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Extending answer set programming using generalized possibilistic logic
School of Computer Science & Informatics Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK schockaerts1@cardiff.ac.uk http://users.cs.cf.ac.uk/S.Schockaert
Steven Schockaert (joint work with Didier Dubois and Henri Prade)
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- 1. Possibilistic logic
- 2. Generalized possibilistic logic
- 3. Answer set programming
- 4. Extending answer set programming
SLIDE 3 Possibilistic logic: syntax
(p ∧ (¬q → r), 0.7)
propositional formula certainty degree, taken from
Λ = {0, 1 k , 2 k , ..., 1}
Knowledge bases in possibilistic logic are sets of weighted formulas
SLIDE 4 Possibilistic logic: syntax
(p ∧ (¬q → r), 0.7)
reflects my degree of surprise if I found out that the formula were false
Knowledge bases in possibilistic logic are sets of weighted formulas
K = {(loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) → loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) → loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) → ¬loc(IJCAI2016, SouthAmerica), 0.75), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) → ¬loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 0.5)}
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Possibilistic logic: syntax
Certainty degrees are interpreted qualitatively, i.e. possibilistic logic theories can be seen as stratified classical logic theories Using numbers makes it easier to describe the semantics and to formulate inference rules
→ ¬ loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) → loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) → loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica) loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) → ¬loc(IJCAI2016, SouthAmerica) loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) → ¬loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica)
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Possibilistic logic: semantics
At the semantic level, the role of models is taken up by possibility distributions, which assign to every propositional interpretation (or possible world) a degree of possibility, e.g.
π(ω1) = 0 π(ω2) = 0.4 π(ω3) = 0.7 π(ω4) = 1
Intuitively, a model corresponds to the epistemic state of an agent, encoded as the weighted set of worlds it considers possible
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{ | | } − ¬ Π(α) = Π({ω | ω | = α}) = max{π(ω) | ω | = α}
Possibilistic logic: semantics
If π represents the epistemic state of an agent, then that agent considers a formula α possible to the degree that some model of α is considered possible
possibility measure
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Possibilistic logic: semantics
If π represents the epistemic state of an agent, then that agent considers a formula α possible to the degree that some model of α is considered possible
{ | | } − ¬ Π(α) = Π({ω | ω | = α}) = max{π(ω) | ω | = α}
The agent considers the formula necessary to the degree that all counter-models of α are impossible
N(α) = N({ω | ω | = α}) = min{1 π(ω) | ω 6| = α} = 1 Π(¬α)
necessity measure
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Possibilistic logic: semantics
A possibility distribution π satisfies a formula (α,λ) iff N(α) ≥ λ, with N the necessity measure induced by π A possibility distribution π is called a model of a set of formulas K iff π satisfies all formulas in K
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Possibilistic logic: semantics
A possibility distribution π satisfies a formula (α,λ) iff N(α) ≥ λ, with N the necessity measure induced by π K = {(a, 0.8), (a ! b, 1)}
π({a, b}) = 1 π({a}) = 0 π({b}) = 0.2 π({}) = 0.2
A possibility distribution π is called a model of a set of formulas K iff π satisfies all formulas in K
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Possibilistic logic: semantics
A possibility distribution π satisfies a formula (α,λ) iff N(α) ≥ λ, with N the necessity measure induced by π K = {(a, 0.8), (a ! b, 1)}
π({a, b}) = 1 π({a}) = 0 π({b}) = 0.2 π({}) = 0.2
N(a) = 1 Π(¬a) = 1 max(π({b}), π({})) = 0.8 N(a ! b) = 1 Π(a ^ ¬b) = 1 max(π({a})) = 1
A possibility distribution π is called a model of a set of formulas K iff π satisfies all formulas in K
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Possibilistic logic: semantics
⌃ω . π(ω) = 1
π(ω0) = 1 and ⌃ω ⇧= ω0 . π(ω) = 0
Completely uninformative: every world remains possible Maximally informative: exactly one world is considered possible π1 is less specific than π2 if
⌃ω . π1(ω) ⇥ π2(ω)
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Possibilistic logic: semantics
⌃ω . π(ω) = 1
π(ω0) = 1 and ⌃ω ⇧= ω0 . π(ω) = 0
Completely uninformative: every world remains possible Maximally informative: exactly one world is considered possible π1 is less specific than π2 if
⌃ω . π1(ω) ⇥ π2(ω)
Every consistent set of formulas K in possibilistic logic has a unique least specific model πK
SLIDE 14 Possibilistic logic: inference
inference rules
if (α, λ) 2 K then K ` (α, λ) ( if α ⌘ β and K ` (α, λ) then K ` (β, λ) ( if λ1 λ2 and K ` (α, λ1) then K ` (α, λ2) ( if K ` (α _ β, λ1) and K ` (¬α _ γ, λ2) then K ` (β _ γ, min(λ1, λ2))
possibilistic logic is based
SLIDE 15 Possibilistic logic: inference
inference rules soundness and completeness
The following statements are equivalent:
if (α, λ) 2 K then K ` (α, λ) ( if α ⌘ β and K ` (α, λ) then K ` (β, λ) ( if λ1 λ2 and K ` (α, λ1) then K ` (α, λ2) ( if K ` (α _ β, λ1) and K ` (¬α _ γ, λ2) then K ` (β _ γ, min(λ1, λ2))
- 1. K ` (α, λ) can be derived from (1)–(4).
- 2. Every model π of K is a model of (α, λ).
- 3. The least specific model πK of K is a model of (α, λ).
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Possibilistic logic: applications
Possibilistic logic is closely related to AGM belief revision and the rational closure of default rules
(loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork), 1)
+
K = {(loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) → loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) → loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) → ¬loc(IJCAI2016, SouthAmerica), 0.75), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) → ¬loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 0.5)}
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Possibilistic logic: applications
Possibilistic logic is closely related to AGM belief revision and the rational closure of default rules
K = {(loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina), 1), (loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) ! loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) ! loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ! ¬loc(IJCAI2016, SouthAmerica), 0.75), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ! ¬loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 0.5)}
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Possibilistic logic: applications
Possibilistic logic is closely related to AGM belief revision and the rational closure of default rules
K = {(loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina), 1), (loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) ! loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) ! loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 1), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ! ¬loc(IJCAI2016, SouthAmerica), 0.75), (loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ! ¬loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica), 0.5)}
SLIDE 19
- 1. Possibilistic logic
- 2. Generalized possibilistic logic
- 3. Answer set programming
- 4. Extending answer set programming
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Generalized possibilistic logic
In possibilistic logic, a formula (α,λ) corresponds to the constraint N(α) ≥ λ at the semantic level, and a knowledge base corresponds to a conjunction of such constraints Π(α) ≥ λ
SLIDE 21 Generalized possibilistic logic
In possibilistic logic, a formula (α,λ) corresponds to the constraint N(α) ≥ λ at the semantic level, and a knowledge base corresponds to a conjunction of such constraints In generalized possibilistic logic (GPL), arbitrary propositional combinations of such formulas are allowed To emphasize the view of possibilistic logic as a modal logic, we use the following notations
) means that whereas Nλ(α) with suggests that
alternative notation for (α,λ)
ailable beliefs while Πλ(α) with (Π( ) ⌅
abbreviation for ¬N1−λ+ 1
k (¬α)
corresponds to the constraint Π(α) ≥ λ
SLIDE 22 Generalized possibilistic logic
Syntax Note: every propositional atom is encapsulated by a modality Note: no nesting of modalities
- N0.4(a ∧ ¬b) ∨ Π0.3(a → (b ∨ c))
⇥ → N0.7(b)
SLIDE 23 Generalized possibilistic logic
Syntax Note: every propositional atom is encapsulated by a modality Note: no nesting of modalities Semantics
- N0.4(a ∧ ¬b) ∨ Π0.3(a → (b ∨ c))
⇥ → N0.7(b)
- ⇥
- N(a ∧ ¬b) < 0.4 ∧ Π(a → (b ∨ c)) < 0.3
⇥ ∨ N(b) ≥ 0.7
Note: models are possibility distributions, which are interpreted as epistemic states Axiomatization Weighted version of the axiomatization of the modal logic KD without introspection (KR 2012)
SLIDE 24 possibilistic logic GPL
formulas:
express lower bounds on the necessity of a propositional formula
models:
express propositional combinations of lower bounds on the necessity of a propositional formula
weighted epistemic states
minimally specific models:
unique 0, 1 or more weighted epistemic states
useful for reasoning about the consequences
useful for reasoning about the revealed beliefs
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Inference relations
GPL naturally leads to one monotonic and two non-monotonic inference relations (all of which are equivalent in normal possibilistic logic):
ten K | =b Φ en K | =c Φ
iff Φ is true in at least one minimally specific model of K iff Φ is true in all minimally specific models of K
Brave reasoning Cautious reasoning
ten K | =b Φ
iff Φ is true in all models of K
Standard reasoning
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Computational complexity
| = | =b | =c GPL coNP ΣP
2
ΠP
2
GPL∆ ΘP
2
ΣP
2
ΠP
2
GPL∆
R
ΠP
3
ΣP
4
ΠP
4
Same complexity as inference in (disjunctive) answer set programming and many non-monotonic reasoning frameworks Extension of the language of GPL with a modality that corresponds to the guaranteed possibility measure Extension based on a refinement of the guaranteed possibility measure
SLIDE 27
- 1. Possibilistic logic
- 2. Generalized possibilistic logic
- 3. Answer set programming
- 4. Extending answer set programming
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Answer set programming
a1 ∨ ¬a2 ∨ a3 ← b1 ∧ b2 ∧ not c1 ∧ not c2
A (disjunctive) answer set program (ASP) consists of rules of the form: Intuition: if we already know that b1 and b2 are true, then we should
accept that a1 is true, that a2 is false, or that a3 is true, unless we know that c1 or c2 is true.
head body
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Answer set programming
A (disjunctive) answer set program (ASP) consists of rules of the form: Intuition: if we already know that b1 and b2 are true, then we should
accept that a1 is true, that a2 is false, or that a3 is true, unless we know that c1 or c2 is true.
Usual way to define the semantics is in terms of the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct: guess what can be derived from the program, use this guess to evaluate literals preceded by not, and verify that the guess was correct The set of literals that can be derived from the program is then called an answer set or stable model
a1 ∨ ¬a2 ∨ a3 ← b1 ∧ b2 ∧ not c1 ∧ not c2
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Answer set programming
1 the program w ← not c c ← not w
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Answer set programming
1 the program w ← not c c ← not w is it ? 2
guess
{w}
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Answer set programming
1 the program w ← not c c ← not w 3
reduct
w ← not c c ← not w is it ? 2
guess
{w}
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Answer set programming
1 the program w ← not c c ← not w 3
reduct
w ← not c c ← not w is it ? 2
guess
{w} Minimal model of the reduct is indeed {w}, which means that {w} is an answer set (or stable model)
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Relationship with GPL
We associate a GPL theory ϴP with an answer set program P as follows
l1 ... ln ⇤ p1 ⌥ ... ⌥ pm ⌥ not c1 ⌥ ... ⌥ not cr
ASP rule GPL formula
N1(p1) ^ ... ^ N1(pm) ^ Π1(¬c1) ^ ... ^ Π1(¬cr) ! N1(l1) _ ... _ N1(ln)
SLIDE 35 Relationship with GPL
A set of literals M is an answer set of P iff the possibility distribution π defined as
π(ω) =
if ω | = l for all l ∈ M
is a minimally specific model of ϴP Note that π is the least specific possibility distribution that satisfies N1(l) for each l in M
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Relationship with GPL: intuition
There are three ways of making the following GPL formula satisfied: Make N1(pi) false Make 𝚸1(¬ci) false, i.e. make N1/k(ci) true Make N1(li) true
N1(p1) ^ ... ^ N1(pm) ^ Π1(¬c1) ^ ... ^ Π1(¬cr) ! N1(l1) _ ... _ N1(ln)
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Relationship with GPL: intuition
There are three ways of making the following GPL formula satisfied: Make N1(pi) false Make 𝚸1(¬ci) false, i.e. make N1/k(ci) true Make N1(li) true
This will always be preferred when we are looking for minimally specific models
N1(p1) ^ ... ^ N1(pm) ^ Π1(¬c1) ^ ... ^ Π1(¬cr) ! N1(l1) _ ... _ N1(ln)
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Relationship with GPL: intuition
There are three ways of making the following GPL formula satisfied: Make N1(pi) false Make 𝚸1(¬ci) false, i.e. make N1/k(ci) true Make N1(li) true
This corresponds to the guess that ci will be derivable Boolean models are those for which the guess can be verified, i.e. those for which N1(ci) can be derived
N1(p1) ^ ... ^ N1(pm) ^ Π1(¬c1) ^ ... ^ Π1(¬cr) ! N1(l1) _ ... _ N1(ln)
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Relationship with GPL: intuition
There are three ways of making the following GPL formula satisfied: Make N1(pi) false Make 𝚸1(¬ci) false, i.e. make N1/k(ci) true Make N1(li) true
This intuitively corresponds to forward chaining In minimal models, this option will only be chosen if all of the pi literals can be derived and none of the ci literals.
N1(p1) ^ ... ^ N1(pm) ^ Π1(¬c1) ^ ... ^ Π1(¬cr) ! N1(l1) _ ... _ N1(ln)
SLIDE 40 Relationship with GPL
P has an answer set iff:
ΘP | =b Φ
Let us define:
Φ ≡ ^
a∈At
N1(a) ∨ N1(¬a) ∨ (Π1(a) ∧ Π1(¬a))
The literal l is contained in at least one answer set of P iff:
ΘP | =b Φ ∧ N1(l)
The literal l is contained in all answer sets of P iff:
ΘP | =c Φ → N1(l)
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Restricting the set of certainty degrees
N1(α) = ¬Π1(¬α)
When only two certainty degrees, 0 and 1, are used, we have This would mean that the following two ASP rules are incorrectly translated to the same GPL formula
a ← not b b ← not a
The characterization of ASP requires that at least 3 certainty degrees are considered
SLIDE 42
- 1. Possibilistic logic
- 2. Generalized possibilistic logic
- 3. Answer set programming
- 4. Extending answer set programming
SLIDE 43 Disjunction inside N
strong disjunction weak disjunction
loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) ∨ loc(IJCAI2016, SanFrancisco) ←
N1
- loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork)
- ∨ N1
- loc(IJCAI2016, SanFrancisco)
- N1
- loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) ∨ loc(IJCAI2016, SanFrancisco)
SLIDE 44 Stable models of propositional theories
((a ← b) ∧ (c ← not d)) ∨ (x ∨ y ← z)
- N1(b) → N1(a)
- ∧
- Π1(¬d) → N1(c)
- ∨
- N1(z) → N1(x) ∨ N1(y)
- More flexible than equilibrium logic (e.g. weak disjunction)
More intuitive semantics: all models respect the idea of minimal commitment
SLIDE 45 Possibilistic ASP
1 : loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) ← 0.6 : loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) ← not unreliable(website) 1 : loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) 1 : loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) 0.75 : ¬loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) 0.5 : ¬loc(IJCAI2015, NorthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) Certainty weights indicate our belief that the rule is correct Semantics: possibility distribution
- ver classical answer sets
Certainty weights indicate our belief in the conclusion of the rule, if the body is satisfied Semantics: set of possibilistic answer sets
SLIDE 46 Possibilistic ASP
1 : loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) ← 0.6 : loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) ← not unreliable(website) 1 : loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2015, Argentina) 1 : loc(IJCAI2016, NorthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2016, NewYork) 0.75 : ¬loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) 0.5 : ¬loc(IJCAI2015, NorthAmerica) ← loc(IJCAI2015, SouthAmerica) Certainty weights indicate our belief that the rule is correct Semantics: possibility distribution
- ver classical answer sets
Certainty weights indicate our belief in the conclusion of the rule, if the body is satisfied Semantics: set of possibilistic answer sets
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Possibilistic ASP
Intuition: certainty(head) ≥ min(l/k, certainty(body))
l k : a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm ∧ not c1 ∧ ... ∧ not cr
SLIDE 48 Possibilistic ASP
l k : a1 ∨ ... ∨ an ← b1 ∧ ... ∧ bm ∧ not c1 ∧ ... ∧ not cr
l
^
i=1
k (b1) ∧ ... ∧ N i k (bm) ∧ Π i k (¬c1) ∧ ... ∧ Π i k (¬cr) → N i k (a1) ∨ ... ∨ N i k (an)
Intuition: for each i≤l, if the body can be derived with certainty i/k then we should also believe the head with certainty i/k
SLIDE 49 Conclusions
Possibilistic logic offers a convenient way to encode the epistemic state of an agent ➡ natural characterization of (AGM) belief revision and default reasoning Generalized possibilistic logic (GPL) offers a convenient way to encode
- ur knowledge about the possible epistemic states of another agent
➡ natural characterization of NMR frameworks based on multiple extensions,
such as answer set programming (ASP)
The GPL characterization of ASP suggests several natural generalizations
➡ Weak disjunction ➡ Stable models of arbitrary propositional theories ➡ Modelling uncertainty in answer set programming
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References and acknowledgments
Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, Steven Schockaert. Stable models in generalized possibilistic logic, Proc. KR, 2012 Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, Steven Schockaert. Reasoning about uncertainty and explicit ignorance in generalized possibilistic logic, Proc. ECAI, 2014 Kim Bauters, Steven Schockaert, Martine De Cock, Dirk Vermeir. Semantics for possibilistic answer set programs: uncertain rules versus rules with uncertain conclusions, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 2014 Kim Bauters, Steven Schockaert, Martine De Cock, Dirk Vermeir. Possibilistic answer set programming revisited, Proc. UAI, 2010
Generalized possibilistic logic Possibilistic answer set programming