Defending Against Malicious Socialbots Position Paper Yazan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Defending Against Malicious Socialbots Position Paper Yazan - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Key Challenges in Defending Against Malicious Socialbots Position Paper Yazan Boshmaf, Ildar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering (LERSSE) Networked Systems


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Laboratory for Education and Research in Secure Systems Engineering (LERSSE) Networked Systems Laboratory (NetSysLab) Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering

Key Challenges in Defending Against Malicious Socialbots

Yazan Boshmaf, Ildar Muslukhov, Konstantin Beznosov, Matei Ripeanu

Position Paper

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Outline

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Problem Motivation Socialbots OSN Security Challenges

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Problem Motivation

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Reaching Out to Millions

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(Source: Jose Vargas, Voices on The Washington Post, November, 2008)

Obama Raised Half a Billion Online in 2008

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Mobilizing the Masses

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Photo credit: Peter Macdiarmid, Getty Images Photo credit: Steve Crisp, Reuters

The Arab Spring, January 2011 - Now

Salem et al. Civil movements: The impact of Facebook and Twitter. The Arab Social Media Report, 2011

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Predicting the Future: Elections

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%

YouGov Tweetminster Actual

Conservative Lib Dem Labour

Twitter elections predictions (Tweetminster) outperform market research (YouGov)

(Source: Jemima Koss, The Guardian, May 2010)

2010 UK General Elections

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Predicting the Future: Markets

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Twitter mood (Calm) predicts Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)

Bollen et al. Twitter mood predicts the stock market. J. Comp. Sc. March, 2011.

Day-to-day Overlap Calm lagged by 3 days

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Socialbots

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Bots and Socialbots

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Automation software (to pass off as human) Social media account

Socialbot

Computer program used to perform highly repetitive operations (AI?)

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Rise of the Socialbots

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The Web Ecology Project (Social Engineering), 2011 Zack Coburn and Greg Marra, Olin College, 2010

ACM Interactions Magazine Cover Story, April 2012

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Misusing Socialbots on a Large Scale?

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Infiltration Misinformation Data collection

An automated social engineering tool for:

Boshmaf et al. The Socialbot Network: When Bots Socialize for Fame and Money. ACSAC’11

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OSN Security

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Tolerate Socialbots

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Adversarial Machine Learning

classifications classifiers influence

profit first specific

erfit superficial

Attacker Detects Defender Responds Begin Attack Initial Detection Attacker Controls Defender Controls Attack Detect Defense Mutate

classifier indefinitely

filter filtering,

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Stein et al., The Facebook Immune System, EuroSys – SNS, 2011

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Graph-theoretic Defense Techniques

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Honest region Sybil region Attack edges

Sybil detection via social networks1 With adversary running large-scale infiltration2

Honest node

1 Haifeng Yu. Sybil Defenses via Social Networks: A Tutorial and Survey. ACM SIGACT News’11 2 Boshmaf et al. The Socialbot Network: When Bots Socialize for Fame and Money. ACSAC’11

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Prevent Socialbots

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Observation: It’s all about automation Prevent it and the socialbot threat will go away (almost surely) Not an easy job!

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Challenges

Solve at least one

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OSN Vulnerabilities: Ineffective CAPTCHAs

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Koobface Botnet CAPTCHA-solving businesses

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#1

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Design a reverse Turing test that is usable and effective even against “illegitimate” human solvers

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How about Social Authentication?

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Use “personal” social knowledge to challenge users

Kim et al. Social authentication: Harder than it looks. FC’12

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OSN Vulnerabilities: Fake (Sybil) User Accounts and Profiles

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#2

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Guarantee an anonymous, yet credible,

  • nline-offline identity binding in online and
  • pen-access systems
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How can we deal with Sybils?

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Centralized trusted authority Tie identities to resources Use external information

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OSN Vulnerabilities: Large-Scale Network Crawls

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#3

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Effectively limit large-scale Sybil crawls of OSNs without restricting users’ social experience.

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How about using a credit network?

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Small edge cut

Assumption #1 Assumption #2

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OSN Vulnerabilities: Exploitable Platforms and APIs

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#4

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Detect abusive and automated usage of OSN platforms and their social APIs across the Internet

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OSN Vulnerabilities: Poorly Designed Privacy/Security Controls

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#5

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Develop usable OSN security and privacy controls that help users make more informed decisions

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Take-home message(s)

  • Large-scale infiltration is feasible

– has serious privacy and security implications

  • Socialbots make it difficult for OSN security

defenses and their users to detect their true nature

– defending against such bots raises a set of unique challenges

  • Effective, socio-technical defenses less

vulnerable to both human and technical exploits are needed

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Yazan Boshmaf Ildar Muslukhov Konstantin Beznosov Matei Ripeanu

Key Challenges in Defending Against Malicious Socialbots

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