should there be any future use of chemical weapons in violation of international law, wherever and by whomever committed.

• Outcome Documents of the 2006

and 2011 Review Conferences of BWC:

• “The United Nations Secretary-

General’s investigation mechanism represents an international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.”

Recognition

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• Any UN Member State can request an

investigation by the UNSG;

• In response, the SG may:
• review the evidence to decide if a team is

dispatched,

• dispatch a fact‐finding team to a location of

the alleged attack;

• Team collects evidence, conducts clinical

examinations and interviews with victims, eye witnesses and officials and collects samples for analysis;

• Team submits its findings to the SG to be

reported to all UN Member States.

SGM Basic Modalities

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Secretary-General’s Mechanism (SGM) Two Pillars

SG Mechanism Guidelines and Procedures Roster of Experts and Laboratories

• SG’s mandate does not imply the creation of a

permanent body;

• Mechanism is designed in such a way that the

required expertise and capabilities are regularly updated and readily available in the roster

• Skills, knowledge, equipment and other

resources in the roster are made available to the SG by Member States and international organizations

Secretary-General’s Roster

• Ongoing update of the roster
• f experts and laboratories
• Currently:
• Experts

>240

• Laboratories >42

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• Focal point within the Secretariat

to facilitate the administrative and substantive support and co-

• rdination for the smooth

functioning of the investigative mechanism, including the conduct

• f on-site investigations

UNODA role

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Partnerships with International Organizations

• Assistance of international organizations

in preparation for and conduct of investigation

• Partners
• OPCW (2001 UN-OPCW and 2012 UN-OPCW)
• WHO (1948 UN-WHO, 2009 UNODA-WHO)
• OIE (MOU 2012)
• INTERPOL
• FAO

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Training for Experts

• Key requirement
• Training offered by Member States and

conducted in cooperation with UNODA

• First-ever training course in 2009 in Sweden
• Second & third training courses in France in

2012 and 2015

• Additional training was held in Sweden, UK,

Germany

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Recent Training

• Since 2014 BWC experts meeting:
• September 2014: Advance training

course in UK for a command element;

• November 2014: SGM exercise to

validate a FSU model

• FSU model
• June 2015: Third Basic Training

course in France

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Training: Achievemnts

• Results:
• The cadre of trained expert: 43 experts

from 25 countries and 3 IO;

• Established training programme
• Lessons learned
• Possible enhancements

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Future Training for Experts

• Training activities in 2015 and onwards:
• Advance course offered by UK to be

held as a joint OPCW/SGM course, September in the Hague.

• Basic training course offered by

Australia

• UNODA is ready to cooperate with any

Member State in holding SGM training activities

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SGM Laboratories

• The 2015 also saw a start of a practical

work on another key element of the SGM: analytical laboratories.

• A special workshop on the development
• f a UNSGM biological analysis network

in Stockholm, 16-17 June 2015 organized by the Swedish MFA and the FOI.

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SGM Laboratories

• Participants:
• representatives from a number of laboratories

designated to the SGM;

• representatives of UNODA, WHO, VERIFIN and

experts from the UNSGM Syria investigation team.

• Step in the creation of an informal network of

SGM biological analytical laboratories;

• Forum for on an initial discussion of SGM

needs

• The workshop’s report is available.
• Follow-up activities are in planning

Mission in Syria: Lessons Learned Principal conclusions:

• The SGM is an effective mechanism to

investigate alleged use of chemical, biological and/or toxin weapons.

• Role of international organizations
• Areas for strengthening preparedness of

the SGM including partnerships and cooperation; information-sharing and training

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• Legitimate, effective and proven

international tool for investigation of alleged use

• Build upon the high level of expertise

(experts and laboratories) provided by Member States and international

• rganizations
• Cooperation between international
• rganizations
• Enhancement of the SGM requires

additional efforts in particular training of experts and SGM operational capabilities

• Efforts are on-going

Summary

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