Defending the Price Containment Reserve: Benefits and Options James - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Defending the Price Containment Reserve: Benefits and Options James - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Defending the Price Containment Reserve: Benefits and Options James Bushnell Emissions Market Assessment Committee (Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, And Frank Wolak) Benefits of Defending Containment Reserve Limits the possible price


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SLIDE 1

Defending the Price Containment Reserve: Benefits and Options

James Bushnell

Emissions Market Assessment Committee

(Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell, And Frank Wolak)

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SLIDE 2

Benefits of Defending Containment Reserve

  • Limits the possible price and economic impacts

from volatility in supply or demand

– Especially if abatement supply is very inelastic

  • Avoids possible market disruption if shortage
  • ccurs near end of market period (2020)
  • Eliminates price increase that incorporates low

probability of skyrocketing price

  • Eliminates incentive to push price above current

reserve levels through market manipulation

2

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SLIDE 3

Allowance Price Probabilities by Scenario

69% 67% 65% 82% 80% 76% 91% 89% 86% 3% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 12% 13% 10% 8% 8% 10% 5% 5% 4% 16% 17% 22% 9% 11% 13% 3% 5% 9% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

S1: Med Demand S2: 75th Demand S3: Max Demand S4: Med Demand S5: 75th Demand S6: Max Demand S7: Med Demand S8: 75th Demand S9: Max Demand

pr(flo

  • r )

pr(upslope) pr(inreserve) pr(abovereserve)

Low Abatement/Allowance Supply Medium Abatement/Allowance Supply High Abatement/Allowance Supply

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SLIDE 4

Cost Containment and Allocation

  • Allocations through output-based updating dilute

the impacts of allowance prices

– Reduce the responsiveness to allowance prices. – Can be acceptable side-effect for trade-exposed industries with options for reducing CO2 intensity. – Makes no sense for emissions related to end-use fuel consumption (e.g. gas).

  • Diluting incentives provided by allowance prices

is not true cost-containment.

– Can be counter-productive by making high allowance prices more likely and raising the economic costs of abatement.

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SLIDE 5

Principles for Price-Containment

  • Should be ex-ante transparent

– A deterrent only works if market knows it exists

  • Should be credible

– A hard quantity cap is not credible if the prices that result are unsustainable

  • Should be timely

– Measures need to kick in immediately to avert disruption

  • Should consider broad environmental benefits instead
  • f narrow ones

– Environmental integrity of global pollutant involves more than just capped CA (or WCI) emissions

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SLIDE 6

ARB Options

  • We believe there is a non-trivial possibility current reserve could be

exhausted

– Would not support the do nothing option

  • Delay or cancellation of compliance obligations would be disruptive

and harmful to the program

– Significant equity impacts on differing participants.

  • EMAC strongly prefers an option that substantially increases

availability of allowances – sufficient to credible contain the maximum price (or allows a fixed payment in lieu of permits).

– Could borrow from post 2020 period. – Proceeds could be applied to offsets, or other sources of GHG emissions. – Can provide a greater overall GHG reduction under those circumstances.

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SLIDE 7

Thank you