EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 1 Stefan Schneele June 2006
DSN 2006 Workshop on Architecting Dependable Systems (WADS) - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
DSN 2006 Workshop on Architecting Dependable Systems (WADS) - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany DSN 2006 Workshop on Architecting Dependable Systems (WADS) Fault-tolerant Smart Sensor Architecture for Integrated Modular Avionics Stefan Schneele, Klaus Echtle, Josef Schalk June 27th, 2006 Page 1
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 2 Stefan Schneele June 2006
DECOS – Application Aerospace
SP6-Approach: Electronically Synchronized Flaps
A (time-triggered) bus system will be used between the flap panels instead
- f the mechanical shaft
A System Control Unit (SCU) has to control and monitor the time-triggered communication, instead of the Central Motor Unit For redundancy reason each flap panel will be powered by 2 Motors Cross Shaft Brake to hold system Development and usage of new, smart sensors, interfaces and gateways supporting TTA
Rotary Actuator Cross Shaft Cross Shaft Brake Load Zylinder Motor
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 3 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Application Aerospace - Work Share
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The Challenge
- Build a smart sensor that meets:
- Functional Requirements
– Reliable – Higher Resolution (90° ±0,1° ( 6 ‘) ) – New Single-Turn coverage – Built-In Test capability
- Project Requirements
– Use DECOS Tools & Methods – Integrate DECOS design approach – Use DECOS Hardware
- Industrial Requirements
– Efficient (costs, weight, size, Integration, complexity) – Airworthy
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 5 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Proof of Airworthiness I
- Reliability Modeling and Analysis of fault
tolerant Flap Control System based on the to be developed DECOS technology
– HW, SW and communication components – Fault tolerant structures: redundancies for fault diagnosis and reconfiguration purposes – Signal diversity for highly fault tolerant flap control system – Reliability analysis and evaluation of flap control system models based on different top events – Probabilities: top events satisfied / not satisfied – Degraded system states:
- ‘fail ^n -operational’ capabilities
- probabilities of degraded system states
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 6 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Proof of Airworthiness II
- Redundancy Management of fault tolerant
Flap Control System based on the to-be- developed DECOS technology
– Redundancy Management: Assessment of different reconfiguration processes based on a hybrid system model (reliability block diagram and finite state machine).
Identify benefits & risks of system evolution by using DECOS technology
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 7 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Safety Requirements
- The US Federal Aviation Regulations and the European Joint Aviation
Requirements provide detailed system safety regulations:
- degraded positioning rate of a specific control surface as consequence of one failed
channel.
- The second failure case of our interest is loss of operation of a specific control
surface as consequence of failures in both channels.
- fault regions SFRx:
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 8 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Evolution of System – Federated Architecture
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The Tool - Syrelan
- Developed by Dominick Rehage,
University Hamburg-Harbug
- Supports:
– Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) – Concurrent Finite State Machine (CFSM)
- For:
– Reliability Analysis – Degradation Analysis
CPIOM 3 CPIOM 4 CPIOM 1 CPIOM 2 CPIOM 5 CPIOM 6 Querruder Spoiler Höhenruder THS Seitenruder
CPIOM 1 P2 CPIOM 4 P4 CPIOM 3 P3 CPIOM 2 P1
1.00E-06 1.00E-04 aktiv aktiv aktiv aktiv- eiss h aktiv- eiss h
a h a a a h h h h h h h1.00E-06 1.00E-04 aktiv aktiv aktiv 1.00E-06 1.00E-04 aktiv aktiv passiv- alt k
a k a k kaktiv passiv-kalt 1.00E-06 1.00E-04 aktiv aktiv 1.00E-05 aktiv 1.00E-05 passiv-kalt 1.00E-05 passiv-kalt 1.00E-07 aktiv 1.00E-04 aktiv 1.00E-04 aktiv 2.10E-05 aktiv 2.10E-05 aktiv 1.00E-07 aktiv 1.00E-06 1.00E-04 passiv- alt k
a h a h kaktiv- eiss h aktiv 1.00E-04 isoliert 1.00E-06 isoliert
i i i a a a a a aisoliert
i i i i i a a a aaktiv-heiss
a a a a haktiv- eiss h 1.00E-04 isoliert
i i i i i i a a a1.00E-04 1.00E-05 isoliert 1.00E-05 aktiv aktiv-heiss
a a a a aaktiv 1.00E-04 aktiv isoliert isoliert 1.00E-06 isoliert 1.00E-04 aktiv isoliert isoliert 1.00E-04 aktiv
i a i a aaktiv isoliert
i i i i aisoliert 1.00E-04 isoliert isoliert 1.00E-04 isoliert 1.00E-05 isoliert 1.00E-05 aktiv aktiv 1.00E-04 aktiv isoliert aktiv isoliert 1.00E-06 isoliert 1.00E-04 aktiv isoliert isoliert 1.00E-04 aktiv isoliert isoliert isoliert 1.00E-04 isoliert 1.00E-05 isoliert 1.00E-07 isoliert 1.00E-04 isoliert 1.00E-04 isoliert 2.10E-05 isoliert 2.10E-05 isoliert 1.00E-07 isoliert
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 10 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Failure Modes of Conventional Sensor
- Failure Rates of components:
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 11 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Evolution of System – Integrated Architecture
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Design Rules for Smart Sensors – Common Cause Failures
Although the structural reliability numbers of smart sensors can meet the ones conventional systems
additional failure modes are introduced to the system
(COMPLEXITY).
Risk of common modes. For worst-case consideration, the β-Factor - representing
the chance of common cause failures in different channels – is set to 0.4.
Do not receive any data, very few numbers of operational modes suitable simple composition of components Everything should be made as simple as
possible, but not simpler.
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 13 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Smart Sensor - Components
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Position Pick-Off Unit – Software Design
- To achieve fail-safe behavior, usually failure masking with n-out-of-m failure masking
is used efficiency constraints
- The presented architecture can only provide two different values. Therefore an
approach is selected, which is based on an online selftest for failure detection.
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 15 Stefan Schneele June 2006
DECOS - Integrated Distributed Execution Platform
- Specification of Requirements and Design of:
Communication infrastructure taylored to a DAS (TT or ET) Core Services (DAS-Indep.) C1 Predictable Message Transport C2 Fault-Tolerant Clock Synchronization C3 Strong Fault Isolation C4 Consistent Diagnosis of Failing Nodes Hiding of implementation details from the application, thereby extending the range of implementation choices Time-Triggered Base Architecture Core Services for Interfacing the Time-Triggered (TT) Physical Netw ork
- f the Base Architecture
Communication infrastructure taylored to a DAS (TT or ET) High-Level Services (DAS-Specific)
...
Virtual Network Service Gateway Service
Safety-Critical Subsystem
Job Job Job Job
Non Safety-Critical Subsys
Job Job
Application Code
- App. MW (e.g., CAN)
PI Job Job
Encapsulated Execution
Environment
Virtual Communication Links
and Gateways
Platform Interface Layer
- DECOS = Dependable Embedded
Systems and Components
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 16 Stefan Schneele June 2006
DECOS - Methods and Tools
- Specification of the Platform
Independent Model (PIM)
– PIM Metamodel, – Design methodology
- Specification of the
Resource Layer
– Hardware specification model
- Software-Hardware
Integration
– Specification of PSM development tool
Platform Independent Model (PIM) Distributed Application Subsystem (DAS)
Integrated HW/SW System (PSM)
SYS Platform Interface (PI) Platform
DAS: Distributed Application Subsystem PIM: Platform Independent Model PSM: Platform Specific Model PI(L):Platform Interface
- Modeling Distributed Application Subsystems
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 17 Stefan Schneele June 2006
µ-Controller – single point of failure
- Modern µ-Controllers provide suitable operation life-time of
up
- to 20 years in controlled temperature racks.
- Concerning the use in extremely harsh environment with
high amplitude
- f temperature and pressure chances, we expect:
- Self-checks on power-on can be interpreted as frequent
maintenance intervals, making this failure rate plausible.
- This maintenance interval should be equal to the mission
time.
- Redundancy cause of efficiency constraints not a
suitable approach for smart sensing devices
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 18 Stefan Schneele June 2006
- Failure Rates of components:
Failure Modes of Smart Sensor - Hardware
More states because of Initialization
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 19 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Benefit of DECOS Technology
- For Reliability Analysis, Smart Sensor must fulfill:
– Fail-safe behavior – appearance as an atomic unit – No failure propagation Guaranteed by DECOS node design (to be proofed)
- Minimization of Design faults and handling of
complexity Addressed by Model based and Hardware Independent system design approach
- Partitioning in time and space domain
Addressed by Encapsulated Execution Environment and Time-Triggered Protocol
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 20 Stefan Schneele June 2006
Conclusion
- the novel DECOS architecture is applied to a
smart sensor design.
- The justification of the sensor concept was given
- n a structural level.
– sensor design meets the reliability constraints
- a remarkably small subset of components can
fulfill both efficiency and reliability constraints
- This concept is implemented in
real hardware, and evaluated on a realistic test- bench.
EADS Corporate Research Centre Germany Page 21 Stefan Schneele June 2006