for April, beginning to re-open in May Irelands economy and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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for April, beginning to re-open in May Irelands economy and - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Ireland: Shutdown for April, beginning to re-open in May Irelands economy and financial system was in its best shape for almost two decades pre-Covid 19 May 2020 Index Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 16: Covid-19 fiscal response Page


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SLIDE 1

Ireland: Shutdown for April, beginning to re-open in May

Ireland’s economy and financial system was in its best shape for almost two decades pre-Covid 19

May 2020

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SLIDE 2

2

Index

Page 3: Summary Page 8: Macro Page 16: Covid-19 fiscal response Page 24: Fiscal & NTMA funding Page 39: Long-term fundamentals Page 48: Property Page 54: Brexit Page 61: Other Data

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SLIDE 3

Ireland hit hard like rest of Europe but better placed than most to weather Covid- 19 recession

Summary

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SLIDE 4

4

Economy grew strongly before Covid-19; unemployment shows large impact like other countries

True unemployment rate and timing of peak uncertain Robust growth in run up to lockdown

Source: CSO * Underlying series is modified final domestic demand (excludes inventories) ** The dotted line is CSO data. It can be considered an upper bound for unemployment in April. There are definitional questions around whether those on government income supports are unemployed. Some will have left the labour force, others are just temporarily furloughed.

  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 GDP Underlying* 30 35 40 45 50 Germany Slovakia Ireland Italy Greece Belgium Slovenia EU 27 Finland EA 19 Austria Denmark Luxembourg Portugal Sweden Cyprus Malta UK Netherlands Spain France Lithuania Latvia

Compensation of Employee in most affected sectors (% of total) 40% of wage bill in most affected sectors

Irish wage bill less impacted – ICT and Pharma help

16.0 5.4 28.2 5 10 15 20 25 30 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Unemployment Covid-19 Adjusted Unemployment

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SLIDE 5

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Debt to GNI* Debt to GDP

5

Ireland used 2014-19 growth to create fiscal room and improve debt sustainability; will be needed in years ahead

Improved debt position allows for fiscal policy to act Debt-to-GNI* (99% 2019f, from 166% peak) Debt-to-GG Revenue (233% 2019, from 353%) Average interest rate (2.2% 2019, from 5.1%) Debt-to-GDP^ (59% 2019, from 120%) Debt fell to 99% of national income but will reverse Six years of primary surplus; run to end in 2020

^ due to GDP distortions, Debt to GDP is not representative for Ireland, we suggest using other measures listed.

  • 25
  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019e GG Balance Primary Balance €bns

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SLIDE 6

6

Covid-19 and Ireland outlook

Recession

Irela eland is is he headed for

  • r rece

ecess ssion. Key que questi tion is is for

  • r ho

how lon long? This his is is a a bl black ck swan event. The he fan an cha chart t of

  • f out
  • utcomes

s is is wid ide so

  • for
  • recasti

ting is is of

  • f li

littl tle val alue.

Exposure

Ireland’s domestic economy has has be been hi hit t har hard li like oth

  • thers

s but but the there ar are rela elati tive pos positi tives. s. Our ur in internati tionally y tr traded sec ectors s (Pharm rma and and ICT) ) wil ill help help weath ther r the the stor

  • rm

Policy

Irish rish fisc iscal res esponse se cu curr rrently ly at t 6.5% .5% of

  • f GNI*

NI*, mor

  • re cou
  • uld

fol

  • llow if

if nee needed. ECB CB an and Fed acti actions s sho hould cap ap in interest t cos

  • sts

ts an and al allow nec necess ssary ry fis iscal roo

  • om
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SLIDE 7

7

NTMA already funded €11bn of revised funding plan of €20-24bn for 2020; Ireland relatively well placed

Fle lexibility

Irela eland has has la large cash ash bal balances, s, the the la last t 2020 rede edempti tion pr prefu funded an and a a yea ear r free of

  • f

maturi ring bo bonds s in in 2021 Funding can an com

  • me from several

l sou

  • urces.
  • s. Bo

Bonds, s, Sh Short rt Term erm pa paper an and the the Rai ainy Day Fun und. Irela eland has has la large cash ash bal balances, s, 2020 red edempti tions s pr prefu funded, min inimal red edempti tions s in in 2021

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties s in in Eur Europe The he NTM NTMA us used ECB CB QE QE to

  • extend deb

debt t maturi rities red educe in interest t cos

  • st

t and and rep epay y the the IMF. No Now the the ECB CB has has start arted to

  • buy

buy ag again wit ithout t li limits ts

AA AA-

Irela eland has has be been up upgraded to

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economy an and touri

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SLIDE 8

Q2 numbers will be grim but structure of Ireland’s economy will help cushion impact

Section 1: Macro

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SLIDE 9

16.0 5.4 28.2 5 10 15 20 25 30 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2019 2020 Unemployment Covid-19 Adjusted Unemployment 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016 2018 2019 Millions Total Employment

9

Labour market illustrated Ireland’s march to recovery and full employment; now highlights the stark Covid-19 impact

April unemployment rate: Traditional CSO metric 5.4%; incl. Covid-19 impact 28.2%* A million getting income supports - unclear how many would be considered unemployed

CSO has urged caution on Covid-19 data given likelihood

  • f revisions

Source: CSO, Department of Social Protection, NTMA calculations * The dotted line is CSO data. It can be considered an upper bound for unemployment in April. Note: There is no official data on how employment has been affected yet. The next labour market survey may answer questions about what constitutes being employed and whether those losing jobs will leave the labour market. Thus we give a range of outcomes, as we cannot be accurate now.

Note: CSO define those on wage subsidy scheme as employed

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SLIDE 10

10 20 30 40 50 60 January Composite PMI March April

10

Ireland’s Composite PMI at 17.3 in April, Manufacturing held up at 36.0 Brief upswing after Brexit reprieve but PMIs have fallen sharply on Covid-19 since

PMIs have tumbled like other countries but Ireland’s contraction smaller at the margin

Source: Bloomberg

Manu 36.0 Comp 17.3 Services 13.9

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Services Manufacturing Composite

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SLIDE 11

11

2019 data (€ Billions) GVA Wage Bill^ Domestic Owned Profits^^ MNCs Profits^^ Estimated % of normal Output* Agri, Forest & Fish 3.1 0.7 2.4 0.0 >75% Industry (incl. Pharma) 112.4 14.1 7.9 90.3 >75% Construction 9.7 4.5 5.0 0.2 <25%

Dist, Transport, Hotels & Rest.

36.2 19.8 10.0 6.0 <25% ICT 44.7 8.3 1.9 34.7 >75% Financial & Insurance 23.3 9.2 5.1 9.3 >75% Real Estate 20.9 0.7 20.1 0.0 <50% Prof, Admin & Support 33.7 12.8 5.6 15.6 >75% P Admin, Educ. & Health 33.7 28.3 5.5 0.1 >75% Arts, Other 4.4 2.1 2.1 0.1 <25% All Sectors 324.2 100.6 65.4 156.3

  • During lockdown, Pharma and ICT will stabilise GVA;

domestic sectors in lockdown or have reduced capacity

Source: CSO (2019) NTMA calculations Note GVA figures are not adjusted for distortions by multinationals. ^ Wage Bill is given by compensation of employees in national accounts ^^ Profits are given by Gross Operating Surplus in national accounts; *Construction set to re-open gradually from May 18th

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SLIDE 12

30 35 40 45 50 Germany Slovakia Ireland Italy Greece Belgium Slovenia EU 27 Finland EA 19 Austria Denmark Luxembourg Portugal Sweden Cyprus Malta UK Netherlands Spain France Lithuania Latvia Compensation of Employee in most affected sectors (% of total)

12

The Irish wage bill is not going to be as impacted as other countries ICT sector will be a bulwark in protecting incomes in Ireland

On a relative basis Ireland could perform better than most EU peers – thanks to big tech/ social media companies

40% of wage bill in most affected sectors

Source: Eurostat (2019) Note: Most affected sectors include construction, wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food service activities, real estate activities, professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service activities, arts, entertainment and recreation

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 Greece Portugal Italy Slovenia Belgium Austria Spain Lithuania Slovakia EA 19 Cyprus EU 27 Denmark Germany Netherlands Malta France Luxembourg Finland Sweden Latvia UK Ireland % of Compensation of Employee % of Employment

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SLIDE 13

13

Estimated €250bn hit to global passenger revenues from Covid-19* Impacts Ireland in two ways

  • Hit to Irish- based airlines – Ryanair (Europe’s

biggest airline) and Aer Lingus

  • Will have a knock impact on multinational

aircraft leasing companies in Ireland.

  • The 2008 crisis led to a fall in aircraft values of

19% on average. Implies hit to assets held in Ireland are likely.

  • Support for airlines through fiscal packages in the

US and China will alleviate some concerns

  • Secondary impacts on retail given high value jobs

could be lost. Dublin office market may lose a demand source. Only fiscal impact is lost taxes Covid-19 outlook – plummeting travel numbers will endanger leasing contracts

Most foreign-owned multinationals are shielded but aircraft leasing is exposed (as are Irish-based airlines)

Source: CSO (2018); *based on 70% reduction in Q2 travel numbers (CAPA forecast)

2018 Assets (€ bn) 140 Persons Employed 1,971 Average Salary (€ 000s) 207.6 Total Compensation of Employee (€bn) 0.4 Profits (€ bn) 4.7 Industry % of GNI* 2.6 Timely CSO data on aircraft leasing in Ireland show a small but valuable sector

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SLIDE 14

14

Consumption is being curtailed by lockdown; Oil price drop is welcome boost for importer like Ireland

Lockdown economy means as much as 40%

  • f consumption may not be happening

Oil price drop might boost the economy by 0.5-1% of GNI*

Source: CSO; DataStream; NTMA calculations Using Household Budget survey data, we can estimate how much consumption of goods and services can still occur during the lockdown. We make allowances for extra grocery shopping and reduced housing costs given government moratorium policy.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Brent Oil €/Barrel Mineral Fuels Imports (12m rolling, €bns)

significant drop in import cost in 2015/16 reversing in 2017/18 Food & Drink (increased groceries), 23% Fuel and light , 3% Housing (10% moratorium use), 18% Non-durable goods, 2% Prof services (incl. medical), 12% Recreation and education, 2% Lost consumption , 40%

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SLIDE 15

15

Building and construction investment will be hit in Q2 but can rebound quickly Another surge of IP into Ireland in 2019 – helps ICT but distorts investment picture

Construction sector has been shuttered for the time being; good news that it is set to restart in mid-May

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Building Investment Other Domestic Investment Distortions (mainly IP) Modified GFCF Total GFCF Source: CSO; NTMA calculations

  • 5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 50 100 150 200 250 300 1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2005 2007 2008 2010 2011 2013 2014 2016 2017 2019 € billions Construction Employment (000s) Building GFCF (4 quarters, RHS)

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SLIDE 16

16

Fiscal response €13bn (6.5% of GNI*) is considerable; more could be announced as needed

€4.8bn bn for income support measures:

1.

A temporary wage subsidy scheme (TWSS) has been introduced for 12 weeks which pays 70-85% of an employee’s income up to €410p/w. This equates to any salary below €38,000.

 Subsidy is for businesses with >20% reduction in turnover and keeps employee on the books.  Most furloughed salaries are below €38,000; average payment close to €350 p/w more likely.

2.

A pandemic unemployment payment (PUP) for employees (and self-employed) who were laid off due to Covid-19 is now €350 p/w. This is larger than the usual benefit of circa €200 p/w.

3.

A sick leave payment for actual Covid-19 diagnosis or self isolation is available and is €350 p/w. €2bn bn for increased health spending to combat Covid-19. €6.5bn bn for business supports: Some of these supports need to be legislated for in coming weeks.

1.

A €10,000 restart grant for micro and small businesses;

2.

A three month commercial rates waiver for impacted businesses;

3.

A €2 billion Pandemic Stabilisation and Recovery Fund within the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF), which will make capital available to medium and large enterprises on commercial terms;

4.

A €2 billion COVID-19 Credit Guarantee Scheme to support lending to SMEs;

5.

The ‘warehousing’ of tax liabilities for a period of twelve months Other measures enacted include support for bank borrowers, reducing the CBI’s Countercyclical Capital Buffer, deferrals on tax payments including VAT & stamp duty, temporary rent freezes and temporary ban on evictions.

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SLIDE 17

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme Pandemic Unemployment Payment % of Sector Employment (RHS)

17

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Distribution of weekly net pay of TWSS participants 72% below avg. earnings of c.40k

Around 40% of workforce have received either one of two Covid-19 income supports Those furloughed under TWSS are weighted towards the lower end of wage scale

Government’s income supports have seen historic take- up: those on TWSS are still employed; PUB unemployed

Source: Department of Social Protection (as of 5 May), Revenue(as of 30 April), CSO

PUP – 598k TWSS – 427k 53% below median earnings of c.30k

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SLIDE 18

18

Roadmap for phased re-opening laid out by Government; May 18th is start, sees all sectors back open in early Q3

100 200 300 400 500 600 29-Feb 07-Mar 14-Mar 21-Mar 28-Mar 04-Apr 11-Apr 18-Apr 25-Apr 02-May 09-May 16-May 23-May 30-May 06-Jun 13-Jun 20-Jun 27-Jun 04-Jul 11-Jul 18-Jul 25-Jul 01-Aug 08-Aug 15-Aug 22-Aug 29-Aug Daily cases (7 day average)*

Full Lockdown Phase One: Outside Works -

Construction Garden centres

Phase Three:

More retail Cafes Restaurants

Phase Four:

Hotels, museums, parks

Phase Five:

Cinemas, theatre, pubs

  • pen

Phase Two:

Small retail

  • utlets

Partial Shut down Source: HSE, Department of the Taoiseach, NTMA analysis *Daily cases are adjusted for backlog of testing which meant cases related to end-March/early April but were not confirmed until mid April. ** Roadmap subject to change. Arrows are illustrative. Covid-19 cases & other indicators will need to fall or be contained for Ireland to move through the proposed phases. Ultimately the re-opening will be guided by public health advice.

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SLIDE 19

19

External environment – monetary policy and oil positives will partially offset negative external shock Ireland faces

2019 2020 EA Monetary Policy Accommodative in Q4 Maximum accommodative EU Fiscal Policy Minimal Expansionary US Monetary Policy Easing Maximum accommodative US growth YC inversion, but still growing Covid-19 shock Oil price Flat y-o-y Significantly down on demand and Saudi action UK growth Brexit uncertainty headwind Covid-19 shock Euro Growth Sluggish Covid-19 shock Euro currency No change y-o-y v. £; weaker v $ Neutral so far

Source: NTMA analysis

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SLIDE 20

20

High-skill employment grew sharply in recovery period (index, 100 = end 2008) Real wages increase helped HHs to repair balance sheets, increase living standards

High-skill jobs were added in recovery; wage growth and low inflation pushed real wages up in the last five years

Source: Eurostat; CSO High skill jobs include the ISCO08 defined groupings Managers, Professionals, Technicians and associate professionals

70 80 90 100 110 120 130 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 High Skill Other 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% IT Fin, Insurance & RE Transport/Storage Prof, science & tech Construction Total Industry Wholesale/Retail Admin & Support Education Health Accom & Food Arts & Rec Public admin 2015 v 2019 real wage %chg average € increase (RHS)

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SLIDE 21

21

Household debt ratio has decreased due to deleveraging and increasing incomes Legacy of crisis is on the Government balance sheet not the private sector’s

0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% Public and Private debt (% of GNI*) Private debt (% of GNI*) Public debt (% of GNI*) 2003 2008 2013 2019Q3

Ireland has used recovery period to repair private sector balance sheets – especially households

Source: CBI data, CSO

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 Debt (€Bns) Disposable Income (€Bns) Debt-to-Income Ratio (%) 2008 2013 2019Q3

Source: CBI Note: Private debt includes household and Irish-resident enterprises (ex. financial intermediation) CBI quarterly financial accounts data used for household and CSO data for nominal government liabilities.

Economic growth has allowed smooth private sector deleveraging

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SLIDE 22

22

Gross household saving rate lower than peak but close to EU average Interest burden down to 3% of disposable income from peak of 11%

Savings rate around EU average – pointing towards households being more prudent

Source: Eurostat, ONS, CSO ; CBI, Eurostat NTMA calculations Note: Gross Savings as calculated by the CSO has tended to be a volatile series in the past, some caution is warranted when interpreting this data

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 % of f di disp sposable le Inc ncome Ireland EA-19 Germany Spain Italy Netherlands 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 % of Disposable Income (4Q MA) Ireland EU-28 EA-19 UK

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SLIDE 23

23

No two parties together can form govt. No new legislation can be passed without govt. formation which will force issue

Recent general election was inconclusive but coalition likely in coming months

Source: NTMA analysis *Note: Number of seats increased by two to 160 in 2020 election.

Sinn Féin the biggest winners of the GE but may not enter govt.

Breakdown of seats in Dáil Éireann following 2020 General Election (160 Seats total)*

Other/Ind, 21 Fine Gael, 35 Fianna Fáil, 38 Labour, 6 Greens, 12 Social Democrats, 6 Sinn Féin, 37 AAA-PBP, 5

  • 15
  • 6
  • 2
  • 1
  • 1

3 10 14

  • 20
  • 10

10 20 Fine Gael Fianna Fáil Other/Ind Labour AAA-PBP Soc Dems Greens Sinn Féin

Change since GE 2016

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SLIDE 24

Ireland was in relatively good shape fiscally before Covid-19

Section 2: Fiscal & NTMA funding

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SLIDE 25

25

NTMA already funded €11bn of revised funding plan of €20-24bn for 2020; Ireland relatively well placed

Fle lexibility

Irela eland has has la large cash ash bal balances, s, the the la last t 2020 rede edempti tion pr prefu funded an and a a yea ear r free of

  • f

maturi ring bo bonds s in in 2021 Funding can an com

  • me from several

l sou

  • urces.
  • s. Bo

Bonds, s, ST pap paper r an and the the rai ainy y da day fun und. Irela eland has has la large cash ash bal balances, s, 2020 red edempti tions s pr prefu funded, min inimal red edempti tions s in in 2021

10 years

One ne of

  • f the

the lon longest t weig eighted average maturi riti ties s in in Eur Europe The he NTM NTMA us used ECB CB QE QE to

  • extend deb

debt t maturi rities red educe in interest t cos

  • st

t and and rep epay y the the IMF. No Now the the ECB CB has has start arted to

  • buy

buy ag again wit ithout t li limits ts

AA AA-

Irela eland has has be been up upgraded to

  • AA space by

y S& S&P On n rela elati tive ba basi sis, s, Irela eland may y be be le less hit hit tha than ot

  • ther

r cou

  • untr

tries gi given mul ulti tinati tionals, s, rela elati tively smaller dom domesti tic sha hare of

  • f the

the ec economy an and tour

  • urism

sm sect ector

slide-26
SLIDE 26

26

Two positives for Ireland: smoother maturity profile and no bond redemptions in 2021

Source: NTMA Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extensions. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any

  • f its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the

2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Billions € Bond (Fixed) EFSM EFSF Bond (Floating Rate) Green Other (incl. Bilateral)

slide-27
SLIDE 27

27

NTMA issued €80bn MLT debt since 2015; 13.6 yr. weighted maturity; avg. rate of 0.94% Even with extra Covid-19 borrowings, NTMA might not match supply since 2015

Near term redemptions much lower than last five years; this + lower borrowing costs provides NTMA with flexibility

Source: NTMA, CSO, Department of Finance Only showing marketable MLT debt (auctions and syndications). Other issuance such as inflation linked bonds, private placement and amortising bonds occurred but not shown.

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Redemptions (2017-2020) Redemptions (2021-2024) 5Y 8Y 5Y 10Y 10Y 16Y 7Y 30Y 10Y 5Y 20Y 10Y 12Y 15Y 10Y 12Y 30Y 7Y 15Y 5.5 3.9 2.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.3 3 6 9 12 15 18 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020f € Billions Auction Syndication Weighted Average Yield % (LHS)

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SLIDE 28

28

The NTMA took advantage of QE to extend debt profile

…Ireland (in years) now compares favourably to other EU countries Various operations have extended the maturity of Government debt …

Source: NTMA; ECB Note: Data excludes programme loans. Ireland’s maturity including these loans is still similar

10.4 10.3 10.1 8.7 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.7 6.9 6.7 6.4 6.1 2 4 6 8 10 12 Govt Debt Securities - Weighted Maturity EA Govt Debt Securities - Avg. Weighted Maturity 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036-40 2041-45 2046-50 2051-53 € Billions Debt Prefunded Long-term Extensions since 2014 Debt Profile

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SLIDE 29
  • 6
  • 4
  • 2

2 4 Romania France Spain UK Hungary Belgium Italy Slovakia Finland Poland EU27 EA19 Estonia Latvia Portugal Czechia Lithuania Croatia Malta Slovenia Sweden Austria Ireland (GNI*) Germany Greece Cyprus Netherlands Bulgaria Luxembourg Denmark

29

Government worked to get Gen. Govt. Balance (€bn) to surplus before Covid-19 2019 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP): Ireland started in better shape than most

Fiscal discipline in evidence in last decade – after Covid- 19 stimulus Ireland will have to do the hard yards again

Source: CSO; Department of Finance Eurostat

  • 25
  • 20
  • 15
  • 10
  • 5

5 10 GG Balance Primary Balance 2020 estimates caveated by large degree of uncertainty

slide-30
SLIDE 30

30

Debt-to-GNI* had dropped since last crisis No country will be running primary surplus necessary to keep debt ratio in check

Gross Government debt likely close to 59% of GDP at end- 2019 but 100% of GNI*; will reverse in the short term

Source: CSO; Department of Finance, NTMA analysis

  • 30.0%
  • 20.0%
  • 10.0%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% Primary Balance (% of GNI*) Debt Stabilising PB (% of GNI*)

~

  • 40%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 Debt to GNI* Debt to GDP 2020 estimates caveated by large degree of uncertainty

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SLIDE 31

31

  • Two bonds mature in 2020: the first matured in

April and the second will mature in October.

  • Four of the remaining five tranches of the UK

bilateral loan mature in 2020.

  • The Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (EBR) has

been revised to €15.5bn up from €1.6bn. This is subject to change given the economic uncertainty.

  • Existing cash balances will be run down to meet

part of the 2020 funding requirement.

  • Short term paper will also be an important funding

source – one Ireland has not tapped in recent years.

Various sources of funding will be used to meet Covid-19 borrowing requirements – cash balance and flexibility key

Bond issuance: 22 EBR: 16 Net ST paper: 5

Redemption

  • f Bonds: 17

Other 1

UK Bilateral 2

Other: 3 Change in cash: 10 €- €4 €8 €12 €16 €20 €24 €28 €32 €36 €40 Funding Requirements (€bn) Sources of Funding (€bn)

Source: NTMA Notes: Other funding: Includes general contingency provision including for potential FRN purchases Bond issuance: Mid-point of €20-€24bn bond funding range. Net ST paper: Forecast net growth in short-term paper. Other Sources: Includes retail (State Savings), private placements and EIB loan drawdowns.

slide-32
SLIDE 32

32

2019 2020 2021 Comments EBR 0.6

  • 15.6
  • 11.1 This is the deficit in cash terms that

the NTMA must finance each year

Adjust for Accruals 0.9 1.4 0.8

Accruals can relate to interest, taxes,

  • ther expenditures

Exclude Equity & Loan Transactions -2.5

  • 4.8
  • 2.4

Transactions between the Exchequer and NAMA, CBI and other govt. entities: this benefits funding req.

Social Insurance Fund 1.5

  • 2.1
  • 0.3

Archaic funding structure of social insurance in Ireland is outside

  • Exchequer. Consolidated in GGB

Semi State, ISIF,

  • ther funds

1.2

  • 0.4

0.0

Dividends and profits from government entities

Local Govt.

  • 0.5
  • 1.7
  • 0.9

Local governments fund themselves

GGB 1.3

  • 23.1
  • 13.8

Most complete metric for fiscal

  • position. Use this for deficit

comparison with other nations

Methodological Differences EBR GGB Accounting basis Cash (exchequer) Accrual Financial transactions Included Excluded Scope Subset of Central Govt. Includes all of central + local Intra-Government Consolidation No Yes

NTMA must finance EBR with cash but GG balance includes other revenue/costs; use GGB for deficit comps

  • 60
  • 50
  • 40
  • 30
  • 20
  • 10

10 GG Balance EBR

  • Prom. Note capital

transfer to recap banks hit GGB in 2010 but not EBR (non-cash expenditure)

Gap between EBR and GGB (€bns) usually minor - stark in 2020

Source: CSO

slide-33
SLIDE 33

33

Debt metrics improved but debt stock is high and will increase; assess other metrics apart from debt to GDP too

2019 GG debt to GG revenue % GG interest to GG rev % GG debt to GDP % Greece 370.0% 6.2% 176.6% Italy 286.4% 7.2% 134.8% Portugal 274.7% 7.0% 117.7% Spain 244.2% 5.8% 95.5% Ireland 233.3% 5.1% 58.8% Cyprus 231.7% 6.1% 95.5% UK 226.5% 5.6% 88.1% Belgium 196.1% 3.9% 98.6% France 186.6% 2.7% 98.1% EA19 181.1% 3.5% 84.1% Austria 143.7% 2.9% 70.4% Germany 127.6% 1.7% 59.8% Finland 113.8% 1.6% 59.4% Netherlands 111.4% 1.8% 48.6% Sweden 71.5% 0.8% 35.6%

Source: Eurostat Ireland 99% Debt to GNI* ratio in 2019

slide-34
SLIDE 34

10 20 30 40 50 60 1 2 3 4 5 6 € Billions PSPP IGB purchases (LHS) PEPP purchases (Min, LHS) PEPP purchases (Max, LHS) Cumulative ECB Purchases (RHS) Cumulative ECB purchases (Max, RHS))

34

ECB’s parameters on new purchases (no limits, <1 yr included) & large size (€750bn) can underpin IGB market

Depending on the % of purchases allocated to public sector additional monthly IGB purchases could between €0.8-1.3bn

Source: ECB, NTMA Calculations Notes: PEPP min scenario assumes 50% of new purchases will be for public sector assets. Using Ireland’s capital key of 1.69% would imply €0.8bn. PEPP max scenario assumes 80% of new purchases will be for public sector assets.

slide-35
SLIDE 35

35

Ireland roughly split 80/20 on non-resident versus resident holdings (Q4 ‘19) “Sticky” sources - official loans, Eurosystem, retail - make up over 50% of Irish debt

Diverse holders of Irish debt – sticky sources account for

  • ver 50%; will increase further with Eurosystem’s PEPP

Source: CSO, Eurostat, CBI, ECB, NTMA Analysis IGBs excludes those held by Eurosystem. Eurosystem holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of

  • FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA. Other debt Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC-

related liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

50 100 150 200 250

IGBs - Private Non Resident IGBs - Private Resident Short term Eurosystem Retail Other Debt (incl. Official) Total Debt (€bns)

IGBs - Private Non Resident 35% IGBs - Private Resident 6% Short term 2% Eurosystem 22% Retail, Resident 11% Other Debt (incl. Official) 24% IGBs - Private Non Resident IGBs - Private Resident Short term Eurosystem Retail Other Debt (incl. Official)

slide-36
SLIDE 36

36

Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

Investor breakdown: Average over last five syndications Country breakdown: Average over last five syndications

Source: NTMA * Does not include ECB. ECB does not participate on primary market under its various asset purchasing programmes

8.6% 22.2% 8.1% 43.6% 15.2% Ireland UK US and Canada Continental Europe Nordics Asia & Other Fund/Asset Manager, 34.2% Banks/ Central Banks*, 38.4% Pensions/ Insurance, 14.2% Other, 9.6%

slide-37
SLIDE 37
  • 2.0

4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 0.0% 4.0% 8.0% 12.0% 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Corporation Tax (€bns, RHS) Corporation Tax (% of tax revenue) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Manufacturing ICT Financial & insurance Admin & support services Wholesale & retail trade Other

37

Corporation tax (CT) receipts have more than doubled in four years Sectors with large MNC presence dominate CT receipts (2018)

Corporation tax revenue to be cushioned by payments relating to 2019 and defensive nature of Pharma and ICT

In 2018, 45% of CT paid by 10 companies

Source: Department of Finance, Revenue

slide-38
SLIDE 38

38

Ireland rated in “AA” category by Standard & Poor's

Ra Rating g Ag Agency Lon Long-term Sho Short-term Outl utlook/Trend Da Date of

  • f las

last ch change Standard & Poor's AA- A-1+ Stable Nov 2019 Fitch Ratings A+ F1+ Stable Dec 2017 Moody's A2 P-1 Stable Sept 2017 DBRS A(high) R-1 (middle) Positive Jan 2020 R&I A a-1 Stable

  • Jan. 2017

Source: NTMA

slide-39
SLIDE 39

Ireland’s long run positives like demographics will reassert in time

Section 3: Long term fundamentals

slide-40
SLIDE 40

40

Ireland’s GNI* per capita above 2007 levels

and compares favourably to EA

Ireland’s structural drivers of growth will reassert when crisis passes

Source: CSO, Eurostat

Gross National Income* at current prices (1995=100)

  • 5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 Ireland (GNI*) EA 19 (GDP) Germany (GDP) 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 320 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 "Celtic Tiger" 1994-2001 Credit/Prop erty Bubble Bubble Burst

Recovery

slide-41
SLIDE 41

41

Ireland’s population profile younger than the EU average

Ireland’s population was 4.92m in 2019 –

  • ver 200,000 more than 2011 Census

Ireland’s population will remain younger than most of its EA counterparts

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 World USA Sweden Canada China Belgium UK Ireland Denmark France Finland Germany Spain Italy Portugal Greece Japan 2018 Old Age Dependency Ratio 2045

Source: Eurostat (2019) CSO; OECD

0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.2% 1.4% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0% <1 yr 5 101520253035404550556065707580859095

Ireland Germany EU28

25% of Ireland’s population aged 17 or below versus 19% for EU % of population in age cohort

slide-42
SLIDE 42

42

Percentage of population: Ireland’s has relatively more young people and fewer old The consequence is that working-age population expected to grow (2020-2029)

Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look healthy

Source: Oxford Economics forecasts Source: Eurostat

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% <18 years 18-64 65+ EU Ireland

  • 10.0%
  • 5.0%

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% Japan Germany Italy China Euro area EU Austria France Netherlands Belgium Spain UK Denmark Ireland US India

slide-43
SLIDE 43
  • 120
  • 90
  • 60
  • 30

30 60 90 120 Third level Other Education Net Migration 2009-2013 2015-2019

43

Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland “Reverse Brain Drain”

Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland; migration in 2020 to be closer to zero given lack of travel

Source: CSO

  • 2.0%
  • 1.0%

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0%

  • 100
  • 50

50 100 150 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Emigration (000s) Immigration (000s) Net Migration (000s) Net Migration (% of Pop, RHS)

slide-44
SLIDE 44

44

Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Ireland is living within its means again

Current account is distorted heavily by MNEs: modified CA is consistent with GNI* Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices)

  • 10.00
10.00 30.00 50.00 70.00 90.00 110.00 130.00 150.00 170.00 190.00

90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Contract Manufacturing* Services Goods ex. CM Exports

  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Current Account (% of GNI*) Modified Current Account (% of GNI*)

Source: CSO, NTMA calculations * Contract manufacturing proxy Nominal values, exports excludes contract manufacturing. Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland’s current account data. MNC’s action distort metrics heavily.

slide-45
SLIDE 45

45

UN Goal – Peace, Justice and Strong institutions Ireland Actual Figure Ireland Normalised (world leader = 100) OECD Average

Overall

  • 87.5

75.8 Corruption Perception Index (0-100) 73.0 79.4 73.5 Government Efficiency (1-7) 4.8 74.8 52.8 Homicides (per 100,000 people) 1.1 97.8 96.1 Prison population (per 100,000 people) 80.0 87.8 74.6 Property Rights (1-7) 6.1 94.8 73.1 Population who feel safe walking alone at night (%) 75.0 73.7 67.4

Ireland is close to OECD norms socially Favourable metrics on property rights and government efficiency

Ireland scores well on social issues and ability to do business

Source: United Nations SDG project

50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Gender Equality Decent work and economic growth Reduced Inequalities Sustainable Cities and Communities Ireland (World leader = 100) OECD Average

slide-46
SLIDE 46

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 Slovakia Slovenia Czech Rep Iceland Finland Denmark Norway Belgium Hungary Sweden Austria Poland Netherlands France Germany Switzerland Luxembourg Canada Ireland Estonia Italy Australia Portugal Russia Greece Japan Spain Israel Latvia UK Korea Lithuania USA Turkey Chile Mexico Costa Rica South Africa GINI Coefficient (Post Taxes and Transfers) Pre Taxes and Transfers

46

Income equality – Ireland’s progressive system means income equality is around OECD average after tax

Source: OECD

Lower GINI score means more equal society

slide-47
SLIDE 47

47

  • Pillar Two - the basic idea is to introduce a

minimum tax rate with the aim of reducing incentives to shift profits.

  • Where income is not taxed to the minimum level,

there would an “income inclusion rule” which

  • perates as a ‘top-up’ to achieve the minimum

rate of tax.

  • The obvious questions arise:
  • what is the appropriate minimum tax rate?
  • who will get the ‘top-up’ payment?
  • Is the minimum rate taxed at a global (firm)

level or on a country-by-country basis?

  • These questions are as yet unanswered. If the

minimum rate agreed is greater than the 12.5% rate that Ireland levies, it would erode this country’s comparative advantage.

  • The OECD has proposed further corporate tax

reform - a BEPS 2.0.

  • BEPS 2.0 looks at two pillars. The first pillar

focuses on proposals that would re-allocate taxing rights between jurisdictions where assets are held and the markets where user/consumers are

  • based. Non-routine profits could - to some -

degree be taxed where customers reside.

  • Under such a proposal, a proportion of profits

would be re- allocated from small countries to large countries. Such a proposal will reduce Ireland’s corporation tax base but it is impossible to predict the size of the impact.

  • Nothing has been decided as of yet. OECD original

deadline of end 2020 is likely to be delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic. Pillar One : proposal to re-allocate taxing rights on non-routine profits Pillar Two: proposal for minimum global tax

OECD’s BEPS 2.0 process could impact the business tax landscape globally – agreement might be delayed to 2021

slide-48
SLIDE 48

Property market in hibernation for a few months with low transactions

Section 4: Property

slide-49
SLIDE 49

49

House prices have stabilised 20% below their peak (100 in 2007) Office prices have diverged from retail and industrial (peak = 100)

House prices had plateaued before the virus arrived

Source: CSO; MSCI data

20 40 60 80 100 120 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 Retail Office Industrial 20 40 60 80 100 120 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 National

  • Excl. Dublin

Dublin

slide-50
SLIDE 50

50

Housing supply still below demand; supply was catching up before Covid-19 put the sector in hibernation

Housing supply picking up in a uniform fashion – coronavirus to hamper supply H2 2020 Housing Completions* above 25,000 in 2019

* Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections

  • f old houses or connections from “ghost estates” overstate the annual run rate of new building.

Source: DoHPCLG, CSO, NTMA Calculations

5 10 15 20 25 30 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Thousands

Non-Domestic Reconnection Unfinished New dwelling completion All connections

  • 2

4 6 8 10 12 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Thousands

Dublin Starts (advanced 12 months) Dublin Completions Commuter Belt Starts (advanced 12 months) Commuter Belt Completions ex-GDA Starts (advanced 12 months) ex-GDA Completions

slide-51
SLIDE 51

51

Demand will fall off given migration and unemployment – less than 30K units needed per annum in coming years

Mortgage drawdowns (000s) rose from deep trough before Covid-19 impact Non-mortgage transactions still important but closer to 40% of total

Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register Source: BPFI (4 quarter sum used)

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0% 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Q4 2010 Q2 2011 Q4 2011 Q2 2012 Q4 2012 Q2 2013 Q4 2013 Q2 2014 Q4 2014 Q2 2015 Q4 2015 Q2 2016 Q4 2016 Q2 2017 Q4 2017 Q2 2018 Q4 2018 Q2 2019 Q4 2019 Thousands Non-mortgage transactions Mortgage drawdowns for house purchase Non-mortgage transactions % of total (RHS)

20 40 60 80 100 120 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Residential Investment Letting Mover purchaser First Time Buyers

slide-52
SLIDE 52

52

Dublin resi. property prices fell in 2019; higher end of the market most hit Rents are well above previous peak – out of line with prices

Covid-19 impact on prices unclear as both supply and demand impacted but rents should come off highs

Source: CSO; RTB

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Rents (100 = 2005) Price

Prices were above rents Rents now well above prices

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 National (Y-o-Y %) Ex Dublin (Y-o-Y %) Dublin (Y-o-Y %)

slide-53
SLIDE 53
  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% SD BG NL OE NW LX DN FR ES IE PT EA UK BD FN GR IT

  • 20%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% SD NW BG UK DN FR LX ES IE NL OE FN EA BD PT GR IT

53

Irish house price valuation metrics remained well below 2008 levels throughout last cycle

Source: OECD, NTMA Workings Note: Measured as % over or under valuation relative to long term averages since 1980.

Deviation from average price-to-income ratio (Q3 2019, red dot represent Q1 2008) Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q3 2019, red dot represent Q1 2008)

slide-54
SLIDE 54

“Hard Brexit” risk has de-escalated but cliff edge at end 2020 is sill possible

Section 5: Brexit

slide-55
SLIDE 55

55

  • With the withdrawal agreement sorted we enter

the transition period, which is slated to finish at the end of 2020.

  • The UK government has stated its intention to

seek a free-trade arrangement for the long term.

  • The upshot is that the trading relationship will be

more distant, making negotiations difficult.

  • There is only one year to negotiate what normally

takes several years.

  • More time has been lost as politicians are rightly

concentrating on the global pandemic.

  • Risk of hard Brexit if the transition period is not

extended.

  • Northern Ireland will remain within the UK

Customs Union but will abide by EU Customs Union rules – dual membership for NI.

  • No hard border on the island of Ireland – customs

border will be in the Irish sea. Goods crossing from ROI to NI will not require checks but goods going to UK will.

  • Complex arrangements will be necessary to

differentiate between goods going to NI and those travelling through NI to UK or vice versa. Customs checks at ports, VAT and tariff rebates and alignment of regulations will be needed.

  • All of this is backed by a complex consent

mechanism, which allows Stormont to opt-out under simple majority at certain times. Withdrawal Agreement in 2019 helped to solve Northern Ireland border issue UK-EU Future trading relationship unresolved

Amid Covid-19, trade agreement still progressing – hard Brexit is a possibility for 2021 but extension better for all

slide-56
SLIDE 56

56

Negatives of hard Brexit outweigh positives in short-term, although opportunities may appear longer term

Sh Short rt term erm

  • Major trade disruption from tariffs, customs

checks and documentation (red tape)

  • Regions suffer severe recession in agriculture and

UK-focused manufacturing; tourism might suffer

  • Confidence shock to business and households
  • Liquidity may dry up in property market
  • Fiscal impacts are likely given need to support

regions Long term erm

  • Lower consumer spending thanks to higher

inflation when tariffs dominate the FX benefit

  • Political economy cost (loss of ally in the EU)

Sh Short rt term erm

  • Cheaper domestic food prices

Long term erm

  • Fiscal help from Europe is likely; selective

temporary waiving of State Aid rules?

  • FDI influx from UK, as multinationals avoid

turmoil; UK’s reputation might be tarnished

  • Financial services (passporting lost by UK)
  • Other multinationals - especially

IT and business services

  • Commercial property occupancy could rise; there

may also be an influx of well paid workers

  • Gradual partial trade recovery
  • Irish companies may steal EU market share

from British ones (and finally diversify)

  • Import substitution (especially in food)

Cons Pros

slide-57
SLIDE 57

57

Whichever type of Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted

Irish rish/U /UK tr trad ade li link nkages s will ill suf uffer r fol

  • llowing Br

Brexit

  • The UK is the second largest single-country

export destination for Ireland’s goods and the largest for its services

  • At the same time, Ireland imports c. 20% of

its goods from the UK. Ireland’s trade with the UK is is lab labour r in intensive

  • The UK might only account for 14% of

Ireland’s total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that because those UK- reliant sectors are labour intensive SM SMEs Es ac account for

  • r over

r 55% % of

  • f Irish

rish exp xports rts to

  • the

the UK.

  • K. The

hey ar are li likely to

  • be

be mor

  • re ad

adverse sely y affected tha than la larger r com

  • mpanies

s by y the the in intr troducti tion of

  • f tari

ariffs s an and barri barriers s to

  • tr

trade

Source: CSO 2018 * UK data includes Northern Ireland NTMA calculations; Data does not include contract manufacturing

% of f tot total Good

  • ods

(20 2018) Servic ices (20 2018) Tot

  • tal

(20 2018) Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. US 27.9 18.5 11.6 25.4 18.0 23.1 UK* 11.5 21.7 15.7 9.6 13.8 13.6 NI 1.6 1.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a EU-27 38.8 37.4 29.4 26.8 33.5 30.3 China 3.9 5.9 2.6 1.5 3.1 3.0 Other 21.8 22.4 43.3 38.3 30.7 31.1

slide-58
SLIDE 58

58

  • 20%
  • 15%
  • 10%
  • 5%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%

  • 30%
  • 20%
  • 10%

0% 10% 20% 30% 2000200220042006200820102012201420162018 Euro/Sterling (y-o-y, Lagged 3Qs, RHS) Visitors to IE from UK (y-o-y) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 % of Irish Agri Exports going to UK % of Other Irish Goods Exports going to UK

Agriculture has not diversified from the UK Tourism numbers linked to FX moves

Agri-food and tourism most at risk from trade barriers

Source: CSO, DataStream Eikon

  • Agri. exports to UK

All other goods exports to UK

slide-59
SLIDE 59

59

Forecast vs. no Brexit baseline Short term (2 years) Medium term (5 years) Long term (10-15 years) Department of Finance (ESRI)

  • 2.4%
  • 3.3%
  • 5.0%

Copenhagen Economics

  • 2.0 to 2.5%
  • 4.5%
  • 7.0%

(of which -4.9pp is due to regulatory divergence) Central Bank of Ireland

  • 4.0%
  • 6.0%

Bank of England “disruptive” (implied)

  • 5.0%
  • 6.2%
  • 6.2%

Bank of England “disorderly” (implied)

  • 6.3%
  • 8.2%
  • 8.2%

UK Treasury range (implied)

  • 5.0 to 7.2%

Hard Brexit impact estimates all show similar story – return to WTO rules would be negative for Ireland

Source: ESRI, Copenhagen, Bank of England, UK treasury Implied uses the impact on UK GDP and an elasticity measure of 0.8 to calculate the impact on Irish Growth

slide-60
SLIDE 60

60

  • Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.

The chief areas of interest are  Financial services  Business services  IT/ new media.

  • Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt,

Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services.

  • Ireland’s FDI opportunity will depend on the
  • utcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK

(City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more

  • pportunities in time.

FDI: Ireland benefitting already Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland

Many financial institutions have announced that they will expand or set up in Dublin

slide-61
SLIDE 61

Ireland’s banks now among strongest in Europe – complete reverse of late 2000s

Section 6: Other data

slide-62
SLIDE 62

62

Net Interest Margin Profit before Tax

Ireland’s pillar banks in relative good shape to weather Covid-19 storm

  • Banks profitable before Covid-19: income, cost and balance sheet metrics much improved.
  • Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues and the

slow judicial process in accessing collateral.

  • An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) occurred in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer to be

used for debt reduction. Further disposal of banking assets unlikely in the short term given valuations

  • Irish banks had paid dividends in recent years.

Source: Annual reports of banks - BOI, AIB, PTSB Profit measures are before exceptional items

All three pillar banks were profitable in recent years

0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% AIB BOI PTSB 2017 2018 2019 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 AIB BOI PTSB 2017 2018 2019

slide-63
SLIDE 63

63

CET 1 capital ratios (Dec 2019) allow for amble forbearance in Q2 Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books were slashed

Capital ratios strengthened as banks shrunk and consolidated in last ten years

Source: Published bank accounts Note: “Transitional” refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios. Source: Published bank accounts

20.3% 17.3% 15.0% 13.8% 18.1% 15.0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) AIB BOI PTSB

  • 20

40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) Loan-to- Deposit % Loans (€bn) AIB BOI Dec-10 Dec-19

slide-64
SLIDE 64

64

Ireland’s banks are among the most capitalised banks in Europe

Austria Belgium Cyprus Germany Spain Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Latvia Malta Netherlands Portugal Slovenia SSM Countries 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 Leverage Ratio (%, Fully phased in definition) Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio (%)

Stronger Note: Leverage Ratio = Tier 1 capital/Total leverage exposure; CET1 = Common tier 1 capital/total risk

  • exposures. “Fully loaded” refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios.

Source: ECB consolidated banking data (Q4 2019)

slide-65
SLIDE 65

65

Domestic bank cost base has risen but marginally

… and IE banks* below EU average Cost income ratios improve dramatically…

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks, EBA * EBA data includes three domestic banks as well as Ulster Bank, DEPFA & Citibank.

Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks

Staffing (000s) halved post crisis

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% LV SK ES PL DK GR PT NL HU SI GB FI IS IE IT EU AT LU BE FR CY DE

123% 88% 144% 56% 63% 68% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% AIB BOI PTSB 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 26 16 5 10 10 2 10 20 30 AIB BOI PTSB 2008 2019

slide-66
SLIDE 66

66

Pillar banks sold non-performing loans during 2018/19

No Non-performin ing exp xposures % of f tot total l loan

  • ans1 (los

loss pr prov

  • visio

ion % of NP NPE) Dec-18 18 Dec-19 19 Book k (€bn) bn) BOI

Irish Residential Mortgages 9.5(21) 6.3 (25) 23.1 UK Residential Mortgages 2.3(15) 2.1 (13) 23.2 Irish SMEs 11.2(49) 7.5 (54) 7.3 UK SMEs 6.1(53) 6.3 (46) 1.7 Corporate 2.6(60) 2 (60) 11.4 CRE - Investment 10.7(44) 7.7 (37) 7.2 CRE - Land/Development 14.0(54) 3.8 (64) 0.9 Consumer Loans 2.1(140) 1.7 (159) 5.7 6.3( 3(35 35) 4.4 4 (37) 37) 80.5

AIB

Residential Mortgages 10.1 (20) 7.4 (22) 31.5 SMEs/Corporate 5.2 (36) 2.2 (32) 20.3 CRE 17.9 (29) 5.1 (35) 7.9 Consumer Loans 11.2 (50) 6.4 (60) 3.0 9.6 5.4 4 (27) 27) 62.1

PTSB

Residential Mortgages 8.9(39) 5 (38) 12.2 Buy-to-let Mortgages 12.8(113) 10.5 (138) 3.5 Commercial 33.3(76) 24.8 (93) 0.17 Consumer Loans 7.5(112) 4.9 (133) 0.37 10.0( 0(64) 4) 6.4 16.4

All 3 Pillar banks (€bn) Dec-18 Dec-19 Total Loans 158.2 159 Non-performing Exposures 12.7 7.9 (NPE as % of Total) 8.0% 5% Provisions 4.4 3.0 (Provisions as % of book) 2.8% 1.9% (Provisions as % of Impaired) 34.6% 38.4%

Source: Published bank accounts 1 Non-performing exposures include impaired loans, loans past due greater than 90 days but not impaired, and Forborne Collateral Realisations

Non- performing Exposures, 7.9, 5% Performing Loans, 151.1

slide-67
SLIDE 67
  • 8.0
  • 6.0
  • 4.0
  • 2.0

0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Over 90 days 90-180 days 181-360 days 361-720 days >720 days Total change

67

Irish residential mortgage arrears could reverse course in 2020 – moratorium will help

  • Non-bank entities now hold 13 per cent of all PDH mortgage accounts outstanding; 11 per cent are held by regulated retail credit

firms, with the remaining 2 per cent held by unregulated loan owners. Credit Servicing Firms hold 22 per cent of all PDH mortgages in arrears over 720 days

Mortgage arrears (90+ days)* Repossessions**

Source: CBI

PDH Arrears (by thousands)

* Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years. ** Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions

0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 PDH BTL % of MA90+ (RHS) 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20% 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 PDH + BTL (by balance) PDH + BTL (by number)

slide-68
SLIDE 68

68

The European Commission’s ruling on Apple’s tax affairs does not change the NTMA’s funding plans

  • The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This

figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland’s tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014.

  • Thi

his s case has nothing to do with Ireland’s corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: “This decision does not call into question Ireland’s general tax system or its corporate tax rate”.

  • App

pple is is ap appealing the the rulin ruling, g, as as is is the the Iris rish Govern rnment.

  • t. This process could be lengthy. Pending the
  • utcome of the appeal, Apple has paid approximately €13bn plus EU interest (c. €2bn) into an escrow

fund.

  • Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services

to hold and administer the fund.

  • Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management

International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund.

  • As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the

the NTM NTMA has has mad ade no no al allowance for

  • r these

these funds. s.

slide-69
SLIDE 69

69

Government’s NDP outlines green projects; aim to cut CO2 emissions by at least 80% by 2050

Sustainable Mobility €8.6 billion Sustainable Management

  • f Water and

Environmental Resources €6.8 billion Transition to a Low carbon and Climate Resilient Society €7.6 billion

Total:€23 billion (13%

  • f GNI*)

Source: National Development Plan 2018-2027

1 in 5 euros in the National Development Plan (NDP) to be spent on green projects

Further details are available at ntma.ie

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GNI* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP; best as a level rather than a growth metric

  • GDP headline numbers do not reflect the “true”

growth of Ireland’s income due to MNCs.

  • Reasons for 2015-18 MNC distortions:
  • Re-domiciling/inversions of several

multinational companies

  • The “onshoring” of IP assets into Ireland

by multinationals

  • The movement of aircraft leasing assets

in Ireland.

  • By modifying GNI to take account of these factors,

GNI* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.

National Account – Current Prices (€, y-o-y growth rates) 2015 2016 2017 2018 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 262.8bn (34.9%) 271.7bn (3.4%) 297.1bn (9.4%) 324.0bn (9.4%) minus Net Factor Income from rest of the world = Gross National Product (GNP) 200.8bn (22.9%) 220.6bn (9.9%) 234.9bn (6.5%) 253.1bn (7.7%) add EU subsidies minus EU taxes 1.2bn 1.0bn 1.1bn 1.1bn = Gross National Income (GNI) 202.0bn (22.9%) 221.6bn (9.7%) 236.0bn (6.5%) 254.2bn (7.7%) minus retained earnings

  • f re-domiciled firms
  • 4.7bn
  • 5.8bn
  • 4.5bn
  • 5.0bn

minus depreciation on foreign owned IP assets

  • 30.1bn -35.3bn -42.5bn -46.3bn

minus depreciation on aircraft leasing

  • 4.6bn
  • 4.9bn
  • 5.1bn
  • 5.4bn

= GNI* 162.7bn (9.4%) 175.6bn (8.0%) 184.0bn (4.7%) 197.5bn (7.3%)

Source: CSO

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Disclaimer

The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities. The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying

  • slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information
  • provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past
  • r future) of the Irish State or the NTMA.

The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice.