Extremely Secure Communication Daniel Romo - daniel.romao@os3.nl - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Extremely Secure Communication Daniel Romo - daniel.romao@os3.nl - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Extremely Secure Communication Daniel Romo - daniel.romao@os3.nl Oil Company Oil Company What (almost) everyone knows: NSA collects traffic Confidential data can be compromised Backdoors in encryption-related software and hardware make it


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Extremely Secure Communication

Daniel Romão - daniel.romao@os3.nl

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Oil Company

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Oil Company

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What (almost) everyone knows: NSA collects traffic Confidential data can be compromised Backdoors in encryption-related software and hardware make it easier

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Research Question How can an extremely secure communication

  • n the Internet be deployed for work teams and

individuals around the globe?

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What can we do?

1 - Avoid possible backdoors on RNGs

➢ Use a verifiable HRNG to improve the kernel entropy pool

2 - Avoid having all data going over a single link

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What can we do?

1 - Avoid possible backdoors on RNGs

➢ Use a verifiable HRNG to improve the kernel entropy pool

2 - Avoid having all data going over a single link

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What can we do?

1 - Avoid possible backdoors on RNGs

➢ Use a verifiable HRNG to improve the kernel entropy pool

2 - Avoid having all data going over a single link

➢ Use a multipoint VPN!

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Hardware Random Number Generator

  • Multiple devices exist, mostly closed source

○ Big price differences

  • Ongoing discussion on noise sources

○ PN junctions, RF noise, clock drift, thermal noise...

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What if we implement a HRNG that is verifiable and has multiple noise sources?

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HRNG - Related Work

  • Rob Seward implemented a basic HRNG on

Arduino using a single PN junction

○ Calibration on startup ○ XOR and Von Neumann filtering ○ Serial interface for output

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http://holdenc.altervista.org/avalanche/images/noise.png http://robseward.com/misc/RNG2/RNG_Version_2_images/rng2_circuit_small.png

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HRNG Implemented

  • Extension of the previous work

○ Multiple noise sources ○ Continuous calibration ○ Second serial interface for logging ○ Raw byte output mode for rng-tools

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HRNG Testing

  • Ent

○ Entropy, Optimum compression, Chi square, Arithmetic mean, Monte Carlo Pi, Serial correlation

  • RNGtest

○ FIPS-140-2 test ○ To test cryptographic modules for use by the United States federal government

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Ent results Sample size: 2504 bytes

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Ent results Sample size: 512Kb

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RNGtest results Sample size: 512Kb

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Multipoint VPN

  • DMVPN

○ Cisco technology ○ Open source implementation exists: OpenNHRP ○ IPSec ○ Hub (server), Spokes (clients)

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Operating System

  • Tails Linux

○ Open source operating system ○ Aimed at privacy and anonymity on the Internet ○ Only traffic over Tor and I2P networks can go ○ Always boots from a clean install state

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How to deploy the DMVPN spoke software on Tails?

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Conclusion

  • HRNG and a Tails DMVPN spoke integrate well

with each other

  • Jitter-based noise generator has very low

throughput

  • Dual oscillator without filtering was overall the

setting with best performance

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Future Work

  • More experiments with the HRNG

○ Other noise sources and filtering ○ Faster microcontroller

  • Optimization of the configuration
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Thank you!

Go get it: https://github.com/dromao/arduino-rng

https://github.com/dromao/dmvpn-spoke

Pictures without source are under the CC0 Public Domain license