Deconstructing Monetary Policy Surprises - The Role of Information - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Deconstructing Monetary Policy Surprises - The Role of Information - - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Deconstructing Monetary Policy Surprises - The Role of Information Shocks Marek Jaroci nski and Peter Karadi European Central Bank FRBNZ Macro-Finance Conference, December 2018 The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do
What we do?
- We study how financial markets react to central bank policy an-
nouncements, within the first half-hour. We separate the effects of – news about monetary policy and – news about the central bank’s outlook on the economy.
- We track the response of the economy, in the US and the euro area,
using a vector autoregression (VAR).
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What we find
- Market reactions reflect both news about monetary policy and news
about the economy. Variance shares: US: 65:35, EA: 55:45.
- The responses of the economy are very different.
Surprise interest rates increases are ...
- contractionary (output, prices decline) when reflecting news about
monetary policy (monetary policy shock),
- expansionary (output, prices increase) when reflecting news about
the economy (central bank information shock).
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Implications
- 1. Private agents learn something about the economy (not just about
monetary policy) from central bank annoucements.
- 2. These news about the economy attenuate the standard estimates of
monetary policy effects.
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Plan of the presentation
- Key data
- Selected literature
- VAR, Identification, IRFs
- A structural DSGE interpretation
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Key data: “surprises” p - price of a financial asset τ - time of a central bank announcement surprise: m = p(τ + 20min) − p(τ − 10min) We compute m for
- interest rate derivatives (US: fed funds futures, Euro area:
Eonia swaps). These instruments include also near term forward guidance.
- stock prices (US: S&P500, Euro area: EuroStoxx50)
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Motivating example: FOMC announcement on March 20, 2001, 2:15pm For immediate release The Federal Open Market Committee at its meeting today decided to lower its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 5 percent. (...) [The Committee’s analysis] (...) suggests substantial risks that demand and production could remain soft. → fed funds futures and stock prices both drop between 2:05pm and 2:35pm
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Expected effect on stock prices
- Textbook asset pricing: A monetary policy surprise → negative co-
movement between interest rates and stock markets
- lower fed funds rate:
→ lower credit costs, higher demand → higher future dividends → lower discount rate ⇒ present discounted value of dividends goes up = stock price goes up
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An empirical observation Stock prices do not always go up after a surprise interest rate cut.
- noise?
- information
about the economy in the central bank announcement?
Surprise in the 3m FF futures
- 0.3
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 0.3
Surprise in the S&P500
- 1
1 2 3 4 I: 17 II: 66 III: 41 IV: 50 3/20/2001
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An empirical observation Stock prices do not always go up after a surprise interest rate cut.
- noise?
- information
about the economy in the central bank announcement?
Surprise in the 3m FF futures
- 0.3
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 0.3
Surprise in the S&P500
- 1
1 2 3 4 Monetary Policy shock CB Information shock
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Further investigation
- We separate the shock that makes interest rates and stock prices co-
move negatively (as they should after Mon.Pol. shock) from the shock that makes them co-move positively.
- We use a Structural VAR with a mix of high-frequency identification
and sign restrictions.
- We study how the economy responds.
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Selected literature
- Interest rate surprise ≈ monetary policy shock: Kuttner, 2001; G¨
urkaynak, Sack, Swanson, 2005; Barakchian, Crowe, 2013; Gertler, Karadi, 2015 → we add the central bank information shock
- Measurement of CB information shocks: Campbell et.al., 2016; Miranda-
Agrippino, 2016; Lakdawala, Schaffer, 2016 – use Fed private info; Hansen and McMahon, 2016 – textual analysis of statements → we use the markets as Andrade, Ferroni, 2016, Cie´ slak, Shrimpf, 2018, Kerssenfischer, 2018
- Models of the information channel of monetary policy: Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2018 QJE; Melosi, 2017 REStud → we add communication policy, use VAR for estimation
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Monthly VAR - data (US)
- 7 × 1 vector
- mt
yt
- where
– mt (2 × 1): interest rate and stock price surprises that occurred in month t source: updated G¨ urkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) dataset – yt (5 × 1): standard macroeconomic and financial variables in month t → government bond yields, S&P500, real GDP and GDP deflator (interpolated using Kalman filter, Stock and Watson 2010), Ex- cess bond premium (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012)
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VAR with surprises – restriction mt - surprises (monthly), yt - macroeconomic variables (monthly) mt are i.i.d.:
- mt
yt
- =
P
- p=1
- Bp
Y M
Bp
Y Y
mt−p yt−p
- +
- cy
- +
- um
t
uy
t
- Bayesian estimation with a Minnesota prior on the nonzero parameters
- Within the Gibbs sampler we also draw the missing observations on
mt
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Our identification (Restrictions on the impact responses)
shock variable Monetary policy CB information
- ther
(negative co-movement) (positive co-movement) Interest rate surprise (m1
t)
+ + Stock price surprise (m2
t)
– + All other variables (yt)
- Two surprises: interest surprise and stock price surprise
- Zero restrictions: other shocks are unlikely to occur systematically in
the narrow time window around the announcements
- Sign restriction on the co-movement of surprises
- No restrictions on yt
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Sign restrictions
- mt is decomposed into two orthogonal shocks (MP,CBI)
- Set identification: uniform prior on rotations, provided that they are
consistent with sign restrictions. Robustness check: ‘poor man’s sign restrictions’
- Quadrants II and IV: MP shocks; quadrants I and III: CBI shocks
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For comparison: Standard high-frequency identification (HFI)
shock variable Interest rate surprise
- ther
Interest rate surprise (m1
t)
+ All other variables (yt)
- Single surprise: interest rate
- Zero restrictions: other shocks are unlikely to occur systematically in
the narrow time window around the announcements
- Interest rate surprise ≈ monetary policy shock.
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United States impulse responses
- A. Standard HFI
Interest rate surprise
10 20 30 0.05
surprise in 3m ff futures
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y gov bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
months
United States impulse responses
- A. Standard HFI
- B. Sign restrictions
Interest rate surprise
Monetary Policy CB information (negative correlation) (positive correlation)
10 20 30 0.05
surprise in 3m ff futures
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y gov bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30 0.05
surprise in 3m ff futures
10 20 30 0.05 10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2 0.4
surprise in S&P500
10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2 0.4 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y gov bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1 10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
months months months
United States impulse responses - zooming in on yt
- A. Standard HFI
- B. Sign restrictions
Interest rate surprise
Monetary Policy CB information (negative correlation) (positive correlation)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y gov bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y gov bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1 10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
months months months
United States: shocks over time
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
- 35
- 30
- 25
- 20
- 15
- 10
- 5
5 10 15
Monetary Policy (sign restrictions) Central Bank Information (sign restrictions)
- Every month different mix of policy and information shock
- Both shocks occur throughout the sample.
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Euro area results We have created a dataset of ECB announcement surprises. 284 ECB policy announce- ments from 1999 to 2016. press release + press confer- ence. VAR results similar to the US
Surprise in the 3m Eonia swaps
- 0.3
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 0.3
Surprise in the Euro Stoxx 50
- 3
- 2
- 1
1 2 I: 61 II: 57 III: 68 IV: 85
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Euro area: IRFs
(More information shocks in the mix) Interest rate surprise
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
1y Bund yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
2
STOXX50 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.5
0.5
BBB bond spread (%)
months months months
Euro area: IRFs
(More information shocks in the mix) Interest rate surprise Monetary Policy CB information (poor man’s s.r.) (poor man’s s.r.)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
1y Bund yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
2
STOXX50 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.5
0.5
BBB bond spread (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
1y Bund yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 2
2
STOXX50 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
2 10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.5
0.5
BBB bond spread (%)
10 20 30
- 0.5
0.5
months months months
A structural interpretation
- ... through the lenses of a standard DSGE model with financial fric-
tions Gertler-Karadi, 2011, 2013). We match impulse responses.
- To explain real effects of monetary policy shocks
– Nominal frictions less important – Financial frictions more important in our identification vs. the standard HFI identification.
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Why does the economy respond to the CB information shock? Alternative stories behind the IRFs
- Central banks have superior information on fundamentals (Romer and
Romer 2000). This information would have become apparent anyway, central bank merely reveals it a bit earlier. Announcements predict the trajectory of the economy. → Nakamura and Steinsson (2018)
- Self-fulfilling announcements (unexplored). Confidence; strategic com-
- plementarities. Public signal, even imprecise, affects the equilibrium.
Announcements cause the trajectory of the economy.
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Conclusions
- We partition interest rate surprises into two components:
– monetary policy shock - an interest rate increase followed by a contraction, – central bank information shock - an interest rate increase followed by an expansion.
- Lessons
– Stronger effects of monetary policy on the economy (we purge the attenuation bias from the information effects) – Central bank information is relevant. We don’t know if it causes
- r merely predicts the trajectory of the economy.
24/24
Additional slides
25/24
Refining the information shocks We add daily change in inflation compensation to high-frequency variables
shock variable Monetary Central Bank Central Bank Policy Demand Supply all mt (high frequency) interest rate + + + stock index – + – inflation compensation – + + yt (low frequency) . . .
- 26/24
Refining the information shocks: results
Monetary Policy CB demand CB supply
20
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y govt. bond yield (%)
20
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 20
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 20
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
20
- 2
- 1
1 20
- 2
- 1
1 20
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
20
- 0.2
0.2 20
- 0.2
0.2 20
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
20
- 0.1
0.1 20
- 0.1
0.1 20
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
20
- 0.05
0.05 20
- 0.05
0.05
Relaxing the zero restrictions - almost the same with zero restrictions on B without zero restrictions on B
10 20 30 0.05
surprise in 3m ff futures
10 20 30 0.05 10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2 0.4
surprise in S&P500
10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2 0.4 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 0.1
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 0.1 10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1 10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 10 20 30 0.02 0.04
surprise in 3m ff futures
10 20 30 0.02 0.04 10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2 0.4
surprise in S&P500
10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2 0.4 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 0.1
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 0.1 10 20 30
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 1
1 10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.08
- 0.06
- 0.04
- 0.02
0.02 0.04
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.08
- 0.06
- 0.04
- 0.02
0.02 0.04 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
US VAR: Robust error bands (Giacomini-Kitagawa, 2015)
Monetary policy CB information (negative co-movement) (positive co-movement)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 10 20 30
- 2
2
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
2 10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
months months
US VAR: 2-year rate as instrument
- A. Standard HFI
- B. Sign restrictions
2-year interest rate surprise Monetary policy CB information (negative co-movement) (positive co-movement)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 0.1
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 1
- 0.5
0.5
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30 0.02 0.04
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1 10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
0.05
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
0.05 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
months months months
US VAR: sample until December 2006
- A. Standard HFI
- B. Sign restrictions
interest rate surprise Monetary policy CB information (negative co-movement) (positive co-movement)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y gov bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.02
0.02 0.04 0.06
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2 10 20 30
- 2
- 1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
0.05
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
0.05 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
months months months
US: the GSS decomposition is different from ours
- A. Standard HFI
- C. GSS(2005)
Interest rate surprise
Target factor Path factor
10 20 30 0.1 0.2
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 1.5
- 1
- 0.5
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30 0.02 0.04
EBP (%)
10 20 30 0.1 0.2
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30 0.1 0.2 10 20 30
- 1.5
- 1
- 0.5
0.5
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 1.5
- 1
- 0.5
0.5 10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
10 20 30
- 0.02
0.02 0.04
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.02
0.02 0.04
months months months
US VAR with IP and CPI standard HFI sign restrictions
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 0.2
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.6
- 0.4
- 0.2
- Ind. Prod.
(100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
CPI (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30 0.1 0.2
1y govt. bond yield (%)
10 20 30 0.1 0.2 10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1
S&P500 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
- 1
1 10 20 30
- 0.6
- 0.4
- 0.2
- Ind. Prod.
(100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.6
- 0.4
- 0.2
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
CPI (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
EBP (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
US VAR: Responses of expectations
- A. Standard HFI
- B. Sign restrictions
Monetary Policy
Monetary Policy CB information (negative correlation) (positive correlation)
10 20 30
Expected GDP growth (%)
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
Expected GDP growth (%)
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
Expected inflation (%)
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
Expected inflation (%)
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
5y break-even inflation rate (%)
- 0.1
- 0.05
0.05 10 20 30
5y break-even inflation rate (%)
- 0.1
- 0.05
0.05 10 20 30
- 0.1
- 0.05
0.05
months months months
- Positive impact of GDP-growth expectations in standard HFI
is due to information channel (as in Nakamura, Steinsson, 2018)
- Delayed adjustment (Coibion, Gorodnichenko, 2012)
Euro area VAR: IRFs
(More information shocks in the mix) Interest rate surprise Monetary Policy CB information (sign restr.) (sign restr.)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
1y Bund yield (%)
10 20 30
- 2
2
STOXX50 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.5
0.5
BBB bond spread (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
1y Bund yield (%)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 2
2
STOXX50 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 2
2 10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
Real GDP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
GDP deflator (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.5
0.5
BBB bond spread (%)
10 20 30
- 0.5
0.5
months months months
Euro area VAR with IP and HICP
Interest rate surprise Monetary Policy CB information (sign restr.) (sign restr.)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05
1y govt. bond yield DE (%)
10 20 30
- 1
1 2
STOXX50 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2
IP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.15
- 0.1
- 0.05
HICP
10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2
BBB bond spread (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 0.1
1y govt. bond yield DE (%)
10 20 30
- 0.05
0.05 0.1 10 20 30
- 1
1 2
STOXX50 (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 1
1 2 10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2 0.4
IP (100 x log)
10 20 30
- 0.2
0.2 0.4 10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1
HICP
10 20 30
- 0.1
0.1 10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2
BBB bond spread (%)
10 20 30
- 0.4
- 0.2
0.2
months months months
Euro area: shocks over time
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
- 30
- 25
- 20
- 15
- 10
- 5
5 10 15
Monetary Policy (sign restrictions) Central Bank Information (sign restrictions)
- August 2011: no IR change; “particularly high” uncertainty
- July 2012: IR cut, because “downside risks have materialized”
- October 1999: Millenium bug
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Construction of high-frequency surprises for the 3-month Eonia swap
4.5 4.55 4.6 4.65 4.7 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 Bid Price Ask Price midquote
EUREON3M 2001-05-10
.8 .85 .9 .95 1 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 Bid Price Ask Price midquote
EUREON3M 2011-03-03
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